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of a
RICHARD LOWITT
Tins first detailed biography of Morris traces the
great liberal's Me, views, and political develop
ment to his entrance into the U.S. Senate in
1913. In examining the metamorphosis of a rising

young lawyer with mortgage interests into a
leader of the Progressive movement, the book
gives a thorough account of the political growth
and maturing of a man who became one of the
foremost legislators in American history.
The early chapters draw a vivid picture of
Norris' boyhood on an Ohio farm in a staunchly
Republican family, his life during college and
law school days, and his young adulthood as a
lawyer and businessman in Nebraska, the state
with which he is identified. After serving as judge
of the district court, Norris was elected to the
House of Representatives, where he spent five

vigorous terms.

These were the years of Norris* insurgency
from regular Republican ranks in Congress to
lead the fight against Speaker Joe Cannon's iron
control of the rules of the House, a battle which
Norris finally won in 1910 and which brought him
national acclaim. They 'were the years of Norris*
maturing as a progressive in politics, from his
early support of Roosevelt's legislative program,
to the Progressive
less

Republican League, to his

tire

championing of progressive candidates in the

dramatic 1912 presidential election.
Norris brought to the political scene a rare
quality the stubborn belief that principle is
more important than expediency, the individual
of more value than property, and integrity the
best guide for behavior in any activity includ
ing politics. The events of the legislator's early
career, as well as the shaping pf the views which
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Preface

is MY PURPOSE in the
following pages to relate in some detail the
career through 1912 of one of the more remarkable political person
alities in American history.
George W. Norris was an unobtrusive man.

IT

He

did not attract attention because of the power of his personality,
demagoguery, control of a machine, or position as spokes
man for a particular point of view or powerful vested interest. Yet he
was a commanding figure in both houses of the Congress and in his
home state of Nebraska.
While some individuals command attention because they rise
his oratory,

backgrounds to positions of political prominence, and
from privileged backgrounds, seek to understand the problems
and viewpoints of their constituents, Norris fitted neither pattern. Like
Lincoln he was an uncommon common man. He chose the simple and
the unpretentious, and was more at home in the parlor than in the
drawing room. He preferred small town America; Main Street was
always more attractive than Connecticut or Fifth Avenue. Yet he could
understand and sympathize with the common man whether he lived
on a windswept Nebraska farm, in Beaver City or McCook, Nebraska,
or in the slum sections of Omaha. America to him was Nebraska writ
large. And when he examined the world beyond the United States, his
angle of vision remained the same. He believed that people were
primary, that property rights, while important, were never superior to
personal liberties, and that a high sense of moral values should charac

above

their

others,

men in government, business, or any other area of
endeavor. His outlook could be summed up in the classic
advice of a homesteader to his children: "Tell the truth, stay out of

terize the behavior of

human

debt, don't be afraid of work, and remember when you pray that God
helps those that help themselves." In the context of American thought,
such views automatically classified Norris as a nineteenth-century
liberal in the Jeffersonian tradition. And indeed he was, though he
never read Jefferson or placed Jefferson, let alone Lincoln, among his

patron

saints.

IX
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But Norris was

also

He was one
history. He was

something more.

of the best

fortunate in

parliamentarians in American political
that his sparse small town education, while somewhat scanty in cul
tural content, stressed rhetoric and debate. From his earliest years in
school he was continually exposed to parliamentary procedure, the
"Uncle Joe"
knowledge which in later years enabled him to defeat
remarkable
the
achieve
and
Shoals
Muscles
the
win
Cannon,
fight,

made him one of the most useful legislators in American
That
he did all of these things almost singlehandedly is ex
history.
in
an age when party organization, machine rule, and
traordinary
increased
pressure politics were expanding their influence and causing
and
scholarly scrutiny.
public
As he came to political maturity the welfare state was being
central
forged. Norris was not interested in building the power of the
if
se.
But
was
in
any way extorting undue
government per
privilege
the neighborly folks,
were
from
to
Norris,
(and
profits
people
people,
not necessarily native-born Americans, he knew in Beaver City and
McCook), he would not hesitate to use federal power to curb or super
sede it. Moreover, his small town background helped him to under
stand that the Industrial Revolution, with which he never came in
direct contact, had created a national economy and that only central
ized authority could cope with it. The railroad, the mortgage loan busi
ness, and the land speculation of his environment made him aware
that people's lives could be vitally affected by factors and forces in

record which

other parts of the state or nation,
regional in character.

As a

by problems not primarily

local or

though a stalwart Republican in his
he
and
younger days,
quickly
naturally fell in step with the policies of
Theodore Roosevelt, who was president when Norris reached Wash
ington, D.C. His career in Nebraska during the Populist revolt had
paved the way for his insurgency and later progressivism. He was not
an intellectual. He was not given to philosophizing about political
theory or the role of government. He was not one to absorb political
political personality,

history or the biographies of prominent Americans.
History for George Norris began with the Civil War,

the
into

which claimed

only brother, and continued on through the New Deal
War II. It paralleled his life span and served as his frame

life of his

World

of reference. Rooted in nineteenth-century values and traditions, he
played a role in meeting most of the challenges of the first half of the

twentieth century.
matist.
effect

He met

And

like

most American liberals, he was a pragand was concerned with their

issues as they arose

on people everywhere.

If

curbing privilege meant increasing the
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power of the federal government, he would support such measures. If
it meant government supervision, development, or control of natural
resources in the interests of all the people, he would favor this as well.
In this book I have tried to present, chiefly from manuscript and
other primary sources, a biography that will do justice to the man. To
understand the career of a political personality who was a master of
careful attention to detail to parlia
legislative process necessitates
bills and amendments to bills, to particular
to
mentary procedure,
clauses in

bills,

of Congress. I

in short, to the daily routine of a
tried to force any pattern upon

to debate

have not

my

member
subject.

Rather, I have tried to write concretely, to pay attention to significant
details, to record observations, and to avoid excessive generalizing.
Many generalizations relevant to recent American history are not based
on adequate primary research and consequently are continually being
revised or rejected. More valid ones, I think, will emerge after nu
merous studies in depth, such as that attempted in this volume, have
been made.
When I began this biography I had few preconceived notions about

George

Norris.

Working through the huge

collection of his papers in

the Library of Congress, processing a segment of them for the Manu
other relevant collections, reading the
scripts Division, examining
and
Record,
doing all the other research such a study
Congressional
entails convinced me that I was fortunate in my continual contact

with the career of an admirable person who was also one of the great
men of our recent history. This volume studies Norris' career through
the campaign of 1912 which witnessed his election to the United States
Senate. In a concluding volume I intend to complete his biography.

RICHARD LOWITT

New London, Connecticut
March, 1963
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Gentlemen,

Certainly,

it

ought to be the happiness and

glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest

correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with
his constituents.

Their wishes ought to have great weight with

him; their opinions high respect; their business unremitted at
tention. It

is

his

duty to

factions, to theirs,

their interest to his

sacrifice his

and above

all,

repose, his pleasure, his satis

ever,

and

in all cases, to
prefer

own.

But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his enlight
ened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to
any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure,
no, nor from the law and the Constitution. They are a trust from
Providence, for the abuse of which he
representative

owes you, not

deeply answerable. Your

is

his industry only,

and he betrays, instead of serving you,

if

he

but

his

judgement;

sacrifices it to

your

opinion.

From

the Speech to the Electors of Bristol

November 3, 1774
by EDMUND BUBKE

Chapter 1

In the Beginning

YOBK TOWNSHIP, Sandusky County, Ohio, about three and a half miles
east of Clyde, which was Sherwood Anderson's prototype of small
towns in the Middle West, was the birthplace of George W. Norris
on July 11, 1861. On the western fringe of the Western Reserve and
on the eastern border of the "Black Swamp" area, Sandusky County
as part of northwestern Ohio comprised the last frontier area in the
state.

Immigrants started penetrating and transforming it during the
decade of the 1820*s. Many were en route to lands in Illinois, Indiana,
and southern Michigan; others settled, despite agues and fevers, in
this level and wet region. The extreme northwestern corner of Ohio
1
had, by the census of 1830, a population of three thousand. While
the original settlers had come chiefly from New York out of New
England, during the 1830's others from Pennsylvania and southern
Ohio were arriving along with Germans who had in the 1820's settled
along the Sandusky River in Seneca County, due south of Sandusky
County.

The area in which Norris was born was inhabited largely by
Pennsylvania Dutch farmers. At the time of his parents* arrival in
1846, northwest Ohio was rapidly emerging from the pioneer stage but
it still retained and reflected the
simpler social and economic condi
tions associated with the frontier.
Sandusky County was primarily a wheat area; during the Civil War
produced from two to five hundred thousand bushels of
was also a vegetable and orchard district, and Clyde be
came a milling and later a canning center. Sherwood Anderson, who
lived there some twenty years later, succinctly summed up its agricul
tural experience: "The soil on the farms about the town was a light
sandy loam that would raise small fruits, corn, wheat, oats or potatoes,
but that did particularly well when planted to cabbages." 3 Cabbages,
which provided a staple for many a poor farm family and which be
came a major crop during Anderson's childhood, were not known to
years

it

wheat. 2

It

GEORGE W. NORRIS
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many

of the earlier farmers. Stands of timber

were numerous and

in

cluded beech, oak, and walnut.
the

Into this agricultural area moved the parents of George Norris in
summer of 1846. They had been married on Christmas day, 1838,

Monroe County, New York. Chauncey Norris was thirty-one years
of age at the time of Bis marriage and had lived most of his life in
4
nearby Cayuga County. His bride, Mary Magdalene Mook, a Penn
in

Dutch girl of twenty, is supposed to have met Chauncey at
a house-raising ceremony. The couple started their Me together on a
farm in Monroe County. In 1846, at the time of their departure for
sylvania

Ohio, they lived in Batavia,

New York,

with a family of four children.

The youngest child, a month-old daughter, died shortly before
Chauncey loaded family and furniture into a wagon and headed west
to join his wife's brothers as a farmer in Sandusky County.
cleared the
Chauncey succeeded on his York Township farm.

He

stumps, and

He

trees,
planted crops of wheat, corn and
fruit
with
and
built a modest but substantial
trees,
vegetables, along

land of

rocks.

5
standing today, And Chauncey and Mary Norris increased
the size of their family in Ohio. Twelve children were born of this

home,

still

marriage: two died, Elizabeth just before they left New York for Ohio,
and Ida, less than three years old and the last child in the family, in
1867. Eight children were born in Ohio; besides Willie as
George
William was called by his parents the only other male child was the
eldest, John Henry, born in 1839. In July of 1861 when Willie was
born, his father was fifty-four and his mother forty-three. His two

were already married.
the
During
early years of Willie's life, the Civil War raged. The
of
Ohio
were bitterly divided over the issues involved. Sanpeople
eldest sisters

dusky County, in almost every major election throughout the nine
its votes to Democratic candidates,
though not by

teenth century, gave
6

Most of the farmers in the township the Norris
were Republicans. 7 While there were antislavery and
abolitionist families in the county, they did not dominate, nor was
there overwhelming Unionist sentiment manifested when war was de
clared. The Norris family
certainly were antislavery in their views,
and the nearby city of Sandusky was a terminal point for the Under
large majorities.

family included

ground Railroad.

The county, despite opposition to the Civil War, contributed its
share of soldiers. Among over twenty-three hundred men who en
was John Henry Norris. At the outset of the struggle, he had
promised his mother that he would not volunteer. However, in Janulisted

IN
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promise and joined the Fifty-fifth Ohio Volun
Fifty-fifth Ohio had participated in some major
in
Tennessee
in the autumn and winter of 1863 at Mis
engagements
and
in
the
Knoxville
sionary Ridge
campaign immediately afterward.
It enjoyed a brief furlough in Ohio in January and February of 1864,
when John Henry enlisted. In the spring the regiment participated in
ary, 1864,

he broke

teer Infantry.

his

The

the "March to the Sea." At the battle of Resaca, Georgia, in mid-May,
John Henry suffered seemingly inconsequential wounds in the right
hip and

left thigh.

Within a fortnight he was dead at the age of

8

twenty-five.

Thus the tragedy of war struck the family. Before the year 1864
was over, however, an even greater blow was inflicted upon the
family circle. Chauncey Norris, on December 1, 1864, contracted
pneumonia, and before the week ended, he was dead and buried in
the little community cemetery, with neighbors, Mary Norris' kin, and
his family as mourners. Norris later wrote this description of the family
situation at that time: "Three of the girls had married and had estab

homes of

their own. Six sisters
Henrietta, Mary Adelaide,
Erie
and
Clara
and I remained with my
Elizabeth,
Ann, Emma,
mother on that cold and bleak December day when my father was
9
buried, to share the heritage of the Ohio farm." Within a year Willie
Norris, age three and a half, found himself the only man left in the

lished

family.

Mary Mook

Norris, age forty-six,

now became

children the heart and soul of the family. There

for her .younger

was an eighty-acre

be maintained and Mary, although pregnant with her last
this task along with her household duties. She was a
assumed
child,
she
loving, anxious, and above all a hard-working mother. Although
had no spare time to herself, she made some available to her children,
receive an education. The family's lot was not an
insisting that they
was not only the center of the home, but she
Norris
one.
Mary
easy
her
son home itself. She made almost every piece
for
became
quickly
of clothing worn by any member of the family. At harvest time she
would take her place in the field. "Her hair was unstreaked; she walked
erect"; her son could never remember a song upon her lips, nor ever
10
Her sensitive, rather melancholy tempera
recall her humming a tune.
little
ment became a part of the
boy which he retained for the rest of

farm

to

his life.

Norris, while providing little intellectual or cultural stimula
tion for her children, did much to mold their moral and social values.

Mary

Her concern

for the

in
poor and their problems was later reflected

GEORGE W. NORRIS
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her son's concern with problems of social justice. Her interests were
neither selfish nor limited to the present, and she passed on to her
children a feeling for the importance of planning for the future. 11
Though she was not a church member, she raised her children be

and righteousness of the Lord. She
read the Bible aloud on Sunday afternoons to her children. It was
probably at this time the only book in the home. She believed the
Bible literally and frowned upon dancing and card playing for many
years. Indeed, her son never attended a dance until after he left home.
He was not duly impressed with the Gospel teachings he heard at
home or at the church services and occasional revivals he attended.
He was disturbed and confused over matters of church and religion
which he later resolved, like his mother, by not joining any church
and, unlike her, by reading volumes which stressed science as op
posed to supernaturalism, such as John William Draper's History of the

lieving in the absolute goodness

Conflict

between Religion and Science. 12

Even by prevailing standards the Norris family was poor. Cash on
hand was always very meager and the family was a large one. But
nobody was rich there or then; they lived in the simple abundance of
that time and place, and did not consider themselves poor. In
July,
1867, less than three years after her husband's death, Mary Mook
Norris married a neighbor, Isaac Parker, whom her son later charac
terized as "an elderly, quiet Pennsylvanian of Dutch blood, and an

expert wood-worker." Now the family circle was again complete, and
part of the burden was removed from the mother's shoulders. Little is

known

of this marriage, except that after twenty-five years

it

ended

in divorce. 13 Norris barely mentions the
marriage itself in his auto
but
devotes
to
his schooling, labors, and
biography,
many pages
while
at
home
after
his
mother's
second marriage.
pleasures

Young Will Norris very quickly assumed his place in the fields, and
took pride and pleasure in the work. He
developed into a sturdy
and
he
the
was
"favorite"
of his mother and his
youngster,
though
older sisters, there was too

much work

to

be done

for

him

to

be

coddled in any noticeable way. Every summer during his school
years
while living at home he worked as a farm hand either on the
family
farm or on neighboring ones. Long before
reaching maturity he was
able to do a man's work, having
early acquired the strength and
ability to perform the most difficult of farm chores. He also became
an expert marksman in a place where squirrel
hunting was considered
a supreme sport.

The family farm was already well stocked with
peach, and cherry, yet his mother one

warm

fruit trees:
apple,
spring afternoon called

IN
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him

to assist her in planting another. Will could not understand why
mother toiled to plant a tree when there were seemingly enough
trees on the farm and when it probably would bear fruit only after
her death. His mother's remark that somebody would see the tree
blossom and enjoy the fruit impressed her son. Here was planning and
his

concern for future generations. 14
Will Norris attended the Mount Carmel district school, a mile and
one-half from the farm house. He enjoyed school and studied almost
every evening by candle light. He remembered his teachers with
gratitude and corresponded with some of them in later years. And it
was in the classroom that he was introduced to two subjects which
would stand him in good stead later on oratory and parliamentary
procedure. From that time on, while pursuing his education, Norris

was always
ability and

active in the debating society, furthering his forensic
same time increasing his knowledge and under

at the

standing of parliamentary procedure.
During his years at the district school, Norris became interested in
the law and in politics. He saw cases tried in the courtroom in Clyde
and, enjoying this experience immensely, decided he wanted to become
a lawyer. Colonel J. H. Rhodes, a local attorney, may have influenced

and helped to develop his interest in Republican politics.
Will was an ardent supporter of President Hayes, and had followed
the entire 1876 campaign through the pages of the Cincinnati Times.
By devious means he had managed to get to Fremont, the county
his decision

hear Hayes
and
bands,
oratory
seat, to

deliver his acceptance speech. The rallies, parades,
15
all aroused his intense partisanship.

and George Norris appeared in
Baldwin
between
the
had
attended
Norris
University
University. John Henry
1858 and 1860. Baldwin advertised itself as an institution "within the
reach of the poor young man and young woman." 16 This fact, plus its
relatively short distance from home, must have provided an additional
In the

fall

of 1877

Emma,

Clara,

Berea, Ohio, to enroll as students at Methodist-sponsored

impetus to Mary Norris in agreeing to

let

her children attend.

The

school was in dire financial difficulties and its campus was not a
mathe
particularly impressive one. Its president, Dr. Aaron Schuyler,
matician and writer of textbooks > was an able scholar and wrote the

algebra text through which Will Norris struggled.

The

student body

academic year 1877-78 numbered 241. Mary Norris would have
been delighted to know that the college catalogue commended Berea
as a town of "moral salubrity" with "no grog shops or seductive loung
for the

ing places in the village."

The young

17

students in Berea rented the second story of a house

GEORGE W. NORRIS

6

on the edge of town where they proceeded to

set

up housekeeping,

as possible
dividing the chores among them. They lived as frugally
his
sister
Clara
and
and devoted most of their time to studying. Norris

were enrolled in the Preparatory Department, while Emma was regis
tered in the College Department. Norris was officially listed as a
as a student at
junior student in the classical course, and his record
Baldwin was outstanding. At the end of the academic year, he re
ceived a perfect "10" grade for seven courses and "9.85," "9.8," and
"9" for the others. Latin and mathematics were the most important
Norris also studied
subjects in the classical course of study, although
18
grammar, physiology, and botany.
Outside of the classroom, as in Mount Carmel district school, Will
were now other
participated in the debating society. However, there

American

history,

forms of diversion available, and the sixteen-year-old scholar was
quick to seize them. Singing popular songs, engaging in that most
important of extracurricular activities, the "bull" session, participating

an occasional prank these were activities that the young farm boy
had rarely been able to indulge in at home. They satisfied his gregari
ous inclinations, especially after a period of hard academic work.
After a most satisfying year at Baldwin, Norris spent the summer
working on the farm. He found this work a bit more arduous after a
winter of sedentary activity. Since his funds were exhausted and his
mother unable to supply him with any more, Will sought a teaching
in

position for the fall to earn the wherewithal to continue his education.
His first teaching job was in the Long School district near Whitehouse

Lucas County, Ohio, where his oldest sister, Lorinda Castle,
lived with her family.
Norris enjoyed teaching school. Occasionally, especially in his first
job, he had discipline problems, but in most instances his pupils
were eager, attentive, and relatively tractable youngsters. Their young
in

teacher was not always a stern, scholarly taskmaster. Living in the
community with the family of one or the other of his pupils, he made
friends easily. Most evenings he devoted to
reading; his determination
to become a lawyer was still strong. During the
year at the Long
School district he spent weekends with his sister in nearby White-

Emma

house, a gathering place for young teachers in the vicinity.
and Clara also spent time with the Castle family. Here the young
folk would enjoy the weekend free from the
restric

socially imposed
on unmarried schoolteachers in rural villages. Will Norris
blossomed forth as an actor in play productions, sang in the various
entertainments, and engaged in sprightly conversation, something he
was usually unable to do while teaching school or working on the

tions

IN
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farm. Also, against his mother's dictates, he learned to dance.
and the other young teachers, after such pleasant weekends,
return to their students for another

week

7
19

Will

would

of .school.

much

of the $150 salary as possible from his
declined
the invitation to teach the following
he
teaching position,
summer
the
He
term.
working at home on the farm. In the fall
spent

Having saved

of 1879

as

he entered the Northern Indiana Normal School and Business

Institute at Valparaiso, Indiana. The school, later known as Valparaiso
University, was located in the southeast part of town overlooking

was administered as a nonsectarian, self-sup
and
self-governing coeducational college, even though it was
porting,
endorsed by the Methodist Church and Porter County, Indiana. Its
president, Henry Baker Brown, an excellent administrator and educa
tor, developed the plant and strengthened the faculty. The institution
became known as die 'poor man's Harvard* and in 1914-15 boasted a
miles of marshlands. It

student body of six thousand, second only in size to that of the older
eastern university. 20
Two main features characterized the institution: the absence of

entrance requirements and the low cost of living. There were four
terms of eleven weeks each and a fifth lasting six weeks, so that a
student could start or resume his studies at any one of five times

during the year. The duration of a course of study leading to a degree
depended on the student's previous preparation, but at least one
year of residence was required. By eliminating middlemen and pur
the
chasing in quantity and by producing some of its own foodstuffs,
and
Board
for
and
staff.
students
school had lowered the cost of living
room in Flint Hall cost $1.40 a week and tuition was $18 per term. 21
Norris completed the classical and elocution courses before turning to
the law. During his years at Northern Indiana Normal School, Will
was one of the more popular students, liked and respected by his
22
In 1880, aged nineteen he received a college degree and was
admitted to the law course.

peers.

Norris found in Valparaiso the same spirit of social equality and
democracy that he knew in Ohio. Few students came from back

were serious
grounds that were markedly different from his. Most
about their studies, though few were so serious that they would ignore
the opportunity to engage in gregarious extracurricular activities. Will
in a course devoted to debat
joined the debating teams and enrolled
learned
and
a
florid
He
many of the tricks of
style
developed
ing.
this way he increased
In
that
in
so
were
that
period.
oratory
prevalent
his self-assurance.

Elocution courses with Professor M. E. Bogarte gave him an op-
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portunity to discuss and debate politics. The election of 1880 occurred
while Norris was teaching school at Monclova, Ohio, prior to entering
law school. He participated as a member of a horse troop in a large

was something of a
deeply. While national

torch light parade for James A. Garfleld. Garfield

hero to Norris and his assassination
politics

aroused

Norris'

politics at Valparaiso

more intense

intense

moved him

Republican partisanship,

campus

were much more important and aroused even
28

partisanship.

In keeping with his interest in campus politics and debating, Norris
joined the Crescent Literary Society. Every Friday night there was a
public program of speeches, essays, and music in which the Crescent
and other literary societies participated. Rivalry was keen among
societies and within each society. Will Norris and Charley Hyde, repre
senting opposing factions within the Crescent, were chosen as the
society's candidates for the oration contests against the other groups.
Bitter feeling was intensified and, when Norris won the contest with

an address, "The Traitor's Deathbed," Hyde's supporters sought re
venge. This they achieved by defeating Norris by one vote in the
election for president of the society.

While the Hyde faction was celebrating its triumph, Norris and
met to form an organization which would have a
great influence on all their lives, the L.U.N. the Loyal United Nine
or, as their opponents called it, the Lunatics Under Norris. The or
ganization, to which no new members could be admitted, was officially
launched with a banquet in the Merchants' Hotel at Valparaiso on
August 6, 1883. It was agreed that every August the members would
have a reunion and a banquet. As the years went by these reunions
came to be treasured. Norris and Ermon E. Smith of Dodge City,
Kansas, who were the last survivors, attended a total of fifty-nine
his nine supporters

banquets, the last one in 1941 at Norris' cottage overlooking Rainbow
Lake, one of a chain of sixteen lakes near Waupaca, Wisconsin. In
the early years of the organization, most of the reunions were held at
lake resort areas in Iowa and Wisconsin; in the twentieth
century,
however, most were held in the L.U.N. cottage overlooking Rainbow
Lake. Here the members and their families built summer houses and

spent their vacations. Here their children and grandchildren became
acquainted and formed friendships that continued after the deaths of
the original members. 24
The year the L.U.N. was formed

was also the year in which Norris
obtained his law degree and was admitted to the Indiana bar. Thus
in the late summer of 1883,
George Norris, age twenty-two, returned
to his mother's farm in York
Township, Ohio, with a law degree in

IN
his possession

and
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his college years at

an end.

9
It

must have been a

very proud mother who greeted her son on his return from Indiana.
His plans were uncertain. Norris no doubt puzzled over what the

him and where he would practice. Colonel Rhodes in
was
Clyde
willing to let him clerk in his law office until he made a
decision. Norris accepted this offer. In Clyde he continued his studies
and acted as Rhodes' office boy. He also taught a term at Mount
Carmel school where he had been a pupil. It was his mother, how
ever, who made the suggestion that brought about his departure from
home. Mary Norris, learning of the booming opportunities in the
Pacific Northwest from colonizing agents, conceived the idea of sell
ing the farm and starting anew. Her son decided to go to Washington
Territory, establish his law practice, and then, if all went well, he
would send for her.
Using almost all his savings, Norris purchased a ticket to Walla
Walla in Washington Territory and traveled across country on the re
future held for

cently completed Northern Pacific Railroad in an emigrant train
sleepers attached to a freight from St. Paul. The journey lasted an
entire

week, and he arrived

at his destination tired

and

dirty with his

funds running low. Walla Walla, he quickly decided, was no place for
a young lawyer and his aging mother to settle. The town was desolate

and uninviting. Land was expensive and jobs were scarce. Norris
sought a teaching position to replenish his funds and, accepting the
only one available, boarded a train for Bolles Junction in a remote
part of the country. Though Bolles Junction appeared on the map to
be a sizable community, it was anything but that. He spent his first
night there sleeping on the floor in the house of a Mr. Lee, president of
district. The next day Norris set up housekeeping in a
crude shack, formerly used by a maintenance crew on the railroad
and now serving as a storeroom for railroad equipment.
The schoolroom was equally crude. Since there were but seven
pupils in the district, Norris conducted school only in the mornings.

the school

The afternoons he had to himself and often went hunting or fishing
with Mr. Lee. Norris found that he still was a crack shot, especially
with a revolver. Occasionally on sunny afternoons, he would sit back
in his chair at school and fire at woodpeckers who darted in and out
of the room. 25

Norris was not pleased either with his teaching position or with
Walla Walla. He had decided to return east as soon as he could re
he went to the nearby
plenish his funds. At the end of the school term

community of Dayton to investigate the possibilities of establishing
a law practice. There he managed to get involved with a logging boss
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in a quarrel which almost resulted in gunplay. This incident, coupled
with his dissatisfaction with his job and location, convinced him once
and for all that Washington Territory was not the place for him.

Thus George

Norris, at the age of twenty-three, eager to put his
and his training to use, purchased a ticket on

legal talents to the test

the Oregon Short Line and the Union Pacific to the city of Lincoln in
the Cornhusker State of Nebraska. 26

He chose this state because his
mother owned eighty acres of land in Johnson County, in the south
eastern part of the state, and because he had a kinsman, David Mook,
in the area. It also appealed to him because his late sister Effie had
gone there after her marriage. Nebraska now seemed a logical place
for the young lawyer to further himself in his chosen career.

Chapter 2

Nebraska, 1885-90: Prosperity

GEORGE NOBRIS did not stay long in Nebraska on his first trip. His
money ran out, and he returned to Ohio for a last term of teaching,
this time at Warrensville in
Cuyahoga County. There he boarded
with a sister as an economy measure. At the end of the school term,
determined to return to Nebraska, he borrowed over three hundred
dollars from his sister Melissa, and received from his mother the deed
to her

Johnson County land.

college classmate and fellow L.U.N. member, EL H. Har
he
rington,
opened a law office in March, 1885, in Beatrice, the seat of
Gage County, one of the richest agricultural areas in the state.
Despite the fact that Nebraska was booming, the partnership did not
prosper and the partners were soon disillusioned; Norris recalled,
"We had nothing to bring us business no associations and no con

With a

1

Perhaps they did not give themselves enough time to get
perhaps they did not get along together in a small office with
few clients to challenge their abilities. Whatever the reason, during
the summer of 1885 the firm of Norris & Harrington was dissolved.
Harrington went back east, and Norris, in September, hoping for
better opportunities, moved farther west into the thriving Republican
River Valley country. He chose Beaver City, the seat of Furnas
County, as his destination. Since the Burlington and Missouri Rail
road had not yet reached this area, he hoped that here his practice
could develop with the country. Fully aware that he would need
considerable capital, Norris sold the Johnson County land for $1,500.
Then, with his few belongings, he traveled by railroad to Arapahoe
and thence by wagon almost due south to Beaver City.
nections."
started;

The period during which

Norris arrived in Nebraska

prosperous in the history of the state

up

to that time.

was the most

With above

prospered and, encouraged by "boomers/*
in ever increasing numbers. In 1880 the state's population
was 452,402; ten years later it had increased to over one million
people. Norris arrived in Beaver City in 1885; before the decade was
average
settlers

rainfall, agriculture

came

11
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over he had become secretary of the Beaver City Board of Trade and

who purchased a
offering agents five dollars for each person
of
worth
or
of
land
$1,000
city
property. The Board
quarter-section
of Trade
these agents with advertising matter and agreed to

was

supplied

2
pay the railroad fare for any settler. The extension
and Missouri Railroad throughout the western part

of the Burlington
of Nebraska was

the major factor in the rapid growth of population. By 1887 a branch
line of the railroad reached Beaver City, enabling it to participate
more directly in the general prosperity.

Furnas County, though organized in 1873, was

when

raw
and

Norris arrived in the

autumn

still

in

of 1885.

many

areas

Broken land

prairie
cultivated fields seemingly were islands surrounded by a gentle
which was punc
rolling sea of short grass on the slowly rising sod

tuated occasionally with steep slopes and rough land. The Republican
River, which flowed across the northern part of the county, was the
main body of water in the region. One of its tributaries, Beaver Creek,

along which the county seat was located, flowed not quite parallel to
in the south central part of the county. Neither stream was navi

it

gable; the bed of each was sandy, bordered by low, sandy banks,
while the Republican was not only shallow but also relatively wide.
Furnas County is located in a subhumid region, an area with a

mean annual

rainfall of

about twenty-two inches. 8

Its

rough lands and

sandy areas provide excellent grazing places for cattle, while the
better lands were devoted at first to corn and wheat. By the end of
the nineteenth century forage crops, particularly alfalfa, were raised
along the streams. Now, in the twentieth century, irrigation is used

more adequate crops. Along the streams are maple, ash, elm,
and cottonwood trees. Cattle and produce from the county
make their way into the Omaha and Denver markets.
While very different from the Ohio Norris knew and loved, the
new country was not totally beyond his previous experience, and he
soon came to love and later to understand it as well. Arriving as the
country was being rapidly developed, he saw it originally at its very
best in a period of prosperity
during a lush and languid autumn
to insure

box

elder,

season.

southwestern Nebraska generally did not understand
Many farmers and town builders
into the region
believing, from its generally luxuriant

Settlers in

the climate of the Great Plains.

moved

ap

did not differ markedly from the known
agricultural
areas farther east. Others, who had heard of conditions on the
plains
in the previous decade, reassured themselves with the
popular de-

pearance, that

it
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somehow changed with settlement and that rain
followed the plow. The early experience of settlers and farmers
during the ISSO's was usually pleasant and profitable. They therefore

lusion that climate
fall

accepted these conditions as normal and regarded any marked change
from them as abnormal and temporary. It would be several years
hence before Norris and other settlers obtained a more valid under
standing of the region, an understanding based on bitter experience.
On the north bank of Beaver Creek is situated Beaver City. First
settled in 1872 by J. H. McKee, it is the county seat and principal
town (the population in 1895 was over fifteen hundred4 ) of the Beaver

Here George Norris would make his home, marry, start raising
a family, and launch his career in law, in business, and in politics.
Before the prosperous decade of the 1880's was over, the community
5
boasted an $18,000 courthouse and a $15,000 high school. Across the
Valley.

owned by
David H. Lashley, who was to become Norris' father-in-law. The
in 1893, it was
building was used as a hotel and office building. Later,
torn down, and the Norris block, an office building still in use today,
was erected in its place. Beaver City, small though it was, had two
newspapers: the Times and the Tribune. The latter, a Republican
Fletcher W. Merwin, who became an intimate
paper, was edited by
aide to Norris when he entered politics. The former was owned by
John T. McClure, an able lawyer, a Democrat, and later a Populist
leader in the area. Two banks, the Furnas County Bank and the First
National Bank of Beaver City, were organized soon after Norris
an old farm building
square from the courthouse was

arrived.
outset, life in Beaver City was far from easy for tie young
His
clothes were threadbare; he usually did most of his own
lawyer.
In
the winter he took to burning corn to keep his office
washing.
warm. Once a week he got a shave, paying at the rate of twelve shaves

At the

A shoeshine was reserved only for very special occasions,
such as a trip to Lincoln or Omaha. Apparently, in his early days in
Beaver City, besides sporting the mustache already evident in his
affected a cowboy hat and possibly other
years at Valparaiso, Norris

for a dollar.

6
aspects of western dress.

was delighted with the region,
Despite his relative poverty, Norris
the town, and the people. Here he found again what he had experi
enced in Ohio and at college: social equality along with a feeling of
will among his fellow citizens. Everybody's latchfraternity and

good
Every man by and large was trusted and accepted
his
of
his
background until he did something to convince
regardless
string

was

out.
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and friendship were mispkced. Norris be
to interest one of his
Beaver
with
came so impressed
City that he tried
7
there.
and
house
a
sisters in buying
settling
Norris easily made friends in the community and the surrounding
the Odd Fellows lodge at Clyde in his
countryside. Having joined
he now transferred his membership to Beaver City.

associates that their trust

twenty-first year,

Bob

Scott, the

lodge, became
stew. 8 Scott may

warden of the

duced Norris

an early friend and intro
have been a member of

to jackrabbit
was acci
the party of four who were hunting quail when Norris
to
each
had separated,
bag as
seeking
dentally shot. The members
When
the
face.
the
in
shot
was
Norris
when
birds as

many

possible,
others found him, he was

groping on

see,

to kill himself.

his

on the ground in extreme pain, unable to
hands and knees, feeling for the gun, and intending

Two

of the

members

of the party carried

him

to a

ran for a doctor. Norris feared at first
nearby house while the other
but found his sight returning
blinded,
been
had
he
that
completely
even before the doctor examined him. Initially the doctor thought he
would lose the sight of one eye, but on second examination revised
saved. Twentythis opinion and agreed that Norris' sight would be
two pieces of shot were taken out of his face. At least two were
9

in his flesh. For several years after this acci
permanently embedded
in hunting and
dent, Norris understandably took no great interest
other business.
and
law
to
his
devoted himself almost entirely
practice
courthouse
the
of
south
office
Norris opened a two-room
square.
Until his marriage in 1889 he worked in one of the rooms, lived in the

and dined out. Despite the desire to utilize his professional
it necessary to engage in other activities along with
training, he found
the law. Indeed, he later wrote, "The first money I made in Nebraska
was in the land business, and often I made more money in the land
10
he pur
business than in the law business."
Shortly after his arrival
chased a quarter section of land which he later sold at a profit. He also
real estate in Beaver City. His activities were typical
started to
other,

acquire

of

young western lawyers who were trying

to earn a living without

a corporate connection as their chief source of income.
Nebraska, as a comparatively new state, desperately needed capital
to maintain the prosperity of the 1880's and to attract new settlers,

had to go outside of the state for much of their work
rainfall remained adequate and crops bountiful, land
While
ing capital.
values increased rapidly. Though agriculture and stock raising were
on a large scale,
the
occupations, urban development began

The

inhabitants

principal

and railroad construction continued without abatement.
dwellers who wanted to improve
Enterprising farmers and town
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their holdings found it easy to borrow money from loan companies,
commercial banks, insurance companies, and even from individuals.
Such mortgages seemingly offered an excellent opportunity for the
small investor. They could be held in modest amounts, and the interest
rates were high. Investors throughout the East and North poured
their savings into companies which proceeded to loan millions of dol
lars in the West. By 1889 Kansas and Nebraska had 134 incorporated

mortgage companies. Including companies organized in other states
but operating in Kansas and Nebraska, the number reached at least
two hundred. Between 1884 and 1887 the number of farm mortgages
362. n
placed in Nebraska was six thousand and their value was $5,467
Newly arrived farmers were immediately subjected to heavy ex
pense for buildings, farm machinery, fencing, seed, livestock, and
?

show adequate returns. In the beginning, their
little money they
much
was
outlay
greater than their income. What
had to sell on
Merchants
them
with
quickly disappeared.
brought
credit, and professional men, like Norris, had to wait for their
fees. The borrowing of money seemed to be a necessity for the satis
taxes before they could

factory development of the country; without mortgages, development
would have proceeded at a much slower pace. 12

At the outset Norris engaged in the mortgage-loan business and
found it profitable. With good crops and more settlers migrating to
the country, land values increased and as a result, loans were given
a safe margin. This led investors to seek more mortgages, and loan
companies to attempt to increase their business by urging their agents,
of whom Norris was one, to lend more money. Soon irresponsible
on poor investments and
agents and companies were loaning money
than
more
they actually needed. Some
encouraging farmers to borrow
extensive
this
that
observers noted
mortgage business was draining
13
the
area
of
the
by
payment of interest. With the failure
money out
of crops in the short-grass country beginning in 1890 > worse effects

would appear.
that
George Norris, as an ambitious young lawyer, quickly found
there were ways of making money in conjunction with legal work.
He took advantage of them, and earned most of his livelihood as an
individuals engaged in the mortgageagent for various companies and
loan business. If Norris was unable to collect, he could initiate legal
all went well, but as debtors ran into
proceedings. In the beginning
and difficult one for a person
delicate
a
became
the
difficulties,
job
with political ambitions who wished to remain on good terms with his
neighbors.

For a while, Norris sold insurance as an agent of the National
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Fire Insurance

Company

of Hartford, Connecticut. In 1889

he sought

to act as agent for the Yost Typewriter Company, but was turned
down on the basis that his other business and his inability to type
him from showing their machine to its best advantage.
would

prevent
In another instance, an Iowa businessman desired to obtain Norris'
services to rent and care for his livery stable and other real estate in

Beaver City. 14 However, these examples were extraneous to his main
line of endeavor, which was that of agent for various individuals,
banks, and corporations engaged in some aspect of the mortgage-loan
business.
Norris' work continually took him away from Beaver City. He
traveled throughout the country making collections, seeking prospec
tive customers for loans, observing conditions, and preparing reports.

In the course of

this

work Norris met people

in all walks of

life.

He

the respect and confidence of most people with whom he came
in contact, and formed some lasting friendships. Since many of the

won

notes he sought to collect were small, his fees

The

were

also small. 15

Vigilant Wholesale Creditors' Agency of Omaha, whose motto
Is to the Swift," carefully defined the fees their agents,

was "The Race

among whom was Norris, were to receive. If the note was paid on
demand or presentation, the charges were 5 per cent on the first $200
and 2M per cent on the excess. "In all other cases/' stated their printed
form, the following fees were to be charged "without respect to time
or effort expended": 10 per cent on claims under $100, 5 per cent on

and 2& per cent on excess of $700. No charge was to
than $1.50 and, most important, the agent making die collec

excess to $700,

be

less

would receive two-thirds of all the fees. The remaining one-third,
along with the proceeds, would then be remitted to the agency in
Omaha. 16
Norris also acted as agent for some large firms which desired the
services of a local attorney to make their collections.
Among them
R. G. Dun & Co., with headquarters in New York and branch offices
in 135 cities. This
company, established by famed abolitionist Louis
in
claimed
that it was the oldest mercantile agency in
1841,
Tappan
the world. Other large firms such as Thurber, Wyland and
Company
of New York and the Credit Guarantee
Company of Minneapolis
acquired Norris' services. He served as agent and collector for William
Deering and Company of Chicago, producers of harvesting machin
17
The larger firms often had a branch office or a general agent in
ery.
Nebraska, and it was the office manager or agent who contacted
tion

Norris.

These companies employed Norris as an attorney when

it

was
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necessary to bring suit against a debtor in Furnas County and vicinity.
If the plaintiff lived outside of Nebraska, Norris had to make certain
that the petition for foreclosure of a mortgage was in accord with

Nebraska statutes before it was filed and a summons issued. There
were court fees and service charges involved in these proceedings and
usually a commission rather than a fee for Norris' services. In most
instances, before court action was taken, Norris was consulted by the
attorney in the plaintiffs home town as to the possibility of settling the
case without recourse to the law. Prior to 1890, however, Norris was
rarely called upon to initiate legal action. Most debtors in southwest

Nebraska managed to meet

their obligations,

and

creditors

had

little

cause for complaint. 18
Though Norris acted as agent or representative for many firms and
individuals in the various aspects of the mortgage-loan business, he
did most of his work for J. H. Miles and the First National Bank of
19
It is not known
Rulo, Nebraska, of which Miles was vice-president.
how, where, and when Norris met Miles, but Miles took an interest in

the young lawyer, trusted him, and expressed confidence in his judg
ment and ability. Norris continued to work in various capacities with

Miles after he left the Bank of Rulo for the one at Falls City. The
association continued until shortly after the turn of the century when
Miles retired. Norris discounted notes, loaned money, bought and
sold land, and performed other services for Miles and the Rulo bank.
At the outset, Norris was associated in this work with George Shafer

by the end of 1889 they dissolved this arrangement
and both men worked on their own. 20 Norris and Shafer remained on
amicable terms and were associated in business again at the end of the
of Beaver City, but

century.

In December, 1888, Norris decided to investigate conditions in
Lake City with the idea of settling there and continuing his work
with Miles in the Utah territory. Norris felt that he was intruding upon
Salt

Shafer's business. And perhaps the incessant traveling and collecting
was beginning to sap his strength. Whatever the reasons, he went to
Salt Lake City for the ostensible purpose of investigating the possi

opening a bank. After being away from Beaver City for less
than two weeks, Norris returned, confirmed in the opinion that his
21
future would be no better in Salt Lake City than in Beaver City.

bility of

The connection with Miles gave

Norris opportunities to participate
With his knowledge of local

directly in the mortgage-loan business.

conditions he made good investments, securing the necessary funds
from the bank in Rulo. He also invested money for members of his
of
family, once informing his sister Melissa that he could loan $1,500
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her

money

"for IQ%

a profit on

it

where

himself.

it

will

be secure" and where he could make

22

end of 1889 Miles decided to seek a new banking connec
Bank of Rulo. He began looking for
another community in which to start a bank, finally deciding upon

By

the

and

tion

close the First National

Falls City, the county seat. Miles' shifting of banks necessitated a
so that most of his accounts could
rearrangement of Norris' activities

be closed when the bank

in Rulo shut

its

doors. 23

In the spring of 1890, shortly after the First National Bank closed,
the cashier of the Bank of Rulo, a competitor of Miles' bank, wrote to
Norris inquiring if he would loan money for this bank as he had done
for Miles'. Norris agreed, although he indicated that he probably
could not do as large a business as he had done for their former com
terms on which he was to conduct this new busi
petitor because the
defined. The Bank of Rulo was more
ness were .now

very rigidly
because
mortgage-loan business than Miles, primarily
were new to the business and because economic conditions

cautious in
its officers

its

were changing.24
Norris' interest in the mortgage-loan business was begin
Miles to accept the position of
ning to wane. He refused an offer from
of
a
at
his
new
bank
in
cashier
$1,200 for the first year and the
salary

By 1890

25
Part of the reason
to one-fifth of its stock.
privilege of purchasing up
in
the
remain
to
his
desire
was
the
offer
for refusing
legal profession

had been forced
pursue the interest in politics which thus far he
to relegate to a subsidiary position.
But there was another reason for refusing the offer. On June 1,
1889, when Norris was not yet twenty-eight years of age, he married
and

to

a belle of Beaver City,

Pluma Lashley. The Lashleys had come from
after its founding in the 1870's. David

Iowa to Beaver City shortly

Lashley had risen rapidly as a businessman in the thriving community.
He owned a considerable amount of real estate, built a substantial
house, and operated a prosperous grist mill on Beaver Creek about a
mile out of town. Lashley's daughter, Pluma, had been born in Iowa,
in 1864, and at the time of her marriage was a tall, attractive, dark-

woman

three years younger than her husband. They
started their life together in a rented four-room cottage which they
had carefully and tastefully furnished. 26

complexioned

Before the couple had been married a year, Pluma's father died.
Norris had the task of settling the estate and keeping the gristmill in
operation. Shortly afterwards the newlyweds moved into the Lashley
home so that Pluma would have the companionship of her mother
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while Norris was traveling. This relieved some of his anxiety and re
morse at being away from home.

had established
had arrived with
a minimum of cash, but through his own initiative and ability had
developed a prosperous business which brought him into contact with
men in all walks of life. He was becoming known, liked, and respected
a difficult feat for a person who had to collect money. He was sym
pathetic and fair in his business dealings, and people quickly learned
After five years in Beaver City, George Norris
himself as a rising young man in the community. He

word, while many business firms throughout Nebraska
and some larger western and national concerns sought his services.
Within five years he had paid off most of his debts, could promptly
meet his obligations, owned a few choice real estate items, and in a
small way participated in the mortgage-loan business. He was happily
married to the daughter of one of Beaver City's leading citizens and
had a promising future. True, he was not practicing law as much as he
might have desired, but he could not have secured as many agencies
as he did without his law degree. Moreover, most lawyers in the
region, unless they worked full time for the railroad or held public
office, earned their livelihood in approximately the same way. This
type of work was significant in fie development of the West. In
Nebraska it enabled young George Norris, during the boom period
of the 1880's, to sink his roots in a region that he would henceforth
consider his home. While he was able to start his adult life in Nebraska
in a period of prosperity, adversity in the last decade of the nineteenth
century would test his character and, incidentally, launch his political
to trust his

career.

Chapter 3

Nebraska, 1890-95: Adversity

THE BOOM

PERIOD in southwestern Nebraska was coming to an end

by

the late 1880's. Since the prosperity of the country depended on satis
factory prices for agricultural produce, overproduction and over-

expansion started the deflationary process which lack of rain, drought,
and hot winds accelerated, thereby adding physical misery to people
already overburdened with economic woes. Capital had been invested
here and elsewhere in the West beyond reasonable amounts which

The debt burden, both public and
was
and
investors were becoming sus
some
eastern
heavy,
private,
been
their
funds
had
not
that
picious
prudently invested. A day of
seemed
to
at
hand.
be
reckoning
Drought caused widespread crop
failure in 1890, and this in turn brought the situation to a head.
The farmer's woes were aggravated by the fact that the price he
received for his products, despite fluctuations, went steadily down
ward during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century while
his fixed costs, such as freight, interest, machinery, and taxes,
generally
remained steady or did not decline from their boom-time high level
as rapidly or as far as the farmer would have liked. Seldom
during
could insure immediate returns.

these years did the market price of grain equal the cost of
production.
At times during the 1890's, the drought was so severe in some places
that no crops were harvested and farmers were forced to turn their
livestock loose to forage for themselves. A nationwide
panic and de
pression complicated these problems, and struck the final blow to many
western fanners and townspeople who pulled up stakes and moved out
of the region. 1
to

In this period of adversity, the companies which had been so
eager
lend money only a few years before had little cash and were

reluctant to lend

what they had. Much money was withdrawn and

potential lenders were frightened away by the court rulings which in
many Nebraska counties granted stays of six to nine months or even
longer, depending on the amount of money involved, before fore

closure proceedings could

20

be made

final.

2
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Unable to secure funds through real estate mortgages, many farm
were now forced to accept chattel loans borrowing money on
their livestock and agricultural implements. For the five-year period
ers

May 31, 1895, the number of chattel mortgages recorded by
the state auditor of Nebraska was 539,323. 3 The average assessed valu
ending

ation of farm land in Furnas

County dropped from $3.64 per acre in
1880 to $2.09 in 1890, and by 1900 it had risen only to $2.30. In the
neighboring county on the west, Red Willow, the figures ran as fol
lows: 1880-44.81, 1890-41.86, 1900-$1.54. 4 Conducting business of any
sort during this period was exceedingly difficult; making collections
on notes as they fell due was almost impossible.
The decade of the 1890's, to the people of the short-grass country,
was a time of struggle with debt, bad credit, and decreasing values.

Few new

debts were incurred, and old ones, owing to clamoring credi
were
reduced as much as possible. Many were foreclosed. Some
tors,
instead
of continuing the struggle, left the region; but most of
people,
them, believing that drought and bad times were the exception and
that rain and better times would soon return, grimly held on. They
had invested heavily in the Republican River Valley; they had raised
their children and buried their dead in lonely country cemeteries;
they now considered this area their home and they intended to hold
on to their property.
With a better understanding of the subhumid region, droughtresistant crops, irrigation, and with a more balanced agricultural
economy, the people of the future would find it less difficult to live
and prosper in the midst of a challenging environment. For those
who remained throughout these troubled times, a bond was forged that
manifested itself in a growing regional consciousness, an awareness
that their part of the West was different from other areas. The "old
"
settlers*
picnics and reunions thus became very meaningful to these
early sod-busting and sod-dwelling farmers as the last years of the

nineteenth century receded into history. Norris' experiences during the
1890's

enhanced

his understanding of people

thereby helped to

and

their

problems and

make him an outstanding

Throughout the decade

his

major

public servant.
activities in the mortgage-loan

Bank of Rulo, and with Miles and the newly
Bank of Falls City. Norris was pleased with
National
First
organized
the Bank of Rulo and its cashier, B. F. Cunningham, because they
did not take advantage of drought-stricken farmers and avoided fore
closing whenever possible. However, while the bank was willing to
grant extensions or renewals on its notes, it was reluctant to allow
Norris to loan more money. 5

business were with the

GEORGE W. NORRIS

22

In 1891 there was a record rainfall of over twenty-five inches; crops
excellent, and debtors, temporarily at least, were able to meet

were

their obligations. Few people, however, were willing to borrow money
at the prevailing rate of 10 per cent. Norris tried to convince the Bank

he could make a few safe loans if it would accept 8
interest
cent
payable in advance. A merchant in Beaver City, he
per
was
wrote,
ready to borrow $2,000 on six or eight months time on
these conditions. But the bank was unwilling to loan money at 8 per
of Rulo that

when

all the money it desired at a higher rate of
conclude satisfactory arrangements, Norris severed
his connection with the Bank of Rulo -in 1892.

cent

interest.

On

6

it

could loan

Unable

to

the other hand, Miles, who settled in Falls City in July, 1891,
to work as cashier of the First National Bank, quickly re
his business with Norris. Soon Norris was making almost all his

and went

newed

The Falls City bank, like the one in Rulo, had no
making loans at 10 per cent. Though Miles allowed Norris to
place a few choice loans, he was unwilling to let him expand his activ
ity. Because of the precarious national financial situation and the
nationwide panic which began in the summer of 1893, Miles feared a
run on the bank or the failure of a correspondent bank, and did not
want to commit himself too deeply to any line of endeavor. 7 These
events and the policies resulting from them severely limited Norris'
loans for this bank.

trouble

activities.

As the panic broadened into a depression, drought and hot winds
added to the plight of already desperate people. Because the rainfall
was woefully inadequate in 1893 and 1894, 8 crops were almost a total
failure, and Norris found it more difficult to conduct his declining busi
ness for Miles. Debtors could not sell property and creditors could
not collect on their notes and accounts. By the end of 1894 Norris
claimed that he had never seen money so hard to obtain. 9
Norris' work for Miles and the First National Bank of Falls
City
was the most important aspect of his career as an agent in the mort
gage-loan business. At the same time, however, he also acted as an
agent for other individuals and concerns. He continually told credi
tors that it would be difficult if not
impossible to collect until nature
relented and abundant crops were harvested. Meanwhile, holders of
notes requested extensions because they had
nothing to market and
no money to meet their obligations. Norris advised some creditors not
to take a client to court because under Nebraska law "he would be
entitled to a stay of nine months." If the debtor were conscientious
and nature helpful, he might pay sooner without a court order. 10
If the debtor were unable to
pay and the company unwilling to
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grant an extension or a renewal (which might be secured by a chattel
mortgage or increased interest), Norris would then have to institute
foreclosure proceedings, an activity he seldom indulged in during the
booming decade of the 1880's. By foreclosing and obtaining judg
ments, more than ever before, Norris now used his legal talents in
connection with the mortgage-loan business. 11
Aside from his dealings with the two banks in Richardson County,
Norris now did most of his mortgage-loan business for two companies
and an individual. One company, Burnham, Trevett & Mattis, was
located in Beatrice and was a regional organization. The individual,

Stanley E. Filkins, was a lawyer of Medina, New York, who had heavy
investments in and around Beaver City. Snow, Church & Company was

company with its Nebraska branch office located
Omaha.
The relationship with Burnham, Trevett & Mattis was a pleasant

a national collection
in

one for Norris. He handled their legal work, foreclosing when neces
sary, and found that the concern was "willing to extend every
courtesy to a borrower" when he tried "to do the right thing." After
foreclosing on a piece of property, Norris was requested to try to
"scare up a buyer" because the land the company had acquired was of
little

value to

it

and

necessitated the

payment

of taxes.

Burnham,

&

Mattis, being a Nebraska concern, was fully aware of the
difficult conditions people faced; the firm understood what a good
soaking rain meant to a struggling farmer. Its members were also

Trevett

sympathetic to Norris* political aspirations, even though these aspira
12
tions would probably entail the loss of his services.

When

Filkins*

agent in Beaver City resigned to become commis

sioner of the United States District

hoped

to succeed him.

Land

Office in

McCook, Norris

However, he was not successful

until 1894,

when Filkins considered enlarging his investments in the area. By
that summer Norris was handling all of Filkins' Nebraska investments.

He was making

and sell property, obtaining
from customers who wanted renewals, securing

collections, trying to rent

chattel mortgages

judgments, and foreclosing

when

13

necessary.
The relationship of George Norris with Snow, Church & Company
was the most formal and least satisfactory of his mortgage-loan con
nections. The company, with twenty-nine offices throughout the
to be the most vigilant collection agency in
United States,

professed
the country. But Norris was not impressed with its cold efficiency.
After several months he wrote the chief of the Omaha office that thus
far the agency had yielded him "the magnificent sum of $1.34," a
sum substantially lower than the postage fees incurred, for bringing a
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court action necessary to secure a judgment. The only other claim
had received was immediately taken out of his

of consequence he

hands. 14
Besides his

difficult

work

in the established channels of the

mort

gage-loan business, Norris continued his side ventures in real estate
and other activities. Several insurance companies sought his services,

Nebraska law required that any insurance
in
a county must also appoint an attorney
an
company having
agency
While
real estate ventures were more time
seat.
at
the
county
residing
chiefly to aid in collections.

consuming than insurance work, the opportunities for making im
mediate profits in insurance were very limited. In 1887 he had pur
chased 160 acres of land in Greeley County, Kansas, for $800. Early
in 1891, he purchased 220 acres of land near Beaver City for $2,400;
it contained both timber and water. Since it was
virtually impossible
to sell land, he sometimes tried to trade lots located in Kansas and
other parts of Nebraska. Occasionally property owners asked him to
try to sell their property. For selling a client's land Norris received
the regular commission of 5 per cent on the first thousand, and 2%
15
per cent on the balance.
His most extensive real estate activities, however, were in and
around Beaver City where he collected rent and generally attended
the property of absentee owners. Norris usually took his commission
out of the rent money. Collecting rent was a difficult and troublesome
chore. Some tenants would
depart just before their rent was due,
others were forced to sell their crops at ruinous
prices in order to make
some payment to the landlord. A dwelling house in Beaver City could
be rented for about six dollars per month. The rent on a house Norris
had purchased as an investment for a sister in Ohio "from the first of

October" in 1894 amounted to $45. 16 At such rates,
his commission could not have amounted to a
very large sum, especially
when compared to the time and energy he had to spend
looking after

May

to the first of

the property.

The major problem Norris had with real estate in Beaver City in
volved the mill, part of which he and his wife inherited from the
Lashley

estate. All of the heirs

the estate, should

sell

it.

The

mill

agreed that Norris, the executor of
was sold for $8,000 to a man named

Andrew Jackson who apparently had borrowed $5,000 from the late
Mrs. Lashley to make the
purchase. Jackson soon failed in business
and was left with no money and heavy debts. Norris decided to take
over the mill and the $2,500
on it rather than allow it to be
mortgage

sold at a sheriffs sale.

By buying

insure a steady income to

pay

the mill

taxes

and

and renting

interest

it, he hoped to
on the mortgage, and
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assumed

re

mill until a buyer could be found, but,
sponsibility for managing the
owing to the depression, found it impossible to sell the property. By
the end of 1895 the mill was in a critical condition, in need of an over

hauling of
order.

machinery before

its

it

would be

in satisfactory working

17

While Norris was not anxious to assume the heavy responsibility
he did assume another responsibility in 1893 with
enthusiasm.
Despite the financial stringency, he had accumu
greater
lated some funds and thought he could borrow even more to erect
a two-story brick business building in Beaver City the Norris Block.
Early in die year he initiated the necessary real estate transactions.
The local brickyard agreed to supply the necessary bricks, and con
tracts were awarded for the lumber and iron work. Before the winter
was over all arrangements had been completed and construction was

of the Lashley mill,

under way. 18
Norris wanted to

buy only

for cash,

and asked various business

firms to quote him prices with this understanding. By June, however,
the Panic of 1893 was well under way and banks became increasingly

making loans. Only after Miles and Norris had fully
Falls City Bank their
explained to the Board of Directors of the
take his note for
arrangements did the board members agree to
19
for
cash was quickly
Thus Norris' policy of buying only
$5,000.
difficulties
started.
By building in a period of
jeopardized and his
into a national depression,
broadened
which
financial panic
quickly
when all sensible business
at
a
time
himself
had
overextended
Norris
men were sharply curtailing their activities.
By autumn, despite difficulties, the Norris Block was almost com
faced north and east on the square, and had the
pleted. The building
name "Norris" and the year "1893* engraved on its pediment. Norris
be moved from Hopping's
requested that the Beaver City Post Office

hesitant about

Drug

Store to his building, suggesting among other reasons that its
would then be over five hundred feet nearer to the railroad

location

insured against fire, windstorms, and tor
depot. He had the building
floor
nadoes, moved his office to the second floor, and reserved the first
20
Furnas
the
This space, however, was taken by
for the post office.
Bank, which eventually caused Norris much more difficulty

County

than the post

office.

As the depression deepened, the Norris Block brought in less and
less money in rent. By 1895 Norris had to borrow money on his life
insurance policies to meet his mounting financial obligations. In
April, 1895, the

Furnas County Bank

failed, depriving Norris of

both
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the rent of his chief tenant and nearly $1,400 he had deposited in

its

vaults. 21

The day after the bank failed, the next best tenant in the building,
the owner of a stock of general merchandise, also failed. The other
tenants, who likewise had been doing business with the bank, were
unable to pay their rent. The result was that by June, 1895, Norris
was receiving

month instead

of the $74 he had orig
but
no buyers, and could
inally anticipated.
ample property
not pay anything on his loans until a crop was ready for market. Nor
ris first tried unsuccessfully to borrow from friends to whom he had
previously loaned various sums, and then called upon his more affluent
L.U.N. classmates, who responded most generously. 22
The failure of the Furnas County Bank came at a most inoppor
tune time for George Norris, interfering with the political activities
in which he was engaged. Whereas previously business, to his regret,
had to take precedence over politics and had to be shared with legal
work, henceforth law and politics would be Norris' chief concerns. His
numerous and varied business contacts helped to make his political
and legal work easier. Though not a Populist (his. dedication to the
Republican party was too great for that), Norris well understood why
rents of $3 per

He had

new

party gained in influence and power. He knew the difficulties
faced
and the grievances they harbored, having experienced
people
some of them himself. He first began to interest himself in politics in
Nebraska in 1890, just as the Populist party in the state was being or
the

ganized.

The

People's Independent party, to give

would provide Norris with

it its official

his earliest political antagonists.

name,

Chapter 4

Populism and

Politics

ON July 29, 1890, at Bohanan's Hall in Lincoln, more than eight hun
dred delegates and several hundred well-wishers witnessed the launch
ing o a new political party, one that claimed to speak for discontented
and economically depressed farmers and workers. This party wreaked
havoc upon the traditional political structure of the state, and it swept
like wildfire through the debt-ridden
short-grass country of southwest
Nebraska, Populists, during the decade, were elected to every major
political office, though at no time were they able to dominate the state
without help from the older political parties. In 1890, for the first time
since Nebraska became a state, the Republican party met defeat at the
polls, and numerous measures designed to alleviate the discontent that
became abundantly evident with drought and depression were seri
ously considered

by the

legislature.

The

Populists in Nebraska gained most of their followers from the
ranks of dissatisfied Republican farmers and small businessmen. By
1894,

when William

Jennings Bryan wrested control of the Democratic

party in the state from its conservative leaders, discontented Demo
crats had a leader and soon a program that articulated their needs and
desires.

While many Republicans would support the new party, family

traditions, social pressures, and antagonisms dating back to the Civil
War made it impossible for most of them to support the Democratic

party. Eventually most of these people went back to their old party
and tried, as Bryan had done with the Democratic party in Nebraska

and on the national level, to reform it from within. Their children,
growing up in a political environment that called for effective govern
ment action to promote the general welfare by curbing corporate
wealth and privilege, would carry many of the ideas and policies they
heard expounded in their youth into the progressive wing of the Re
publican party in the new century.
Many of the farmers, small businessmen, and professional men in
Nebraska who remained true to the Republican party fully understood
most of their opponents' complaints and recognized the validity of

27
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However, they felt with some justification that
Populist leaders bordered on demagoguery in their political con
duct and that reform could be better obtained within the framework

some

of their remedies.

many

of the party of Lincoln. George Norris, who quickly found himself a
lone Republican lawyer surrounded by a mob of Populists, was among
those who took this stand. 1 He later wrote of this period, "I could see
nothing unnatural about this Populist movement. It represented human

misery and poverty. It came into existence as naturally as the sea
2
Thus at the time when Populism was sweeping across the
sons."
Great Plains Norris launched his political career.

He

started

it

in the

most disastrous way possible

with a defeat.

This was the only defeat he ever met at the polls until his last

cam

paign for public office in 1942; his political life began and ended with
rejection at the polls. In 1890 he sought the office of prosecuting attor

ney of Furnas County. His opponent, John T. McClure, was also his
outstanding lawyer in Beaver City. McClure, owner of the
Beaver City Times, was a former Democrat turned Populist, and he
handily defeated Norris on election day. The Populist party gained
control of both houses of the state legislature and elected two con
gressmen, one of whom, W. A. McKeighan, whose district included
Furnas County, also received the Democratic nomination.
rival as the

.

Norris

devote as

campaigned vigorously,

much

curtailing his

other activities to

time as possible to politics, and paying most of the
3

expenses himself. However, the post of prosecuting attorney did not
elude him. Twice he was appointed to fill out unexpired terms and
once in 1892 he was elected. His mortgage-loan business, his
legal

work, and his strenuous campaigning helped to make him known
personally to almost every voter in Furnas County. Thus without un
due effort on his part Norris became a Republican
party leader. In
1891 Furnas County Republicans wanted to nominate him for district
4
judge and rumors to this effect appeared in the
press.

was politics that brought Norris into contact with W. S. Morlan
of McCook, undoubtedly the most
powerful figure in Republican
circles
in
southwestern
Nebraska.
As general attorney for the
party
and
Missouri
he
wielded
considerable
Burlington
influence, and Norris
railroad
from
him.
two men at times
The
usually requested
passes
worked together on a case and Morlan, whenever the
opportunity
arose, sent legal business to Norris. Morlan was an exceptionally gen
erous man at times; in one instance, for
example, he refused to accept
any money on a case in which Norris had done most of the work.
Morlan was an able lawyer and was very
demanding of his associates
and assistants. No Republican candidate could obtain a nomination
It
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Red Willow County without his approval, and he enjoyed
much power throughout the region.

for office in

almost as

Morlan was undoubtedly responsible for

Norris'

becoming the

Beaver City for the Burlington and Missouri. It is
not known when Norris first assumed this job, but by 1894 he was very
much a part of the company, 5 and was in its employ while he served
as prosecuting attorney. But when he went on the bench
a full-time
which
his
he
office
not
was
job,
previous public
gave up this work
with the Burlington and Missouri and his other business as well.
The 1892 election saw Norris again seeking the office of prosecuting
local attorney in

and state candidates and issues in this elec
he concerned himself almost exclusively with his particular cam
paign. He was optimistic about his chances. Since his opponent, a
Mr. Harper, was not highly reputed as a lawyer, Norris wanted his
own supporters to portray him as a capable attorney, one who would
be competent to look after the business of the county. If his candidacy
was presented in this light, Norris believed that despite overwhelming
6
Populist sentiment in the county he could be elected. And he was
elected, even though the fusion candidate McKeighan, won handily
in the newly created Fifth Congressional District which included
southwest Nebraska, and a Populist, James B, Weaver, received almost
a two-hundred vote majority over Benjamin Harrison in Furnas
County. This was the first time in the county's history that it cast its
attorney. Ignoring national

tion,

7
presidential vote for other than a Republican candidate.
as
work
a lawyer also
With his election Norris found that his
increased. Since the prosecuting attorney was usually about the court

house, lawyers as well as clients throughout the county sought his
services or asked his advice. Tax matters came within his purview,

because with the hard times more and more people were unable to
pay their taxes. And as chief law enforcement officer of the county,

had to prosecute criminals and take action in related matters.
With the increase in legal duties, Norris* other business, already
declining because of drought and depression, was not unduly affected.
However, he had to make adjustments to be on hand when the district
and county courts were in session. To avoid confusion, for example,
Norris

he

tried to

have no cases before a

the district court.

And

as time

justice of the

went

on,

peace during a term of

he resented the numerous

and service by citizens who thought that as
he
should
handle their legal work free of charge.
prosecuting attorney
As an aspirant to higher public office, as a Republican officeholder in
a Populist area, he could not afford to antagonize too many people.
impositions on his time

Therefore Norris performed

many

petty legal services for citizens
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did not distinguish between his public office and his private legal
work. 8
In 1894 he did not seek re-election and was able to devote his
candidates. As a leading politician in
energies to aiding Republican
Furnas County he could control some convention votes, usually the
Beaver City delegation, in favor of particular candidates. Conse
leaders contacted him to use his influence for their
quently, party
candidates. There were county, district, and state conven
particular
tions in 1894 and Norris attended them all.
22, was the most
The state convention held in Omaha on

who

August

secured passes for the Furnas County delegates
important. Norris
9
from Morlan and attended to other details. The delegates to the

Nebraska must have been
Republican state convention from southwest
In
the
boarded
as
mood
in a grim
Burlington and Missouri cars.
they
frost had ruined thousands of acres of early corn. Rain
severe
a
May

had been far from adequate, and late in July a furnace-like wind
had withered much of the corn crop. Norris and his fellow delegates
windows saw the results of this devastation.
looking out of their car
effects of panic, depression, and crop failure in terms
understood
They
of their own area. In Omaha they could comprehend what it meant
in terms of an urban area: large numbers of unemployed, row upon
row of houses with boarded windows, newspaper columns filled with
10
notices of foreclosures and sheriffs' sales.
of his corner of the state was
outside
unknown
That Norris was not
candidate for attorney gen
A
assembled.
convention
the
evident as
eral wrote to him as a person "of influence in shaping the disposition
of your delegation." However, Norris did not play a prominent role at
the convention. Thomas J. Majors, who had the support of the Burling
ton Railroad, obtained the gubernatorial nomination. With the excep
fall

tion of the candidate for secretary of state, all the candidates came
state. The entire ticket was composed of

from the eastern part of the

and the platform was fully in accord
regular, standpat Republicans
with their views. It ignored the .events which Norris and his fellow
lives. While
delegates experienced and had to deal with in their daily
the
not
notice
it denounced the Democrats, the platform did
Populist
11

policies.

Norris campaigned for the entire ticket in what turned out to be a
furious as well as a confusing campaign. The results from Furnas

County were most encouraging, for the county was fully redeemed
from Populist control. On the state level, however, the Democrats and
Populists presented a fusion ticket and their candidate, Silas A. Hoicomb, defeated Majors in the race for governor. Edward Rosewater,
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Republican owner of the Omaha Bee, had refused to endorse Majors
and had thrown his paper's support behind Holcomb. This proved to
be a decisive factor in Majors' defeat, as Republicans captured the
other state offices, controlled the legislature, and failed to elect a con
In the Fifth District William E.

gressman only in the Sixth

District.

Andrews became the

Republican congressman from

first

this

new

district.

Norris was pleased with the results of the campaign. He had
stumped the district in behalf of Andrews and other Republican can
didates.

He had renewed

his

acquaintance with Republican leaders in

nearby counties and had met others for the first time. He now was
known to a larger number of voters than ever before. The campaign in
1894 was in effect a

trial

run. Rather than seek another term as

prosecuting attorney, Norris had decided to try for the office held by
Populist D. T. Welty, judge of the Fourteenth Judicial District.
Welty was far from popular among the lawyers who appeared in
his court.

His ability both as judge and lawyer was questioned. More
was convinced that he showed favoritism to Populist de

over, Norris

fendants by continuing cases whenever possible, or by canceling,
12
Whereas in the recent election
usually, the spring term of his court.

Republicans had recaptured many offices from Populist incumbents,
Norris now sought to redeem the judiciary from the taint of Populism.
Shortly after the 1894 election, he began to devote his energies
to the judicial race. First, of course, came the task of securing the
necessary delegates for nomination. By January, 1895, he had started

an extensive correspondence throughout the eight counties comprising
the district, sounding out sentiment and making inquiries about poten
13
tial
delegates who might favor his nomination.
The judicial convention was to be held at McCook in mid-Septem
ber, and as the summer of 1895 came to an end Norris intensified his
efforts. His chief contenders for the nomination were W. R. Starr of
Indianola and a Mr. Benson of McCook. But of equal, if not greater,
importance to Norris was the opposition candidate. Welty was seeking
renomination, but there was a possibility that McClure also would

who had defeated Norris for prosecut
would be a powerful opponent because he was
an able lawyer and had many followers throughout the district.
When the Republican county conventions were held in August all
three candiates intensified their activities to win delegates favorable
to their candidacy. Norris did most of his work through letters. He
relied heavily on his supporters to inform him of local developments.
Once the county conventions were held, the efforts of the candidates
seek the nomination. McClure,

ing attorney in 1890,
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were focused on obtaining control of each of the eight county delega
tions that would gather in McCook on September 18. Since both op
ponents were residents of Red Willow County and a fight between
their followers could only redound to his advantage, Norris made
great efforts to win delegates from this county.
Norris and his supporters by the end of August were most optimis
tic. Indeed, he
questioned whether he should attend the McCook con
vention. Supporters advised him pro and con. But in the end Norris
decided against attending, although he did put in an appearance at
several fairs in the district shortly before the judicial convention

assembled. 14

Events were occurring just as Norris desired. The Populist con
vention early in September renominated Welty by a thumping ma
and the Democrats nominated a separate candidate. At the
jority,
last minute he met requests of
delegates for transportation to the

Republican convention.

He

felt

certain

that

he would win the

nomination. 15

and Benson, Norris was nominated on
Welty, though an easier opponent than McClure
would have been, still had several advantages that would prove dif
ficult to overcome. He was the incumbent and a
Populist in an area
where Populist sentiment was still powerful. His work as a judge,
which outraged Norris and other lawyers because of his flimsy knowl
edge of the law and his failure to hold court for a full session, pleased
the numerous defendants who had
reaped the benefits of his decisions
and actions. After his nomination, Norris received the
note
Despite the

the

first

efforts of Starr

ballot.

following

from Welty:
I feel

much

pleased and congratulate you on your nomination

for the high office of District
Judge, and hope you may have the
16
to
return
the
pleasure
compliment after November 5th.

had several assets during the campaign. First he had the
of
who exerted all of his influence against Welty, using
McClure,
help
his control of the Beaver
City Times to this end. As a result, not a
Norris

newspaper in Furnas County, the home county of both candi
were many prominent dis
Shallenberger, a future congressman
17
and governor, who helped Norris by
making no effort to assist Welty.
It was also to Norris'
that
fusion between Demo
advantage
crats and
this
Populists, unsuccessful in 1894, did not work
single

dates, supported Welty. In addition there
trict Democrats, such as A. C.

during

campaign

either.

The Democrats nominated a

separate candidate.
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among the list of assets was Morris* own reputa
and consideration in the mortgage-loan business.
This insured voters that if elected Norris would not indiscriminately
foreclose mortgages and agree to sheriffs* sales of property.
Early in the campaign, Norris, eager to win all possible support,
may have made a visit to the German settlement, traditionally a Demo
cratic stronghold, north of
Arapahoe. The effort to win votes, how
ever, was not always carried on scrupulously. Some of Norris' sup
porters actually purchased votes and later presented him with a bill for
their expenses. After the campaign, one individual while explaining
his expenses wrote, "I have paid all the parties I agreed to except one
German, $5.00. I have not seen him since election, but he will prob
1S
ably be in town and I will have to pay him.**
C. E. Hopping, Beaver City drugstore proprietor, served as chair
man of the judicial committee managing the campaign. Republican
Last but not least

tion for fairness

made great efforts for Norris, because they realized that
he received and every victory their party won would bring
vote
every
the demise of the Populist party in Nebraska that much closer.
stalwarts

Throughout the campaign, Norris was deluged with requests by Re
publican leaders for railroad passes to bring workers to their home
precincts for election day. Railroad passes also provided an excellent
method of winning disgruntled Democrats and Populists into the

Republican

fold.

Many men, owing

to the

hard times, roamed about

the countryside seeking odd jobs. Their votes, it was believed, would
19
go to the candidate who provided them with transportation.
By the end of October Norris* mail indicated that his chances were

good; none of the letters were pessimistic. The Republicans attacked
Welty as a judge. The fact that he did not discriminate between bona
fide residents

and nonresidents impressed some

voters.

Norris op

posed Welty's "continual and almost endless continuancy for people
who had long ago left the country with no intention of returning or
redeeming their lands,'* and his habit of showing little leniency for
resident mortgagors who were unable to meet interest payments be
cause of crop failures and low prices. Norris argued that if elected
he would grant resident farmers as much consideration

as the

law

20

permitted.

Times blasted Welty as a tool of the
and
other
partisan papers took up this
Burlington and Missouri
21
that
theme.
It is doubtful
Norris, a railroad attorney who was
to
trade
literally trying
passes for votes, denounced his opponent
along these lines. His campaign was geared on a more personal level;

McClure

in the Beaver City
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he directed

his efforts toward meeting as many voters as possible and
the
need for judicial integrity.
stressing
W. W, Barngrover, the Democratic candidate, was not seriously
considered by the electorate, most of whom regarded the campaign

primarily as a race between Norris and Welty. But Barngrover's
presence on the ticket prevented Norris from achieving a clearcut
victory. Norris won by two votes, and only after much time was spent
in debate and litigation was he granted a certificate of election.

However, shortly
unofficial returns

after the polls closed

came

without any doubt.

He

on November

5,

as the first

Norris thought his election was assured
defeated Welty in Fufnas County by over

in,

in Red Willow, the
most populous counties in the district. Indeed, he seemingly carried
all but the
predominantly Populist counties of Hitchcock and Frontier
where Welty's majority was not as large as expected. The first un

three

hundred votes and by over two hundred

22
proclaimed a Norris victory, a verdict verified by the
eight county canvassing boards in the judicial district. The result was

official results

Norris, 4,612; Welty, 4,610; Barngrover, 431.

Judge Welty immediately raised the cry of fraud, claiming that
the figures in Union precinct, Furnas County, had been changed to
give Norris a two-vote lead. If the ballots had not been tampered with,

Welty argued, he would have carried the precinct by four votes and
it the election. He did not
say that Norris manipulated the votes,
and never in the furor that arose did Welty accuse Norris personally
of direct involvement in the fraud. As soon as Welty aired these
charges, Norris contacted all judicial committee chairmen and re
quested them to examine carefully the precinct records in their respec
tive areas for
irregularities. He soon found evidence in other pre
cincts and heard rumors to the effect that votes
properly belonging
to him had been rejected. One chairman wrote, "I think we can collect

with

enough evidence of

irregularities in

Hayes Cbunty alone

to

make 15

votes in your favor." 23
Norris and his supporters also uncovered evidence of fraud in
Frontier County which went for
in the election. The

Welty
county
more votes by irregularities than
Welty," and that "a recount would increase the number" of his votes.
Norris thought that A. R. Curzon, a
Republican banker of Curtis, was
involved in some of these irregularities, because he had not assured
Curzon that if elected he would favor moving the county seat from
Stockville to Curtis. Thus Norris was
prepared, if necessary, to pre
sent charges to combat Welty's. 24 However, until
Welty took legal
sheriff

believed that Norris 'lost
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action, Norris
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of the Fourteenth Judicial

District of the state of Nebraska.

Since Welty's charges were public and Norris' evidence private,
the accusation of fraud would occur in many future campaigns. At the
time, however, the press throughout the state carried the story of his
election along with Welty's charges, and letters of congratulations
poured in upon Norris from delighted Republicans. What Norris ex
pected and this was his reason for collecting evidence of election

frauds

was that Welty would apply

for a writ of

vember

15,

mandamus

to the

Nebraska Supreme Court

to force a correction of the canvass.

Welty and a group

of his advisers

met

in

On No

an Indianola law

behind

closed doors arid curtained windows," and several days
did
as Norris expected. Since Norris already had evidence
Welty
of fraud and more was being unearthed by his friends, he had no
doubt he would be able to hold the office, though it might take a legal
office

later

contest to do so. 25

a suit charging fraudulent returns from Union precinct
He claimed that his opponent's tally had been
from
to
forty
forty-six after the county board certified the re
changed
and
that
was
it
C. S. Anderson, McClure's law partner, who
turns,
in
the pollbook on the Sunday following the
the
votes
changed
canvass. Welty alleged that the pollbook figures did not tally with

Welty

filed

in Eurnas County.

those of the county commissioners, and that the additional six votes
gave Norris a plurality of two. Both Anderson and County Clerk

McFadden were

Populists

who, as suporters of McCIure, probably

men argued these charges,
while Norris* followers countered them by alleging that many Norris
votes had been thrown out by prejudiced election boards on the
favored Norris* election. Partisans of both

grounds of

irregularities in

On November

marking.

26, 1895, the

Furnas County canvassing board met

in Beaver City, pursuant to the mandamus of the Supreme Court, and
re-examined tie judicial vote of the entire county. Their results showed

that Norris still carried the county by two votes even though the
Union precinct pollbook had been tampered with, as Welty had
but four more votes
charged. The converted six votes were disallowed,
The
the
recanvass.
in
were
found
for Norris
county tally as certified
for
881
and
for
Norris
Welty, making a total
by the board was 1,375

26
for the judicial district of 4,612 votes to 4,610 in favor of Norris.
In accord with these findings, on November 29, every member of the

board signed a certificate of election which declared
Norris the legally elected judge of the fourteenth Judicial District.
state canvassing
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The

action

tions of

was taken

Governor

and over the initial objec
A. Holcomb, a Populist and a member of the

after a long session

Silas

board. 27

Thus, by the end of November, Norris' election finally became
Welty said he would file his oath of office with the secretary of

official.

state 28

and continue

he brought an ouster proceeding
of
Court
the state. Norris, with McClure
Supreme
Lincoln
in
as
his
went
to
attorney,
April, 1896, to attend a meet
acting
the
at
which
a
commissioner
was to be ap
of
Court
ing
Supreme
evidence.
In
Lincoln
learned
that
to
take
they
pointed
Judge Welty
to serve, while

against Norris in the

had dismissed

his action. 29

Norris later claimed that

if

the contest

had been

tried

and

his

evidence presented, he would have won by between fifty and one
hundred votes. 30 When a correspondent asked why he did not counter
Welty's charges with evidence of his own, he replied, "We have not
taken the pains to give it publicity as Judge Welty always does

when he
time,

and

thinks he finds something wrong, but prefer to abide our
31
let the matter come
up for the first time in court."

ever, since Norris

How

never had

enemies con
tinued to charge that the election had been stolen for him.
After ten years in Nebraska, George Norris, age thirty-four, had
carved a remarkable career for himself. He was about to enter upon
his judicial duties after
engaging in one of the hardest fought cam
this opportunity, political

paigns in southwestern Nebraska, and had every reason to be satisfied
and even optimistic about a promising judicial career and, perhaps,
higher political attainments. He was one of the youngest district court
judges in the history of Nebraska.
But, despite numerous reasons for optimism, Norris was somewhat
melancholy and depressed as the year ended. He was disturbed

by

the litigation with Welty,
displeased about the behavior of some of
his supporters, and burdened
by the heavy expenses incurred during
the campaign (over $3,500), He was afraid that a contested court
case would bankrupt him, and was
dismayed by the lack of aid and
encouragement he received from the Republican party. 32 Norris be
lieved that conspiracy,
corporations, and corruption were united to

secure his political downfall.
Norris had fought a vigorous, skilful
campaign, one that few ob
servers thought at the outset he would win. Yet a
brooding sense of
melancholy overwhelmed him, a sense of isolation that made him

seem solemn and sad

in a moment of
triumph. Norris enjoyed cam
paigning. The melancholy that made him almost feel sorry for him
self set in after the results were known. In later
too, he was

campaigns,
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was not

greatly interested in support
contest.
This
increased
his
his
sense
of isolation and made him
ing
realize that in politics he was almost always on his own. These traits,
his party

evident by the end of his first important campaign, became more pro
nounced and were more widely observed in future years.

Chapter

5

The Family Man
DURING the campaign, the ensuing litigation, and general confusion
following his contested victory, George Norris was too busy to fully
enjoy his infant daughter, Hazel. Since Mrs. Norris had previously
given birth to a stillborn child, the parents were especially delighted
with Hazel, born in January of 1895. In February of 1897 another
daughter, Marian, blessed their household. Pluma Norris proved her
self a devoted wife and mother and the family circle was a very
happy
one.

After her mother's death in 1894 Pluma found the house too large
for the needs of her family. Norris had difficulty selling the property
because of the depression, but at the end of the century he was
finally able to make a satisfactory arrangement. The family then moved
to a house

more

suitable to

its

needs in McCook, the seat of neighbor

ing Red Willow County.
Though he was busy with

judicial

and family

responsibilities,

Norris did not ignore his mother in Ohio. Whenever he went east,
usually to attend IOOF conventions, he arranged to visit with her and
his nearby sisters. He
spent the entire month of August, 1896, visiting
with his mother on the family farm and seeing old acquaintances in

Clyde and other nearby communities. In 1897 his mother and a

sister

vacationed in Nebraska. 1
In 1892 his mother had divorced Isaac Parker,
charging him with
of
on
the
that
he
did
not
gross neglect
duty
grounds
adequately pro
vide her with clothing and other necessities. 2 In order to ease the
financial

burdens of

his mother,

who was allowed

to

resume the name

of Norris, her son suggested that she
apply for a pension as the
mother of a gallant soldier who had died for his country. 3

Norris was solicitous about his mother's welfare

needy

and continually

inquired about her in his letters to Melissa, who lived in Clyde. Mary
Norris, after her divorce, claimed that she wanted to sell the farm
and spend the remainder of her days in Nebraska. But because of her

38
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failing health, the lack of a good offer for the farm,
4
financial difficulties, she made no effort to move.

39

and her

son's

By the end of the century Mary Norris was living with her daughter
Melissa. She made periodic visits back to the farm, which was then
operated by a tenant, and delighted in the atmosphere. She examined
the fruit trees, drank in the balmy spring air, and tasted the fruit as it
ripened. She discussed the prospects of the wheat crop with the tenant.

farm made her nostalgic and she talked about moving
to the old place and selling or renting the fields to nearby farmers
so that she could live in the house. Her health, as she approached her

Visits to the

back

eighth decade of life, was slowly deteriorating, and frequent colds
depleted her strength. Her interest in her grandchildren was great,

and she was

full of

advice on

how

Ohio
and was

to raise them. After a trip to

in 1897, Hazel talked for months about her grandmother
5
eager to visit her again whenever the opportunity arose.

As a thirty-four-year-old judge, Norris found that his greying hair
and recently grown beard helped to give him a more mature appear
ance, and made him a known figure as he traveled through the eightcounty judicial district. On formal occasions he wore a wing collar,
though he avoided it whenever possible in the interests of comfort.
He was not yet sporting the cigar which characterized his congres
sional career, but was experimenting with pipes during this period.
Since he preferred thinner soled shoes than he could buy in Beaver
City, he bought his shoes, along with baby furniture and other items,
from a mail-order catalogue. 6
Norris enjoyed music, and after his marriage he rented and later
purchased a piano. Now he could enjoy to the utmost an evening at
home with friends, neighbors, and later children to harmonize with
his baritone voice. Together they sang what later generations would
call "the old favorites." Effervescent water and lemon sour which he
ordered in Iowa added to the merriment on these occasions. It is
he purchased a piano, Norris tried
interesting to note that shortly after
bachelor days. 7
During the difficult years of the 1890's, Norris increased his library
and kept abreast of current events. He purchased many law books,
sell
although shortly after his election to the bench, he was forced to
a number of them to the West Publishing Company in order to pay
8
his debts to that firm.
Besides local newspapers, Norris subscribed to the Nebraska State

to sell his pool table,

probably a

relic of

Journal, published in Lincoln, which he relied upon for state and na
tional news. To obtain a volume of letters by his favorite humorist,

Petroleum V. Nasby, he subscribed to the Toledo Weekly Blade, which
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offered the volume.

To obtain

a Lincoln volume, he subscribed to the
received other national periodicals, such

North American Review. He
as the Literary Digest, and much children's

literature to

encourage

his

youngsters as they learned to read. During the expansionist decade of
the 1890's, he became so interested in Hawaii that he entered a sub

Honolulu Advertiser. Thus, in Beaver City, George
what he had missed on the Ohio farm: the solace of
music, an entrance to the world of literature, and a broader perspec
scription for the

Norris achieved

tive

on current events. 9

During their residence in Beaver City, the growing family experi
enced the usual illnesses, aches, and pains. Since Norris had to be
away from home for long periods of time (when court was in session
he rarely managed to remain at home for more than a week), he was
concerned about Pluma and the children if they were ill. In September
of 1896 Norris himself was bedridden for several weeks with a lame
back which mended very slowly. 10
In March of 1897 the entire family, including the hired girl, came
down with an affliction that kept Norris too busy attending sick
people to open his mail. Confusion and chaos reigned in the house

member of the family, except Norris,
again became sick. Pluma remained ill over a month and by mid-April
she still had not fully recovered. In May, Norris used a railroad pass

hold. In February of 1899, every

provided by Morlan to take her to Lincoln to seek further medical
attention and to have her dental work done. 11
When his family was in its usual good health, Norris looked forward
to brief visits at home when court was in session. He relished the

when it was not in

session. Norris was indeed a doting
with
the
parent, watching
pleasure
development of his two daughters,
Hazel and Marian. He wrote, "No sweeter nor nicer girls have the
privilege of residing on this earth/' Hazel looked so much like him
that he claimed, "If she belonged to any other family than the one of
which I am the head it would be a good cause for divorce from me."
By the end of the century Hazel was taking an interest in the com
munity and was terribly concerned about the health of a barefoot
boy who went by the house, while Marian, a healthy and chubby
12
three-year-old, talked the family almost to distraction.
A few diversions also took Norris away from the family circle. Trips
to IOOF conventions were an
example, though Norris usually de
posited his family with his mother or sister in Ohio before proceeding
to the convention city. Before the children were born, Pluma and
George in June of 1893 had a wonderful trip to the Chicago Fair. On
the Fourth of July and other such occasions Norris indulged his

longer intervals
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oratorical talents, keeping his name before the public in a favorable
way. The L.U.N. reunions, another diversionary activity, soon came
to be a family affair as the members appeared with their wives and

children.
It was the pressure of world events, particularly the SpanishAmerican War, that threatened most ominously to take Norris away
from his family. He wanted to enlist and undoubtedly could have
obtained a field commission, but he knew it would probably shorten
his mother's life if a second son went to war. Norris was grateful that
his judicial duties overwhelmed him with work at this time. He wrote
to a sister, "I am afraid I will get the war fever if I am not kept
busy." Though he supported the war and its results, he did not let
them preoccupy his thoughts. He contributed twenty-five dollars to
help pay the traveling expenses of the First Regiment Nebraska Volun
teers, which had participated in crushing the forces of Aguinaldo in

the Philippine Islands. 13
his children, was the organiza
this became so timeOccasionally
participated.
ceased to be a diversion. But usually he delighted in

Norris' major diversion, aside
tional life in

from

which he

consuming that it
and formed many

lasting friendships. In an indirect way it aided
his political ambitions; lodge brothers had supported him in all of his
campaigns and would continue to do so in the future. Membership in
it

various organizations gave him a wide range of contacts throughout
the state, while fraternal activities enabled him to travel and renew

The IOOF, the Odd Fellows, was the organiza
he
devoted
most of his attention while a resident of
tion to which
At
the
Beaver City.
outset, Norris participated in Knights Templar
conclaves in Holdrege, but by the time he became a judge his free
time was almost exclusively devoted to IOOF affairs. He served as a
delegate to the Sovereign Grand Lodge from Nebraska in the IOOF
and attended annual sessions of that body in Boston and Detroit. In
1896-97 Norris served as Grand Master of the Odd Fellows in the
Dakota. This
jurisdiction that included Nebraska and part of South
of
his
about
three-fourths
consumed
he
time, and he
estimated,
job,
was thankful as his term drew to a close. His active interest in the

these acquaintances.

IOOF

declined after his service as representative to the Sovereign

Grand Lodge. This was a position to which he was elected without
and one
opposition and by acclamation, an extraordinary occurrence
which Norris deeply appreciated. His experiences, which he never ex
had not been what he antici
plained, in the Sovereign Grand Lodge
no desire to be re-elected.
and
had
he
disillusioned
became
pated;
By the end of the century Norris, though a member of several fra-
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ternal

and benevolent

associations,

was no longer an

active participant

in any of them. 14

Other than his election as a judge, most aspects of Norris' adult
in Nebraska were not very different from those of other young
western lawyers. His interest in politics, concern with family, and

life

participation in various organizations were and still are typical of
lawyers in small towns throughout America. The office of county

prosecuting attorney was and still is for many lawyers the first rung
on the ladder of political advancement. Typical too, during this decade
of drought and depression, were the financial problems and accom
panying worries. After 1896 his affairs, like other people's, began to

ease owing to the return of adequate rainfall, good crops, and, ac

cording to Republican politicians, "McKinley Prosperity."
When Norris was elected to the bench he was heavily in debt and
was preoccupied for several years with the need to pay off these
obligations. He owned property on which he had realized very little
and which he either hoped to sell or to rent profitably. His salary as
a judge was $2,500 a year, and by 1897 he was able to pay the
15
premiums on $9,600 worth of life insurance. The struggle to get out
of debt was a long and difficult one. Throughout his life the memory
of it and the fear of its recurrence made Norris conservative about
fiscal affairs. This conservatism and his belief that no one should
spend
more than his income were noted in his public life from that time on.
Meanwhile, though on the bench, Norris maintained a lively in
terest in his business transactions. Though he could no
longer engage
in the mortgage-loan business, he continued to speculate to buy and
sell real estate and to
manage various holdings for himself and for
members of his family. When he first came to Nebraska he borrowed
money from some of his sisters. Later he invested funds for them.
When he was heavily in debt he again borrowed money from his
sisters, though he never told his mother of his financial embarrass

ment. 16

Because of his financial

difficulties,

Norris tried to

sell

some of

his

During the campaign of 1896 he found it unsalable because of
the political excitement. It was equally difficult to borrow money on
land.

land; one company wrote, "If McKinley
in the market but we do not care to

is

elected,

we

think

we

will

be

make any investments while
there is an uncertainty as to what kind of money a
person will be paid
back in." Norris was also informed by one of his creditors that unless
McKinley was elected, he would have to pay his note when due and
could expect no extension. After McKinley's election, he was able to
17
it on
generous terms,

renew
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When his land was occupied by a farmer, Norris usually helped
decide what crops would be raised. He preferred alfalfa and some
times gave instructions on how to plant it. When the crops were har
vested, Norris received an "owner's part of the crop." At times, he
would write

to the

Department of Agriculture making

inquiries

and

13
requesting seed samples.
he
had
to take legal action against land purchasers
Occasionally
who did not make payments on their notes. He did this only after

and accepting numerous promises which
a case came to court Norris preferred, if
reach a compromise solution. In one instance, a pair of
possible, to
debtors unable to meet their obligation assigned him some of their
giving repeated extensions

were not

fulfilled.

When

Beaver City. Other debtors made other arrangements. By
1898 conditions had improved so much that Norris told Miles, "Good
level land on the bottom suitable for alfalfa cannot be bought any
where in Furnas County for much less than $20,00 per acre and most
of it is higher than that." Moreover, if the 1898 crops were good, real
real estate in

estate anticipated "the greatest rush" in the history of the short-grass
Norris urged Miles to
country by the spring of 1899. Consequently

whatever funds he could scrape
purchase land, and he tried with
19
either land or mortgages.
obtain
to
together
a continuing and embar
Renting space in the Norris Block was
stood as a monument to Norris'
rassing problem. The empty building
lack of financial wisdom. After the failure of the Furnas County Bank,
.

he assumed ownership of its safe and other fixtures; these he offered
to sell to a prospective buyer if he would agree to establish a new
bank and rent the space at a reduced rate. This plan, however, met
with no success. Another office in the building was left vacant when its
his rent, suggesting that
occupant, a doctor, left town without paying
were unpaid. However,
accounts
whose
it
from
Norris collect
patients
and Norris" financial
rented
was
the
1898
fully
building
by March of
and
able
to
now
was
He
declined.
worries
liquidate his obligations
20
some income from his real estate holdings.
His most perplexing and difficult financial problem, while not fully
settled at the end of the century, had turned out far better than he had
Pluma's mother had left Norris with two items
expected. The death of
to dispose of the Beaver City mill and the house in which the family
was living. 21 The family resided in the latter until 1899 when it was

derive

a
finally sold, after

long search for a buyer.

The history of the mill was more complicated. In 1888 Pluma's
father had given a mortgage to James H. Tallman on 240 acres of
land for $2,500. This land contained Lashley s original residence, the
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a barn, a small house for a tenant, and other improvements. At
his widow inherited the mill and the build
Lashley's death in 1890,
the mortgage. Pluma's brother, Charles P. Lashley,
assumed
and
ings
from
inherited the balance of the property, which Norris later bought
stated that he was not to pay
him. The deed of
mill,

conveyance

distinctly
mill property, believed to

be worth
water
the
and
about ten thousand dollars, consisted of the buildings
mill
was
The
land.
of
acres
and twenty
power, mill race, and dam,
of
her
time
the
At
acres.
death,
almost at the center of the twenty
off the $2,500 mortgage, and it was
had not
Sarah
any

part of the mortgage.

The

paid

Lashley
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the difficulty in settling the estate.
mortgage which caused
owners sold the mill property, the
later
and
When Mrs. Lashley
and agreed to
the
that
grantee assumed
conveyances all stipulated
had
1898
in
owners
The
improved the
pay the $2,500 mortgage.
to show a profit on its operation. They
and were

this

beginning
property
the holder, after
were, however, unable to pay the mortgage, and
several extensions, was about to begin foreclosure proceedings in

March, 1898.
At this point Norris,
a compromise.

borrowing funds from Miles, suggested
of
pay $2 000 cash for the assignment

after

He

to

proposed
mortgage, but before this
mill outright from the owners.
this

?

offer

was accepted Norris bought the

He then offered the property for sale
the offer of
a
at $4,000. Unable to locate
purchaser, he accepted
in the mill.
interest
half
a
for
a
note
him
Shafer, who
gave

George

With the help of Miles, the partners then installed modern machinery
and renovated the mill. Shafer handled its management, but Norris
23
took a lively interest in it.
Drain though the will was on his time and energy, Norris was learn
his will, about milling. By the summer of 1899,
ing, almost against
business was so good that the partners could not meet the demand
installed a
for their flour.
engine so the mill could al

They

ways operate

at capacity.

gasoline
Norris returned to Beaver City after
himself with mill business until he had

When

holding court, he immersed
to depart for another court session at another county seat. The income
from the mill undoubtedly assuaged Norris for the need to work even
24

during brief respites from judicial duties.
By the end of 1899, Norris and his partner agreed to rent the mill
Since the partners had spent over
if the
right man could be found.

was willing to sell at a
twenty-five hundred dollars in repairs, neither
means of getting back
The
best
that
attracted
potential buyers.
price
a
their investment and
they thought, was to rent the
making

profit,

property to an experienced miller. Such a person was

W. W.

Tallman,

THE FAMILY MAN
who had

previously worked
Beaver City. Norris had faith
to sell the

hoped eventually

when
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came to
in Tallman's experience and ability and
property to him. Thus when Norris moved

McCook

at the mill

Norris

first

were being made
and
contentious
costly, complicated,
problem
seemed to be on its way toward a satisfactory solution.
Though the mill consumed most of his spare time, it helped

from Beaver City

to

to rent the mill, 25

and a

relieve

Norris'

financial

in 1899, arrangements

embarrassment. In the twentieth century

private business matters would not preoccupy him to the extent they
did at this time. As he moved on to the national scene, Norris' financial
position became more comfortable, though he rarely could afford
luxuries of any kind. Fortunately his tastes were simple and moderate,
and he was able to provide for the modest needs of his family with

out suffering the pangs of anxiety and the curse of debt he had experi
enced in the last decade of the nineteenth century.

By 1900 he was paying
his greatest pleasure

He

returned the

from

off his

long-standing obligations, receiving

settling accounts

with his L.U.N. friends.
his life insurance and

money formerly borrowed on

increased the amount he held

a final measure of his improving finan

In November, 1899, he took out an $8,000 policy with the
Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, acknowledging the fact

cial status.

he was beginning to experience the prosperity that seemed to be
pervading the United States. With his private life now on a financially
secure basis, Norris could devote a greater portion of his time and
that

energies to his career as judge of the Fourteenth Judicial District of
the State of Nebraska. 26

Chapter 6

Judge Norris
GEORGE NOBKIS found

his job as a district
judge both challenging and
In
his
he
claimed, possibly forgetting his
enjoyable.
autobiography
financial troubles at the time, that the seven years he
spent on the

bench were the most satisfactory years of his life. He even wondered
if he had made a mistake to leave his
post for a political career in
1
when
he
mounted
the bench, he was achiev
Washington. Certainly
a
status
and
a
that
set
him well above his dis
ing
salary ($2,500)
tressed fellow citizens,

As a judge, more so than as a prosecuting attorney or as a
lawyer
in the mortgage-loan business, Norris came in contact with a wide
with "human nature
range of people and their multifarious
problems,

and goodness; and all of its weakness and error."
All of this had its effect.
During his years on the bench he wrote',
"My sympathies were to be broadened, my understanding of life en
riched, and my conceptions of simple justice strengthened." 2 He met
a variety of situations which required either his decision or his
precise
instructions to a jury, and in so
doing he increased his understanding,
knowledge, and respect for the law and its processes.
Almost thirty years before Norris became a
judge, a young Boston
lawyer with a philosophical bent, reviewing a volume in the American
in all of

its

nobility

Law

Review, succinctly noted the significant role that busy western
judges, like Norris, performed. Oliver Wendell Holmes praised them as
men who were "more intent on adapting the law to modern
require
ments than on standing in the ancient
ways." Norris, like many of his
colleagues, with little opportunity in his previous preparation for the
study of legal scholarship or philosophy, and almost no opportunity
in his present
position, would have been regarded with contempt by
many of Holmes* more proper associates in the Boston bar. But as
Holmes noted, with many of Norris' colleagues in mind, one could not
expect of them that "businesslike common sense" which was to be
found among the lawyers of the western states. 3
Holmes, with his in
sight and understanding of
realities,
described the
legal

46

adequately
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role that Norris fulfilled as a district judge. Morris was a realist and a
pragmatist in the dispensation of justice. Conditions as they existed
in rainless, poverty-stricken, debt-ridden southwestern Nebraska were

basic considerations in his decision making.
To a visitor from Holmes* Boston, Norris and his colleagues on the
bench and bar would have seemed rather crude at the outset. They

dressed plainly; some were quite careless in their personal appear
Few were as well educated as Norris; most had less preparation

ance.

few words of barbarous Latin jargon they had
extracted from law books, and usually mispronounced, they knew noth
ing of foreign languages unless they were brought up in an immigrant
home, which they generally considered a liability. Even the English
in law. Outside of the

language was mingled with variations that would have grated harshly
upon the ears of the Harvard-trained lawyer. If a lawyer or Norris
himself said, "It looks like the plaintiff will win his case," or, of a man
in jail, "He wants out," the Boston visitor would have had difficulty
separating the speaker from his phrase or believing that he could
really be a man of learning or ability. But if the visitor had daily
contact with his western counterparts, witnessed the competitive trial
in court, observed the actualities of life which concerned them, and
recognized their ability "to think under

fire

to think for action

upon

which great interests depend," he would have realized that the bench
and bar of western Nebraska, though they lacked the cultural polish
and intellectual tone of his own Boston, were indeed not very dif
ferent in professional skill and ability. Certainly the visitor would have
noted after observation and contact that Judge Norris' mind in its
analytical and logical capacities was well suited to the law. He would
have seen that Norris had a shrewd sense and a keen knowledge of
human nature and that he was capable of clear thinking and of fluent
and forcible, if not elegant, speech and writing. And if the proper
Bostonian observed carefully enough he would have noted that these
western Nebraska lawyers and judges, though they exhibited very few
of the ornaments of learning, possibly had a better perspective of life
and the things that are useful in it than many of his associates. 4
In some respects the bar of the eight-county judicial district was
comparable to a large family over which Norris presided. He soon
knew, lawyers in each county and met with them early in the morn
ing in the courtroom to make up the issues and dispose of matters
preliminary to the official opening of his court. He usually held two
sessions in each county during the annual term of the district court,
one involving equity cases and the other jury trials. The first session
occurred during the winter or spring, while the second convened in
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the autumn or winter. There were so

many

cases

on the docket during

he called a special session and held
the
year Norris presided that
court during the summer months of 1896 at each county seat.
As a judge, beginning in January 1896, Norris stood in marked con
trast to his predecessor, Welty. During the campaign it was charged
from the bench by favoring debtors
had
that
first

Welty

played

politics

creditors and Republicans. It was claimed that
Populists over
rather than foreclose, Welty would cancel a session of his court and
debtors from losing their property. Norris too had to

and

thereby prevent
meet the difficult problem o ordering foreclosures and sheriffs' sales,
but unlike Welty he was courteous, capable, and impartial in the

administration of his judicial office.
Norris' solution to the foreclosure problem was not markedly dif
ferent from Welty's. If the individual who lived on the property that
was presented for foreclosure had made every effort to meet his pay
ments but had been unable to do so because of the drought, Norris

and thereby complete the foreclosure
law, he would have confirmed
proceeding.
each sale as it appeared before him, but he wrote, "It is a very hard
and difficult thing to take away from a man his home when it is all
to save it and pay the debt, and has
he has, and where he is
hesitated to order a sheriff's sale

Had he strictly followed the

trying

been prevented from doing so by some act of Providence, or some cir
cumstance beyond his control."
a course of mercy than to follow the
Believing it wiser to pursue
he thought
would
Norris
grant extensions whenever
strictly legal path,
to meet
his
desire
in
sincere
and
was
debtor
the
honest, industrious,
admitted that some people possibly obtained exten
obligations. Norris
sions by "false and fraudulent representations," but he preferred "to
lean to the side of mercy" and pursue the course that he thought was
"mercifully
justice,

and morally

but given the

plight of

many

difficult

citizens, it

This may not have been impartial
economic conditions and the desperate
a realistic effort to find a middle5

right/'

represented

and long-term extensions.
ground between continual foreclosures
In such cases, Norris was facing an historic situation with prece
dents deep in the American past. Foreclosure meant that the fanner
would lose his farm and much of his chattel property, and thus would
be without means to plant or harvest a crop. Sheriffs' sales rarely
brought in enough money

to satisfy creditors,

while debtors could

become a public charge. Therefore whenever he was convinced
that a farmer was doing everything possible to pay off his note, Norris
was willing to give the person an opportunity "consistent with justice
and right" to save his homestead. If after granting an extension, how-
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had reason
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to believe that the individual involved

was

not doing everything possible to meet his obligation, he would refuse
6
to grant a further extension, thereby bringing about the foreclosure.
Norris confirmed sales only if the mortgage indebtedness was in
excess of the value of the land and the owner could in no way benefit

from an extension. In cases where he felt a farmer would eventually
meet his obligations, he postponed confirmation until the next term. In
all cases he took into account the value of the land and the means
the farmer had available to meet his debt. Before Norris granted an
extension, the farmer had to agree to pay on his note any cash he
possessed and any income he could anticipate from his current crops,
and to pay taxes on his property. 7
Since Nebraska had no moratorium legislation until the New Deal
period, each judge had to work out a solution to this problem. Norris*
solution, while more moderate than his predecessor's, was at first pro
tested with equal bitterness by the attorneys for the mortgage holders.
However, after it had been applied for two or three years it met with
general satisfaction. Norris believed this policy provided the best pos
sible way for the creditor to get his money, since a sheriff's sale was no
8
guarantee that he would be reimbursed for the full amount of his loan.
Thus, while Norris served as a district judge, numerous debt-ridden

farmers were able to pay off their mortgages and maintain ownership
of their property. At the same time Norris was able to retain the
respect of both creditors and debtors and obtain the support of most
citizens in the district for his fair policy.

He

avoided the animosities

that Populist Judge Welty had aroused, and increased his chances for
re-election when his term came to an end in 1899.
While foreclosure proceedings were the most important and nu
merous of the cases that appeared on his docket, Judge Norris had
other duties to perform. Some of them had political overtones. In one
instance, a bank in the district failed, and Norris had to appoint a re
ceiver to untangle its activities and list its assets prior to final disposi
tion. Receivers worked for a small salary; none received more than

a month. But owing to the hard times, lawyers through
out the district sought such appointments. It was not always easy to
find a competent and unbiased man. However, by the autumn of
Norris' first year on the bench, economic conditions improved and
fifty dollars

these appointments virtually ceased. 9
As a judge, Norris had to decide

if injunctions should be issued
and
affidavits
demanding them. He also had
upon
to determine whether it was worthwhile to issue judgments against
debtors who were not meeting their obligations. (In such instances he

receipt of petitions
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usually followed a policy similar to that of foreclosure proceedings.)
Norris also felt obligated to answer requests for information addressed

him in his judicial capacity. Could he approve testimony given
before a justice of the peace and on the basis thereof issue citizenship
papers? Could he inform a young lawyer as to the most promising com
munity to start a practice in his district? Of course in no instance did
to

he

offer legal advice. Legal ethics
because of the possibility that he
where his advice, if offered, played
Human interest cases provided

and Nebraska law prohibited this
would have to adjudicate a case
a significant role. 10
a form of social recreation
.

and a

When a murder
topic of endless discussion to citizens in small towns.
case was on the docket, Norris tried to have no other jury cases pend
ing until the case was decided. As prosecuting attorney he had ap
peared before a jury in cases involving murder, adultery, and other
seamy aspects of the human condition. As a judge, therefore, he found
no novelty in such proceedings. He looked at each case as sympa
thetically as possible and considered the welfare of the innocent vic
tims of such proceedings to be of primary significance. After the jury
reached its decision, he would then dispose of the case. Occasionally
he disagreed with its decision and expressed his disagreement. Toward
criminals Norris rarely

showed

clemency,, sentencing

them

to the limit

of the law. 11

One

aspect of his public life did not change from the days before he
to the bench: Norris, like most public officials, traveled

was elected

by railroad with a pass. Now, however, he was no longer deluged with
requests for free transportation. The passes were usually supplied by
George

W.

Holdrege, general manager of the Burlington and Missouri

in Nebraska or Charles F. Manderson, former United States senator
and general solicitor of the road; passes for his family were usually

obtained from W. S. Morlan. 12 He received passes for all railroads in
the state. Fortunately for Norris, no major case involving a railroad
came before him. Passes at this time were taken for granted except

by

a minority of disgruntled citizens and, as a former railroad attorney,
saw nothing objectionable or at least nothing worthy of public

Norris

criticism

in their use.

His railroad pass and the few requests he $till received for free
transportation served to remind Norris that, although he was a judge,
he had been elected to office on the Republican party ticket. Though
he did not neglect political activity, he was circumspect in his par
ticipation. He was an ardent Republican, but he was also a judge
serving all the people of the Fourteenth Judicial District. For this
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reason he was unable to participate actively in the crucial and exciting

campaign of 1896.
W. E. Andrews, incumbent congressman from the Fifth District,
was one of the few Republicans Norris felt called upon to support.
Indeed, he felt a heavy obligation to Andrews which he explained by
referring to his recent judicial campaign:

When

all the combinations of circumstances, and underhanded
was
united against me, and when even the Republican
politics
State Committee and the leading Republican Dailies of the state
were silent and gave no encouragement or support,
you un
.

.

.

remainder of the leading Republicans in Nebraska, put
to the wheel, and did everything in your power to
shoulder
your
13
about
my election.
bring
like all the

Both men were aware that the incumbent's chances were not very
bright, since fusion between the Democrats and Populists was working
once again. Norris wrote Andrews early in the campaign that "if
God will send us rain, and the present Congress makes no mistakes,"
Andrews would have an excellent chance of returning to Washington.
But rather than sit back and await these divine and fortuitous events,
Norris proposed "to do a few things in the way of nominating the
right man in opposition" to Andrews.
There was talk of nominating Welty as the Populist congressional
candidate. Norris believed that he would be an easy candidate to de
feat and proposed, if Andrews thought it desirable, to "control enough
of the Populists" in Furnas and Red Willow counties to keep down any
nominated. Welty would
opposition at least until after Welty was
make an inferior candidate, Norris explained, because his position on
mortgage foreclosures, which had made him so powerful a judicial
a congressional fight. 14 This
opponent, would do him little good in
fusion candidate, R. D.
and
the
rumor, however, was not realized
election.
Sutherland, overwhelmed Andrews in the
Behind the scenes Norris played a minor role in the campaign of
1896. He informed Republican candidates of sentiment in his district
and contributed to county campaign funds. He tried to commit conven
tion delegates to particular candidates and arranged transportation to
the state convention in Omaha for others. Moreover, he was besieged
with requests to support various county candidates. He helped in
whatever ways possible and only once did he pointedly refuse a re
was made by the chairman of the Republican State
quest. This request
Committee, who notified him that the finance committee had fixed an
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assessment of twenty-five dollars as his share of the campaign fund.
Norris refused to pay on the grounds that in his judiciary campaign
the previous year he spent over thirty-five hundred dollars and re
ceived no assistance from the Republican State Committee.

He be

lieved the committee should not request contributions until the salary
($2,500 a year) from his office equaled the amount he had expended
in securing

it.

15

Fusion candidates swept almost every available office in Nebraska
in 1896. Bryan carried the state while Populist Silas Holcomb was reelected governor by a greater majority than Bryan obtained over
McKinley. Republicans, as a result of the election, found themselves
a very small minority in both houses of the state legislature. In the
Fifth Congressional District, Andrews and almost all of the lesser Re
publican candidates went down to defeat. After the election, Republi
can officeholder George Norris found himself almost isolated as one of
district. The election, how
ever, helped to enhance his status among Republicans as a candidate
who, in a predominantly Populist area, could get elected to an im

the few Republicans in public office in his

portant public office.
After the election Nebraska Republicans found some solace for
their overwhelming defeat in McKinley's victory. Norris regretted that

he was

Mexico" and quoted the Bible, "What doth it profit
he gain the whole world and lose his own soul/' He remem
bered that others had suffered more directly than he in the past cam
a

man

paign.

"living in

if

He recommended Andrews

for a lucrative federal position.

Fortunately his court was not in session until January, 1897, so that
he had ample time to recover his perspective and consider the political
future. 16
Norris' loyalty to the Republican party remained unshaken, and
to participate in politics as far as his judicial duties
would allow.
tried to keep abreast of state and national
develop

he continued

He

ments, but he did not feel qualified to

comment

fully

upon any but

developments in his correspondence. As the 1897 campaign
for state, county, and local offices got under way, Norris tried to size
district

was a confusing picture.
of September there occurred in Lincoln the initial con
vention of what Norris called "the three ring circus that is
opposing

up

the situation. It

On the

first

us." Populists,

Democrats, and Free Silver Republicans each met in

separate groups at the capital city, but all agreed on a fusion ticket
to oppose the Republicans in the November election.
Though Norris
knew that many Populists and some Democrats were disgusted with
this arrangement, he was
unwilling to prognosticate the outcome. If
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dissatisfied Populists could "be induced to come back into the ranks,"
then Norris thought Republican prospects would be very good. Un
fortunately for Norris and his fellow Republicans, fusion was still effec
tive in the 1897 election. Its candidates
swept the available state
offices

and made gains

The

in county offices as well. 17

throughout the Fourteenth Judicial District were no
from those throughout the state. "Not quite a Waterloo,"
wrote a county judge to Norris, "and perhaps if providence permits
by keeping away Bryan, drought and grasshoppers we will still be able
to make a gallant fight two years from now." Another correspondent,
an editor of a Republican newspaper, informed Norris of the results in
his county with the quip, "We have met the enemy and we are
results

different

theirs." 18

Yet Norris was not too pessimistic about the results of this off-year
The fusion majority in Nebraska had been reduced nearly
one-half and elsewhere his party carried some states that had for
merly been in the other column. Had it not been for the defalcation of
two former Republican officeholders, the party, Norris believed, would
possibly have carried the state. However, even in this matter, where
two Republican officials were sentenced for stealing state funds, Norris
could still see a bright side. By assisting in their conviction, and thus
purifying their own ranks, the party "at no late date" could again
election.

win respect and confidence. Furthermore, fusion between Populists
and Democrats was an ill-fitting arrangement and could not be counted
on to function smoothly in the future. Thus Norris could see at this
time of defeat opportunities for his rejuvenated party at coming elec
tions. 19

The

1898 proved that Norris was correct. Though
party
every major state office, it retained control of the con
seats
it
gressional
previously had won in the first and second districts
his

state elections of
lost

and, most important, it won control of the state legislature. Norris
ardently supported the gubernatorial candidacy of Monroe L. Hayward, who was defeated by less than three thousand votes by Populist

W.

A. Poynter, the fusion candidate. This time, Norris cheerfully
contributed his assessment of thirty-five dollars to the state cam

20
paign fund.

Norris' political pulse began to quicken after the improved show
ing of his party in 1898. No doubt he was flattered when friends sug

gested he was meant for higher office than district judge. A high rank
ing Nebraska Odd Fellow wanted him to enter the race for the United
States Senate. Norris

day he would

had previously confided to this friend that some
House of Representatives, and

like to serve in the
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more permanent government job, as defeated
from Nebraska already had done. When the
incumbents
Republican
state legislature met to choose a United States senator in 1899, Norris
received one vote for this esteemed office. 21
Thus as his first term as district judge came to an end, Norris,
heartened by the good will manifested toward him, considered his
chances for renomination and re-election. Whereas he formerly felt
glum about his political future, the election of 1898, his improved
financial status, and the general satisfaction with his judicial admin
eventually to secure a

istration,

made

Norris' political

prospects as well.

optimism come to include his

own

Chapter 7

Triumph and Tragedy
POPULISM was still rampant in Nebraska in 1899 when Norris* judicial
term came to an end. The state was unredeemed, as far as the Re
publican party was concerned; it remained so after the off-year elec
tions in 1899. Silas A.

Holcomb, former governor, handily defeated his
Republican opponent for judge of the Supreme Court and fusion
candidates won the other state-wide contests. But in the Fourteenth
George Norris was re-elected

Judicial District, a Populist stronghold,

by an impressive margin.
Earlier in the year, Norris was not unduly
optimistic about his
As far as he knew there would be no opposition to his re-

chances.

The election, however, was another question. Norris be
lieved the Populists had a majority of between three hundred and
four hundred votes in the district. If they gave their votes to his op
nomination.

ponent, his defeat was assured. Furthermore, in February a bill was
before the legislature which, had it passed, would have legislated him

out of

office

district.

by adding four heavily

Though nothing came
were

Populist counties to the judicial

1

to

be

re-elected he

of this

bill,

Norris realized that

if

he

wean a goodly number of
Republican fold. Accordingly, by July,

would have

to

Populist voters back into the
he was requesting county leaders to send

who were

him the names of Populists
and
inclined toward the middle
were
formerly Republicans

of the road. 2

Norris also

hoped to
and Democrats

capitalize

on the

fact that fusion

between

rarely worked smoothly. Indeed Democrats
were already threatening that unless allowed to name more candidates,
they would put .a separate ticket in the field. Norris knew too that
John T. McClure was interested in the Populist nomination and

Populists

would be a

opponent to defeat. Therefore Norris was most
news of rifts between Populists and Democrats. 3
And there were serious rifts in the camp of the opposition. ExJudge Welty and his followers, recalling McClure's support of Norris
difficult

interested in
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in 1895,

were determined

nomination.
dissensions.

to prevent

The Republicans did
Norris, tied down with

McClure from obtaining the

they could to support these
and not yet willing
judicial duties
all

to keep
campaign openly, conducted an extensive correspondence
4
abreast of political developments.
convention chose the
Early in September the Populist judicial

to

a Mr. Miller, to oppose
prosecuting attorney of Gosper County,
Norris. Because Miller was not a strong candidate, and because there
was dissension at the convention, Norris' chances of breaking the

were considerably improved. Mc
Populist majority in the district
he would have
the
to
in
a
Clure,
delegates, indicated that
speech
conducted a mudslinging campaign. Norris, therefore, had reason to
5
be satisfied with the results of the Populist convention.

The news that Republican county conventions had proceeded
minimum of friction and a greater manifestation of party

with a

harmony than had been exhibited
So
brighten the campaign picture.

for

many

years also helped to

optimistic was Norris about the
that
on
situation
September 12 he left on a vacation to visit
political
his mother in Ohio and to attend the Sovereign Grand Lodge of the

He planned to return in time to attend the Re
at McCook on September 27. When he
Convention
publican Judicial
left on vacation there was no opposition to his nomination, and Norris
and ... I
boldly prognosticated, "This will be a Republican year,
IOOF

at Detroit

6
ought to be reelected."
renominated by acclamation. Unexpected,
was
he
As expected,
of Miller and the substitution of
withdrawal
the
was
sudden
however,
McClure as his opponent. Attorney Miller withdrew because of illness;

a paralyzed throat made it impossible for him to campaign. Though
Norris now faced a skilful, dangerous, and difficult opponent, his

optimism did not disappear. He exhorted his supporters to greater
efforts. Furthermore, now that McClure was his opponent, Norris
gained an unexpected ally in Welty, his previous opponent and a
bitter political

enemy

of MicClure. 7

McClure campaigned
individually to

many

vigorously, holding meetings

and speaking

voters. Norris, relying on his supporters to do
a posture of judicious aloofness and followed the

work, maintained
course of the campaign in correspondence and conversation. McClure
undoubtedly hurt Norris personally by the type of campaign he con
this

ducted.
1895.

He denounced

These

Norris, claiming he was fraudulently elected in
denunciations had a ring of authenticity because McClure

had been hired

to present Norris' case in the litigation following the
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1895 victory. McClure argued that while he had made use of every
legal turn to sustain his client, the ethics of his profession prevented
him from divulging details presented in strictest confidence. In speech
after speech and in the columns of his Beaver City Times and other
Populist papers he attacked Norris as fraudulently holding public
office.

8

These charges were effectively combated. Welty wrote letters
claiming that though fraud was perpetrated in 1895, Norris was not
guilty and indeed knew nothing about it. Toward the end of the
9
campaign Welty took the stump and spoke against McClure.

On November

3,

1899, the Beaver Valley Tribune published a
by Welty, a statement by Norris,

series of affidavits, including a letter

and

reports of

two members

of the 1895 Furnas

County canvassing

refuting the charge of fraud on the part of Norris and sug
gesting that McClure's law partner was responsible for distorting some
of the returns. Thus four days before the election, Norris with Welty's

board,

all

aid was able for the first time to present to the public his side of the
disputed election of 1895.
Norris' notarized statement, included among the affidavits, repre
sented the closest he came to actual campaigning. But Republican
leaders left virtually no stone unturned on his behalf. Wavering Demo
crats and Populists were personally informed of Norris' merits by
clients the
precinct leaders. Republican lawyers impressed on their
importance of keeping Judge Norris on the bench. One Republican
stalwart spoke to most of the Populist leaders in his county and secured

indi
promises of support from others to spread the Norris gospel. He
under
cated the nature of his activities when he wrote, "Of course you
stand these men don't neglect their own work and devote it to others

without compensation, and

money

to

make

I

the campaign.'*

am

advancing for you the necessary

10

William Jennings Bryan appeared in western Nebraska in October
to speak on behalf of Democratic and Populist candidates. Norris no
doubt was pleased when one of his supporters claimed that Bryan's
this observer was, he pre
trip lost him very few votes. Biased though
a campaigner. He wrote:
as
sented an unorthodox picture of Bryan

was the crowd that not even one cheer was given the
in old cloth
party from start to finish, and although Bryan posed
the farmers
and
one
no
deceived
ing to catch the rural vote it
was
this
that
themselves
felt and afterwards expressed
just a de
the
of
the
vice to catch their votes. To show
managers of
apathy
lumber
old
an
from
the Bryan crowd, (he) spoke
wagon. No
So

listless
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were provided and the different members of the party dur
the sharp edges of the wagon box until
ing the speaking sat on
11
concluded.
the meeting
seats

The

election results

political situation.

showed

that Norris

He won an impressive

had

correctly sized

up the

candidates
victory. Since both

must have been especially gratifying
community by over one hundred votes, though
he lost Furnas County, which had given him a large majority in 1895,
was so elated that he threw his
by a very slim margin. Ex-Judge Welty
his feet, and asked his friends to burn the
on
the
floor,
stamped
cap
did. He also wrote Norris a congratulatory
cap which they obligingly
letter claiming that the voters had "rebuked the rascality of the
12
Welty at
would-be leaders of the Populist Party at Beaver City."
were residents of Beaver

City,

it

to Norris to carry the

who had sup
revenge against McClure. And McClure,
defeated
now
was
by Norris with
ported Norris in 1895 against Welty,
Furnas
the support of Welty. Factional fights among
County Populists
role in electing and re-electing Norris as a district
the
major
played
last

had

his

judge.

Since McClure and his followers did not charge him with official
misconduct in office, Norris believed the voters had censured and con
the opposition for the course they pursued. The official can
vass gave him a majority of 440. He ran between 1,000 and 1,500
votes ahead of his ticket and carried all but two counties, Furnas and

demned

Furnas County by only twenty-seven
Gosper. While McClure won
feel
disturbed about its loss, especially
to
reason
no
had
Norris
votes,
since

he carried Beaver

13

City.

In a letter to Welty, Norris acknowledged that Welt/s efforts and
those of his Populist friends accounted for many votes. In all, the
for re-election cost Norris less than fifty dollars, forty of

campaign
which at the outset he had turned over to the treasurer of the
committee. This

judicial
recalls that the

sum

is

all

the

district

more remarkable when one

1895 campaign with its litigation and dispute almost
14
bankrupted him.
of election as
Early in December, Norris received his certificate
But he
District.
Fourteenth
Judicial
judge of the district court for the
in
involved
and
with
the
was much too involved
preparations
plans
it.
moving his family to McCook to take more than casual notice of
had
he
December
and
sold
been
had
in
Beaver
The house
by
City
purchased a home in McCook, the seat of Red Willow County.
McCook was centrally located and was the largest, and most prosper
ous community in the entire judicial district. The main line of the Bur-
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lington and Missouri Railroad ran through it and the Republican River
flowed past it. In 1900, McCook claimed a population o 2,445. It

boasted a waterworks and an electric light plant, both privately owned,
along with eight churches, four schools, and a municipal park located
almost directly across the street from Norris* home on Main (now

Avenue in the north end of town. It had a police department,
consisting of two full-time officers, and a volunteer fire department.
Two public halls, a saloon, and a municipal park provided recrea
tional facilities for the local citizenry. McCook also had a jail, though
this was seldom occupied. 15
The town had been laid out by the Lincoln Land Company in
June, 1882, and was originally known as Fairview. The name was
changed to honor Major General Alexander McDowell McCook, one
of the famous fighting McCooks eight brothers and a father, all of
whom served as officers in the Union army during the Civil War.
McCook quickly became a railroad town and a trading center for
farmers who brought large quantities of corn and alfalfa for shipment
to Omaha or Denver. Because the town was a division point on the
Burlington and Missouri main line to Denver, the railroad employed
many men in its shops and roundhouse. Other railroad employees who
traveled this line made McCook their home. Until 1905 it was also the
site of a United States Land Office. The
community, with its pleasant
homes, numerous trees, many civic improvements, and hard-working
but diverse population, was a pleasant one and the family quickly felt
at home. Certainly the move was a sensible one for Norris, who found
Norris)

the town's central location convenient for traveling throughout the dis
trict.

Before moving to McCook, Norris succeeded in settling the estate
of Mrs. D. H. Lashley. He also hired two men to supervise his real
estate holdings in Beaver City. Tenants in the Norris Block and else

where henceforth would pay
to C.

their rent

and present

their complaints

H, Wilson, who superintended the building, or to

J.

F. Fults>

who

acted as rental and collection agent. Thus Norris became an absentee
landlord. 16

March Norris' family was settled in their new
and
was able to resume his regular activities with
Norris
quarters,
little interference. Judicial duties were more
conveniently arranged
due to the more adequate transportation available at McCook. But
they still kept him away from his family for extended periods. Since
1900 was a presidential election year as well as a census year, he was

By

the end of

deluged with requests for transportation to the various Republican
conventions, despite the fact that Nebraska now had a law making it
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a crime to give a pass to attend any political meeting, and with peti
tions to appoint loyal Republicans as census enumerators.
As the spring court term came to an end and the various state
conventions were held, Norris began to look forward to his

political

summer vacation before

the national political campaign was launched

his sisters and his mother in
expected to visit some of
to
Ohio before proceeding
Richmond, Virginia, for the annual IOOF
conclave. 17 There also was a gathering of the L.U.N. scheduled in
because of unex
August. Most of these plans went astray, however,

in the

fall.

He

pected misfortune in the family.
In June, Norris' mother died suddenly at the age of eighty-two in
the family farmhouse at York Township. He arrived in Ohio for the
funeral, emotionally upset and physically exhausted. The sight of his

mother in death caused him intense anguish, though outwardly he
remained calm. As her only living son, he was haunted by the knowl
edge "that if there was anything she most desired at the final end, it
was that her boy might be there so she might give him her departing
and depressed.
blessing." A month later Norris was still heartbroken
He claimed, "If it were not for the little ones I have here I would
mother's side."
prefer that I might be taken back there and laid by my
The fact that Norris did not see his mother before her sudden death
(she was neither bedridden nor ill) no doubt was partly responsible
for this feeling of remorse. This feeling in turn helped to unleash the
melancholy which

now overwhelmed him. 18

became reconciled to his grief during the summer
which he spent in McCook, and began to overcome his melan
choly with the help of his daughters and with the news that Pluma
was pregnant once again. For at least two months he did not engage
in any social activities, though he did meet his financial obligations.
19
Fortunately, his court was in recess until the fall.
Among the financial matters requiring his attention was that of his
mother's will According to this document, Norris was to serve as one
of the executors and as trustee for the sums bequeathed to his children.
The only personal item he received was his brother's watch, a memento
Norris gradually

of 1900,

much prized by his mother. 20
on by

involvement with his family, was
the political campaign that was
underway. Although economic conditions in Nebraska had improved
considerably since 1896, a summer drought had once again caused
hardship in the southwestern sections. Crops had been burned out by
Norris' recovery, spurred

at last effected

by the

his

activities of

the blazing sun and withered by the dry heat that
pervaded the re
The railroad contributed to the political uncertainty by discharg-

gion.
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number of their employees'* because of the sharp decline
For these reasons, Norris and his fellow Republicans expected
the battle against the Populists and their Democratic allies to be an
arduous one, despite the fact that Populism elsewhere had markedly

ing "quite a
in traffic.

declined or disappeared. 21
At the end of August, Norris indulged in his first social activity
since his mother's death; he attended the Sovereign Grand Lodge of
the IOOF at Richmond, Virginia. He returned to McCook in September

opening of his court and the beginning of the national cam
he was faced with a vexing problem: court in Hayes
There
paign.
was
scheduled
to start the same day
October 1 that Theo
County
dore Roosevelt was to speak in McCook. Though Norris "greatly ad
mired the fighting Colonel," and hated to miss an opportunity to hear
him speak, he refused to postpone the court opening to attend a
partisan political meeting. Instead, he arranged for the jury panel and
lawyers to go to McCook while he remained in court tending to neces
22
sary but perfunctory details.
Believing it unwise for a person holding his position to make parti
san speeches, Norris concluded that he probably could do more good
for the

Republican cause by "quietly working" with people. He thought
campaign of 1864 was repeating itself in 1900; the attacks on
the administration were similar to those made then, "and if you would
take the speeches and editorials of that campaign and change the name
of Lincoln to McKinley you would have them as they now appear." 23
Thus Norris' contribution to the Republican victory in 1900 was not
an obvious one. But both W. S. Morlan, the candidate for Congress,
and F. M. Rathbun of the state committee were satisfied that the course
he pursued was the correct one. Norris spent more than two hundred
dollars of his own and engaged in many personal talks
more, he
than
other
individual
the
candidates.
At the
any
thought,
including
end of October he felt that he had done "a great deal of good," and
the chairman qf the Republican State Committee agreed. Early in
November, Norris encouraged absentee Republicans with railroad
24
passes to return to their precincts to vote on election day.
for the

that the

The results of the election gave Republicans in southwest Nebraska
cause for both elation and depression elation because Bryan was
defeated and C. H. Dietrich was elected governor, and depression
because Morlan by less than five hundred votes lost to A. C. Shallenberger for congressman. While the Republican party regained control
of the state, in southwestern Nebraska Norris and his fellow Republi
cans still had to redeem their district from the control of the Populist

and Democratic parties.

6s
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In the Fifth Congressional District, where Norris voted, the Re
publican political picture was not promising. Since 1896 Republican
candidates had been defeated in congressional elections. With the
exception of Norris himself no Republican had been elected to a signi
ficant political office embracing more than a municipal or county area.

Indeed, though Morlan turned in a creditable performance, the election
of 1900 helped to convince many Republicans in southwestern Ne
braska that George Norris was the best vote getter the party had in

the short-grass country.
After the election, now that the Republican party was powerfully
entrenched on the national scene, Norris believed that his next political
responsibility was to help loyal Republicans obtain government jobs,
particularly postmasterships. However, politics was no longer an im
mediate or pressing problem and he began once again to interest him
self in other activities. As the year ended Norris was
trying to con
vince J. H. Miles that money could be doubled in a very short time by

taking advantage of the numerous opportunities that were developing
in land speculation. 25

Thus relaxed and somewhat elated, Norris seemed to have over
come his recent grief. His family was a constant source of satisfaction
and there was anticipation of a new arrival in the spring. He was again
participating in fraternal and incidental business activities. Though
political ambition burned within him, there was little he could do
about it at this time. Certainly he had every reason to believe that the
future would offer exciting new
opportunities. The political and eco
nomic upheaval of the 1890's was now receding into history and the
new century seemed to offer the hope and opportunity he had en
visioned when he arrived .in the
short-grass country fifteen years be
fore. True, the fifteen years Norris had
spent in Nebraska had not been
years of complete frustration and collapse. He had risen to a position
of prominence. But his hopes and ambitions led him to
suspect that
the coming years would be even more
rewarding. However, before his
expectations could be realized, an even greater
mother would befall him.

loss

than that of his

Chapter 8

Greater Tragedy and Readjustment

THE YEAR 1901

started auspiciously enough for George Norris. While
court
for
holding
Judge H. M. Grimes in North Platte in the Thirteenth
Judicial District, Norris was pleased to receive a letter from State

Senator E. N. Allen informing him that if the bill recently introduced
in Congress providing for another United States district judge for
Nebraska was enacted, he would procure for Norris the endorsement
of as

many members

of the state legislature as possible. Though the
it revealed that other office-holding Republi

proposal came to naught,
cans deemed him worthy

He
weeks

of a higher office than the one he occupied. 1
planned to adjourn court in mid-February for two or three
so that he could be on hand when Pluma had her baby. Since

McCook prior to adjournment, he was able to be at
home for at least a month prior to the birth of the baby. Early in
March Norris canceled the coming term of his court because "there was
court was held in

nothing of great importance" on the docket. This cancellation enabled
him to spend at least two more weeks in McCook after the baby ar
rived. 2

On March 21, 1901, a third daughter, Gertrude, was torn to the
Norrises. Five days later Pluma, age thirty-seven, was dead and Norris
was left with three little girls. The suddenness of her death again
into chaos and made it impossible for more than
a few friends to attend the simple funeral held in the parlor of tie
Norris home. Once again Norris was overcome with grief, and had to
3
rely on others to attend to the necessary details and arrangements.
Overwhelmed though he was, Norris had too much to do and too
many pressing and immediate matters to handle to give full vent to
his sorrow. He bore his loss remarkably well, considering his reaction
to his mother's death the previous year. By April he had recovered

threw the household

enough

to tackle

some

of his legal correspondence.

Fortunately for the family, Norris* sister Emma came from Toledo
to live with them in McCook. After the nurse left, Emma devoted most
of her time

and attention

to the

newborn

infant,

and Norris hired a
63

girl
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to

perform the remaining household chores.

Emma, however,

vised, if she did not perform, all the necessary activities.

The

super
children

and Norris felt no undue anxiety when he left home. He
knew his family was under loving and capable surveillance. 4
To complicate matters even more at this trying time, Hazel, age six,
broke her arm. Then Pluma's sister in Arkansas, who had been unable
liked her,

to attend the funeral, wrote requesting various heirlooms and other
items that had been borrowed from her. She stated that she was glad
he had decided not to break up his home, but, if he ever changed his
5
mind, she wanted to care for the children.

By

July the hired girl

had

left

and Norris had

to find

someone

to

help his sister manage the household. Despite his difficulties, he was
determined to provide a home for his daughters. Under no circum
stances would he send them to live with relatives. This summer, as in
the previous one, he turned down all invitations to deliver public
addresses. But this summer he did make plans to attend the annual

L.U.N. meeting, and in August he was again chosen as a delegate to
the Sovereign Grand Lodge IOOF.
Household arrangements proved so satisfactory that shortly after
Pluma's death Norris was able to pick up the threads of his disrupted

A year later Emma went to Ohio for an operation and placed baby
Gertrude with another sister in Ohio until she had recovered and was
life.

able to return to

McCook. Norris took care of Hazel and Marian

until

her return and claimed that he and the children got along very well
without any supervision, though they had the help of another hired
6

girl

Since smallpox was rampant in parts of his judicial district Norris
canceled three sessions of his court in 1901. 7 Unable to drown his sor

rows in judicial work, he turned his attention to financial affairs. He
did not philosophize, as he later did, about death, nor did he seem in
any outward way unduly affected by his great loss.
It

was

at the

end of September

in a letter to United States Senator

Dietrich that Norris inadvertently revealed some of his anxieties and
inner tensions. He commented on his recent loss, his
heavy insurance

burden, and other debts. He explained that he found the expenses
connected with his office unduly heavy and his
salary hardly adequate.
It was with the
hope of increasing his income that he inquired of the
senator about judicial or
legal positions available in the
Philippine

environment and by plunging into a new job,
Norris hoped to solve his financial
problems and begin a new existence.
Dietrich, however, was unable to aid him, chiefly because Norris knew
Islands.

By changing

his
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no Spanish. The matter was never brought up again, although Dietrich
8
later helped him get elected to
Congress.
In the fall there was politics to absorb and interest him, but the
1901 campaign was not a major one. In August, Norris attended the
Republican State Convention at Lincoln where he met United States

H. Millard and other high officials in the party. During the
campaign, he worked for the Republican ticket by conversing with
candidates and voters, but he did not participate in any formal way.
The campaign, despite the dry weather and hot winds, was unexciting,
even for an off-year election. The fusion movement was waning and
Senator

J.

Republican candidates easily won the few state-wide posts available.
In the short-grass country the party recaptured county and local offices
from Populist or Democratic incumbents. The lone exception to this
pattern in the Fourteenth Judicial District was in Gosper County where
9
Populists maintained all but three of the offices at stake in the election

Once the campaign was over and

Norris

saw how handily the

Republicans won, he rather regretted that he had not become a
candidate for Supreme Court judge. He consoled himself by reflecting
that service on the Supreme Court would have meant working much
harder for the same pay. The only object in seeking such a position,
he mused, would be to enlarge and improve his practice in the future
since Norris presumed that he would eventually drift back into
10
private law practice.
as the year 1901 drew to a close George Norris, who had
previously envisioned better things for himself in the new century,

Thus

rut.
Trying to raise three daughters after the sudden
death of his wife, holding court and tending to numerous fraternal and
financial matters, he was active enough. But his expenses were exceed

found himself in a

ing his income and this worried him. Furthermore, though he found
satisfaction in his work, his children, and his friends, there was some
thing missing; he was not being challenged to the full extent of his
ability.

District

Given

his ambition, a larger stage than the Fourteenth Judicial
to make full use of his talents and compensate

was necessary

for the loss of his wife.

He had

inquired about the possibilities of

and had regretted that
he did not seek the Supreme Court nomination; now he would have
to bide his time and make sure that he did not let the next opportunity
judicial or legal

work

in the Philippine Islands

bypass him.

At

7

life did not markedly differ from
had previously followed. Court sessions kept him
away from home. With his sister's help he was maintaining a home for

least until early in

the pattern that

it

1902 Norris
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did not always run smoothly.
although the household
their
chores, and Emma, whose
Most of the hired girls neglected
as well as her
health was not of the best, had to perform their work

his children,

own. 11

was an old problem which he hoped to
and by the
solve by selling the property. No purchaser appeared
it on almost any
sell
to
were
er
Shaf
willing
summer of 1902 Norris and
to suit the purchaser. They were
terms, allowing payments to be made
To
anxious to get rid of what they now considered a "white elephant."
in
Beaver
fire
a
was
there
City
in
1902,
add to Norris'

The

mill at Beaver City

January,
anxiety,
the
that burned out nearly all the south side of the square except
Norris Block, which

was

12

slightly

damaged.

became

interested in the school

systems
During this period, Norris
McCook
attractive
teacher,
an
met
He
McCook.
of Beaver City and
a
Ella Leonard, and tried unsuccessfully to persuade her to accept
elected
was
Norris
In
1902,
schools.
Beaver
April,
City
position in the
more fre
to the McCook School Board, and, seeing Miss Leonard
quently, he soon

began

to take a

for
Seeking a greater outlet

13

more personal interest in her.
his talents and ambitions, Norris,

early

decided'* to seek the Republican congressional
in 1902,
"practically
nomination. Fletcher Merwin, editor of the Beaver Valley Tribune and

had

one of the few persons to whom Norris had confided this decision, was
sure that he would win not only the nomination but the election as
well. 14 Though only one Republican had been elected from the con
district since its creation in 1892, and though he had served
gressional

but a single term, Merwin's optimism was not entirely misplaced. Since
1-900 the Republican party had been wresting political power through
out Nebraska from the hands of the Democrats and Populists. W. S.
Morlan, who had never held public office and was considered by some

be a tool of the Burlington and Missouri, had been defeated in the
than five hundred votes. With
congressional campaign in 1900 by less
and many county govern
of
the
control
in
state,
national,
Republicans
ments, and with Norris' impressive 1899 judicial victory in mind,
to

Merwin had a

basis for optimism in his realistic appraisal of the

political situation.

Since Morlan had previously let it be known that he did not intend
the congressional seat again, Norris now had an opportunity
to announce his own candidacy. Merwin agreed to make the initial
to seek

announcement in the columns of the Tribune. Norris, however, re
quested that Merwin make no mention of Morlan's decision not to run.
He believed that other papers would bring this out and that, if the
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of his candidacy noted Morlan's decision, it might
enemies that he was running with Morlan's ap
15

proval and backing.
Before the story of his candidacy appeared, Norris was busy laying
the groundwork for his nomination. He wrote numerous letters to

prominent Republicans throughout the eighteen-county congressional
district which embraced all of southwestern Nebraska and several
southcentral counties. He claimed that he had been urged by "quite a
large

number

of Republicans in different parts of this Congressional
He said that he would take no offense

District" to enter the race.

should any individual oppose his candidacy, but that he preferred to
in advance how his correspondent felt about it. Norris, as in the

know

wish to engage in a political fight unless he felt reasonably
assured of attaining his goal. 16
As he prepared for the contest, Norris thought he would be the only
candidate from the western end of the district and that he would prob

past, did not

ably have the support of the delegates from the eight counties

com

He

requested Judge H. M. Grimes in the
Thirteenth Judicial District, a small portion of which was in the Fifth
Congressional District, to keep him informed of political sentiment in
this area. When Grimes
replied that he too was about to enter the con
in
race
his
district, Norris wrote back, explaining what he
gressional
believed to be true in his own case as well: "Your judicial district will
and with that judicial district at your back I do not
go with you
believe there will be any difficulty in getting the nomination." 17
Along with party workers, Norris contacted lawyers and bankers
who, through their daily work, usually came in contact with large num
bers of people. He concentrated his efforts on his judicial district, con
vinced that if delegates from these counties went to the convention
solidly in his favor, the nomination was assured. He continued through
correspondence and courthouse conversations to let as many Republi
cans as possible know of his candidacy, while claiming that he had no
intention of making a personal canvass for delegates. And whenever a
correspondent's reply was encouraging, Norris suggested that he talk
prising his judicial district.

.

.

.

Republicans in his particular precinct and use his influence in
securing a delegation favorable to his candidacy. In this way, while
maintaining an impassive pose, Norris worked incessantly for the
nomination. 18
to the

to

Late in March one development made Norris realize he would have
engage in a more vigorous campaign. Morlan came out in favor of

State Senator Allen of Furnas County, and, in Frontier County, a
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Dr. Andrews announced his interest in obtaining the nomination.

By

Morlan seemed determined to pre
backing both Allen and Andrews,
nomination.
the
vent Norris from receiving
Since Morlan was the chief railroad attorney in the area, his
It meant that Norris would be unable
opposition could be damaging.
use them freely. Neither
his
while
to obtain passes
opponents could
the support of the
have
to
Morlan nor Norris, however, appeared
G. W. Holdrege, its general manager in
Burlington and Missouri.
end of the con
a
Nebraska, was supporting candidate from the eastern
become
district. Despite these developments, Norris did not
gressional

in several instances that Morlan had
unduly pessimistic. He believed
redound to
s
Morlan
that
and
the
"overdone
matter,"
opposition could
his favor.

19

two had
Why Morlan suddenly opposed Norris is not clear. The
never been close associates and Morlan, in their previous relations, had
Morlan thought that by oppos
always been the senior figure. Perhaps
the convention and, despite his official
could
deadlock
he
Norris
ing
statement that he did not intend to run, obtain the nomination for a
second time. Whatever the reason, Norris knew that Morlan's opposi

would be most effective in Furnas and Red Willow counties,
where he had considerable prestige and influence among local Republi
tion

cans.

One
Norris.

of inestimable benefit to
aspect of this development was
fact that the Burlington and Missouri Railroad officials

The

were supporting other candidates meant that he would gain support
and
among farmers and shippers who had grievances with the railroad
harbored increasing resentment against it. Also, the fact that he tem
lost the ability to obtain transportation for friends and sup

porarily

He also gained
porters made it easier for him to oppose free passes.
the experience of engaging effectively in politics despite the loss of an
him in
important source of patronage, something that would stand
good stead in later years.
Even with Morlan's help, Allen's candidacy did not make much
headway. Only one newspaper, the Arapahoe Mirror, supported him.
In a widely distributed April issue, it charged, without presenting any
details, that Norris had made a "deal" for the purpose of selecting his
Norris quickly denied the allegation claiming it was
"absolutely groundless and without any reason whatever." He added
that if elected to Congress he would take no part in the selection of
his successor. In this way Norris was able to keep the support of
successor.

Republican attorneys

who were

interested in his judicial position.

A
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statement to this effect was sent to the Beaver Valley Tribune and was
20
widely distributed.

By mid-May, before the county conventions met, there were more
than a dozen candidates in the field. Norris, however, had a larger
following than any other individual. If he received the support of all
the delegates from his judicial district he would have fifty-three of the
eighty-nine votes necessary for nomination. Allen, backed by Morlan,

was his only opposition in the entire judicial district, and Norris did
not believe that they could control many delegates. 21

On May

20 the Furnas County convention met at Beaver City and
without
passed
opposition a resolution instructing the delegates to the
convention
to support Norris* candidacy. Allen appeared
congressional

and withdrew
assured that
follow

suit.

his

name. The

activities of this

convention virtually

other county conventions in the judicial district would
Norris was now convinced he would have the largest
all

at the Hastings Convention. 22
the convention assembled at Hastings

number of delegates

When

on June 10, every
from
the
the
Fourteenth
counties
delegate
Judicial
eight
comprising
District was for George Norris. The other ten counties had instructed
their delegates for different candidates. Captain Adams from Superior
in Nuckolls County at the extreme eastern end of the congressional
district seemed to be his strongest
opponent. On the first ballot Norris
received seventy-one votes, while his nearest opponent, Adams, had
but twenty-nine. On the fifth ballot Norris received the nomination

with 122 votes, a large majority. His nomination was not obtained
at the expense of party harmony; good feeling prevailed both before
and after the convention which one newspaper called "one of the pret
tiest free-for-all political races ever run in the Fifth congressional
district."

23

Norris was largely successful in maintaining his original posture
of having the office seek the man. He accomplished this with a mini

mum
the

and therefore could count on unified party support in
campaign. Further omens that augured well were abundant

of friction

fall

rainfall (over

twenty-one inches, the best rainfall in over a decade), a

large wheat crop, and an increasing demand for grain. Thus Norris
24
felt confident of success in November.
a
take
well-deserved
Before he could
vacation, he had to organize
a congressional committee and get acquainted with party leaders in
the eastern end of the congressional district. Norris chose his devoted
friend Fletcher Merwin as chairman of the committee, and J. E. Kelley
of McCook as secretary. Norris believed one of the officers of the
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committee should

live in his

home town

so that there

would be no

committee con
difficulty in communicating. Indeed, the completed
tained a representative of each of the eighteen counties in the district,
but only one of
trict.

its officers

came from outside

of Norris' judicial dis

25

With

this

important task disposed

of, Norris, less

than ten days

after the Hastings Convention, made a cautious campaign promise
designed to win him support in Hall County, the most populous county

in the Fifth Congressional District. He pledged that if elected he would
direct all of his efforts toward securing funds to erect a federal build

ing in Grand Island, the largest city in the district. The claim of Grand
Island for a public building, Norris said, should take precedence over
26

any other community within the district.
Before the Democrats and Populists held their convention, Norris
had perfected his organization for the hard campaign to come. He had
committed himself to a public building for the largest city in the dis
trict. He had contacted individuals who traveled
throughout the dis
trict in the course of their business and had
persuaded them to inform
him of political conditions. He had also prepared a statement and affi
davits to send to Republican editors when the need arose,
presenting
the facts in regard to the 1895 disputed election. 27 Thus when the
opposition nominated,, as expected, the incumbent congressman, A. C.
Shallenberger, Norris was fully prepared to engage in the most difficult
that of

campaign of his budding career, a campaign that would determine
whether he could move on to the larger stage that he
sought as an
outlet for his talents

personal problems.

and

abilities

and

as a solution to his financial

and

Chapter 9

The
WITH

1902 Campaign

the nomination safely secured, Norris was compelled by illness
bed and was not fully recovered until the third week in

to take to his
July.

He

then began setting his political house in order for the

cam

paign.

One

of his

first

statements was that he would assist no candidate in

securing his judicial post. If

he and the Republican candidate

for

governor, John H. Mickey, were both elected, Norris pledged to resign
his judgeship after Mickey's inauguration, thereby allowing the new

governor to name his successor. If the incumbent governor, Ezra P.
Savage, were elected, Norris promised to resign on January 1, 1903,
1
thereby allowing Savage to appoint a district judge. By taking this
stand on the matter of his successor, Norris hoped to avoid losing the
support of aspirants to his post.
In an attempt to anticipate the issue of the disputed 1895 election,
Republican newspapers presented their readers with affidavits, notably
those written by D. T. Welty, explaining Norris' position. The 1895
election

was an old

him

and had not been successfully used against
had no reason to believe that it could be so

issue

in the past. Norris
used at this time.

Early in the campaign, Norris made another decision that helped
avoid possible pitfalls. He refused to endorse anyone for a federal
position, particularly postmaster candidates. He avoided local political
quarrels and disputes and notified all who sought his endorsement that
2
along these lines until after the election.
However, Norris could not avoid requests for railroad passes. Burling
ton officials claimed that during the summer months so many people
went off on vacation to the Colorado Rockies they thought it advisable

he would make no

effort

to curtail free transportation. Despite this proscription Norris was able,
when he thought it necessary to obtain transportation for individuals

who might be of help in his campaign.3
transportation problem became more difficult because some
Republican leaders made commitments which Norris could turn

The
local
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votes. One wrote requesting transporta
only at the risk of losing
at least six votes
who
tion for a "Catholic pop"
promised to deliver
similar
a
made
Another
"out of his own church."
request for a Popu

down

who promised

list

to

work among the German farmers

in

Webster

urged Norris to provide transporta
County. This same politician
Cloud who could do much good
Red
in
tion for a Populist saloonkeeper
In
one
instance, a committee mem
his Bohemian
also

countrymen.
among
ber was unable to obtain a pass for a Scandinavian leader in his
tickets out of his own pocket, explain
county and purchased railroad
him." These free passes represented a
lose
to
do
ing that it "wouldn't
4
in votes on election day.
off
could
which
commitment
pay
reason to be grateful to Senator
Though Norris later had every
his
election to the senator's efforts,
owed
and
C. H. Dietrich,
possibly
harm. Die
was
Dietrich
he
at the outset
indirectly doing him
thought
from
his post.
collector
revenue
a
remove
to
desired
trich
deputy
Norris thought that such a change during the campaign would be "a
the collector was a Union veteran and
very bad political move," since
a hard worker for the Republican party. Norris asked G. W. Holdrege
of the Burlington and Missouri to persuade the senator to retain the
5
official at least until after the election.
If Norris was disturbed or annoyed with Senator Dietrich in this
instance,

he kept the grievance

to himself.

He

never mentioned

it

the campaign progressed he re
again in his correspondence. And as
which were always forthcoming.
senator's
the
services,
peatedly sought
Matters pertaining to irrigation and postal routes were the two areas
Indeed in the latter area it was
where the senator's aid was

important

crucial.

Theodore Roosevelt signed into law a
West. Under its
terms the federal government would construct dams and reservoirs
for irrigation purposes. Norris was convinced that there was a natural
location for a reservoir along the border of Red Willow and Hitchcock
counties. 6 He desired to have a dam located there and hoped that the
election day. He wrote to
specific site could be agreed upon before

On

bill

June

17, 1902, President

of arid lands in the
calling for the reclamation

the secretary of the interior to arouse interest in the plan.
Norris was prompted into action because his opponent, A. C. Shallenberger, claimed that he was the "sole mover and prime originator"
of the law and that several projects would soon be located in the dis
trict

While Norris doubted

his

opponent's claims, he nevertheless

requested that Senator Dietrich meet with the state engineer and any
federal officials who might come to Nebraska and arrange matters so
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Congressman Shallenberger would not have them in tow and
7
thereby reap political advantage from their visit.

that

The senator responded with a valuable suggestion of his own. He
asked Norris to have Republicans in the westernmost counties write
letters urging Dietrich to secure the location of artesian wells in these
counties. Previously Dietrich had held a long conference with F. H.
Newell, chief of the newly organized Bureau of Reclamation. Newell
it would be easier to recommend the
digging of artesian

informed him

if the
people themselves requested it. Dietrich added that it
would do Norris "a great deal of good" to let voters know that he was
aware of their interests. 8 Thus with Dietrich's help Norris was able

wells

to obviate the promises of his
opponent.
In this matter Norris was on the defensive, trying to neutralize

Shallenberger's claims more than anything else. However, in the case
of establishing rural postal routes he was able to press a telling advan
tage. Early in the campaign Senator Dietrich received requests from

two towns in the

district

asking that he hasten the establishment of

proposed rural routes. He relayed these requests to the post office
authorities for immediate action. In the meantime, Dietrich thought,
Norris might get in touch with these postmasters and have the informa
he was consulting with Dietrich and soon expected

tion go out that
to

have the matter

weapon

satisfactorily

disposed

of.

9

Here was a

political

that Shallenberger, a Democrat, could not use, while Norris

utilized

it
very effectively.
Senator Dietrich also sent Norris a letter containing two lists of
rural routes in the Fifth Congressional District. One list contained

had been favorably recommended but were not yet in
at his own discretion could tell interested parties that
Norris
operation.
he would consult with Dietrich and insist upon having them put into
routes that

operation as quickly as possible.
The other list contained routes that had been requested but were
not yet inspected and approved. Here, Dietrich suggested > Norris
should select those routes he deemed politically beneficial. Then he

could inform people that he would urge an early inspection of the
proposed rural routes. Through Dietrich's efforts the Post Office

Department promised to send a special agent to investigate them.
Since these routes had to be approved by officials in Washington, time
was of the essence. The routes had to go into operation before election
day if Norris were to benefit from the results of having brought them
about so quickly. 10
So impressed was Norris with these vote-getting opportunities that
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he went further and asked Dietrich if it would be possible to secure
Dietrich
star routes for two communities which had requested them.

who issued
immediately wrote the second assistant postmaster general,
an advertisement endorsing one of the routes. The route was scheduled
11
to go into operation several weeks before election day.

Dietrich was also able to report by the end of September that
favorable action would be taken on the reports that the special agent
from the district. In October he suggested that Norris inform
was
filing

the postmasters that

would soon be forthcoming.
news, Norris began mentioning to

official notification

Becoming bolder as he received
voters that if he were a congressman rather than merely a candidate,
these routes already would have been in operation. Herein was an
of having a congressman of the same political
he
this

argued,
advantage,
12
persuasion as the president.
Thus through Senator Dietrich's

efforts,

Norris

was able

to take

form of federal "pork" that was unavailable to his
of aid when he
In
September he sought a more direct type
opponent.
wrote the chairman of the National Republican Congressional Com
Babcock
mittee, J, W. Babcock of Wisconsin, for financial assistance.
contribution and several thousand
a
thousand-dollar
with
responded
But throughout the
copies of speeches by prominent Republicans.
federal officials
from
raise
money
campaign Norris made no effort to
in Nebraska
custom
the
It
was
district.
in
the
(including postmasters)
he had no
and
committee
the
state
to
assessments
that these people pay
advantage of a

desire to interfere with

its

work. 13

aid was, Norris still had to campaign through
out the district in order to wrest the congressional seat from Shallen-

Valuable though

this

berger, a tireless and able politician. Moreover, Shallenberger brought
Champ Clark of Missouri and other Democratic colleagues into the
district

while Norris was unable to get a prominent out-of -state Repub
on his behalf. Shallenberger boasted of the many bills

lican to speak

he had introduced and of other important things he was doing in
Washington. Norris noted that the bills had died in committee and
argued that a Republican congressman supporting a Republican
administration, ably led by President Roosevelt, could do more for the
people of the Fifth Congressional District. He also explained that
Shallenberger, who claimed to represent the farmers of the district,
really a banker in private life. Norris insisted that he knew more
about agriculture and farmers* problems than his opponent. Toward
the end of the campaign, he challenged Shallenberger to a corn14
husking contest to demonstrate who the real "farmer" candidate was.

was

Norris concentrated his efforts on the

more populous eastern end
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where he was not widely known and where the large
Most of his "noncities, Hastings and Grand Island, were located.
and old soldiers
Fellows
Odd
of
before
gatherings
partisan" speeches
in August were in this area, as were a majority of the newly established
rural routes. He counted on the support of politicians in the judicial
district to turn out the vote while he made himself known elsewhere.
of the district

Merwin in Beaver City kept Republican newspapers supplied with
news about Norris, while his own recently reorganized paper, the
Beaver City Times-Tribune, loyally supported Norris' cause. However,
Norris refused to purchase the support of at least two editors who
claimed that they would endorse "the ones who furnished the dough."
with one brief
Fortunately he was able to arrange his judicial duties,
the election. 15
until
after
court
hold
he
would
not
that
exception, so

Meanwhile, his opponent, "a man of impressive personal appear
an
ance, with piercing eyes, handsome features, a fine head set upon
a relentless
body, and a fine speaking voice," was conducting
16
his support of inflationary
he
stressed
In
his
speeches
campaign.
measures and favored the regulation of trusts. He made much of his
for their
sympathy with farmers and of legislative measures designed
athletic

benefit. On the other hand Norris, when discussing national issues,
favored reciprocity as well as the protection of the American workingman and the home market. He stood with Roosevelt on the trust ques
tion and charged that "Democratic obstructionists" were primarily
for their existence. Any indication of his future lack of

responsible

could not have been

discerned in these campaign
manifested
former
Populist opponent, Welty,
speeches. However,
his loss of partisanship by issuing a statement on October 15, 1902,
"The people
reviewing once again the 1895 election. He observed,
know him to be a man whose honesty is unquestioned and whose
moral character is unassailable. They will resent as they have done

partisanship

.

his

before,, regardless of politics,

to detract

from

any attempt to injure his fair name or
and good reputation.'* Thus again

his well-earned

from the gradual disintegration that was crack
and Democrats. Prosperity, good
ing the alliance between Populists
and the careful weaning by politicians of
crops, abundant rainfall,
former Republicans out of the fusion fold worked to the advantage of
Norris

hoped

to benefit

17
Republican candidates.
After a debate between Norris and Shallenberger at the end of
September in Republican City, both candidates and their advisers
with its possibilities that they agreed to hold a
were so

impressed,

series of five debates

commencing October

21.

While Norris, unlike

with any serious disafShallenberger, did not have to concern himself
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faction in party ranks, he was worried lest abundant crops and pros
and lead to a disastrous
perity, instead of being an asset, boomerang

complacency by keeping voters away from the

polls.

With most

farmers behind in their threshing, there was a possibility that on elec
tion day, if the weather were good, they would attend to their crops

and not

to politics. 18

After the second debate, Norris received an interesting evaluation
from a minor Republican officeholder. He commented upon the
audience by citing the
"masterly way" in which Norris impressed the
records of recent Republican administrations. Though the writer was
biased, Norris undoubtedly agreed with the validity of his observa
tions:
I am certain and that is that he (Shallenberger) was
on the defensive, trying to explain his record and at
no time willing to tell how he would do or what he is willing to
19
go on record as standing for.

Of one thing
at all times

by observing that Shallenberger would have "to
and discuss pertinent issues, not bills that died in committee,
to convince voters that he should serve another term. This letter and
others show that Norris followed the administration on all points when
he discussed national issues.
Another observer at this debate thought that Norris' presentation
was better than Shallenberger's and that he raised enough questions
on the "money matter" and "trust proposition" to cause some Populists
to question their alliance with the Democrats. 20 Norris, indeed, was
well prepared to meet Shallenberger in public debate. While not a
flamboyant and emotional orator, as was his opponent, he impressed
an audience by sound sense, logic, and familiarity with his subject.
He was not an exciting speaker, but he gave the impression of an
industrious and capable candidate who as a congressman would fully

The

writer concluded

talk fast"

devote himself to the interests of his constituents. In short, the air of
inherent or natural dignity which had aided him in his judicial
paigns served Norris equally well in this campaign.

However, Norris, who was downcast

cam

after the first three debates

owing to the vocal support manifested for his opponent, lost his dig
nity and possibly his temper in the last two debates, including the
one at McCook. He attacked Shallenberger in a most vindictive way,
claiming he was practicing deception by masquerading as a friend of
the farmer. He ridiculed
Shallenberger and his family banking and
business connections and pointed with pride to his own farm back-
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connection that he challenged

21
Shallenberger to a corn husking contest.
election day, Tuesday, November 4, 1902, the candidates,

On

worn

out by campaigning, impatiently awaited the first returns. However,
the party organizations still had important jobs to perform. Helpers
with wagons provided transportation to the polls; others engaged in
last-minute attempts to obtain votes. Farmers busily threshing wheat
to be convinced that it was important for them to quit their fields.
George Allen, an astute local politician, predicted that Norris would

had

two hundred or more votes ( Norris* majority in
and assured the candidate that though party
7
officials in Lincoln had some doubts about Norris ability to carry the
22
Fifth Congressional District, he had none. And Allen was correct.
Republican candidates were elected in almost every contest in the
1902 election. Mickey was elected governor by over five thousand
votes, while the average Republican majority on the remainder of the
state ticket was a little over thirteen thousand. All Republican candi
dates for Congress were elected, except in the Second District where
incumbent David H. Mercer was defeated by Gilbert M. Hitchcock,
carry Clay County by
that county was 184)

publisher of the

was very

Omaha World Herald. In the
won with a precarious

close; Norris

receiving 14,927 to 14,746 for Shallenberger,
and 496 for John D. Stoddard, Prohibitionist. 23

Once the

Fifth District the vote

majority of 181 votes,

Democrat and

Populist,

were known, pandemonium prevailed among

results

Norris' supporters. "In 1895," wrote one, "you redeemed the Four
teenth Judicial District from Populism.
you have restored the
Fifth Congressional District." While Mickey ran ahead of Norris in

Now

most

counties, Norris did

much

better than

Morlan had done two

years before. Nebraska's United States senators sent a joint congratu
latory telegram proclaiming "the complete triumph for Republican

by Fusionists." Nebraska
was now fully redeemed from "the Pernicious Principles of Populism
and the Foolish Fraud of Fusionism," and Norris played an important

principles in Districts heretofore dominated

role in

its

Norris

24

redemption.

now had

to attend to

many

details

emanating from the

campaign. Merwin, who had
to

be

paid.

something."

He
He

not put in a bill for his expenses, had
informed Norris, "There are several fellows who want

asked only one personal favor and that was for a

rail

good fellow" who had done some hard work

road pass for "a tip-top
25
among a colony of farmers.
Another politician informed Norris that he had dealt with an
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individual

who worked with him

in a

Bohemian

settlement.

He

gave

him the

railroad pass Norris sent "and settled with him otherwise."
This worker had relied on similar individuals to get out the vote; some
he paid at the time and others he promised to pay after the election.

His total expenses came to about two hundred dollars and included
such items as hiring teams from local livery stables, advertising, hiring
a band, and sending telephone messages. 26

Thus Norris in his first campaign for national office was able to
achieve a narrow but impressive victory and become the second Re
publican to represent the Fifth Congressional District. Improved agri
cultural conditions, adequate rainfall, and the generally prosperous
union helped to lay the groundwork for his victory>27 as
did the gradual weakening of the bonds that had held the PopulistDemocratic alliance together. Above this foundation was a superstruc
ture that included the federal aid Senator Dietrich was able to mobi
lize, adequate financial support from the Republican party, and the
state of the

personal popularity of President Roosevelt to whose wagon Norris
hitched his political star. Finally, the most significant factor was Norris
himself his personal popularity, his ability as a campaigner, his usual

appearance of dignified judicial calmness in his black suit, white shirt,
string tie, plus his devoted supporters who gave unstintingly
of their time, energy, and money. Together they
helped to eke out the
less than two-hundred vote majority.
Victory opened new horizons for

and black

forty-one-year-old George Norris. It also brought new responsibilities
as well as many trivial but
details.
politically

important

Chapter 10

Congressman-Elect

SINCE the Fifty-eighth Congress would not convene until November,
1903, Norris had a year to wait before taking a seat in the House of
Representatives. The year emerged as one of the most eventful in his
life, a period of endings and of new beginnings in both his private and
public life. The most obvious change that occurred in the congressmanelect was in his physical appearance. When he
appeared at the bar of
the

House

in

November, 1903, Norris sported a weeping-willow mus
was gone and his hair was now heavily tinged with

tache; the beard

Behind the noticeable change in his appearance lay the events,
tragic and others happy, of the year of waiting by the newly
elected congressman from the Fifth District of Nebraska.

grey.

some

After the election, Norris had the leisure to look after his personal
Most nagging was the long-standing problem of the mill at

affairs.

Beaver City. In July, 1902, the dam to the mill was washed out by
floodwaters on Beaver Creek and a new one had to be installed. In

September the partners thought they had a buyer, but he had very
cash, and they did not want to sell the mill on time unless some
security was given. Negotiations were also made with other potential
purchasers in Pennsylvania and Iowa, but none proved satisfactory.
Finally in the spring of 1903, an agreement was worked out with
George E. Hotchkills of Loup City, Nebraska, whereby he paid the
little

partners $1,000 in cash

and gave them a mortgage

for the balance >

amounting to $4,000. Before the final details were completed, Hotch
kills came to Beaver
City and was operating the mill.
Both partners knew the mill property was worth more than $5,000,
but neither Norris nor Shafer was a miller. Norris was no longer a
resident of Beaver City and Shafer did not care to look after its over-all
operation. Furthermore the partners had been unfortunate in their

experience of renting the mill. They had found that as a rule the lessee,
when his term was about to expire, let the property run down. This
usually
to

meant that Norris and Shafer had

redeeming the good

name

to devote

time and energy

of the mill. Therefore they decided to
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Thus, after thirteen years, Norris was finally
free of this property which had caused him irritation and annoyance
and which he never really wanted. 1
Norris' real estate also needed tending. Fults and Hopping contin
sacrifice to

make

the

sale.

ued

to look after his property in Beaver City. Occasionally Norris
asked Merwin to perform a chore for him in this connection. Norris'
Neither Fults,
relationship with these men was informal and friendly.
a lawyer, nor Hopping, a druggist, derived his livelihood from this
work. They helped Norris more from friendship than for anything else.
Both men continued this arrangement after he moved to Washington,
D.C. 2
During the campaign Norris was not pressed or embarrassed for
want of money. He was able to give twenty-five dollars to the Odd

Fellows

Home Fund

though

this contribution

no doubt had

political

overtones. In October he promptly paid the premiums on two large
insurance policies which totaled almost five hundred dollars. After the
election Norris found, too, that

in

McCook and

take his

first

he could afford to remodel

his

home

real vacation, albeit a short one, since the

death of his wife. He took a trip into Colorado and possibly New
Mexico. Though his financial condition was satisfactory, he still found
3
it
necessary to request payment from people who owed him money.
Norris also began to again take a more active interest in McCook
affairs. In September, 1902, a
public library had been opened. It was

housed in the basement of the Red Willow County Courthouse where
Norris held court and maintained a judicial chamber. From this van
tage point he had ample opportunity to observe the large numbers of
people using the library. He wrote to Andrew Carnegie the following
June, requesting a donation for the erection of a separate building in
the city. Eventually Carnegie did contribute and McCook today boasts
a

handsome public library building. 4

Besides his personal business affairs and his
emerging role as a
of
in
the
public figure
consequence
short-grass country, Norris was
all
the
with
a health problem. Since his
plagued
through
campaign

were extraordinarily sensitive, he sought a dentist who could
them without pain. In December, before leaving on vacation, he
wrote to Dr. H. C. Miller, a dentist and also postmaster of Grand
teeth
drill

Island, inquiring whether Miller could care for teeth in a painless way
and, if so, whether he could arrange an appointment. Two weeks later,
Dr. Miller assured Norris that he could treat his teeth without undue
5

pain.

went to Grand Island
For nine consecutive days Dr. Miller fixed his teeth,

Norris, delighted at finding such a dentist,
late in April.
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afterward claiming that it was "the largest and most severe operation"
he had ever performed at one time. At the end of the eighth day Norris
was taken with chills followed by fever. In spite of this he had the
work completed the following day and was consumed with a fever
while in the chair. Miller's fee was $125. 6
Theodore Roosevelt arrived in Grand Island at this time and Norris
appeared with him despite his illness. As soon as Norris returned to
McCook, he become much more seriously ill, took to his bed, and
almost died from blood poisoning and other complications. He was
dangerously ill for over three weeks and did not fully recover for
several months. In addition to blood poisoning, he suffered from
nervous prostration and was very weak and debilitated. Fletcher Merwin came to look after him and quickly sent for Doctor C. C. Green of
Beaver City. The doctors were afraid that the infection would reach
the brain, in which case "the termination would have been fatal and
sudden." Fortunately the blood poisoning was arrested and on May 18,
1903,

Merwin wrote, "We consider Judge

Norris

now

out of

all

7

danger."

With his nervous system seemingly shattered, Norris, though he
was out of immediate danger by the end of May, was still a very sick
man. Microscopic examination indicated kidney trouble, though the
doctors thought this to be only temporary. Norris took various tonic
prescriptions to regain his strength and equilibrium, and was told by
doctors and friends to get adequate rest, sunshine, and care. Dr. Green
suggested that he give up smoking, and Norris did not object. At the
end of May, Dr. Green announced that his patient had no need of more
medicine and that, if he did not overexert himself, he would be well
on the way to a complete recovery. 8

From

all

over the state came

letters inquiring

Governor Mickey requested Merwin

to

convey

about Norris'
his

hope

illness.

9

for a rapid
him in Lin

recovery and suggested that Norris, when able, call upon
coln. Merwin, who remained with Norris in McCook, handled most
of the correspondence and kept the patient abreast of political devel

opments.

By June

4,

Norris

was again handling

his

own

mail and in

forming correspondents that he expected to leave for a long Wisconsin
vacation at Delavan Lake as soon as he regained a bit more strength. 10
In his correspondence he told no one the secret which he must have
divulged to those who cared for him during his illness that he
planned to be married before going to Wisconsin. After the death of
Pluma in 1901, Norris, with three young children to look after and an
intensive political

romance. Yet

it

campaign
was obvious

to

that

wage, certainly had

little

time for

he eventually would remarry, since
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and a
he was desperately in need of companionship, a helpmate,
bachelor
most
a
considered
was
he
eligible
mother for his girls. That
a young lady in Lincoln who
is evident from correspondence with
known. She
her letters "Jeanette," and of whom very little is
signed

him

invited

to several occasions in Lincoln and, although

it

is

not

known whether he attended these particular events, it is certain that
times. That Norris was not romantically
they saw each other several
not tell her of his
interested in her is indicated by the fact that he did
she appears to have been much too flighty and
7
the doings of Lincoln society to suit Norris
in
too deeply involved

illness.

tastes.

From her

letters

11

interested in the
However, Norris was becoming romantically

schoolteacher Ellie Leonard, who knew the first Mrs. Norris.
and after
Miss Leonard was well liked by her students in McCook,
a
casual
than
more
in
her
notice
to
Norris
way.
Pluma's death,
began
a
A.
wrote
Norris
Green,
Dr.
to
visit
his
Miller,
J,
before
In

McCook

March,
watchmaker and optician, about purchasing a ring. Thus they may
12
have considered announcing their engagement before his illness.
when Miss Leonard was un
Possibly his illness and convalescence,
a
fix
to
them
led
hand
on
wedding date.
often,
doubtedly
Pluma's death must have
after
two
years
Contemplating remarriage
moments. In March, at the same time he
caused Norris some
trying

was purchasing a

ring,

he was

also

completing arrangements for the

monument on his lot in the McCook cemetery. Also in
March he received word that his eldest sister Lorinda, at whose home
erection of a

he had enjoyed such pleasant times while teaching school in Ohio, had
died. He must have undergone great emotional confusion and upheaval
during this period.
After the school term ended, Miss Leonard returned to her parents'

and Norris, announcing his intention of
Jose, California,
left at the end of June for the Pacific Coast.
in
Wisconsin,
vacationing
In the home of Ellie's parents, on July 8, 1903, Ellie Leonard and
13
George Norris were married.

home

in

San

Their Wisconsin honeymoon gave Norris a chance to recover his
his L.U.N. friends to his new wife when they
strength and to introduce
reunion.
annual
the
for
During this reunion one decision was
gathered
made which pleasurably affected the L.U.N. members and their fami
lies for the rest of their lives. They decided, chiefly upon Norris' inves
to purchase an island in Rainbow Lake where
tigation and prodding,
members might build cottages and where the annual meetings would
henceforth be held. Only four members,- including Norris, felt they
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were able to contribute toward the $950.00 asked for the island. The
14
price seemed a small consideration for such a wonderful site.
Rainbow Lake, a perfect vacation setting, is one of a chain of
twenty-three lakes southwest of Waupaca, Wisconsin. Its clear waters
still attract fishermen
seeking pickerel, bass, trout, and other varieties.

The entire chain, spring-fed, cold, and clear, is set in deep hollows
between low rounded hills. The lakes offered opportunities for rest,
relaxation, and escape from intense summer heat, and Norris came to
cherish his days there as the years went by. With the purchase of the
island the problem of annual meetings and vacations was forever
solved for Norris and his fellow L.U.N. agitators from the old days at
Valparaiso.

Meanwhile most

of the friends of

George and

Ellie Norris

read of

the marriage in the McCook paper, where a brief announcement ap
peared. After Norris* departure for California, neither Merwin nor
Norris' children, who remained in McCook with their aunt, knew his
exact whereabouts. After this marriage, Norris wrote, "There came into
my home ... a real mother to my motherless children/' Once again
his family circle

Ellie as their

his children quickly came to love
she soon became for these youngsters

was complete and

new mother. Indeed

the only mother they knew, and, as Norris later wrote, "Never was there
a more considerate or more tender hearted, loving mother." 15

September found Norris and his bride back in McCook redecorating
the house to suit the taste of

its

new

indulged himself and bought a fine

mistress. Norris at this time also

bound

set of the collected works of
Robert W. Ingersoll, the famed Republican
orator and agnostic. 16 But most important of all, the return to McCook
brought with it preparations for a new life in Washington, D.C.

one of

his youthful heroes,

Not that Norris had neglected to prepare for his new role. Since
the election he had been attending to political matters. One of the first
things he had to consider was resigning as a district judge. He had
promised not to recommend any candidate, but to allow a Republican
governor to appoint whomever he desired. Norris kept this pledge
in good faith. When, after the election, Governor-elect John Mickey
asked him about a successor, he refused to express any choice and
wrote to the governor restating his position. 17
His first official action as a newly elected congressman was to sup
port, along with the other Republican members of the Nebraska
congressional delegation, the candidacy of Joseph G. Cannon of Illi
nois for the speakership of the House of Representatives. Cannon
wrote him a grateful personal note ? claiming that his help, along with
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Norris
that of the delegation, went far toward settling the contest.
W.
Babsince
this
in
matter,
Joseph
showed no trace of independence
had
Norris
and
this
good
cock of Wisconsin was also seeking
position,
reason to be grateful to him. As chairman of the 1902 Congressional

him with funds and
Campaign Committee, Babcock had helped

ture.

litera

18

With the defeat of Congressman Mercer in the Second District a
on Public Grounds and Buildings became
position on the Committee
vacant. Senator Dietrich advised Norris to put in a request for this
Cannon. Since First Dis
vacancy "as quickly as possible" to Speaker
Elmer Burkett was a member of the Appropriations
trict

Congressman

Committee, Dietrich thought it essential that Norris secure this posi
tion to retain for the state of Nebraska membership on key committees,
thereby maintaining
effort to obtain it.

its

influence in Congress.

19

made

Norris

every

At this time he was unaware of any cleavages within his party.
Indeed, as a freshman congressman, he was more interested in securing
favorable committee assignments than in anything else, desiring above
to the Committee on Public Lands and Buildings.
all an

But

appointment
newly elected congressman, he did not consider

as a

directly for the position.

He

therefore let

wise to ask

it

Dietrich and Burkett know

and requested that they discuss the matter with the new
20
speaker before he approached Cannon.

of his desire

In February of 1903 Norris made a brief trip to Washington,
where he talked to Cannon about service on this committee. The
asked Norris to contact him again some time before the con

Speaker
he presented
vening of Congress. When Norris later wrote to Cannon
his case in a way that undoubtedly appealed to the politically astute
Speaker.

He noted that

all

the other Nebraska districts that

had elected

by large majorities, that he had
Republicans
been elected by a majority of only 181 votes and was the only Republi
can, "with one exception," who had represented the district since the
advent of the Populist party. Furthermore, Norris suggested the neces
to

Congress had done

so

an appropriation for a public building at Grand Island if the
were to remain in the Republican fold. This goal could best be
achieved, he argued, by his serving on the Public Lands and Buildings
Committee. By way of conclusion he frankly stated to the Speaker:
sity of

district

There

is

no doubt but

that the appropriation

by Congress

of

for the building of a public building at Grand Island would
re-election sure> and while it is of no particular impor

money
make my

tance to the country or the Republican Party that

I

should be
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returned any more than any other person, yet it is of considerable
importance that a Republican should be elected in this district,
which I think could be easily secured if this one matter were at
tended to. I think these matters have, perhaps, been brought to
your attention by the senators from this state, and while I do not

want, in any way, to embarrass you in your difficult task, still I
sincerely hope you may be able to give the matter consideration
which I believe it deserves, and decide it as you may think best

under

all

the circumstances. 21

Norris also requested information about his new duties from
Charles F. Manderson, former U.S. senator (1883-95), and now chief
attorney of the Burlington and Missouri Railroad in Nebraska. He
confessed his ignorance of the customs, rules, and regulations of the

Congress and hoped that Manderson would aid him in learning about
these subjects. He told Manderson of his desire to serve on the Com
mittee on Public Lands and Buildings and hoped that the ex-senator
could be of assistance in this matter. 22 Thus Congressman-elect Norris
did his best before he went to Washington to put himself in good
standing with the Burlington Railroad and the Republican organiza
two of the most powerful agencies in the political structure of the

tion,

state.

Another important task which faced Norris at this time was that of
securing the services of a competent secretary who knew the district
and could keep him abreast of local developments. For this difficult job
Norris wanted Merwin,. who had served as chairman of his congres
sional committee in the recent campaign. After the election he had
presented Merwin with a typewriter and a desk as a token of gratitude
and soon thereafter tried to convince him to take the job. Merwin, who
wanted to remain in Beaver City and edit his paper, claimed that he
could not live on the salary, though he recognized that service in

Washington would provide valuable experience

for a

newspaper

editor.

Merwin serve as his secretary only when
and continue to write for his paper when in
modifications Merwin agreed to the plan, and

Norris suggested that

Congress was in session
Washington. With slight
Norris obtained the competent services of a seasoned
and a personal friend. 23

Even though
at the

the Fifty-eighth Congress

end of 1903,

started the

day

Norris' service as a

after election

literally thrust in his lap.

familiar one.

when

was scheduled

member

district

The request

political observer

to

convene

of Congress actually

patronage problems were
was a

for free transportation

But other patronage matters

primarily concerning pen-
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and postmasters were new, and he set about familiarizing him
with them. Soon after his election he wrote the commissioner of
information about the rules and regulations per
pensions requesting
24
of the bureau.
work
the
to
taining
In the matter of postmasters he had much more work to do. First he
sions
self

in the district, since
postmasters
of rural routes,
matter
not all were Republicans. Then there was the
the
in
the granting of which had been so helpful
campaign. By the end
that work on rural
citizens
of 1902 Norris was explaining to irate
and that
small
to
a
routes had been
appropriation
owing

had

to

determine the

all the
politics of

suspended

was granted by Congress. He
nothing could be done until more money
the
Office
Post
in
the
wrote to officials
Department requesting that
in the district be put into operation
twenty-six approved rural routes
25
that the petitioned routes be acted upon as quickly as possible.
for Washington, Norris participated
Finally, before his departure
him to the attention of citi
in a sensational murder trial that

and

brought

zens throughout Nebraska. In March, 1903, he agreed to assist the
in stating the case for the
prosecuting attorney of Frontier County
named
a
the
Puls, and in trying to
of
victim,
Tracy
young girl
family
that her death was caused by a bullet and bruises inflicted by

prove

one Charles Frymire.
laden with political significance.
L. H. Cheney,
Congressman Norris was assisting Prosecuting Attorney
candidate
fusion
the
L.
while the defense was represented by J.
White,
for district judge in an election that was a month away, Presiding in
the courtroom was Judge R. C. Orr, appointed by Governor Mickey to

The case came

to trial in October,

out Norris' unexpired term, and now seeking the office in his own
before the court
right. Attorney White brought these implications
fill

while presenting the defense's side. He warned the jury in a harangue
that lasted more than an hour that they should not be swayed "by the
silent, secret influence that would be present in the prosecution of the
case in the person of Congressman Norris/' 26
In presenting the case against Frymire, Norris recounted the de

known

fact that "Tracy Puls gave premature
months gestation, the child of Charles
Frymire and that the premature birth was caused by the bullet wound
tails,

including die

little

birth to a child of five or six

womb." The jury returned a verdict of man
and
Orr
sentenced
Judge
Frymire to ten years at hard labor.
slaughter,
his
he
term
was
to
be
Throughout
placed in solitary confinement on
each February 1, the anniversary of Tracy Puls' death. 27 Norris' part
in the wall of the uterus or

in this dramatic case served as a farewell before his departure for
Washington to start his career as a congressman.
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1903, George Norris, in a neatly pressed black suit,
and collar, and black string tie, appeared before the
bar of the House of Representatives and took the oath of office. His
grey hair and his neatly trimmed weeping-willow mustache added to
his serious demeanor and gave increased maturity to his forty-two
years. The oath was administered at the opening of a special session
of the Fifty-eighth Congress. At this time he officially learned that
newly elected Speaker Cannon had been most generous in his commit
tee assignments, giving Norris the coveted place on the Committee
on Public Grounds and Buildings, as well as an assignment to the Com
mittee on Election of President, Vice-President and Representatives.
Thus George Norris, the new Republican congressman from the Fifth
District of Nebraska, at last had arrived on the national scene and now
would have the opportunity to put his talents to the test on a broader
stiff

white

shirt

scale than ever before.

Chapter 11

Congressman Norris
As A FKESHMAN in Congress, assigned a seat in the rear of the chamber,
Norris had to worry about getting re-elected almost before he could
learn the rules and procedures of the House of Representatives. Con
whose seat was next to
gressman Wesley L. Jones of Washington,
and
him
whenever
quickly disillusioned him
Norris, guided
possible
about the statesmanship of Joseph W, Babcock, of whom Norris had
learn that Babcock's wonderful
thought highly. Norris was amazed to
orations had never been delivered but were merely inserted into the
1
Congressional Record.

the knowledge that no
Equally amazing to the new member was
could be discussed on the floor unless the Speaker, as Chairman
of the Rules Committee, gave his approval. When Chairman Charles
W. Gillet of Massachusetts called the Committee on Public Grounds
bill

and Buildings together, the group discussed the possibility of drafting
and presenting an omnibus building bill. The senior Democratic mem
ber of the committee, John H. Bankhead of Alabama, presented a mo
tion, which carried unanimously, that the chairman seek a conference
with the Speaker and ascertain if the committee could introduce a
2

public building bill.
As a freshman member, Norris, of course, had no illusions about
what he would be able to accomplish. However, with the country
relatively prosperous, and with the virtual assurance of federal funds
spent in the district through an omnibus building bill, Norris believed

would be satisfied and contented enough to reward
him with another term in Congress. He had no reason to speak, let
alone to challenge his party; yet that is exactly what he did when he
rose on June 13, 1904, "with no little embarrassment and some hesi
tancy ... to say a word or two in favor of the Civil Service Commis
sion and the civil-service law." 3
President Theodore Roosevelt on November 17, 1903, had changed
the removal rule giving the president and department heads greater
discretion and power to remove incompetent employees. At least one
his constituents
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member

of the Civil Service Commission doubted that this
change was
an improvement. 4 And those members of
Congress who were not in
sympathy with the merit system began an attack on the civil-service

system. Previously, in the Fifty-seventh Congress, the Civil Service

Commission had been

criticized after an effective investigation of post
scandals aroused spoilsmen in both
parties. Norris, by defending
the Civil Service in his maiden
speech, sided with the president against
the standpatters in his party.
Repeal the law, Norris concluded, "and
on
the
counter
of partisan politics the appointment of
you put
bargain
all the officers under the Government/* 5
office

If his first
speech in Congress de-emphasized partisanship and was
indicative of his later career, his
only other extensive statements on the
floor were
intensely partisan. They were devoted to lambasting the

Democrats for
speech

is

their continual
opposition to rural free delivery. This
because
it
revealed an aspect of Norris that was
significant

inherent in his background and which remained with him
throughout
his life. It is summed
up by the following sentence, delivered at the
close of the address: "It

is

at the rural fireside that virtue, morality,

and

6

patriotism have reached their highest state."
That the rural life represented the "good life"
the source of crime, disease, disloyalty, and

and that the city was
anarchy was an attitude
that prevailed throughout
nineteenth-century rural America. Indeed
it
lingered on in the new century. Norris expressed it here in order to
cast aspersions on the Democrats for their
opposition to rural free
delivery, but he firmly believed that he was voicing a fundamental
truth when he uttered it. This partisan
speech represented Norris'
major oratorical effort in his first term as a congressman.. But before
the session ended, he was
focusing on Nebraska politics and his cam
7
paign for re-election.
He returned to Nebraska at the end of the session confident that
the voters would approve his service in Congress. He returned as he
had left, a partisan Republican and a devoted supporter of Roosevelt,
seeing no incompatibility in these two positions. He also returned with
as much of Speaker Cannon's approval as did any other freshman in
8

Congress.
The 1904 Republican Congressional Convention for the Fifth Dis
trict was scheduled to convene at
Hastings on May 12. Thus before
Norris returned to Nebraska many chairmen had called
county con

had already chosen delegates favorable to his renominathe Hastings convention met, Norris was renominated by
acclamation, though the Hastings Daily Republican claimed there were

ventions and
tion.

When

two dissenting votes. 9
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With the nomination

Norris
safely secured,
before

lie

was able

national political developments
cause he could not afford a trip to the Republican

to observe

campaign. Be
National Convention

launched

his

R. Mann
in Chicago, he refused the invitations of Congressman James
He
convention.
the
and of an old friend of his to be. their guest during
tame
be
a
to
convention would "prove
thought that the Republican
circus at St. Louis" where
with the three
as

show

ringed
10
Democratic party.
keep control of the
which on June 23
As Norris predicted, the Chicago convention,
of Indiana,
Fairbanks
W.
Charles
nominated Roosevelt and Senator
the return
witnessed
convention
was a tame show. The Democratic

compared
Bryan had pledged a

to

power

of

battle to

more conservative eastern

leaders.

Bryan

lost control,

and

the gold standard,
a New York judge, Alton B. Parker, who favored
devoted sup
left
nomination
Parker's
many
received die nomination.
the
in
and
Democratic
the
party
Populist
in
especially
porters of Bryan
for Roosevelt,
vote
to
but
choice
no
with
elsewhere
and
in Nebraska
11
in his views than was Parker.
who was closer to

Bryan
The nomination of Judge Parker hastened the demise of the Popu
The party had been so greatly reduced in mem
list
party in Nebraska.

of representation to the convention that chose
bership that the basis
the delegation to the Populist National Convention in Springfield,
two hundred votes cast for Weaver
Illinois, was one delegate for each
at this time, "The Populist
remarked
in 1892. As one Nebraska editor
is
it
the point where
nothing with fusion and nothing
party has reached

without it"

12

the Popuist party in Nebraska was in the process of deteriorating,
the Democratic party, owing to Bryan's loss of control at St. Louis, was
Thus Populist candidates were able to
in a weakened
If

position.

dominate the fusion process.

And

strong Democratic campaigners,
decided not to participate

like A. C. Shallenberger in the Fifth District,

in the election.

They feared

that Roosevelt

would

pull to victory the

weaker members on the Republican ticket.
of agitation, had gradually penetrated
Populist ideas, after years
the Republican party hierarchy.' Many of the leaders in Nebraskia and
on the national scene now accepted the view that government would
have to play a larger role in promoting the general welfare. Certainly
in 1904 the Republican party appeared as the more liberal of the major

a former Bryan supporter now made his way into
a devoted follower of Roosevelt. These develop
became
and
the party
the
benefit of Norris and numerous other Republi
to
redounded
ments
parties..

And many

can nominees.

One

aspect of the campaign in Nebraska no doubt disturbed
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was the

fact that Senator Dietrich,
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who had been

so

instrumental in his first campaign, did not receive party support for a
because he secured the re
second term. He had become a
liability
office into

a building that he owned.
he
had collected a salary as
became known
Furthermore,
United States senator. 13
while
he
as
was
already serving
governor
Congressman Burkett of the First District received the Republican

moval of the Hastings post
it

that

also

endorsement. Railroad opposition to Burkett helped to convince
voters that the Republican party
of progressivism.

was now following

many

Roosevelt's brand

Norris conducted the early part of his campaign, as in 1902, by
local
speaking before various nonpartisan groups. By midsummer

were optimistic and their enthusiasm was quickly communi
cated to the candidate. With the lack of cooperation between Populist
and Democratic state organizations, with Alton B. Parker heading the

leaders

Democratic ticket and Theodore Roosevelt leading the Republicans,
with abundant crops, adequate rainfall, and good prices making for a
satisfied farm population, Republican leaders in Nebraska certainly
had good reason for optimism. 14

campaign manager, worked long and hard.
He arranged transportation for individuals who might be able to get
George Allen,

Norris'

arranged to collect
funds from the postmasters, and visited disgruntled Republicans,
remedying their grievances wherever possible. He also made surrepti
tious efforts to appeal to rank and file members of the opposition, who
were ready to reject fusion. He noted, "They could fuse when Bryan
was in the lead as he stood for many things that the Pops did or at

votes, contacted editors

throughout the

district,

least pretended to and they could follow him with very good grace,
but Parker being antagonistic to everything that the Pops advocated
why it simply deadens the whole deal/' In addition to these activities,
15
Allen, a veteran, visited old soldiers and spoke in favor of Norris.
The Democrats and Populists held their congressional conventions
at Hastings on August 24, and soon Norris learned that his opponent
would be H. H. Mauck. Shallenberger had been offered the nomina
tion of both parties, but declined. Mauck literally had obtained the

nomination through default; none of the other fusion leaders desired
it.

As a

result,

most observers believed that

it

would be

"practically

16
impossible" to defeat Norris.

By mid-September there were four candidates seeking to represent
the Fifth Congressional District in Washington, a Socialist and a
Prohibitionist candidate having been chosen by their respective party
conventions. The appearance of these two new candidates meant
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would
further difficulties for the fusionists as some former Populists
be attracted to both of these reform candidates. While the Republicans
would gain some fusion votes, very few of their supporters would be
attracted by either of the new candidates. Their appearance further
led his manager to believe, "We will
improved Norris' position, and
17
catch them coming and going."
Norris and his supporters were certain of ultimate victory when it
became evident that Harry Mauck was a most uninspiring campaigner.
He aroused little of the enthusiasm and attracted none of the crowds
that Shallenberger had. Furthermore, Norris learned that Congressman
Babcock, chairman of the Congressional Campaign Committee, con
sidered Norris' race one of the closest in the nation and was deter

mined to carry
Cannon agreed

it

on

election day.

With

this

end in mind, Speaker
end of

to speak in the district for three days at the

18

September.
By mid-October Norris already had stumped throughout the dis
a different community
trict, speaking six days a week and appearing in

on the same
every day. Occasionally he spoke in two or more villages
with Norris,
day. In the last weeks of the campaign, Allen traveled
and introducing him to leading citizens
briefing him on local situations
in the eastern end of the district, which Allen knew better than Norris.
Allen thought the crowds were good and that Norris spoke very well,
even though the weather at the end of October was far from satisfac
tory for campaign purposes. Norris, in his speeches, stressed the point
that those who went into the Populist movement in good faith could

not conscientiously support Parker and the Democratic ticket in 1904. 19
Despite lack of widespread editorial support and notwithstanding
his colorless personality, Harry Mauck, through the efforts of his

manager, waged a vigorous campaign by hurling numerous irrespon
sible charges at his opponent. And in the week before election Shallen
berger took the stump with Mauck. As a last-ditch effort to stave off
defeat, the Democratic National Committee contributed five hundred
dollars to his

campaign, and Bryan came to speak on Mauck's behalf.

Norris heard that Bryan attracted large crowds but generated
enthusiasm. Bryan did not touch on national issues and made no

little

men

tion of Parker or Roosevelt in his speeches. So confident was Allen of
victory that he did not plan to spend election eve with Norris. Even

Merwin, much more cautious than Allen, predicted victory. And Norris
himself had no reason on election eve to doubt his chances. 20

On election day, November 8, 1904, the Republican ticket won an
overwhelming victory. Roosevelt had 336 electoral votes and a plurality
of more than two and a half million votes.
Republican candidates won
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Nebraska. All six candidates for Congress defeated
opponents and Congressman Burkett was assured of a

offices in

their fusion

Senate seat by polling 107,595 votes in the preferential primary.
George Norris in the Fifth Congressional District received a majority
of more than five thousand, polling 19,645 votes. Not a single county in

Nebraska cast

its vote for Parker, nor did Norris lose a single county in
In Perkins, one of the remote and thinly settled counties,
the vote was a tie, standing 161 for each candidate. A prominent

his district.

Nebraska historian commenting on the campaign wrote, "The final
figures in the nation announced the death of the People's party and
foreshadowed the return of Mr. Bryan as leader of the Democrats.*' 21
Norris, delighted with this splendid victory, in contrast to his 181vote plurality in 1902, claimed that aside from the president, Speaker
Cannon deserved credit for the "land-slide" election results. He be
lieved that Cannon's "able, honest and wise administration" of his

had been "one of the great elements" in the national Republi
can triumph. Norris wrote the Speaker, "Your position is the second one
in the nation, and the confidence that all have in you has made many
votes for the Republican ticket all over our country, because it has

position

been recognized that Republican success meant the retention of your
self in that
high and honorable position." Grateful to Cannon for his
visit

during the campaign, Norris assured the Speaker that

humble way he could help advance Cannon's

his

find

it

an "extreme pleasure" to do

interests

if

in

he would

so.22

After the election Norris had almost no time to relax before return
ing to Washington for the third and lame duck session of the Fiftyeighth Congress, scheduled to convene on December 5, 1904. This time
Norris planned to bring his wife and three children with him. He
to be in Washington by the first of December, to get his family

hoped

settled

and the older

school before Speaker

Hazel and Marian, registered in a public
Cannon brought the House of Representatives

girls,

to order. 23

The

third session of the Fifty-eighth Congress started in a most
way for the re-elected gentleman from Nebraska. Wash

disagreeable

ington weather was damp and cold and soon his entire family was
sick. Norris also found that his official duties involved much harder

who was on hand to aid him, noted at the end of
"The
January,
Judge is mighty busy with affairs of state." Norris sum
marized the situation more succinctly when he remarked, "I have had
24
my hands full."
Work on the Committee on Public Lands and Buildings consumed
much time. Norris was a member of the subcommittee which was conwork. Merwin,
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The subcommittee, after re
two buildings, at Grand
recommended
viewing the Nebraska situation,
a month the
for
sites
three
Island and at York, and
buildings. Within
Island.
Grand
at
a
for
House
building
$100,000
sidering the erection of public buildings.

appropriated

public

Thus Norris fulfilled a 1902 campaign pledge even though^ the bill
25
law without this item included.
ultimately was enacted into
for the first time an interest in
During this session he also showed
the Constitution.
improving the processes of government by amending
House Joint Resolution 166 died in committee, his concern

Though

with it did not. The resolution provided for a national election every
four years, at which time all of the members of the House of Repre
sentatives and one-half of the Senate, one member from each state,
would be elected directly by the people. Every eight years there would
be a presidential election. The great reform in this resolution, Norris
senators by the people, though the
thought, would be the election of
other changes seemed equally important to him. Since his resolution
he thought it might
lengthened the term of senators by two years,
The lower house, Norris
that
receive favorable consideration

body,
by
would undoubtedly agree to any resolution which doubled
the term of its members, while a single eight-year term for the chief
26
executive could readily be defended.
Though he was investigating national and constitutional issues,
Norris voted with his party on all major pieces of legislation and

realized,

devoted most of

Ms time

to the affairs of his district.

The

appropriation

for a federal building helped him as did his concern for Union veter
ans and their pensions. Since Congress was in no mood to benefit a

dwindling segment of the population, many of whom were already
being cared for at public expense, Norris actually could do little to aid

dependent veterans. Nevertheless, he "stood ready to support any
measure" which would serve to treat with more liberality and con

and noble boys." 27
Moreover, Norris was faced with the loss of potent patronage in his
home town. In 1904 an agent of the Department of the Interior con
ducted an investigation of the McCook land office and shortly there
after it was closed. The work of the McCook office, it was announced,
would be included in the Lincoln .land district, comprising southern
and southeastern Nebraska. 28
Sentiment in McCook was against the removal of the office. Many
citizens were disposed to hold their congressman responsible. Resi
dents having business at the land office would now have to travel to
Lincoln, at the other end of the state. People were also charging that
sideration these "brave
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the deeds to available government lands now could be placed within
easier reach of the railroads and "that crowd of grafters and

and were now beyond the reach of the people. The land
had been located in McCook since 1882, and while some citizens
realized it was only a question of time before it would be closed, few
were willing to admit that the time had come. 29
swindlers,"

office

Norris, realizing that the loss of the

McCook

land

office

could

counteract popularity he would gain from the Grand Island federal
building, set out to explain the government's policy in this matter. He

claimed that

its

discontinued,

closing was legal, that other land offices were being
that it was the intention of the Department of the

and

Interior eventually to cancel all the Nebraska land offices except the
at Lincoln. Whether this explanation soothed aroused citizens,

one

Norris

was not able

immediately

to discern.

Fortunately the closing came almost
it would not be a
burning

after the 1904 election, so that

issue in the next congressional campaign. 30
Thus most of Norris' activities in the Fifty-eighth Congress were
routine and pertained largely to the affairs of his district. He concen

congressman must, on serving constituents. As a fresh
he
did speak several times on matters of more than local
man, however,
or sectional interest, and was becoming interested in improving the
processes of government by making it more democratic and respon
sible. He performed his
job conscientiously and may have worked
harder than most members. He was in the good graces of Speaker
Cannon and accepted as well the leadership and policies of Roosevelt.
There was little to indicate in his first term that he would later lead the
insurgency movement in the House of Representatives. It was only
when the party's executive leadership broke down and senior members
in Congress tried to assume it that Norris emerged as an outstanding
trated, as every

figure.

When

the lame duck session

Norris, his family,

and

came

his secretary

to an end in March, 1905,
were glad to return to Nebraska.

They may have witnessed

Roosevelt's inauguration, but, since the
Norrises were not interested in participating in Washington society,
it is doubtful that
they attended the evening festivities. In Nebraska

end of March, Merwin resigned as secretary because his news
was
paper
losing business. His resignation was unexpected and Norris
would have been at a loss to replace him, had Merwin not mentioned
at the

as his successor a

young lawyer

in

McCook, Ray McCarl, a recent
Law School and an experi

graduate of the University of Nebraska

enced stenographer. 31
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With

now had

the matter of a successor to

Merwin quickly

settled, Norris

months of freedom from legislative duties and
the prospect of a summer free from campaigning. In short, he could
at least eight

enjoy his first extended rest since his honeymoon in 1903. This vacation
brought with it an opportunity to travel to Europe.

Chapter 12

The

Large View: International

and National
THE FAMILY,

especially the children, who had talked of little else
month of the session, were delighted to return to

during the last
Nebraska.
in repair.

Home

in McCook, Norris sought to keep his political fences
In Washington he had secured from lameduck Senator

Dietrich some of the free government documents available in his
office.

Now he distributed them among his constituents. 1

Thoroughly familiar with numerous departmental procedures, he
to inform his constituents of the various rules and regulations

was able

necessary to obtain, for example, a rural free delivery route or a pen
sion. 2 He had made sure that the
Department of Agriculture knew that

he represented a district where alfalfa, wheat, and corn were the
and that, as a usual thing, the area did not receive as
much moisture as the eastern part of Nebraska. Norris hoped the de
partment would find it possible to conduct experiments with these crops
"with a view to the introduction of varieties particularly adapted to
the conditions there, which would result in a great benefit to the
farmers of the district." He also had urged that seed corn, wheat, and
alfalfa be sent to leading farmers for experimental purposes and that
the semi-arid districts not be forgotten by government research sci
principal crops

entists. 3

In the Fifty-ninth Congress he had spoken in favor of an amend
for dry farming, which would make productive
"a very large scope of country'' that heretofore had been considered

ment providing funds

useless for agricultural purposes. In these remarks, he showed an inti
mate knowledge of agricultural techniques, explaining to his colleagues
the "Campbell system," a method of dry farming that had been
4
experimented with in his district. Thus at the outset of his congres
sional career, Norris expressed an interest in improving agricultural
production in the short-grass country. He knew that the soil, which
basically was very rich, needed more moisture. He was intent upon
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need by increasing the farmer s knowledge of dry farming
and other techniques, by putting sturdier seeds in his hands, and later
that would make farmers better
by providing vast irrigation facilities
able to cope with the vicissitudes of nature.
In Washington Norris had supported a bill introduced by a
Nebraska colleague, Moses P. Kinkaid, which, when signed into law
affected the pattern of public
by President Roosevelt on April 28, 1904,
in Nebraska. In conjunction with the
land
filling this

distribution, particularly

marked a major and more realistic change
in the land policy of the United States. Briefly, the law permitted any
one to acquire a homestead of 640 acres if he had lived there for five
at least $800 worth of improvements. Its effect was a
years and made
of homesteading in western Nebraska, where
increase
remarkable
Reclamation Act of 1902

small-scale ranching

it

now became possible. 5

after his return from Washing
Traveling through this area shortly
of claims had been filed by
the
that
found
Norris
ton,
great majority

men who
ment of

intended to

fences that

make

their

permanent homes

there.

vacant land, he thought would help remove

this

The

many

settle

illegal

had been placed on the public domain by unscrupulous

cattlemen. In conversation with a county assessor, Norris learned that
in five precincts the population had increased by ninety families and
that this fact was quickly registered in the rising value of taxable
convince him that the law
personal property. Such evidence helped
6
was a beneficial one.
because of the numerous violations by cattlemen in the

However,

Norris soon modified his views.
sparsely populated sand-hills region,

He came

to favor a

of these lands

assume ownership
plan whereby the state would
either sell or lease them to the cattlemen.

and then

Since most of the land available under the Kinkaid Act

was located

in

Nebraska, he believed that the state could deal with violations better
than the national government, which did not have enough agents on
hand to see that cattlemen did not unlawfully extend their fences and
intimidate would-be settlers. Moreover, the funds derived from selling
7
or leasing land could be used to improve the state school system.

Though

affairs in

the district kept

him busy during May and June,

was the forthcoming trip to Europe, as a delegate 'to the Interparlia
mentary Union, that excited him. To be a delegate to this conference,
an individual had to be a member of the highest legislative body of his
government. The union's object was to encourage a sentiment which
would ultimately result in the abandonment of warfare between na
tions, and it had in mind, among other such calamities, the RussoJapanese War then in progress. The organization had no official conit
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nection with any government and its work was of an advisory nature,
though the calibre of its membership gave it a quasi-official status.

The

leader of the American delegation, Congressman Bartholdt of
Missouri, had been responsible for the Interparliamentary Union meet
ing in St. Louis in 1904 and for Roosevelt's invitation to its members

White House, where he had promised to support a second
at The Hague. While Norris did not attend the 1904
conference
peace
and
had
refused Rartholdt's initial request that he be a dele
meeting
to
the
1905
conference, he eventually decided to attend the
gate
to visit the

Brussels meeting of the union. 8
After enjoying a brief vacation with his family in Wisconsin, Norris
left New York on August 12 on the Red Star Line steamer, Vaderland.

The vessel docked at Antwerp, and
week prior to the opening session. 9

Norris arrived in Brussels about a

At the thirteenth meeting of the Interparliamentary Union the
American delegation made two significant suggestions. It called for
the preparation of a model arbitration treaty and recommended that
steps be taken toward the establishment of an international organiza
tion with jurisdiction to enact into law such statutes as might be neces
sary to insure peace among nations. After much debate and discussion
it was decided to refer these matters to the next
meeting of the Hague
Conference. Norris, as well as most of the other members of the Ameri
can delegation, spoke in favor of these resolutions. 10

At the

close of the conference, the Belgian representatives invited
the delegates to a reception in the building where Napoleon's of
ficers had assembled on the eve of Waterloo. The rooms were deco
rated with the colors of all nations. At the very same time the peace
all

commissioners at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, were concluding the
details of the treaty ending the Russo-Japanese War. As Norris later
recalled:

The

finest

band in Belgium was playing her national air. In the
the music suddenly ceased. AH eyes were turned to the
saw the leader of the band seize from the decorations

midst of

it

rostrum.

We

American flag, and using it as a baton, he waved it
over the heads of the musicians, and in answer to his action, there
burst forth the rapturous strains of the Star-Spangled Banner. For
a moment, and a moment only, there was silence, and then there
burst forth a roar of applause which clearly indicated that every
one there understood that beneath the f athomless deep the electric
of the hall the

spark had brought the welcome news that on the shores of America
for peace had been signed. On the occasion of
an

agreement

ioo
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the revelry was interrupted by
nearly one hundred years before
the booming of cannon, but on this occasion it was the joyous
America the peace of the
message that under the leadership of
when it
world had been established. That was an occasion
.

was greater to be an American citizen than

to

Norris recalled this incident and his brief trip to

.

.

wear a crown. 11

Germany many times

an enlightening and en
during his career.
that application had been made
learned
Norris
joyable European trip,
in favor of President Roosevelt as the American candidate for the
Nobel Peace Prize because of his efforts in concluding the Russohad mistakenly believed that the prize could not
Japanese War. Norris
be awarded to a head of state, and would have preferred and strongly
as the American candidate because
supported Congressman Bartholdt
of his work as head of the American delegation to various meetings of

Back home

in

McCook,

after

12
the Interparliamentary Union.

Before returning to Washington, he acceded to several requests to
talk about his recent trip. A friend, who attended the lecture in the
sat still and were atten
Clay Center Opera House, noted that people
he
no
had
tive throughout. Norris
prepared speech, but spoke, as
a
or
campaign, extemporaneously.
during
always spoke in Congress
Moreover, he insisted that, since he did not expect any pay, no admis
sion should be charged. 13

Though not actively participating in the 1905 state-wide campaign,
Norris nevertheless urged Republican leaders to turn out the vote on
election day. 14 As expected, Republican candidates won most of the
available offices and Norris turned his attention to the convening of
the Fifty-ninth Congress early in December. Though Speaker Cannon
refused to commit himself about committee assignments, he told Norris
to rest assured that the matter would receive "consideration from one

who

has the most friendly feeling toward yourself both from the
5
'

15

personal and political standpoint.
Norris agreed to some extent with the criticism of the rules of the

House of Representatives then being voiced, but felt that the fault lay
in the large and unwieldy size of the body and not, as he was later to
believe, in the power of the Speaker. Limitations on debate were neces
sary if any work was to be accomplished. Discussion and legislation,
he knew, were controlled to a great extent by the older members who
enjoyed great influence in House affairs. Realizing that he would enjoy
no influential role in this Congress, Norris wanted to remain on a
committee where he could be instrumental in having federal funds
allocated for his district. Realistic in his appraisal of the House of
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Representatives and of his negligible role in its functioning, Norris, as
the Fifty-ninth Congress prepared to convene, was unaware of any
16
tyranny or undue power exercised by Speaker Cannon.
for
his
family, Norris found a
Departing
Washington ahead of
on
Mintwood
Place
near
Rock Creek Park. In a
pleasant apartment
lived
a
freshman
neighboring apartment
congressman from North
Asle
and
the
two
soon became very
families
Dakota,
J. Gronna,
17
Mrs.
Norris
was
and
the
friendly.
family looked forward to
pregnant

a

new

addition

some time in February or March.

On

February 23, 1906, very early in the morning, Mrs. Norris
birth
to twin boys, both of them dying within twenty-four hours.
gave
For a while she hovered between
and death, remaining on the
critical list at Providence Hospital for several days. Her husband, un

Me

willing to let her return to Nebraska with the bodies of the

dead in

fants for burial, reluctantly decided to have them cremated. This ex
perience was a painful ordeal for the entire family. It deeply affected

Norris,

who

rarely

mentioned

it

either in conversation or in corre

18

spondence.

On

Capitol Hill Norris found,

when Congress convened,

that

Can

non had rewarded him with a place on the Committee on Labor in
addition to membership on the two committees on which he had pre
viously served. Despite his trip to Europe, he showed little interest

The Alaskan boundary dispute, the Russo-Japanese
War, the Panama Canal, and other aspects of American expansion
were not topics of discussion in his letters or public addresses.
Domestic and largely local issues occupied his attention. However,
in foreign affairs.

during

this session his

horizon continued to expand.

He

received a

petition from the leading citizens of McCook protesting pogroms in the
Russian Empire, and both he and his secretary signed it and sent it on
to the president. He was also in sympathy with the idea of sending
Chinese students to the United States. 19 But his primary interest in
world affairs focused on the Philippine tariff measure, supported by the
administration and providing for free trade with this newly acquired

dependency.
On January 13, 1906, Norris delivered his longest speech of the
session reviewing the Philippine question and proclaiming his opposi
tion to the bill. He pointed with pride to the American achievement
of bringing material improvements, educational facilities, and a court
system to the islands. He noted that according to the tariff law in
operation all revenue collected from Philippine imports was being
turned back into their treasury, thereby providing funds necessary to
administer this dependency. If the administration

bill

was passed,

the,
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American people, Norris argued, would then have to provide these
funds out of increased taxation.
He came to the core of his opposition when he noted that the beetsugar men, who, incidentally, had established one of the first beetsugar factories in the United States in Grand Island, Nebraska, did
not favor the measure. Like them, he claimed it would benefit the
7

"sugar trust.' Since the bulk of the imports from the Philippine Islands
consisted of cane sugar which had to be refined before it could be
consumed, Norris noted that there was but one purchaser of raw sugar
in the United States, the sugar trust. Free trade thus would further
benefit the trust since it could arbitrarily fix the price for raw sugar
received by producers in the Philippines. This occurrence would in

turn

fix

the price to the American consumer. Sugar refiners

would have

a greater opportunity to increase their profits with no corresponding
reduction in consumer prices, while the Philippine producers would
not receive a better price for their sugar. Speaking of the producer

who was supposed to benefit from this bill, Norris said, "We are giving
him a gold brick, and while he is innocently picking at the gilt on the
outside and discovering the deception on the inside the sugar trust
walks away with the swag and the Filipino is holding the sack/* He
thought a better name for the bill would be, "An act for the purpose
of deceiving the Filipino, for menacing an American industry, and for
the enrichment of the sugar trust."

The menaced American industry was the beet-sugar industry, the
development of which would be retarded by this measure. Since beetsugar factories would most likely be established either in western Ne
braska or eastern Colorado, Norris was concerned about
any measure
which could retard the future development of his district. He therefore
included as part of the peroration of his
argument a traditional appeal
for protection. 20
Opposition to this bill placed Norris in an embarrassing position.
His views ran counter to those of the president
he claimed to

whom

support, and

opponents in Nebraska would
contradiction. Furthermore, his
opposition may
his

be sure to notice this
have endangered his

standing with Speaker Cannon.
Norris was criticized for his
opposition but he was ready with a
defense of his position. The tariff measure, he claimed, was
unimpor
tant as compared "with the
great corporation question/* And on this
issue he was in full accord with the
president. Moreover, Norris was
convinced that Roosevelt advocated the measure
"simply because it
was recommended to him by Secretary Tart." But, Norris assured an
irate constituent, his stand did not
jeopardize his relations either with
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the president or with Speaker Cannon; "You must certainly admit that
a member of Congress who would do nothing except follow the views

than a cipher." 21
enemies use
this vote as a lever in opposing his renomination. He wrote numerous
letters explaining his position and
arguing that the subject had been
overestimated in its importance to the president. He also was not
of

some other person would be nothing more or
Despite reassurances, Norris was concerned

less

lest his

happy about Washington rumors that he was an "insurgent" and
would oppose the president on other aspects of his program. 22
In view of his later career, it is rather ironic that Norris gained his
initial
reputation as an insurgent for supporting the theory of protec
tion, while being labeled an opponent of the first trust-busting presi
dent simply because

-he

opposed further favors

to

an already powerful

criticism leveled against Norris also indicated
Roosevelt's great popularity in Nebraska. The people by and large
accepted his moral posture of an increased role for the federal govern

corporation. However,

ment

to

curb some of the corporate privileges prevalent in American

life.

Though

Norris defended the theory of protection in his opposition

he was not dogmatic and he recognized
Dingley Tariff. Sentiment for revision was
rising, but he recognized that change for the sake of change could
perpetrate greater inequities than already existed: "The very an
nouncement that the tariff is to be revised would immediately have a
to the Philippine tariff bill,
inequities in the prevailing

very depressing influence upon the business of the entire country.
Everybody would want to wait and see what the new tariff was going
to be before
urging any business proposition involving large sums of

money." Since revision was an intricate and politically volatile subject,
he said it should be undertaken immediately after an election by a

and never during an
would become an obvious political "football."

special session of Congress

election year

when

it

Despite sentiment for tariff modification, Norris believed that
Roosevelt was eminently correct in not calling a special session of Con
gress for this purpose after his

overwhelming election in 1904. It
when no other major item of

should only be attempted, he argued,

legislation was to be considered. Since the administration had given
priority to the question of the regulation of railroad rates, tariff revi
sion would have .to wait. This view, Norris believed, was also Roose

view. No mention of tariff revision appeared in his annual
23
message, nor did he call a special session of Congress.
As Norris sagely observed, the president was more interested in

velt's

railroad regulation than in the

tariff.

And

it

was

to this

former topic
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oHts
session of the Fifty-ninth Congress devoted much
administration's
the
with
accord
in
position
attention. Norris was fully
over rates to the Interstate Commerce Commission.
of
that the

first

granting power
For over thirty years the railroads of Nebraska had been a subject

of political controversy. They were in politics, particularly Republican
and their influence was again noticeable now that the party
politics,

had returned to power. However, Democratic and Populist hostility
and suspicion, and the desire to curb their power, in the 1890's had

carried over into the new century. Many
engendered a sentiment that
were talking very
the
in
leaders
Republican party in Nebraska
young
much like the Populists and Bryan Democrats a decade earlier in their
to railroad influence and boss rule. Such sentiment, prevalent
hostility

in other states as well,

desire to grant
encouraged Roosevelt in his

Commision to regulate
power to the Interstate Commerce
this
railroads and other common carriers. Norris was swept along by
became
now
tide in Nebraska; his attitude toward the railroads
effective

rising

openly

critical.

The

previous hostility of

W.

S.

Morlan, the Burlington's

toward Norris' candidacy in 1902, no
powerful agent in McCook,
of his party.
doubt, helped in pushing him into the more liberal wing
a letter
received
he
before Norris left for Washington
Shortly
indicative of the

more

critical attitude

toward the

railroad.

The

writer,

a political leader, said that the stock shippers in his county were com
detrimental freight service. Stock ship
plaining of inadequate and
time than
for
ments to Denver,
example, were taking much more
crews to
train
lines
the
because
required freight
Burlington
necessary
while it charged the shippers from sixteen to eighteen dollars
car
extra freight. The delay caused a shrinkage in the collective
per
the cattle (hence in their value), and added to their risk of
of
weight
rest,

24
Thus with businessmen, farmers, and cattlemen dis
injury or death.
turbed by the railroad's shipping policies, it required no great courage

for a politician to openly attack the railroad.

And many

from conviction than from mere opportunism.
In Washington, once the president requested Congress

did so
to

less

enact a

railroad rate bill, Norris proclaimed himself in "perfect sympathy"
with these views. He intended to aid in the enactment of an adequate
25

law that would give some

legal body the power to fix a fair rate.
In explaining his decision to his former political adviser, ex-Senator
Manderson, chief of the Law Department of the Chicago, Burlington

& Quincy Railroad Company, Western Division,

Norris wrote:

Ever since the beginning of this rate agitation, I have inter
I had read volumes
speeches, argu-

ested myself in the question.
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etc., on the subject. I have devoted all the time
disposal to this subject. I know that I have been conscien
tious and honest in trying to reach a just conclusion just to the

ments, resolutions,
at

my

public and the railroads alike.

He claimed that hostility to the Burlington raikoad in southwestern
Nebraska had become noticeable only after the system had come under
the control of James J. Hill in 1901. Until that time the Burlington had
come as close to meeting and supplying the wants of its customers and
patrons as any railroad in existence, while the people along its lines
exhibited friendly feeling toward the road and its managers. Since that
time, however, there had been a change for the worse; merchants and
customers in the smaller towns had become prejudiced against the road
and its policies. Norris illustrated what he meant by noting:
There was a time, not many years ago, when a merchant in one
of these towns could order goods from Omaha, Lincoln > Kansas
City or St. Joseph, knowing with an absolute certainty within an
hour or two of the time when that order of goods would reach
him. He could order something he had sold to a customer and be
able to guarantee a prompt delivery at least within a day or two.
He could order by wire, knowing when he did so exactly when
the goods so ordered would be delivered at his home station.

Conditions have radically changed. At the present time it is not
an uncommon thing for goods to be ordered and not delivered un
til from
twenty to thirty days, when in the ordinary course of
business it should not require more than two to three days to make
such delivery, and such was the case in former days.
This lack of desire to accommodate local shippers, it seemed to
had come about by the adoption of what was called "the ton

Norris,

an arrangement whereby the number and frequency of
depended on the tonnage shipped. Some
freight trains, Norris had learned from raikoad men in McCook, re
quired from twenty-five to forty hours going over one division. Such
conditions, he explained, had never existed prior to the Hill manage

nage

rule,"

trains over a particular line

ment. Meanwhile, hostile sentiment, injurious to the raikoad, its em
ployees, and its customers, was spreading. Though these examples had
no direct connection with rate supervision, in Norris' judgment they
to do with prevailing sentiment on that question. He was
convinced that feeling against the raikoad had been brought about
by changes introduced by the Hill management. Moreover, these

had much

changes explained

why numerous Nebraska

citizens

were against the
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and would continue

railroad

to

be so "without going
very deep
into^a26

consideration of the merits of any particular controversy."
to Manderson his pass on the Bur
Early in 1906 Norris returned
all parties
Nebraska.
in
Previously in the 1905 campaign
lington system
as par
statements
denouncing,
their
in
included
had
platforms strong
has
historian
the granting of passes. One Nebraska
ticularly offensive,

noted that

had

this antipass

sentiment "had

its

hitherto resisted or disregarded it,
assumed the halo of righteousness

officials

upon politicians who
and some of the principal
effect

by

ostentatiously repudiat
27

of special privilege."
ing the now disreputable tag
he assumed
Norris was certainly affected by this sentiment, though
in his
influenced
been
ever
had
he
no righteous pose. He doubted if
have
constituents
he
of
wrote, "my
fact/'
official conduct. "As a matter

than
beneficiaries of the free transportation I have had, more
in
matters
to
attention
me
to
as it has enabled
give personal

been the

myself,
distant portions of

connected with

my
my congressional district
to
attended
have
not
could
I
that
matters
personally had
cial duties,
Thus he
I been compelled to stand the entire expense of the trips."
offi

realized that the loss of a pass would add to his expenditures. By
severed relations with the Burlington
returning his pass, Norris politely

some of whose officials, especially Manderson, had ad
vised and helped him in his political career and on whose payroll
he had been when he was a struggling young lawyer in Beaver
Railroad,

28

City.

Not only did Norris support most of the railroad bills presented in
this session of Congress, he also introduced one limiting the hours of
service by railroad employees. Appearing before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce he made several statements
about freight train schedules, the time consumed in shipments by
and the long hours of service of railroad trainmen. After the
witness for the Burlington Railroad denied that there were freight
further evidence he
delays, Norris wrote several friends requesting

freight,

could use in support of his measure. Most of his examples were derived
from conversation with merchants and railroad employees in McCook
and elsewhere, but he now desired more specific information, such as
detailed way-bills.
most
Nothing came of this measure because Congress was devoting
of its time to the railroad rate question. But Norris continued to collect

the information he desired. Rarely, if ever, in his future congressional
career would he introduce and support a bill without first having ex

amined and mastered all the information he could find on it. Measures,
such as the one he introduced, Norris believed, at least had the effect
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the railroads improve their service to prevent further gov

of

making
ernment probing. 29
He was also in accord with the administration's request for legisla
tion calling for the careful inspection and supervision of packing
houses and food and drug products used in interstate commerce. Bills
to achieve these results were considered in June, 1906, and Norris was
certain they would pass before the session adjourned. He was not
certain, however, how effective they would be. And he was unhappy
that reports filed with the president, showing that proper inspection
was not taking place, had been given so much prominence. He be
lieved that as a result the packing industry had received a damaging
blow and that great harm would result for stock raisers.
Not that Norris was against the investigation and regulation of
packing house methods in the interest of public health. But he felt that
necessary reforms and improvements could have been made without
going into so many horrible details (since the packing business was
necessarily a "dirty business") which tended to affect adversely both
the domestic and foreign markets for meats. Furthermore, he hoped
that in the bill presented to Congress the cost of inspection would be
borne by the government and not by the packers, who could take this
item out of the price paid for the cattle, thereby affecting the stock
the farmer, and the consumer.30 Certainly Nebraska stockmen,
concerned about provisions for the cost of inspection, found Norris*
position in accord with their views. Indeed, no position that he took
raiser,

during

this significant session

was markedly out of

with the views

line

of his constituents.

Norris

reintroduced his

resolution

calling

for

a

constitutional

amendment

affecting the terms of the president., senators, and repre
sentatives. This time the amendment received editorial notice, and a

(calling for a six-year presidential tenure) was
by Norris in the closing days of the session. His
interest in improving the processes of
government was receiving some

modified version of

it

actually discussed

recognition, primarily because it was in accord with
clamor for the direct election of senators. 31

growing public

The

tenor of Norris* remarks in this session of Congress, with the
exception of the Philippine tariff bill, was in support of administration

measures and in favor of the expansion of federal authority in instances
where the public interest was threatened. Thus he spoke in support of
the right of Congress to regulate life insurance companies: "Those
who have charge of insurance moneys are charged with a duty not
only to the State, but to all humanity." Since insurance companies, like
other powerful corporate interests, were nationwide in their activities,
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and since most state legislation had failed to prevent their mismanage
ment of other people's money, he thought national supervision would
be better, both for the insured and for "all honest insurance com
then would have to comply with only one set
panies." The companies
of requirements instead of

ments) which by

many

sets

(contradictory state require
32

their very nature encouraged unethical practices.
of the president's program, he re
to

part
Despite his opposition
the first session of the Fifty-ninth Congress as
himself
during
garded
an ardent supporter of Theodore Roosevelt Indeed, during this session
he had broken with the dominant corporate interest in Nebraska, the
had championed the curbing or supervision
Burlington Railroad, and
wealth. The session revealed Norris as a Roosevelt Repub
of
corporate

expanding role of government Though
he always favored economy and denounced reckless expenditures, he
was willing to use the power of the central government, usually after
the states had shown themselves unable to solve a problem, to promote
the health and general well-being of the American people. There was
lican also in his support of the

this belief; his approach was essentially a
one
based
pragmatic
upon experience, knowledge, and understanding.
Since most of the opposition to the president's program came from
led by Nelson W.
powerful, able,, conservative, and standpat titans

no theoretical basis for

Aldrich and concentrated in the Senate, the

The

House

of Representatives

little
most discussions of Roosevelt's policies.
growing tensions between elements in the Republican party were

has received

attention in

not evident in the lower chamber because Speaker Cannon and the
president worked well together. The House of Representatives usually
quickly passed bills that die administration favored. Most of the fights
over Roosevelt's legislative program occurred in the Senate chamber,
Norris, a respected younger member of the House of Repre
sentatives, was gaining stature through his handling of committee

George

assignments and his lucid and cogent remarks. He was a partisan Re
publican, but not an emotional or vitriolic one. He looked after the

he was
done
good
now." 3S Finally, though his
to
summer
had
the
Europe
trip
previous
been an enlightening and rewarding experience, his horizon was
largely a national one. As Norris returned to Nebraska in 1906 he no
doubt mused about the prospect of increased
expenditures owing to
interests of his constituents so well that
early in the session

informed, "Your renomination and re-election

is

as

as

the necessity of
campaigning without the benefit of a railroad pass.

Chapter 13

The Third Campaign
As EARLY as January, 1906, Norris believed that there would be "no
other candidates and possibly no opposition" to his renomination.
Indeed, he had hopes that he would be given the nomination by accla
mation, as was the case two years previously. And George Allen, who

would again manage the campaign, reported that if> after receiving the
nomination, Norris merely announced that he was for Roosevelt and
a square deal, his election would be assured, so strong was the ground
swell in Nebraska for the president and his policies. While some slight
opposition had manifested itself in the spring, neither Allen nor Norris
was unduly concerned about it. 1
from Washington in July, Norris examined the
from his office in McCook and attended the Red
Willow County convention as a visiting dignitary. Though the conven
tion unanimously chose delegates favoring his renomination, he played
a role in preventing the convention from committing delegates to any
candidate for governor or United States senator. He did this because
there were at least two candidates for governor in the congressional
district, and considerable talk of a third; if the convention supported

Upon

his return

developing situation

its action could start a
political fight that
affect delegates to the congressional convention.

any of the candidates,

might

When the delegates from Beaver precinct voted for Norris as their
senatorial candidate, a spontaneous demonstration erupted in the hall
and Norris feared a "stampede" in his favor. Though he never left his
seat throughout these proceedings, his friends among the delegates
labored hard to curb the demonstration. Norris thought the use of his
name in connection with the senatorial race would have an injurious
effect

upon party harmony.

2

However, when

the Furnas County Convention met on the first of
almost
the
same thing occurred. Merwin and other Norris
August,
had
to
convince
supporters
delegates that he did not want anything but

the congressional nomination. While Norris did not deny that the
nomination for United States senator was an honor he would be very
109
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no

not obtain the nomination.
proud to receive, he recognized that he could
him a partner in contro
make
his
therefore,
name,
might
Mentioning
3
versies in which he had no desire to participate.
As expected, Norris was unanimously chosen by the congressional
convention which met at Hastings in mid-August. In his acceptance
he came out strongly against the use of railroad passes and

speech
declared that a pass, in effect, was a bribe. The opposition press
and as a congressman had
quickly pointed out that Norris as a judge
One paper noted, "It was a bribe then, as much as it is
carried a
pass.

now, but only the Democrats and Populists said so." What the Repub
licans now called reform, the paper noted, was nothing but poison
when it emanated from the opposition. Although Norris did not tell
the delegates that he had returned his last pass, his position would
have been equally vulnerable even if he had informed them. 4
Roderick D. Sutherland, former congressman from the district
(1897-1901), received the fusion nomination as the Democratic and
Populist candidate. Sutherland, a Nuckolls County lawyer, was an able
man, but he was not an orator like Shallenberger. Indeed, surprisingly
so for a former Populist congressman, he was an unemotional and
colorless personality who seemingly would have a difficult time in
arousing the voters.
Before he knew

who his opponent would be, Norris had written
House of Representatives to obtain the record of
introduced and enacted by his predecessors. He did this to fore

to the clerk of the
bills

of his record in Congress by showing that his predeces
had done even less. Thus, when the campaign got under way,
Norris was able to prevent Sutherland from attacking him
along these
stall criticism

sors

lines.

5

When a War Department employee from Nebraska wrote that "the
Union labor crowd" would probably oppose Norris' election in the
railroad towns of McCook, Grand Island, and
Hastings, Norris replied
that he thought the "suspicion of
from
Union Labor" was
opposition
correct. However, he had little fear it would affect the final result.
But if the need arose, Norris thought that Speaker Cannon would come
into the district once again on his behalf. And from an
unexpected
quarter, the American Protective Tariff League, Norris received an
because of his opposition to the Philippine tariff bill. He
refused
this offer,
politely
realizing that it would call the voters' at
6
tention to the fact that he had
opposed an administration measure.
offer of
help

Aware

campaign would be more expensive than previous
ones because of the lack of railroad
passes, George Allen and Ray
that this
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campaign contributions from

inter

ested citizens. Norris, for his part, started the campaign in his usual
way, appearing at reunions, picnics, and fairs, delivering supposedly
7

nonpartisan speeches.

Early in September Allen had a conference in his office in Clay
Center with Sutherland prior to a fusion meeting at the courthouse
where William Jennings Bryan was scheduled to speak. Allen was in
formed that Sutherland did not want to begin the campaign before
the first of October. This suggestion, Allen claimed, would be amenable
to Norris. Allen and Sutherland also agreed to conduct a "clean" cam

paign and not indulge in personalities. Sutherland confided that had
he been at the convention he would have declined the nomination. He
left Allen with the distinct
impression that, barring unexpected devel
8
opments, he did not think he could defeat Norris.
Meanwhile, from conversations and correspondence, Norris dis
cerned that most people were concerned about trusts and his attitude
toward them. This concern gave him an admirable way of explaining

his opposition to the
Philippine tariff measure by stressing his hostility
to the sugar trust.
also stated his general position: "Any organiza

He

whatever kind or nature, should be governed and controlled
to the end that it be prevented from stifling competition and ruining
or injuring other organizations or individuals in their efforts to conduct
legitimate businesses." Those who departed from this standard, he felt,
should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. 9
Sutherland started campaigning early in October, while Norris did
not begin until the week of October 8. Sutherland's audiences were not
tion of

and the only reference to Norris in his speeches was to criticize
on the Philippine tariff bill. His speeches were short, usually
minutes
or less. Allen reported that Sutherland had told a
thirty
of
gathering
Populists and Democrats at Hastings he could not afford
to let his law practice suffer, that he had reluctantly accepted the
nomination out of a sense of duty. Even with Bryan speaking on behalf
of Sutherland, enthusiasm seemed to be lacking among the fusion
large

his vote

10

groups.

From Monday, October

8, until

election day, Norris

campaigned

every day but Sundays. He traveled continually, speaking at a different
rally six evenings a week. McCarl in McCook supervised the over-all
arrangements, but it was up to the local leaders to hire the hall, adver
tise the meeting, and arrange to have local candidates and
dignitaries
on the platform with Norris. McGarl advised them to have all of the
"boys in blue" on the platform and to see to it that Norris left the
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with local editors

morning after the rally. Norris was expected
and officials, shake hands, and make himself accessible
to visit

to all visitors

11
in a hotel room.

was fortunate in having the
busy traveling and speaking,
McCarl and Allen. Both were intensely devoted and
their arduous jobs with no prodding
loyal to him^ and both performed
from him. By the end of the campaign neither McCarl, in his twenties,
nor Allen, probably in his sixties, was finding enough time to do all
his chores. All, including Norris, in his forties, were working long
hours with little time for food and sleep. None saw his family to any
Norris,

services of both

hectic period, the candidate least of
great extent during this
or emotion, at times these
sentiment
Norris rarely exhibited

all.

Since

men

felt

he took them for granted. But they usually knew that he gave of him
self even more unstintingly than they gave of themselves. He inspired
his words.
loyalty and devotion by his actions as well as by
to provide transportation to bring
unable
Norris
was
Though
absent voters home to vote, Allen reported that Democratic and Popu
list leaders, who had for years been attacking the railroads, were
providing transportation. Allen was sure this news, which he wanted to
release at the end of the campaign, would boomerang and cost the
opposition many votes. The vagaries of party politics had thus brought
into a
"the great reform party and the old time railroad haters
.

.

.

combination or agreement with the corporations." In his thirty-four
years in politics Allen had seen many odd combinations, but this
strange alliance between the railroads and "the wreck of the great fusion
12
party of reform" presented "the greatest mix-up of all/'

week of the campaign Allen attended several Norris
The
crowds
were large and the speeches good. Norris' "fine
meetings.
In the last

appearance on the rostrum and

his fine

honest look," coupled with his

and "straightforward way" of talking, carried conviction. His
delivery was clear and distinct; his language was simple and impres
sive, unburdened with rotund oratorical flourishes. Allen, who mingled
in the crowd trying to hear remarks about the
speeches, concluded that
most men in the audience agreed that Norris was "an honest and sin
cere candidate as well as an able one." 13
Both McCarl and Allen expected the campaign to conclude without
a hitch. Both were surprised when Norris lost his
temper at the Clay
Center meeting on November 2, and indulged in a tirade of
personal
vituperation against a local editor who had long been attacking him.
earnest

The meeting started well enough, and, despite a heavy rain, the court
room was crowded. But soon Norris lost control and bellowed forth his
wrath and indignation at the hapless editor who was in the audience. 14
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Editor Palmer of the Clay Center Sun was a disappointed candi
date for the Clay Center post office. When Norris concluded two or
three years previously that the good of the service and the wishes of
the party necessitated the appointment of another candidate, Palmer
went into a rage and had opposed Norris ever since. In Clay County

most people knew the reason for the paper's bitter opposition, and thus
were not drastically swayed. However, when its editorials appeared in
other newspapers, some damage did result because readers did not

know the source of the
Norris,

opposition.

though tempted, had never attacked Palmer personally,

believing it better to ignore the man than to lose dignity by a personal
denunciation. 15 For this reason, his tirade was totally unexpected. He

claimed the editor had said that if he did not get the appointment as
postmaster he would continually criticize Norris. Palmer then inter
rupted and cried out that Norris' informant had Med. Norris lost his
temper. Overcome with anger, he left the rostrum, walked down the
aisle, shook his fist at Palmer, and thundered forth that he could prove
his statement. He then proceeded to give Palmer a severe tongue-lash
ing. This incident, of course, created a sensation. Some people expected
Norris to strike Palmer, but, after this castigation, Norris returned to
the platform and went on with his speech. 16
Allen, who considered Palmer "a drooling, drivelling, lecherous,
diabolical piece of polluted humanity
incapable of high morality
and decency," nevertheless, was sorry that Norris had given vent to his
emotions. Though prominent citizens felt that he was justified in attack
ing Palmer, Allen, with his eye on the over-all campaign, thought
Norris* energy was wasted "on so vile a creature," and was afraid that
Sutherland might try to capitalize on it. A Democratic committeeman,
.

.

.

introducing a speaker at a meeting the following night, assured the
audience that no one need fear any physical damage such as occurred
at Republican rallies. 17
For Allen, Norris' speech in Clay Center was the high spot of the
campaign. Allen was too busy to attend the Hastings rally on Novem
ber 3 or the campaign windup at McCook on election eve. The

McCook meeting, the climax of the campaign, took place in the opera
house, which had a seating capacity of over a thousand. Picture posters
were widely distributed and local leaders had been instructed to bring
delegations. A band had been hired and invitations were sent to all the
"old soldiers" to be present as guests of "the Judge" on the
stage where
they occupied reserved seats. Speaking before a friendly audience,

Norris was in fine form, and the local candidates, some of
hard pressed, were grateful for the support he gave them. 18

whom

were
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The 1906 campaign registered the high-water mark of the progres
and
sive movement in Nebraska. All parties had progressive platforms
several of the Republican candidates

sounded

like old-time Populist

all major and
orators. Outside of the Second Congressional District,
Fifth Dis
the
most minor Republican office seekers were elected. In
votes
thousand
Morris defeated Sutherland by more than two

trict,

was ample and
which, though not as impressive as his 1904 victory,
state legisla
next
the
would dominate
satisfactory. Since Republicans
won the
who
Norris
for
Brown,
ture, a United States Senate seat
defeated
Sheldon
L.
assured.
was thereby
George
preferential primary,
His
votes.
thousand
thirteen
almost
Shallenberger for governor by
state
the
for
administration
during the
triumph insured a progressive
next two years. 19
After the results were known, the post-mortem discussions and
ran well ahead of his ticket throughout the dis
analyses began. Norris
votes than Governor-elect Sheldon. Though
more
trict, receiving 1,100
there were no basic issues involved in the congressional campaign,
more liberal than Norris, the advantages
Sutherland

probably being
with the incumbent. Norris had capitalized effectively on his
that he would be in a posi
support of the Roosevelt policies, arguing
tion to serve his constituents better as a. congressman in his third

were

all

consecutive term. 20

had to interrupt them with
Enjoyable as these analyses were, Norris
to
Washington and the convening of the
plans relating to his return
in December. A week
the
of
second session
Fifty-ninth Congress early
after the election he wrote to Speaker Cannon expressing an interest in
in the Six
membership on the powerful Ways and Means Committee
when several vacancies would occur. Norris made this
time to the study of the tariff
request because he had devoted "some
that the interests of the "Great West"
believed
he
and
because
question"
should be given consideration. More important, he was satisfied that
his ideas on the tariff question were in full accord with those of the
that he
Speaker. Cannon, gratified that Norris was re-elected, replied
in the
the
House
of
would "do the guessing on the organization
that
before
time
Sixtieth Congress" some
Congress assembled,
shortly
21
in the event that he should again be chosen Speaker.
Norris was on hand when the second session of the Fifty-ninth
Congress started on December 3, 1906. Though the session would
last only three months, and little was expected of it in the way of
and busy throughout its entirety. He intro
legislation, he was active
duced a bill designed to provide more expeditious delivery of freight,
a bill that would prevent merchants along the Burlington route in
tieth Congress,

THE THIRD CAMPAIGN

115

Nebraska from having

to wait unnecessarily long periods of time for
delivery of their goods. Norris thought his measure had a chance of
being enacted because the president had recommended such a law in

annual message. Possibly as a threat to wrest concessions from the
Burlington, Norris also favored a reduction in the amount of compen
sation paid railroads for carrying the United States mails. 22
Each time Norris spoke during this short session, his remarks,
while relevant to the national scene, were particularly pertinent to
his

Nebraska and conditions in the Fifth Congressional District. He spoke
on one occasion in favor of improved pension legislation, particularly
for an amendment which would grant widows of Civil War veterans
a pension no matter what the cause of the soldier's death. He also
favored a graduated pension for soldiers, increasing with advanced age.
His position on this matter, of course, helped Norris to remain in the
good graces of most old soldiers and their families throughout Ne
braska. It also further increased Roosevelt's status with Union veterans
throughout the country,, since a graduated pension

bill

was enacted

into law. 23

With growing commercial use of the automobile, road building
became a topic of absorbing interest, and Norris now gave it some
attention. During the first session he had supported a measure provid
ing for an appropriation to experiment with methods of road building.
Now he offered a similar amendment providing the United States

Geological Survey with $100,000 to investigate various structural ma
use in government construction of roads, dams, and build

terials for

ings. Such an appropriation, he stated, would result in "cheaper and
better buildings, not only for the government, but for all our people."
It would save millions "in the construction of the Panama Canal and

in the Reclamation Service of the Great West, and, besides, make those
great undertakings more substantial and less liable to destruction and

decay." It would also provide information that could materially im
prove broad highways and country lanes. Nevertheless, Norris insisted
the actual improvement of roads must come to a great extent through

He did not consider federal construction of high
a
or
wise expansion of governmental jurisdiction. 24
ways
necessary
During this session a Senate bill, introduced in the House of Repre
sentatives by Norris,, was enacted into law. It divided Nebraska into
state appropriations.

two

judicial districts

federal judge.

The

many Nebraska

home town

district

of

an additional
would save money for
federal litigation by making the

for the selection of

new

citizens involved in

trip to the federal

Norris*

and called

creation of a

Omaha unnecessary. In 1907,
received the honor of being host to the

court at

McCook

district

n6
first
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term of the newly created federal court for western Nebraska. The

enactment of the law also meant that eventually funds would be
25
appropriated for a federal building to house the sessions of the court.
adjournment of the Fifty-ninth Congress on March
4, 1907, Norris, weary but satisfied with his work in Washington, re
turned to McCook facing no immediate political worries or problems.
At the end of the Fifty-ninth Congress, he had irrevocably committed

With the

final

himself as a supporter of Roosevelt. In defining the policies of the
president, Norris stated his views about the necessity of expanding the
role of the federal
government. He claimed that when he spoke of
Roosevelt's "leading policies," he referred "to the enforcement of the

law against the rich
as the

weak."

He

as well as the poor, against the powerful as well
meant, also, "that the control and regulation of rail

roads and other corporations, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenders against the law of the United States" should be
vigorously

pursued. Roosevelt's policy of "insisting upon honesty on the part of
26
all Government
employees" received his enthusiastic approval.

Furthermore, by the end of the Fifty-ninth Congress Norris exhibited
the independence and lack of
partisanship that were to be so charac
teristic of his later career. He had broken with the most

powerful

corporate interest in Nebraska, the Burlington Railroad, which was
unable to reprimand him for his action, while his constituents
ap
plauded his hostility to railroad inequities. He had refused to follow
the administration in
supporting a tariff measure, albeit a minor one,

and

this

opposition did not noticeably lessen his standing
Cannon and the administration in

voters or with
Speaker

The coming years would
examples of these

traits,

among

the

Washington.

furnish

but the

more dramatic and courageous
steps were taken during this

first

Congress.

Though

Norris considered himself a devoted follower of Roosevelt

and most of

his policies, it is to be doubted if he
thought of himself as
an insurgent.
Certainly he was satisfied with his lot in Congress, and
he realized that his
improving seniority eventually would lead Speaker
Cannon to promote him to more
27
important committee assignments.
Possibly, too, he was aware of the fact that one of the
outstanding
speakers of the House of Representatives, Samuel J. Randall of

Pennsylvania, had started by serving on the Committee on Public
Buildings and Grounds. Certainly, as he returned to McCook in that
chilly and blustery March of 1907, Norris would have
agreed that,
politically speaking, the best was yet to come.

Chapter 14

Seeds of Doubt

WITH
Norris

almost nine months before the next Congress was to convene,
now had time to enjoy his family and to look after personal and

He

became interested in plans for
political affairs in a leisurely way.
a
building, chiefly to provide the many unmarried railroad

YMCA

men

McCook with

a place of residence and wholesome recreation.
The local citizenry hoped to raise between eight thousand and ten
thousand dollars for this project, and Norris hoped that the national
in

headquarters of the YMCA would provide the difference, so that his
home town, with a population of 4,000, could provide in this way for
its

young men.

1

Norris also attended to his real estate interests in Beaver City, par
ticularly to the renting of a new hotel building he had recently ac

with old
quired. Visiting Beaver City gave him an opportunity to chat
his
either
about
lecture
he
deliver
a
of
whom
insisted
some
friends,

work

in

Washington or

his trip to

Europe

as a

member

of the Inter

2
parliamentary Union. These activities were pleasant and leisurely.
In April, Jonah K. Kalanianaole, Hawaiian delegate to the United
States Congress, extended an invitation on behalf of the territory of

to become his guest as a
Norris accepted with alacrity. 3

Hawaii

The group

sailed

member

of a congressional party,

from San Francisco on

May Day

and

with the os

tensible purpose of investigating conditions in the territory so that
Congress might have a better idea of its needs in matters of general
with other
legislation. Actually Norris had a splendid vacation. Along

congressmen he was photographed at the summit of Mount Haleakala,
while Mr. and Mrs. L. A. Thurston of Honolulu extended to him the
hospitality of their home. Norris also spoke at a meeting arranged by
a native prince at a public square; no other member of the party
wanted to speak and he was drafted for the chore to avoid disappoint
4
ing the local citizenry.
He returned to McCook in June and quickly departed with his
family for a long summer vacation in Wisconsin. He enjoyed his leisure
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and the L.U.N. reunion at Rainbow Lake, and no doubt also reflected
Nebraska Legislature. Its
upon the significant work of the Thirtieth
achievements represented and registered the high point of the progres

A

statewide primary, a child labor act,
an anti-free-pass law, and other railroad regulatory measures were
this session.
among the major pieces of legislation recorded during
taken
measures, as an
The state emerged as one of the few that had
work of Con
the
"to
editorial in the Omaha Bee stated,
sive

movement

in Nebraska.

supplement
under the direction of President Roosevelt to the end of relieving
5
the people of Nebraska of railroad domination in politics."
The new primary law meant that hereafter Norris would have to
vote instead of by a nominating con
direct
nominated
be
gress

popular
by
While the primary law would relieve an incumbent candidate
in the good graces of his constituents of some political pressure, it also
meant that most candidates would have to engage in a grueling and

vention.

of representing their
expensive primary before obtaining the privilege
fall election.
in
the
party
Before that time occurred for Norris, he would have served in the
session of the Sixtieth Congress, scheduled to convene early in
December. Rather than start the children in school in McCook and

first

then transfer them, the family decided to move to Washington for the
opening of the fall semester. Once they were settled in the capital city,
Norris planned to return to McCook to participate in the fall campaign.

Early in September, McCarl sent some of the family's belongings to
Washington. Norris rented suitable quarters at the Fairfax, a large

apartment house on Massachusetts Avenue, near fashionable -DuPont
6
Circle, while the McCook house was rented to a local doctor.
McCarl was delighted that Norris was not in Nebraska prior to the

September primaries because a bitter fight occurred between Judge
Orr, Norris' successor in the Fourteenth Judicial District, and Charles
E. Eldred, Morlan's law partner. By his absence, Norris avoided be

coming involved in the controversy.
According to the new primary law, state conventions were to be
held at Lincoln on the fourth Tuesday in September of each election
year for the purpose of adopting platforms and conducting the neces
sary business of the party organization. Though McCarl made great
efforts, all unknown to Norris, to have him chosen chairman when the
Republican convention met on September 24, they were not successful.
7
Norris appeared merely as a
delegate from Red Willow County.
Governor Sheldon presided over the convention. Though the
highest office involved in the coming state election was for Supreme
Court justice, the delegates adopted resolutions
pertaining to national
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and thereby enabled Norris to gauge public sentiment through
state. The convention, for example, favored legislation limiting
the use of injunctions and further controlling corporate activities.
Finally it endorsed William Howard Taft as the man most fitted to
continue the policies of President Roosevelt. Norris was whole
affairs

out the

heartedly in accord with this position, believing that Taft
to representing these policies than any other person. 8

came nearer

Unable to obtain for Norris the chairmanship of the convention,
McCarl next suggested him as chairman of the State Central Com
mittee. Again his efforts were unsuccessful. Both McCarl and Norris
thought it would be well for him to avoid campaigning in his own
district where he would have to
support Judge Orr, thereby risking the
of
Morlan
and
the
numerous friends of Eldred, who was
open enmity
defeated in the primary. Therefore Norris, in offering his services to
the state committee, stated that he preferred to speak in the northern
part of the state. The committee accepted his offer and Norris, for the
first

time in his career, spoke in support of Republican candidates, out

own

side of his

political bailiwick. After the election,

which resulted

in another impressive Republican victory, the secretary of the state
committee thanked Norris for his efforts and informed him that the

committee proposed
tory

work

to maintain its headquarters and begin prepara
campaign of 1908. Thus in 1907, prior to

for the national

his departure for the opening of the new Congress, Norris found him
self working in close harmony with the
Republican organization in

Nebraska.

He had served it well in the

1907 campaign; his services and

advice were sought by party leaders. Such a harmonious arrangement,
previously unknown to the representative from the Fifth Congressional

boded well for the coming national campaign when it was
generally assumed Bryan would make a third attempt to win the
District,

9

presidency.

However, before Norris could concern himself with the 1908
campaign, his presence was required in Washington where the first
session of the Sixtieth Congress convened at noon on December 2,
1907. McCarl, to Norris' great regret, remained in McCook practicing
law and working as best he could by answering routine letters, send
ing out various government documents and copies of Norris' speeches,
and handling pension claims and other matters.
For matters that required personal attention Norris utilized the
services of an able young attorney with an historic name. James K.
Polk looked after correspondence requiring information from various
government departments. A part-time stenographer handled cor
respondence requiring a personal reply. It was not an entirely satis-
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it was a workable one, chiefly because Polk
factory arrangement but
it was thought to be a temporary arrange
best
At
was very competent.

McCarFs financial position improved. As possible compen
was delighted to learn that an office would be available
Norris
sation,
to him in the House Office Building which was to be officially opened

ment

until

in January, 1908. 10
Once the session got

under way, Norris learned that Speaker
considered his request for membership on

Cannon had not seriously
were
Ways and Means Committee. His committee assignments
Public
Build
the same as those he had held in the previous Congress
and The Election of President, Vice Presi
ings and Grounds, Labor,
his
dent, and Representatives in Congress. If he was disappointed,
of it. But he was beginning to give much atten
no
record
reveal
papers
the

and procedures through which the Speaker exercised
the session was concluded, Norris presented a
before
authority, and,
resolution designed to deprive the Speaker of some of his power. In
a small but vigorous band of insur
doing this he allied himself with
the
House
of
in
Representatives.
gents
of the session, however, Norris was not concerned
At the
tion to the rules

beginning
with challenging the authority of the Speaker. The country was in the
midst of a financial panic and many citizens feared that repercussions
would be felt throughout the economy. Carefully following the course
of the panic, Norris concluded that remedial legislation was required
to
banks from speculating. He noticed in the press that

prevent

Governor Edward Hoch intended to ask the Kansas legislature to levy
an assessment on banks for the purpose of guaranteeing deposits. His
thoughts had been developing along similar lines, namely, levying an
assessment on deposits in national banks for the purpose of creating
a fund to pay off depositors in case of failure. In the previous Congress
he had talked to several members of the Banking and Currency Com
mittee and had concluded that such a measure stood little chance of
being favorably received. The Panic of 1907, however, convinced him
that he should again try to introduce a measure to protect depositors.

was more pertinent at this time and, if the Banking and Currency
Committee would not consider it, at least Norris could air his views
It

on the

floor of the

House. 11

He

gave careful study to the proposition, obtained information
from many sources, and discussed it with banker friends in Nebraska.
His idea was to have the secretary of the treasury levy an assessment
upon all national banks, basing the assessment upon the average de
posits of each bank.
for the purpose of

The fund thereby obtained was
paying

off depositors of

to

be used

any national

solely

bank that
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The bill also provided that when any bank had paid into the
fund an amount equal to a certain percentage of its average balances,
it should be relieved from any further assessment until the amount
paid in was less than the percentage of its balances. Thus each bank
in time would virtually have a paid-up insurance policy against pos
failed.

12
sible losses.

Since his object in preparing the bill was to create confidence in
national banks and to prevent runs on banks similar to those which
in New York and elsewhere, Norris readily accepted the
advice of bankers. He also suggested that Governor Sheldon of Ne
braska introduce a similar bill applying to state banks. He realized if

had occurred

Congress enacted his bill and the states did not respond with similar
measures most state banks would probably become national banks,
since depositors would prefer to leave their money in an obviously
more secure banking institution. However, Norris thought most states

would follow the federal example as they had already done in the
case of pure food laws and railroad regulation. 13
He was quick to point out that his proposition was not a govern
ment guarantee of deposits, such as Bryan advocated and the New
Deal later enacted. He was opposed to such a scheme for reasons of
both practice and principle, but some legislation was necessary lest
the public be further cheated by dishonest men in the banking busi
He noted that bank examiners and other officials were reluctant

ness.

to correct the practices of errant bankers by closing their banks be
cause of the injurious effect it would have upon money matters in

general and the panic it might induce among depositors who would
seek to remove funds from legitimate and honestly conducted banks
as well.

enacted, would have prevented honest bankers from
being injured by the failure of another bank. And it could have led
bank examiners to insist on a stricter observance of the law without

His

bill,

if

fear of accelerating a panic by penalizing
to the detriment of both the banking
Finally, Norris concluded that if such a

mismanaged banks operating
community and the public.
law had been on the statute

books, the Panic of 1907 would never have occurred. True, there might
have been a disturbance in New York, but, he asserted, banks through

out the country would have gone on the same as ever. Thus the legisla
he formally proposed to Congress in a long speech on January 7,

tion

would give depositors confidence and would bring relief not only
them and to the men who borrowed but also to the banker himself.
In short, it would be a blessing to all concerned. 14
Norris, like individuals in and out of Congress, gave serious atten1908,

to
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beside the
banking and currency situation
"elastic"
more
a
favored
He
currency
matter of protecting depositors.
most of
its
However,
without
achieved
stability.
be
it
could
if
injuring
be injurious
the measures he had examined on this subject appeared to
tion to other aspects of the

because of the fear engendered in depositors by currency being issued
not on the basis of bonds but on the basis of a bank's total assets. Such
while undoubtedly putting more money into
than prevailed in 1907
circulation, would cause a greater disturbance
Thus he believed an
assets.
their
when in a future crisis banks reduced
a currency, Norris

felt,

asset-based currency could not achieve

a

more

flexible

monetary

15

system.

Another change Norris thought beneficial was to require banks
to keep a larger amount of their reserve fund in their own vaults,
of funds they could lawfully deposit in
thereby lessening the amount
other banks. Such an enactment would avoid bank failure due to ex
cessive speculation. He also thought a law preventing national banks
from loaning money on call at exorbitant interest rates would probably
do some good. But Norris believed that his bill, which would take
his
away from the depositor all fear that the bank would squander
the
relieveprevailing panic
money, was the one that would not only
situation but would also make its recurrence practically impossible.
At the same time it would bring out of hiding a large amount of
money that fearful citizens were afraid to deposit, or, as Norris stated
it: "Old stockings and old tin cans would be emptied, and yield up
their golden treasure, and the money of the country would assume its
in the channels of business and trade
legitimate and proper sphere
16

throughout the land."
This session of Congress, as expected, witnessed a large number of
a
of the
banking and currency measures. Norris, who was not member
committee that would report such bills, did not expect his measure to

But by presenting it early he at least hoped
members might agree with some of his ideas and later incor
porate or add them to a bill that Congress would seriously consider.
This strategy failed and he was far from satisfied with the measure
that Congress finally agreed upon. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act provided

be

seriously considered.

other

emergency currency based on commercial paper, rather than cur
rency reform. Norris would have to wait until the Wilson administra
tion before Congress would enact a measure that provided for reform
for

rather than relief. 17

Related to the problem of banking and currency reform was the
proposal to establish a postal savings bank system which, though discussed > was not acted upon during this session.

The

objections Norris
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how

the govern

raised to this proposition related to the question of
ment should use the money. He wanted the deposits to be utilized in
the localities where they were made; otherwise they might drain one
another. To avoid this situation, Norris
portion of the country to supply
could be devised so that these funds would be
some

hoped

plan
local banks. Furthermore, the gov
deposited in and made available to
in local banks, would in effect be
funds
these
ernment, by depositing
into
and
would
the
help bring hoarded money
deposits
guaranteeing
because
arose
bank
a
for
clamor
the
Since
circulation.
postal savings
bank deposits were not secured, Norris pointed out that the bill he
had introduced to protect depositors provided the same thing in a more
direct and effective way. Indeed, he argued, if Congress passed "proper
would
currency regulation," the demand for postal savings banks
cease. If not, the agitation would increase
18
of some kind would have to be established.

Though the

most of

protect bank deposits consumed
at the outset of this session, Norris received

bill to

energy and attention

and postal savings banks
his

much
McCumber

in the
correspondence criticizing the pension allotments
Act passed by the previous Congress. He therefore devoted some time
to this subject. He thought that the pensions granted should be more
liberal, but most of all he was concerned with the injustice of pensions

Under the existing laws, a
provided for the widows of old soldiers.
widow, to obtain a pension of twelve dollars a month, had to show
that her husband died as the result of a disease or disability originating
in the service. This provision, he argued, was inconsistent, unreason
could do this she only would
unjust, because unless a widow
a
or possibly nothing at all,
month
receive a pension of eight dollars

able,

and

wording" of pension laws enacted during the
old soldiers should all get
Civil
period. Believing that widows of
Norris
a
dollars
twelve
month,
unsuccessfully in the Fifty-ninth Con
had offered an amendment to the McCumber Bill Now in the

owing

to a "peculiar

War

gress
Sixtieth Congress he again presented a bill to remedy this situation.
And in April, 1908, the president signed a measure including more
liberal pensions for widows. Thus Nebraska veterans, already receiving

knew that they had
pensions or adjusted benefits through his efforts,
19
in Norris a congressman who was ever alert to their interests.
Aside from speeches on banking and pensions, Norris did not
of colleagues or
present any lengthy remarks for the consideration
constituents. Nevertheless, he was acutely interested in legislative
developments. In accord with his previous judicial experience was his
concern about unduly severe punishment. The opportunity to express
his views arose because the House of Representatives in January, 1908 a
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which codified all the criminal laws of the United
last been revised in 1873. The new codification
had
States. The code
be presented as a bill and voted upon. At one
to
had
to be accepted
commented that too severe a penalty some
Norris
the
reading,
point in
would be inclined, if the offense
as
defeated
times
conviction,
juries
considered a

bill

were not very grave and the penalty too severe, to find the defendant
not guilty. He believed that greater discretion should be left to the
a case and that
court
punishments should be made
deciding

specific

more flexible. 20

Many Democrats who

did not take this

work

as seriously as Norris

amendments for the purpose of making political
began
were presented, speeches were made, and then
Amendments
speeches.
the amendments were usually voted down, since the Republican party
controlled the Congress. The object of the Democrats was to put the
amendments which ap
Republicans in the position of voting against
them were just and
peared to be just and fair. And indeed most of
fair, but they were in most instances already covered by law or con
to

offer

tained in different portions of the bill being considered. Since the codi
fication was being presented more as a matter of form than anything

became disturbed

at the clever tactics of the opposition.
beside
tactics,
being dilatory, gave the Democrats an opportunity
21
to develop a possible campaign issue.
else,

Norris

These

On

the morning of January 21, 1908, the discussion disclosed that
apparently most of the Democrats were opposed to lawyers and

bankers serving in Congress. Considerable talk was also devoted to the
use of free passes and the possibility of amending the Hepburn Act

These developments, which consumed most of the
without
morning
any discussion of the codification bill, seemed utterly
to provide for them.

ridiculous to Norris,

and he proceeded

fellow congressmen.

When

to make them appear so to his
he obtained the floor to speak, he said he
was impressed with the remarks of Champ Clark, the Democratic

leader in the House of Representatives, who had
presented an example
of a man who sold his bank stock before
coming to Congress. Clark
commended this as conduct worthy of emulation. Norris agreed. He
then went Clark one better
by claiming a member ought not to be a
farmer, because Congress might consider agricultural subjects, or a

merchant, because he might have to legislate on the tariff or other
matters affecting his business. The final result would be that

Congress

would be comprised of individuals "who have no
occupation whatever,
who have no means of gaining a livelihood." To achieve this
logical
conclusion from Clark's
premise, Norris introduced the following
amendment:
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And any member of Congress who shall engage in the practice
of law, or who shall deliver Chautauqua lectures for pay, or who
shall engage in farming or manufacturing, or who shall have any
occupation whatever, or who shall patronize any national bank by
depositing any money therein, or who shall patronize any railroad
company by riding thereon, or who shall purchase any material of
any material to any corporation shall be hanged by the neck
dead and thereafter be prohibited from holding any office of
22
profit or trust under the Government of the United States.
or

sell

until

Another topic which generated much discussion was curbing the
use of injunctions. The administration, favoring moderate legislation,
did not endorse or present a particular measure. Norris was in favor of

would prevent the abuse of injunctions, but he would not
support any measure to abolish their use. While he was willing to
admit that federal judges often had been reckless and careless in grant
ing injunctions, he believed courts should retain authority to issue them
in certain cases without notice; namely, where irreparable damage
would result if time was taken to give notice. Norris' position would
not appeal to those leaders of organized labor who wanted to abolish
the writ, nor would it suit those businessmen who saw much good in
a law that

23

government by injunction. His interest in the topic lasted throughout
his career, and in later years he would achieve one of his most notable
legislative victories in curbing the

misuse of injunctions.

Norris supported the president in his desire to continue the Inland
Waterways Commission. Norris favored the idea of developing the

waterways of the nation, particularly those in the Mississippi Valley.

An

overall plan to develop these waterways, of course, would benefit
Nebraska, but the entire country would benefit from the reduction
in freight rates that would follow such development. Thus Norris and
other proponents of inland waterways were aware that such a program,
beside aiding conservation, would tend to reduce railroad power and
influence in mid-America by providing the railroad with water compe
tition.

24

Though he was interested in more liberal legislation and cham
pioned the president's suggestions whenever possible, like Roosevelt,
Norris knew prior to a presidential election there would be no signifi
cant changes tending to engender controversy. 25 Moreover,. Norris,

who had no

plans of voluntarily retiring from Congress, had to con
an eye toward the coming election. In regard to

sider measures with

on legislative matters, all but the most partisan Democrats
would have found much to approve in his record. Too many voters,

his position
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however, required more tangible notice of his service before they
would pass favorable Judgment on his work. Thus McCarl was kept

and seeds, and Norris an
busy distributing government documents
of relevant and irrelevant
kinds
for
all
swered numerous requests
information about government services.
To aid and impress constituents even more, Norris

made

arrange

ments with the Department of Agriculture to have an expert lecture
before farm organizations and other groups. He also sought through
his work on the Committee of Public Buildings and Grounds to secure
local
Though his membership on the committee
appropriations.

larger

insured the fact that the district would be included in every bill
all communities.
reported to Congress, he still could not satisfy

Furthermore, he had to meet charges of favoritism toward McCook
which, through his efforts, eventually obtained a courthouse as well as
a post

office.

26

While Norris continued as a consistent supporter of the retiring
president, the most important development of this session as far as he
was concerned was his announced hostility to the rules by which
Speaker Cannon exercised his authority. Prior to the Sixtieth Congress,
when a band of insurgents for the first time in a sustained and open
way criticized both the Speaker and his power, Norris never revealed
critic of the rules
by which Cannon administered the
House of Representatives. Indeed he had prided himself on his friend
ship with Cannon and, throughout the long struggle, retained re
spect for the Speaker as a person of knowledge and ability. When

himself as a

Congressman E. A. Hayes of California wrote prior to the convening
of Congress in September, 1907, he was not sure where Norris stood
on this topic. In reply, Norris openly and definitely committed himself

He favored a change whereby the
Committee on Rules would be expanded and elected by the House
instead of appointed by the
Speaker.
Though many members were in favor of such a change, Norris
doubted whether it would receive strong
support because the caucus
at which such a
before the
change could be made took
to insurgency for the first time.

place just
beginning of a new Congress, and the many new members would prob
ably follow the leadership of those in positions of power and seniority.
Thus any change not favored by these new men was
doomed
usually

to failure,

and

did not think

system that

it

though he promised to vote for a rules change,
would occur in the immediate future. It was the caucus

Norris,

was the

basis of the

Speakers power. Though Norris later
his authority to choose

was instrumental in depriving the
Speaker of
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the Rules Committee, he realized that this reform to be meaningful
would have to be followed by the destruction of the party caucus. 27
the

Norris and the insurgents conducted no prolonged battle during
first session of the Sixtieth
Congress. The Panic of 1907 and the

coming national

any open party strife. However,
precisely what he intended to do,
On May 16, 1908, he introduced a resolu
standing committees be appointed by the Com

election precluded

Norris courageously let it be
if the opportunity ever arose.

known

tion providing that all
mittee on Rules. According to this resolution (H.R. 417), a new rules
committee consisting of fifteen members would be selected by the

membership
groups.

The

from

candidates

Norris resolution

representing different geographical
to the Committee on Rules to

was sent

be disposed of by its chairman, Joseph Cannon. 28 ( Norris later produced
this same resolution from his pocket and sent it to the desk to be read,
thus precipitating the historic struggle which deprived the Speaker of
his membership on the Committee on Rules.) Norris, in effect, on May
16, 1908, warned Cannon to be on guard.
Thus when the first session of the Sixtieth Congress came to an
end on May 30, 1908, his position was widely known. Norris knew
that to a great extent public opinion in Nebraska and other western
states was opposed to Speaker Cannon. He received widespread sup
port for his resolution, and soon claimed, "It is on account of such
friends more than on account of any personal wish that I feel like stay
ing in the fight."

Of course, he had no other alternative, since his resolution heaped
upon him the displeasure of the Speaker and most of the party leaders
in the House of Representatives. It put him "out of the shadow of
approval" and in many ways it promised to make his work and life
in Congress most disagreeable. It meant that almost all the "favors
and courtesies" extended to other congressmen would be denied to
him. The die was cast when he presented this resolution. Norris now
would have to place principles above party as long as he remained
in political life. It was this resolution of May 16, 1908, more than any
other single event that made Norris into an insurgent Republican^ one
who would challenge a fundamental pillar of party control, and
eventually the outstanding independent in American political history.
However, his immediate job was a difficult one; namely, to educate
the people who applauded him for the position he took to an under
standing that he no longer could perform all the services he once did
for them.

He had

to see that his constituents,

in terms of personalities

and not of

who

generally thought

principles, did not forget the
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and condemn him for being unable to obtain
and
favors.
Indeed, his continuance in public life depended
patronage
29
to understand this situation.
constituents
his
of
the
ability
upon
of
his
the
of
position,
implications
Though Norris was well aware
his constituents seemingly were satisfied with it. Instead of defending
his action, Norris, in the coming campaign, would have to explain why
he had not opposed Cannon earlier, and why he had been so friendly
to him. 30 But, before the campaign got under way, Norris hoped to rest
and regain his energy by traveling to Europe as a delegate to the
principle involved

Berlin meeting of the Interparliamentary Union.

Returning to Nebraska from Washington in July, he was soon
engulfed in the rising tide of party politics. Before he became com
pletely involved, he lectured before Chautauquas and other assemblies.
In most instances he talked about the work of the Interparliamentary
Union and used an address he hoped to deliver before pacifist confer
ences at Lake Mohonk, New York, and Greensboro, North Carolina,
later in the summer. Though he was interested in the work of the
Interparliamentary Union and pacifist groups, and though he was
strongly urged to attend the conference in Berlin on September 10,
Norris did not go because the expensive trip would have consumed

weeks of valuable campaign time. 31 His reasoning was
wise because the 1908 campaign for re-election to a fourth term in the
House of Representatives was to be one of the most difficult of his
at least four

entire career.

Chapter 15

Victor by

Twenty-Two Votes

THE 1908 campaign was

not only one of the most difficult in the
career of George Norris, but also one of the most significant in terms
of his growing insurgency and political independence. It made dra
matically evident to him the fact that while it was important to oppose
the Democrats, it was equally important to maintain only a minimum
of coordination with the Republican organization. In effect he was
fought on two fronts in this campaign by the Democrats and by his
own party. At the outset only the first enemy was apparent.
Nebraska Republicans in September, 1907, endorsed William
Howard Taft to carry on the policies of President Roosevelt. At the
state convention at Omaha on March 12, 1908, Nebraska became the
first

state to declare for Taft.

And

as early as

November, 1907, Norris

agreed with his fellow Republicans in this choice. He did this first
in an interview published in the Lincoln Journal, then in correspond
ence, then in his participation on the executive committee of the

Nebraska Taft League. 1
In the Fifth Congressional District by January, 1908, there was a
to elect Norris a delegate to the Republican National Con

movement

vention. But he refused to allow his name to be considered, claiming
he did not believe the honors should all go to one man as long as other
worthy, able, and competent individuals were available. "Members of
Congress/' he believed, "should not undertake to dictate in these
matters and should under no circumstances use the power of their
2
position to control conventions." Moreover, he had his own campaign
to consider.

George Allen, whom Norris, before his break with Cannon, had
successfully recommended for the postmastership of Clay Center,
could not serve as campaign manager. The heavy responsibilities of

on the capable but inexperienced shoulders of
J.
reported early in 1908 that few individuals openly
Norris'
place on the Republican ticket. On the other hand,
sought
there were persistent rumors that the Democrats would nominate Fred
campaign manager
R. McCarl,

fell

who
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13 o

Ms

Ashton

as
opponent
Ashton, a state senator from Grand Island,
And scuttle
an
unscrupulous campaigner.
had the reputation of being
a campaign in
conduct
to
who
butt indicated that Norris,
preferred
be in for an espe
which issues and principles predominated, might
since it was
as would all the Republican candidates,
cially tough fight,
3
standard-bearer.
would be the Democratic
that

an open secret
Bryan
much excitement until
However, politics did not really generate
and the major national conventions met, the
Congress adjourned
on June 17 and the Democrats at Denver on
Republicans in Chicago
in Washington while Republican delegates
July 7. Norris remained
as their standardchose Taft and James S. Sherman of New York

He

bearers.

returned to

McCook early in July and shortly thereafter
his name placed on the official primary

have

an application
for the office of representative in
Republican candidate
Fifth Nebraska Congressional District.
the
from
Congress
to

filed

ballot as a

To

State Central
help candidates, the Republican

Committee

worked out a plan by which it hoped, more than ever before, to
coordinate the campaign and simplify financial arrangements. Con
tributions to the state committee would be utilized equally by con
would not have to
gressional committees. Republican postmasters
as had been
committees
these
make separate contributions to each of
3 per
contribute
to
the case in the past. But they now were requested
cent.
This
2
usual
the
of
cent of one year's salary instead
arrange
per
ment had been worked out before Norris returned to Nebraska. Find
that other
congressmen already had agreed to it, he
Republican

ing

had little

alternative but to accept

Though

Norris

it

was on the best

4
as well.

of terms with the Republican State

Central Committee, he nevertheless refused to participate in its affairs.
He preferred the role of the lone political operator, even though he
had recently cooperated more than ever before with the Republican

refused
organization in Nebraska. Since his days on the bench, Norris
to participate in party squabbles or selection of officials. He held
himself aloof but was always prepared to support the ticket once
nominations had been made. He never tried to build a political ma
chine, and this fact applied to his entire political career. No postmaster
or any other officeholder he had recommended was ever called upon
5
any kind of support.
After the September primaries the party slates were completed and
Norris learned that Ashton would be his opponent. Beside Bryan's
popularity in Nebraska, Norris had an additional handicap. The
Democratic candidate for governor, A. C. Shallenberger, resided in the
Fifth Congressional District, where the popularity of both
Bryan and

for
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Shallenberger undoubtedly would help Ashton. Furthermore, both
congressional candidates realized that many former Populist voters
who had supported Theodore Roosevelt would probably vote for

Bryan. Since the platforms of the major parties contained many pro
while Roose
gressive planks, both candidates undoubtedly knew that
velt could outshine Bryan as a personality if not as a liberal, Taft
could not on either score. Thus even though Ashton was a poor public
speaker, he had a chance to unseat Norris on election day.
Norris had further reason to be concerned. Friends said Ashton

and unscrupulous, and these warnings convinced him it
be
impolitic to leave the country at this time to attend the Berlin
might
of
the Interparliamentary Union. Finally there were many
meeting
that
political squabbles, including one pertaining to prohibition,

was

tricky

threatened to upset the harmony that previously prevailed within the
Republican organization. Thus before the campaign got under way
Norris

knew

that he

would have a hard

fight,

though nobody realized

6
just how hard it would be,

Early in September Norris was in touch with the National Republi
can Congressional Committee in New York to get prominent speakers
to appear in the district He was convinced that the Democrats would
make every effort to carry it, since it was not as strongly Republican
as most of the other Nebraska districts. Yet knowing all of this, he still
did not see any particularly distressing obstacles in his path. Since he
believed that despite promised support from Bryan and Shallenberger,
Ashton could be defeated, Norris arranged to spend almost half his
campaign time outside of his district. Complacency was supplemented
desire to play a role in the national campaign, indicative of his
7
rising status as a member of Congress.

by a

Both United States senators from Nebraska were intending to
speak on his behalf, and Governor Charles Evans Hughes of New
York, touring the country for Taft, would speak at Hastings and pos
Norris himself refused
sibly at McCook before the end of September.
all opportunities to speak in his own district prior to October in hopes
of receiving and on the false grounds that he had received speaking
were given
assignments from the state committee. No such assignments
him, however, and as September came to a close, Norris had done no
he had
campaigning and much explaining to those whose requests
turned down. 8
In response to inquiries at this time he felt called upon to explain
his views on the House rules and the Speaker. Moreover, he learned
that his opponents were criticizing him as a "Cannon man." Therefore
he came out in opposition to the re-election of Cannon as Speaker,
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"the power of his high position to pre
claiming that Cannon had used
vent the consideration of legislation asked for by the people and de
a
of the membership of the House of Representa
sired

by

large

body

His most serious objection, Norris explained in a published
to any change in the rules
statement, was to the
tives."

Speaker's opposition

which would modify or

lessen his arbitrary power. In other words,

he

believed the Speaker "ought to be the servant of the House, doing its
will, rather than the master controlling its action." Preventing discus
should not be within his power. How
sion and
throttling legislation
ever, Norris realized that Cannon

was not unique

in the exertion of

conflict was not so much
arbitrary power. He made it clear that his
with the Speaker as with the rules, not so much with Cannon as with

the system.
in a body
Certainly, Norris agreed, stringent rules were necessary
the
and
of
as large as the House
Speaker ought to be
Representatives,
officer. But in his power to appoint chairmen of standing
committees and in his dominance of the powerful Committee on Rules,
which determined the order of business and procedure, the Speaker

the presiding

exercised

arbitrary

authority.

Norris explained that his

would make the Speaker merely "the dignified presiding
10
greatest representative parliamentary body on earth."

resolution

officer of the

This statement represented the extent of Norris' campaign thus far.
state committee,
handling all financial arrangements, had not sent
him any funds while his opponent seemed to have unlimited means at

The

his
disposal This discrepancy was soon noticed in the enthusiasm of
some newspapers whose support had been purchased by the Demo
crats. While Ashton was
attacking him in the press and in his speeches,
Norris, without funds, was bound by an arrangement which was sup
posed to allow him to speak in Nebraska outside of his district but
which actually kept him at home in McCook. And he had
promised to
campaign in Kansas early in October. Therefore it would not be until
the second week In October that he could
begin campaigning in the

Fifth

11
Congressional District.

Nonis was

he contemplated withdrawing from
was prevented
from mailing It by some devoted friends. While he would have en
joyed nothing more than campaigning and attacking the opposition, he
believed that he could not
fight the Democratic party, the Republican
organization in Nebraska, and the lethargy of many local Republicans.
If he were to be re-elected, he would need
assistance and cooperation,
and if neither was
he
intended
to withdraw from the
forthcoming,
the contest.

campaign.

12

so discouraged that

He actually

drafted a withdrawal letter but
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In early October he revealed that the treasurer of his campaign
committee had not received any funds, nor had he been notified of
contributions collected in the district. Thus no posters, leaflets, or
advertisements for Norris had yet appeared. Finally, he was dismayed
to learn, after his arrival in Kansas, where he was to speak on behalf
of Republican candidates, that he had been chosen for the signal
honor of traveling with Taft during his campaign trip through Ne
braska, Norris learned of this decision from newspapers in Kansas.
It seemed to him that the announcement had been given to the press
even though the state committee knew that such an arrangement
could not be carried out since he was speaking in Kansas at the time

Taft toured Nebraska. 13

While Norris was campaigning in Kansas, McCarl was desperately
to the
trying to raise funds from people who had not contributed
at
of
a
He
chest.
day
party head
spent part
Republican campaign
that
the state
news
in
Lincoln
where
he
heard
the
depressing
quarters
committee had already used all of the money collected from the Fifth
Congressional District. Indeed, the only good news McCarl learned
in Lincoln was that Congressman Willis C. Hawley of Oregon and
possibly Governor Sheldon would speak in the district.
Though McCarl was disheartened with this situation, he was
equally determined to see it through and go into debt, if necessary,
to get Norris re-elected. He wisely decided not to make the matter
public knowledge, lest he jeopardize all chances of a reconciliation
with the state committee and further damage Republican prospects in

the campaign. 14

about

McCarl kept

loyal Republicans supplied with information
Norris' record in Congress to aid in refuting Democratic charges that
he was not a loyal supporter of Roosevelt and was friendly with

Speaker Cannon. Rut rather than devote his energies to refuting mis
Ashton's
representations about Norris, McCarl began to investigate
record as a member of the Nebraska legislature. Among other items,
he found that Ashton opposed all antiliquor legislation and this fact,
he knew, would prove helpful in an area where prohibition had many
law might also be of
supporters. Ashton's opposition to the primary
interest to

many voters.

15

On October 12, 1908, Norris at long last opened his campaign
with a well attended evening meeting at Orleans in Harlan County.
Thereafter he spoke once or twice on all days but Sundays. Once he
his record, and attacking
that of his opponent, his discouragement disappeared. There was little
time to lean back in an office chair, plant his feet on the top of the desk,

was speaking, meeting the people, defending
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situation.

and between puffs of the Inevitable cigar discuss the political
were few
The cigars were always with him, but the leisure moments
a hotel
or
office
and were usually confined to an editor's or lawyer's
16

lobby.

with Senator Albert

J. Beveridge
continually speaking,
Nebraska as well as
of Indiana and both United States senators from
Governor Sheldon all appearing in the district and endorsing Norris,
Since the
better about the course of the

With Noiris

McCarl soon

felt

campaign.

he used his own money to have
campaign treasury was almost empty,
He drafted for publica
distribution.
for
posters and handbills prepared
"Ashton Legislative
entitled
a
statement
tion in all Republican papers
to
many of the recently
Record," pinpointing Ashton's opposition
It also pro
Nebraska
the
of
reforms
enacted progressive
legislature.
an
was
Ashton
that
the
of
agent and
vided documentation
charge
17
lobbyist for brewers.

McCarl was working seventeen and eighteen hours a day directing
the campaign; he also was overdrawing his account at the First Na
tional Bank of McCook which fortunately continued to honor his
checks. He was discouraged about the early course of the campaign
and doubted if Norris, owing to his long absence from the district,
could cover it adequately* Though in mid-October he felt he was fightwas "the saving clause in
Ing a losing battle, his friendship for Norris
this measure." On his account McCarl could not think of quitting and

was determined, despite handicaps,

to battle right

down

to election

18

day.

As the campaign moved toward its climax, the congressional can
didates became briefly involved with the national effort. Because
Nebraska was Bryan's home state, he was relentless in his attempt to
carry It on election day. Both parties made determined efforts to appeal
to the voters, but the Democrats made the greater effort, and Bryan
devoted more time to the state than Taft. Without Roosevelt to ap
peal to Nebraska voters, many of them decided to leave the Republican
fold and return to the candidate whom they had supported in 1896 if
not in 1900. Rising Bryan sentiment made the role of Republican
candidates exceedingly difficult because their opponents had the

op

portunity of being pushed to victory on the strength of Bryan's votegetting appeal. This was particularly true in the Fifth Congressional

where Bryan personally endorsed Ashton. The effect of Bryan's
appeal for a straight party vote would be of the utmost importance
because it affected Norris* chances. 19
District

But Norris continually made a good impression, and Ashton a cor
respondingly poor impression. Optimism began to return to the Norris
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headquarters. Everyone involved exerted himself to the utmost; promi
nent Republicans appeared in the district; and the Republican press
confi
gave increased support. McCarl faced the outcome with greater
worries
dence. Victory, however, was not yet assured, and Morris'
grew
to include personal anxiety when he learned that his middle daughter,
20
Marian, was ill with diphtheria, and that the family was quarantined.
Reports confirmed what McCarl and Norris both already knew
that the race would be very close and would probably be decided only
after all the ballots had been counted. One further bit of perplexing
news was the appearance of a third party in Hall County where Ashton
resided, called the County Option League. While this group would
take votes from both parties, it was hard to tell which candidate would
suffer most. 21

To

the very end of the campaign Norris stressed his record as a

follower of Roosevelt in Congress. His speeches carried conviction,
and his honest, forthright presentation created a favorable impression

even among Democrats. The impression was more marked when con
trasted with his opponent's campaign. Ashton delivered few speeches
arid personally canvassed for votes on the streets, in the saloons, and

He

cast aspersions on Norris* honesty and character and
misrepresented his record as a congressman. At the same time, the
Ashton were exerting great efforts to defeat
interests

elsewhere.

liquor

supporting

both Norris and Governor Sheldon, Their agents circulated among tem
perance people the report that both men were "whiskey men"; in the
saloons the agents reversed themselves and argued that Norris

Sheldon were temperance men.

and

22

In the last week of the campaign the Democrats made a tremen
dous effort for Bryan. McCarl meanwhile planned to make the Hastings
cam
rally scheduled for Tuesday, October 27, the great event of the
four-hundredwho
the
The
of
businessmen
McCook,
put up
paign.
dollar guarantee required by the Burlington officials, sold enough
tickets to cover their investment in a special train. At least one hundred
and fifty voters from McCook expected to make the trip. At each town
along the line > a band and a speaker would greet the train, though
the engineer agreed to stop whenever anyone wanted to get aboard.
"Norris Special" was scheduled to arrive in Hastings between
three and four o'clock in the afternoon and would depart at ten-thirty

The

in the evening. 23
While these plans

were being made, the State Central Committee

unexpectedly sent a check for over four hundred dollars to McCarl
and smaller amounts to all but one of the county chairmen in the dis
trict.

These funds helped them

to provide transportation

and meet
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other expenses to insure a full Republican turnout on election day.
McCarl claimed the check "saved our lives out in the Fifth [District]."
He now predicted victory by a majority of over three thousand votes.
Favorable reports of the impact of Norris* speeches and of the rise in
Morris sentiment aided by the success of the "Norris Special," helped

him

24
arrive at this conclusion.

By the end of October the work of McCarl and Norris was virtually
concluded. There remained only the election eve rally at McCook for
on election night, McCarl was expected
inform the Republican National Committee of the results. He
planned to be at work tabulating the votes all night or at least until
Norris* victory was assured. As it turned out, both the candidate and
Norris. Shortly after midnight
to

his

manager waited much longer than
was known. 25

election night before the official

result

the election of 1908 represented another Republican vic
the
on
national scene, Taft did not do as well as Roosevelt in
tory
I904 while Bryan did much better than Alton B. Parker. Though
Bryan had only 162 electoral votes to 321 for Taft, one historian has
noted, "There was a national vote cast for Bryan, and it was urban
as well as rural; it was Eastern, Western, Southern and Northern." 2G
Nebraska gave its electoral vote to its adopted son who carried the

Though
?

state

by over four thousand

votes. In the Fifth Congressional District

Bryan carried ten of eighteen counties, including

home

He

Red Willow,

Norris'

county.
populous Hall County, where Ashton resided,
eleven
votes.
The
Democrats also managed to defeat Sheldon,
by
whom Norris claimed "was as good a Governor as Nebraska ever had."
lost

Three Democratic congressmen were elected, while
Republican incum
Hinshaw in the Fourth District and M. P. Kinkaid in the
Sixth, both of whom, incidentally, were
opposed to Speaker Cannon,
were clearly re-elected. The results in the Fifth
Congressional District
were so close and the returns so
that no one knew who was
bents E. H.

elected until the last ballot

was

confusing
counted. 27

officially

Since the vote was so close, McCarl insisted that each committeefor the official count to see that no "honest mistakes"
occurred. The results revealed that Norris had defeated
Ashton by

man be on hand

twenty-two votes, 20,649 to 20,627. While Ashton carried his home
county by fifty-three votes, Norris ran ahead of his ticket in this
county. The committeeman from Hall County complained, "The Rail
roads simply overwhelmed us"; not a
single Republican was elected in
Hall County in 1908. In view of the
outstanding Democratic triumph

in the counties

comprising the Fifth Congressional District, Norris'
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scant victory stood out as a signal achievement against a very dark
28

background.

On November

8, five

days after the election, Norris obtained a set

of official figures that assured his return to Congress. With a slim mar
gin between defeat and victory there was a distinct possibility that

Ashton would contest

it.

Norris requested that the Nebraska secretary

him immediately of any suspicious returns so that he
commence
might
proper action against the canvassing board of the
where
these
returns originated. He made this request because
county
of state notify

of rumors that his opponent, aided by "an unlimited checkbook/'
might
try to bribe a county clerk to make an intentional error when filing the
vote. 29

Norris viewed his election as a triumph over "a checkbook" and
Though his majority was small and he had to meet a large

over malice.

portion of the expenses himself, Norris was nonetheless gratified by
his victory. He was
disappointed by the defeat of J. F. Boyd in the

Third Congressional District and of Governor Sheldon. Above all
Norris regretted the defeat of William P.
Hepburn in Iowa, the leader
of the small band of Republicans in the House of
Representatives who
were challenging the rules by which Speaker Cannon exercised his

power.

30

On the evening of November
McCook. And on November 13,

12, a victory celebration

was held

in

1908, the secretary of state notified

much doubted if Ashton would undertake to con
But all through November Norris and McCarl anti
cipated a contest and prepared themselves accordingly. It was only
when he received a certificate of election in January, 1909, that Norris
31
finally was convinced that Ashton would not initiate a contest.
That the 1908 campaign was one of the most difficult in the career
of George Norris there is no doubt. That it
played an important role
in the development of his insurgency and
political independence is
certain.
in
He
was
the
of
equally
process
showing his independence of
Norris that he very

test the election.

party machinery in the House of Representatives when his campaign
experience convinced him of the wisdom of running campaigns with
a minimum of coordination with the Republican organization. Here

he would tend more and more to pursue his own course and, if
anything, he would complain about party interference. With the
burden of a mismanaged Republican organization in Nebraska, with
the hostility of Speaker Cannon in Congress, with little money to con
after

duct his campaign while the opposition seemingly had unlimited funds,
with few friendly newspapers supporting him, and with the liability

138

GEORGE W. NORRIS

was able to eke out a twenty-two vote
with
while
Democrats
the
Bryan as their standard-bearer won
plurality,
a singular victory in Nebraska if not on the national scene.
Norris* growing independence of party organization was a major
element in his insurgency. It developed gradually and logically out of
of a late start in speaking, Norris

his experience

and was molded by no

single incident.

The

fact that

he

represented a political '"burnt-over** district which, since his arrival in
the late 1830's, had strongly supported all shades of political opinion

from respectable Republicanism

to belligerent

Bryanism

may have

made
he

his position somewhat easier. But basic to the success of the role
was to enact was the personality, courage, and integrity of the

man

himself. Unassuming, modest but straightforward, presenting facts and
issues sometimes for hours on end, avoiding personalities, diatribes,
and emotionalism, relying on the friendship of a small band of friends,

and without a political machine to aid him, Norris was able to gain
and hold the respect of voters. Whereas many Populists and Demo
crats added emotional fervor to the issues
they raised, Norris presented
reason and logic with the probity of a country judge turned
politician.
That he succeeded in his insurgency throughout a long career attests
not only to his ability but also to the
highmindedness of the constitu
ents whose interests he represented. The second session of the Sixtieth
and the entire Sixty-first Congress witnessed the
eruption of insurgency
in a way that
brought Norris and his cohorts to the attention of a
nationwide audience and, despite his narrow
victory,
stituents proud of his performance.

made

his

con

Chapter 16

Insurgency

PREPABING to return

to

Washington for the second session of the

Sixtieth Congress, Norris expected to participate in a fight against the
rules of the House of Representatives. He, of course, was eager to do
battle, but he was saddened by the fact that William P. Hepburn of

Iowa, a long-time opponent of the rules, would be ending his distin
guished career with this short or lameduck session. Hepburn was one
of four Republican incumbents, generally inimical to the House rules,
defeated for re-election in 1908. 1 Though the ranks of the

who were

would be increased as a result of the election, none had
Hepburn's prestige and seniority and few had his general over-all

insurgents

ability.

As usual during a short session, Mrs. Norris and the children re
mained at home when Norris left for Washington on December 2.
McCarl also remained in McCook to practice law and to manage af
fairs in

the

district.

Norris again sought the services of Attorney Polk

to hire a stenographer to handle his correspondence and
as a receptionist in his office in the new House Office
to
serve
possibly
Building. During the Christmas holiday recess he intended to vacation

and hoped

on the Isle of Pines off the southern coast of Cuba. Norris expected to
be busy during this short session, and the vacation would provide an
2
opportunity to recover from the rigors of an arduous campaign.
However, no sooner had he arrived in Washington and unpacked
his bags than he hurriedly made arrangements to return to McCook.
His youngest child, Gertrude, had fallen ill and the doctor had diag
nosed her illness as diphtheria. She was given antitoxin and put to bed.
The family feared her heart might be affected. By returning to Mc
Cook and spending the period of quarantine with his family, he could
help with the task of amusing two healthy girls while Mrs. Norris at
tended a convalescing one. On December 9, 1908, two days after the
3
session started, he was granted an indefinite leave of absence.
Gertrude
well on
Arriving home and entering quarantine, he found
lifted.
For
was
the road to recovery. On December 21 the quarantine
139
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14 o

the second time In less than two months the house
had to be moved out and back.
almost

was fumigated and

Though Gertrudes
everything
less than a month's
with
of
two
mild
case was a
one,
quarantine
periods
for Mrs.
a
been
have
must
them
experience
between
trying
interval

home until after
Norris and the children. Morris decided to remain at
to the Isle of
the Christmas holidays, canceling his plans for a trip
Pines. 4

Thus Norris was not on hand when, on the evening of December
in the Inter
11, 1908, a small band of insurgent Republicans gathered
the
for
room
purpose of
state and Foreign Commerce Committee
of Rep
House
the
in
democratic procedure
planning a fight for more
authorized
was
and
the
over
meeting
resentatives. Hepburn presided
to choose a

committee of

five,

with himself as chairman, to propose

was suggested that the rule of recognition be re
possible changes.
on Elections and Rules be made elective,
committees
the
that
vised,
5
and that membership on the latter committee be increased.
Four days later, a resolution was proposed that a special committee
It

than February 1, 1909, any changes in the existing rules
report not later
that might seem desirable. Though the resolution was not considered,
the vote on the point of order not to consider it was 149 to 136, indi
the insurgents and the Democrats by voting
cating the possibility that
6
control the House. However, until that day
together might eventually
with bringing their
satisfied
be
have
to
arrived, the insurgents would
the
the
of
Speaker and con
public by harassing
fight to the attention

demning

his arbitrary power.

In January

when Congress reconvened

Norris

was present to lend

to his fellow insurgents, banded together for the first
time in their battle against the House rules. As a solution to the problem

aid

and support

ac

truly representative, the insurgent group
for
the Committee on Rules to be selected by the
Norris'
plan
cepted
members on the basis of geographical groups and for the committee in

of

making the House

members of all the standing committees. Norris, Hep
M. Nelson of Wisconsin, and others in the group agreed
that a change of speakers or a change of political parties would not
lessen the power of the Speaker. Only a change in the rules would re
move the source of his power and solve the problem. Norris succinctly
stated this position when he argued, "The rule that gives the Speaker
power to appoint all the Standing committees of the House, which
was the rule
practically control all of the legislation of the House,"
that was most obnoxious to those who thought that the Speaker had
turn to choose

burn, John

too

much power. 7

He

conceded, of course, that rules were necessary and that most of
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them served a useful purpose. He was opposed to unlimited debate
in a body of almost four hundred members and he
accepted without
8
qualification the "Reed rules." However, notwithstanding the fact that
most of the rules were the result of wisdom and experience, in "one or
two particulars" they were not only wrong but vicious and ought to be
changed. He mentioned the power of the Speaker to appoint all stand
ing committees and noted his "most serious objection to the rules of
the House." The most objectionable and vicious of all was the fact
that there was "practically no provision within the rules themselves"

amendment or change except by the consent of the Speaker.
Here, as Norris and his fellow insurgents knew, was the core of
their dilemma. Any resolution to
change the rules would be referred to
for

the Committee on Rules, of which the
Speaker was chairman and
dominant figure and chose or approved its membership. Once the

members adopted at the beginning of a Congress the previous rules,
Norris claimed, they "tied the hands of the House
absolutely as far as
any change" was concerned. They made it virtually impossible

during

the course of that particular Congress to
consent of the Speaker.

Knowing

amend the

rules without the

would not be reported out of commit
9
proceeded to discuss his resolution which

that a rules change

tee, Norris nevertheless

offered a solution that the insurgents believed would
equitably solve
the problem without undermining the political balance of the House

forcing insurgent Republicans into an uneasy alliance with the
Democratic minority. His resolution called for a new committee on
rules that would not only be
representative of the entire membership
but would also be subject to the will of the majority.

by

Representative James Mann of Illinois immediately perceived the
weakest point in Norris' resolution when he noted that it gave the
fifteen members of the committee the
authority to delegate to a sub
committee of its members, not less than three in number, "the power to
report special rules to the House of Representatives for the transaction
of business." This subcommittee within limits would have all the au
thority of the full committee.

Mann wanted

to

know why

the power

of the House, which Norris thought was being absorbed through the
rules by the Speaker, would not likewise be absorbed by this sub

committee.
Norris replied that this would not occur because the committee
provided for in the resolution derived its authority from and was re

sponsible to the entire House rather than the Speaker. It was more
he believed, that fifteen members, elected by the geographical
division prescribed in his resolution, would better represent the ideas
likely,
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and purposes of the House than would the members of the Rules Com
In one
mittee chosen by the Speaker. But Mann did not see it that way.
of three,
subcommittee
on
a
confer
would
members
fifteen
case
power
rules, a majority of the dominant party,
while under the
prevailing

assembled in caucus, conferred power on the Speaker. Though Norris
the only possible answer to Mann's question, his antagonist
suggested

was not convinced of its validity. In his response Norris also made
au
clear that he was not implying that Speaker Cannon usurped any
bitter
sometimes
and
this long
thority or power. Indeed, throughout
as did some of the other Republican
Norris
insisted,
always
struggle,
that he was opposed to the system and did not intend to
insurgents,
cast aspersions

on Cannon or anyone else. Finally Norris, apparently
stated that he held no brief for his plan.
impressed by Mann's criticism,
the
same results he was willing to accept
achieve
could
If another plan
in
it
was
offered
it,
good faith and not simply for the purpose
provided

10

of causing delay and confusion.
However, Norris' remarks did not comprise the

major assault upon

the rules during this session. This honor was reserved for Hepburn as
his farewell address after twenty-two years of distinguished service
in Congress. But before Hepburn delivered his speech the insurgents
made some important decisions. On January 27, 1909, Hepburn an

nounced

their acceptance of Norris* resolution

and

of another expedi

ent designed to secure greater freedom in the consideration of

meas

ures.

This expedient proposed to set aside each Tuesday, except during
the last six days of a session, when no business except that on the
House Calendar and the Calendar of the Committee of the Whole

Union would be in order. 11 On "Calendar
Tuesday" all committees would be called in regular order and each
committee could call up any bill on either calendar. Motions to ad
journ, recess, or rise were not in order before 4:45 P.M. Furthermore,
on Calendar Tuesday general debate on a measure in the Committee
of the Whole could be closed at any time after the expiration of forty
minutes. And, finally, proceedings under this rule, which if enacted
would have markedly curtailed the power of the Speaker only one day
a week, could be suspended for the day by a two-thirds vote. 12

House on the

State of the

On February 9, 1909, a resolution to amend the rules embodying
these proposals was introduced by twenty-nine Republican members,
including all of Nebraska's Republican congressmen. The resolution
(H.R. 551) was sent to the Committee on Rules for Cannon, its chair
to consider. 13 While none of the
insurgents seriously expected
anything except publicity to come from the resolution, few realized

man,
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it

presented the Speaker.
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By accepting

the idea of

Calendar Tuesday he could make a concession to his critics and, un
doubtedly, split the ranks of the insurgents. Calendar Tuesday, of
course, would not seriously damage the Speaker's power and would
not in the least alter the rules of the House, the source of his power.

Indeed some moderate insurgents, like Augustus P. Garner of Massa
chusetts, probably would have been amenable to fighting for only
Calendar Tuesday.14
On February 18, 1909, Hepburn delivered the major speech of the
session against the rules. It was entirely fitting that he should have
done this. Though he was the leader of the Republican caucus and
chairman of a powerful committee, Hepburn had been attacking the
rules longer than

any other person in Congress, long before the other
elected
were
to the House of Representatives. A polished
insurgents
orator and a dangerous opponent in debate, Hepburn used his talents
of biting satire, keen wit, and scathing ridicule to chalenge the arbi
trary
basic
tion:

hoist

power of the Speaker. In his speech Hepburn gave voice to the
dilemma of the insurgents and predicted the fate of their resolu
"Oh, it is easy to get into the Committee on Rules, but by what
and by what petard would we get out of the Committee on

Rules?"

15

Speaker Cannon must have been thankful and the insurgents sad
that this speech was Hepburn's last as a member of Congress. Though
the February resolution of the twenty-nine insurgents was never re
ported to the House, on March 1, 1909, within four days of the end of
the Sixtieth Congress an amendment was presented and adopted call
ing for a "Calendar Wednesday" when no business but the calling of
the committees would be in order. Cannon thus made the most of his
opportunity to split the ranks of the insurgents by offering a mild con

amendment to the rules.
Norris was furious at Cannon's use of the resolution to

cession as an

harm the

insurgent cause, and gave vent to his wrath:

Mr. Speaker, I believe that this proposed rule is the most useless,
that has
perhaps harmless, and worse than worthless proposition
ever emanated, especially coming at this particular late day, from
the Committee on Rules. It is, in my judgment, the most comical
In
parliamentary joke that ever came down the legislative pike.
16
it is a homeopathic dose of nothingness.
its
application

argued that since the rule provided it should not be in effect
members of the House were
during the last two weeks of Congress, the
at this late date placed in "the foolish and ridiculous position" of ac-

He
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not have any effect in the Congress in which
ceptlne a rale that would
"a sop to the people of the country to
it was adopted. He called it

deceive them in their
so that

it

machine."

shall

be

demand

that this

House

really a representative

body

shall

modify

instead of a

its

rules

one-man

1T

mem

isolated
last years of the nineteenth century,
Periodically in the
the rules but
bers of the House of Representatives had spoken against
an
the
proportions of
never in the past had the opposition assumed
Theodore
of
months
last
the
movement Now, however, in

organized

was rapidly increasing and assuming na
and gruff, quickly became
tional proportions. Speaker Cannon, colorful
the public mind an over
in
and
in many newspapers and magazines
House of
who
ruler
tyrannized the
bearing, bearded, cigar-smoking
a plank
and
in
While
Congress
insurgents
Roosevelt's administration

it

Republican
Democratic platform of 1908 criticized the

Representatives.

in the

journalistic

articles attacked the

rules,

the end of 1908 became a subject of
Speaker by
"Cannonism" a system that insurgents sought

many

of the

and the
national attention, and

man. Thus the House

rules

to eradicate.

Though

came to favor changes in
Norris, as a result of his service in Congress,
and the posi
the rules, he nevertheless maintained respect for Cannon
however, were more concerned with the
18
man than with the source of his power. Meanwhile, pressed and
the Demo
own
his
harassed on all sides by members of
party and by
"Uncle
clamor,
and
the
cratic
increasing public
tion

he held. Most

citizens,

by
press
opposition, by
tremendous power the rules gave
Joe" began to utilize the

him

and perhaps punish his antagonists. Indeed, he had not
19
Norris since he introduced his resolution in May, 1908.
It

should be noted at

tration,

this

to fight
to

spoken

the Roosevelt adminis
point that during
rules were never a major obstacle to

Speaker Cannon and the

the president in advancing his legislative program. Most of Roosevelt's
difficulties were with the Senate, and, in most instances, the House
desired. Roosevelt, though
quickly passed the bills the administration
he might not have liked or admired Cannon, worked well with him,
consulted with him frequently, wrote him often, and listened to his
advice about the tenor of opinion in the House of Representatives. In
and the
short, harmonious relations prevailed between the president
administration. As a result,
Roosevelt
of
the
most
Speaker throughout
about supporting Roosevelt and ad
Norris saw

nothing incongruous
Sixtieth Congress car
miring Cannon. But the ill will evident in the
ried over into the Taft administration, when the president, who did
not like the Speaker, found it difficult to cooperate and work with him,
less effort than his predecessor, and
partly because Taft exerted much
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partly because Cannon, now thoroughly aroused
much less inclined to cooperate. 20
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and angered, was

Thus as the Sixtieth Congress came to an end, the fight against
Cannonism had come out into the open and, of course, would be con
tinued in the next Congress. Though this struggle was the most signifi
cant aspect of Norris' service in the short session, he concerned him
self with other matters as well. The most important of these was the
tariff issue, since the
incoming president had announced his intention
of calling Congress into special session to revise it.
Important, too, was
the growing sentiment for a postal savings system, while many mer
chants were concerned lest a parcel post system be established. They
claimed the establishment of such a system would enable the large
mail-order firms to drive retail merchants in small towns out of busi
ness. 21

Norris pointed out that a parcel post system was already in exist
ence and that those who favored it really desired the Post Office De

packages at lower rates than the law provided.
that
Believing
express company charges were exorbitant and unjust,
he was inclined to favor a reduction in the postal laws so that rates

partment

to carry larger

would take

and weight, but distance
were done, retail merchants in small towns would not
suffer unduly from mail-order competition, and both merchant and
farmer would benefit from the competition thus forced upon the ex
into consideration not only size

as well. If this

22

press companies.
Like many of his constituents, Norris was interested in the concept
of a postal savings bank.
plank in the Republican platform of 1908
favored the enactment of such legislation. However, he did not intend

A

to support any measure that would siphon funds from the area of de
posit to a large city. He believed that deposits in a postal savings bank
should not be granted special tax exemptions. In this respect, his views

from the bill introduced by Senator Thomas H. Carter of
Montana, a bill which granted postal savings bank deposits exemption
from taxation and levy on execution. 23
While both a parcel post and a postal savings measure would be
enacted during the Taft administration, it was the tariff that received
immediate attention once the new administration got under way.
Norris believed that the tariff ought to be removed from wood and
all of its
products, and that the rates on grain ought to be retained at
their prevailing high level to protect farmers and millers from foreign,
differed

a new
particularly Canadian, competition. He realized, however, that
tariff law would have to be the result of compromise and would con
tain

many

items he would not favor. 24
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But discussions of these issues were merely skirmishes for battles
short session
to come. The attack against the Speaker dominated the
most
as far as the House of Representatives was concerned. Meanwhile
1909.
March
4,
to Taft's inauguration on
Republicans looked forward
were mixed, few if any were indifferent about the de
While
feelings

from the White House. Most congressmen,
parture of Roosevelt
whether Democratic or Republican, were unhappy about the prospect
of foregoing their deserved vacations for the dubious privilege of re
the summer, to prepare a
maining in Washington, possibly throughout
and
tariff which under any circumstance was bound to create acrimony
discord. Norris, in February, wrote to the president-elect requesting
the special session at least a week later than the tentatively scheduled
date of March 10, thereby allowing the western members of Congress
to return home for a few days and still be back in time for the begin
it did not make much dif
ning of the session. Ordinarily, Norris knew,
ference if some members were not present at the start of a session, but
the desire of the insurgents to challenge the rules made it necessary for
5
al to be present at the outset when the fight would take placed Taft,
the
though he did not acknowledge Norris' letter, complied by calling

on March 15.
Norris left Washington on March 4, before the new president took
the oath of office. He was not sufficiently impressed with the grandeur
special session to convene

of inauguration ceremonies to go out of his way to witness one. He
was back in Washington shortly before Congress convened ready to
26
participate in the rules fight.
that
a large majority of the Republican
of
knew
Norris,
course,
caucus favored Cannon's re-election as Speaker. It would be impossible

but the insurgents believed there was "a fair chance"
the rules at this time. And Norris intended to battle for

to defeat him,

of

amending

last ditch shall have been reached." If beaten, he
there would be no hope for favors and consideration during this

reform "until the

knew

27

Congress.

On March

15, as soon as the session started, parliamentary maneu
over
vering began
adopting the rules of the previous session. Once

these rules were adopted, virtually all hope of modifying them would
be ended. Norris dramatically pointed up the issue, and incidentally
noted that the new administration would be a far cry from the previous

one:

Mr. Speaker, there will be no change in the rules that will be
satisfactory or produce satisfactory results either to the House
or to the country that does not take away from the Speaker the
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right to serve on the Committee on Rules and the right to ap
point all the standing committees of this House. ... It is to be
regretted, Mr. Speaker, that we were not left to settle this ques
tion without any outside influences. During the vacation

Mem

bers of this House have been worked upon

by the various depart
what are known as the

ments of

this Government, especially
"insurgent" part of the House; Senators, Cabinet members, and,
I regret to say, the President, have all been working in behalf of
the Speaker and his machine; so that we have had a combination

of the Senate, the Cabinet, the Executive, and the "knights of the
Iron Duke," all combined in an assault upon that little band of
28

insurgents.

Unfurling their banner, the insurgents were risking their political
Newspapers claimed that if defeated they would be punished by
loss of important places on committees and by loss of executive patron
lives.

age. Norris' response to this challenge

was

as follows:

If we are to be punished for standing for a principle which we
believe to be right, then let the lash be unfurled. Do your worst.
will not surrender. I would rather
will not be intimidated.

We

go down

We

to

my

political

grave with a clear conscience than ride

in the chariot of victory, a congressional stool pigeon, the slave,
the servant, and the vassal of any man, whether he be the owner

and manager of a

legislative

menagerie or the ruler of a great

nation.29

Lest he be pushed too far in opposition to the chief executive,
Norris clarified his position by proclaiming his confidence in Taft The
real power in government, he said, was being exerted not by the presi

dent but by the "Iron Duke** who, "sitting upon his throne, crowned
with the power given him by the rules, reaches out his mighty hand
and forces even the Chief Executive to do his bidding." For Norris, at
last, the struggle had degenerated to the level of personalities. He also
life crushed out of us by the
predicted, "We insurgents may have the
machine, but the cause

is

right,

and

in the

end

it

must

30

prevail."

to
Despite insurgent opposition, the previous rules were modified
the
not
while
Speak
hampering
improve the functioning of the House

Committee on Rules or his power to appoint stand
Democratic
ing committees. This modification, which received some
the
made
by
Speaker with
support, was the result of an arrangement
Democratic
and
other
Democratic Representative John J. Fitzgerald
a
to support
members, whereby the
higher duty on
er's

control of the

Speaker promised
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tariff bill in

return for

enough
petroleum products in the impending
Democratic votes to prevent the insurgents in alliance with Champ
Clark from further amending the rules. The rules that were adopted,
under this compact, provided for a unanimous consent calendar
which eliminated the daily procession to the Speaker s office to obtain
with general approval. Calendar
permission to consider bills meeting
Wednesday was strengthened by changing the requirement for setting
and finally a recommittal
it aside from a
majority to a two-thirds vote,
the
after
motion was permitted
previous question had been moved on
31
not
in order before this.
was
motion
a
Such
bill
any
Thus defeated, the lonely insurgents knew that before the special
session was concluded they could expect the wrath of the Speaker to
'

itself in lowly committee assignments. They had supported
amendments offered by Champ Clark to amend the rules, amendments
that would have deprived the Speaker of most of his authority. But
because of the defection of Democratic members these amendments
were defeated. The only positive achievement they could discern was
in the form of national press coverage which publicized their struggle
to a large audience. Norris, for the first time, came to the attention of
a national audience and many citizens, no doubt, admired his per
in antagonizing the
spicacity in analyzing the issues and his courage
32
Speaker and possibly the president.
Incidentally, despite his attack on the Speaker's power and his cam
paign promise to vote against Cannon, Norris voted for him and re
33
ceived, at the same time, two votes for Speaker.
By voting for Can
within
the
could
remain
non, Norris
Republican organization and re
tain a vote and a voice to change the rules. If he disregarded the party
caucus and voted against Cannon, Norris was aware that Cannon still
would be re-elected and his own standing would become even more
precarious. He had argued that if there was no possibility of defeating

manifest

the Speaker the insurgents should vote for his re-election. 34 Norris re
mained throughout this fight one of the more moderate insurgents who
to separate growing hostility to
modify the rules.

managed
sire to

Once the

fight to

amend

the rules

was

Cannon from a primary de
lost the

House

settled

down

to the urgent business of the special session preparing a new tariff
35
measure was
law, though an undercurrent of hostility prevailed.

A

introduced in the House by Sereno Payne on March 17, 1909. The bill,
providing for generally lower rates, met with more approval than most
observers had expected. The insurgents presented no organized
oppo
it. Norris,
believing that an unduly high tariff encouraged
and monopolies, favored some reduction, though the loss of tariff

sition to

trusts
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revenue would have to be balanced either by increased taxation or
curtailment of expenditures. He preferred eliminating extravagant ap
propriations, especially for the navy. He had voted against such appro
priations since he had been in Congress, but "the country seemed to
demand the upbuilding of a big navy, and the President was very
enthusiastic in his demands for the same." Therefore he realized that
any reduction of rates would have to be balanced by increased taxa
tion.

36

Norris succeeded in adding a significant amendment to the tariff bill.
The subcommittee which prepared the measure unanimously placed

petroleum and petroleum products on the free list. At the insistence
of Speaker Cannon, the chairman called a meeting of the subcommittee
to reconsider this decision. After bitter debate, in which the Speaker
insisted that Republican members abide by party principles and prom
ises, the committee by a partisan vote agreed to put a tariff of 25 per
cent on petroleum and petroleum products. 37
Before Norris was elected to Congress, the tariff on petroleum and
its
products had figured in a congressional campaign in the Fifth Dis
trict. Consequently, he was very much interested in this particular
portion of the tariff. The bill was considered under a special rule
which made it impossible to place an item, by means of amendment,
on the free list. Therefore, on April 7, 1909, Norris presented a motion

reduce the 25 per cent duty on petroleum and its products to a
nominal 1 per cent. After some debate in which Speaker Cannon took
the floor to speak against it, Norris* motion prevailed, whereupon
Payne, sponsor of the measure in the House of Representatives, in
formed the members that the duty as amended would not pay the
cost of collection. He requested unanimous consent that petroleum
to

and

its

products be placed on the free

list.

38

Norris' action in reducing this important schedule of the tariff won
immediate approval from his constituents. McCarl wrote from McCook

he had not been able to find a man, "Democrat or Republican or
indifferent/* who was not pleased with his "victory on the oil proposi
tion." Most newspapers were generous in their praise of Norris, whose
election. 39
popularity was on the rise after the low point of the 1908
One of the things that pleased Norris most with the tariff bill that
a sug
passed the House on April 9, 1909, was the fact that it followed
for
inheritance
an
and
in
Taft's
provided
inaugural message
gestion
tax as a means of balancing the loss of income from the generally low
ered rates of the Payne bill. He had always favored an inheritance tax.
While in theory an income tax was generally conceded to be the most
most diffiequitable tax, as a matter of practice Norris thought it the
that
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cult to collect because

it

On

offered too

many

opportunities for evasion

hand a graduated inheritance tax
posed no such difficulty. Ideally it could be collected from the bequests
received by the beneficiaries so that the larger the amount received,
by dishonest

citizens.

the other

the larger the rate of taxation; however, the plank in the tariff measure
merely taxed the sum left by the deceased. Despite this mild objection
to the inheritance feature of the
certain

it

The debate on

the

bill,

Norris was delighted and

was

in considerable revenue. 40

would bring

tariff

in the Senate

was one

of the notable events

in the history of that distinguished body, lasting well

on into the sum

mer. The House, having passed the measure on April 9, had little im
portant business to conduct until the Senate reached some agreement.

Thus many House members, having

little to do in the
capital city, re
leaves
of
of
because
business.
absence
Norris ob
quested
important
tained such a leave on April 12, 1909, 41 and chose to conduct his im

portant business in the Panama Canal Zone. He returned to Washing
ton on May 2 to find Senate debate raging, as a handful of
Republican

members subjected the

tariff to what some of its
supporters, no doubt,
considered an agonizing reappraisal.42
On May 14, Norris decided to go home until the Senate debate was

concluded. In

McCook he

his correspondence,

relaxed with his family, kept abreast with

and avoided

all
public commitments, including
Fourth of July addresses, because of the need to return to
Washington
as soon as the Senate
passed the tariff bill. By July 7 he was back in
Washington and glad to be where the heat was less intense than it had
been in Nebraska. 43
By a vote of forty-five to thirty-four on July 8, the Senate passed its
version of the tariff bill with ten
Republican members, including both
Nebraska senators, voting against it. The next day on the floor of the
House, Norris followed the lead of La Follette by characterizing the
bill as a revision
revi
upward. Norris argued that unless the

upward

sion of rates in

many

schedules

was

rejected, specifying particularly
gloves and hosiery, the Republican party would not be true to its
pledges. He quoted speeches by Taft to illustrate the party's pledge to
reduce tariff schedules and suggested a resolution
whereby the House

would concur in those Senate amendments which reduced the tariff
and would go into conference on the balance. Unless the members
voted for this resolution, Norris warned
they would not have another
chance to discuss the bill. When it returned from conference commit
tee, it would probably contain several hundred items. Members would
not get a separate vote but would be required "to accept all or refect

alT 44

-
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By adopting his proposition, the House could dispose of all Senate
amendments where rates were reduced. In doing this, the members
would have an opportunity to express themselves on every one of them.
Whereas if the measure was sent immediately to conference committee
the members would lose control over the bill, because the Speaker
would choose conferees sympathetic to his high tariff views. 45 How
no doubt expected, his proposal failed. It received
insurgent support on the Republican side of the House.
The conference committee remained in session until early August
trying to adjust all items where Senate and House measures provided

ever, as Norris

The president attempted to convince it of the neces
reduced
rates
of
on gloves and hosiery, while also demanding free
sity
iron ore, coal, hides, oil, and a lower duty on lumber. 46 Norris, remain
ing in Washington during these deliberations, feared the conferees

for different rates.

would eliminate the inheritance tax provided

in the

House

bill

and

substitute the Senate provision for a corporation tax. Since the presi

now

this latter proposal which, Norris thought, was
the attorney general, he knew that a corporation rather
than an inheritance tax would be included in the law ultimately en
acted by Congress. He also knew that House members would vote for

dent

advocated

prepared by

47

or against the bill with no chance to consider particular items.
At the end of July, by the narrow margin of 191-186, the House
defeated a recommittal motion, with Norris and most insurgent
bers voting with the minority. On the final vote to accept the confer
ence committee report, Norris and some of the moderate insurgents
were included among the 195 members who voted in the affirmative.

mem

Prior to these votes six progressive Republican senators appeared on
the House floor in an effort to convince members that the measure
48
should be sent back to conference committee. Failing in their efforts,

the senators continued their battle in the Senate chamber* but when
the roll was called on August 5, 1909, the conference report carried by
a vote of 47-31 with only six Republican senators voting against it.
This time both Nebraska senators voted with the majority. Thus after
bitter debate in both houses, but especially in the Senate, the Payne-

was sent to President Taft for approval, which was
on
August 5, 1909, before the special session of the Sixtyquickly given

Aldrich

tariff bill

first

Congress formally adjourned.
In summing up his attitude toward the Payne-Aldrich tariff Norris
said he fought the bill from start to finish in most of its essential fea
tures. However, he admitted the law had much in its favor. Though

he had voted against many schedules and for every parliamentary
have kept the conference report in committee,
proposition that would
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He did this because the Payne-Aldrich tariff
than the Dingley law/' since it was molded "on
the right principle." It raised the tariff on luxuries and lowered it on
in the right
necessities; "not enough," he admitted, "but it was a step
to Norris, the true principle of a tariff was that It
direction."
he

still

was

voted for the

bill.

"infinitely better

According
should represent the differences between the cost of production at
home and abroad. The Payne-Aldrich tariff did not do this, but, Northis goal much better than did the Dingley
ris believed, it

approached

tariff.

49

the day before the special session came to an end when the
deficiency bill," Norris spoke against
an item which granted an automobile for the vice-president and the
for indirect and face
Speaker. It presented him with an opportunity
"If
should buy this auto
we
the
of
criticism
Speaker:
tiously amusing
mobile for the Speaker and he should become adept and an expert in
the management of it, as he undoubtedly would in a short time, his
natural inclination to run over people when assisted by an automobile
would make it dangerous for everybody in the community/' However,

On

House was considering an "urgent

was the Speaker who had the final word at this time. On the last
day of the session committee assignments for the regular session of
the Sixty-first Congress were announced. Norris now fully felt Can
non's power when he found himself downgraded to membership on
the insignificant committees on Coinage, Weights, and Measures, and
on Private Land Claims, committees which he claimed were "dead and
it

committees in

name

50

only/*

Returning to Nebraska, Norris believed that

many

of his constitu

ents sympathized with his position and resented the actions of the
Speaker. He knew, too, that his ability to be of service to his constitu

ents had been and would remain severely curtailed as long as Cannon
was Speaker. However, his position and that of his fellow insurgents
was not yet clarified because no one knew for certain whether Taft
intended to continue the policies of his predecessor or whether he
would move into the more conservative camp dominated by the able
and powerful senator from Rhode Island, Nelson Aldrich. Norris there
fore resolved to bring his case before his constituents, lest
opponents
take advantage of his weakened position. Thus, instead of a vacation
for what remained of the summer, he
sought a way to present his
to
the
if
to
increase his income.
and,
position
public
possible,

Chapter 17

The Eve

of Conflict

WHEN

Norris returned to Nebraska in
August, 1909, the prevailing
sentiment in that state had become more
progressive in response to
national developments such as the
insurgency revolt, to reform move
ments in other states such as Wisconsin, and to
clamoring for further

measures to protect citizens against banks and bosses. The legislature,
controlled by the Democrats for the first time since statehood, enacted
under Governor A. C. Shallenberger more liberal legislation than un
der Republican Governor George L. Sheldon. A bank
guarantee law
designed to protect depositors, an idea Norris had suggested in Con
gress, was the most important piece of new legislation. Other measures
1
changed the primary from a closed to an open election, provided for
the election of educational officers and
judges on a nonpartisan ticket,
and established the "Oregon Pledge Law," requiring legislative can

didates to state that

if

elected they

would vote

for the candidate for

United States senator receiving the highest preferential vote. But the
most important sign of increased progressivism to Norris was the wide
spread approval by Nebraskans of his course of action in Congress.
Indeed, rumor had it that he would seek the senatorial nomination in
1910 in place of Senator E. J. Burkett, who was regarded as too con
servative. 2

Norris was noncommittal regarding this nomination. He preferred to
wait until party opposition to Burkett clearly crystallized and other
candidates came forward. He claimed too that he was not particularly

anxious to be a candidate for the Senate. Life in Washington presented
many disappointments and too much opposition of a disagreeable

"too

and often

The

of a dishonorable kind."

Norrises

had planned

to

3

spend

their

summer traveling to the
The special session of

Pacific coast to visit relatives of Mrs. Norris.

Congress, however, had forced them to abandon this idea. Instead,
Norris made arrangements for several Chautauqua lectures beginning
in September.

Most of the

talks

were

to

be presented under the auspices
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of the University of Nebraska's extension lecture

modest

fees.

program

for very

4

Norris spoke on three topics: peace, the Panama Canal, and Cannonthe most popular. His lecture,
ism, with the last subject proving to be

"The Dream of Peace," was an able presentation favoring the

settle

ment of international disputes by a court of arbitration. Though most
of the talks were delivered in churches, Norris' pacifism did not have
a religious base or orientation. It emanated primarily from his experi
ence as an American delegate to the Interparliamentary Union con
ference at Brussels in 1905. "Ever since then/' he wrote in 1908, "I
interested in the subject." And the more he examined
have been
greatly

more convinced he became that "the greatest disgrace of the
is that war is in any case and under any condi
present civilized age
it,

the

5

tion a possibility."
He suggested that

if

the United States

and England took the lead

settled all disputes by arbitration, "AH the world would doubtless
follow in their footsteps." He favored a vast network of separate trea

and

ties rather than a single treaty to which all nations would agree. And
he thought the men appointed as arbitrators should be granted a long
term so that they could make a careful study of international law and
the administration of international justice. Then, too, with long terms

jurors could rise above national prejudice and decide questions purely
on their merits. Thus when a controversy arose the machinery to cope

with

it

would be immediately

available.

6

Norris also coupled these lectures with a plea for a smaller navy,
claiming the reason the peace forces in America were divided was that

they could not agree on naval policy. While he favored curtailing
naval expenditures, 7 other peace advocates held that the best way to
obtain peace was to be prepared for war. Accepting the necessity of
maintaining an army and a navy and claiming that from 60 to 70 per
cent of the nation's revenues were spent for war or the preparation for

war, Norris, nevertheless, hoped that these expenditures could be cur
tailed as the civilized world began "to shake off the shackles of bar
barism." Since war was a frightful reminder of the "barbarous
ages"
he considered it a disgrace "to the present civilized age" that any na

waging war with any other civilized nation, "when the
could so easily be settled by arbitration." 8
In his lecture on the Panama Canal, Norris
hoped to communicate

tion think of
difficulty

some knowledge

of

what the government was doing there so that

his

constituents could comprehend, for
example, some of the difficulties
encountered by the engineers in charge of the
project. Though audi-

THE EVE OF CONFLICT

155

ences listened attentively to the address, none received

it

enthusi

astically.

At the end of the second lecture when the audience was about to
be dismissed, somebody called out: "Before you go, Mr. Norris, tell us
about the Cannon fight; that's what we want to know about." Where
upon Norris, unprepared for another lecture the same evening, talked
for an hour and aroused the first real enthusiasm of the evening. Thus
it quickly
developed that the lecture "Cannonism and the Remedy"
was the most popular of the three. 9
In these talks, during the question period when the audience re
verted to politics, Norris replied that it was too early to say anything
definite about his senatorial candidacy, though he did claim that he
could not afford to

make

criticism of the direct

cussed the rules, the

the race. In doing this he presented a basic
10
primary system. In the formal lecture he dis

tariff

fight,

and the

injustice of

Speaker Cannon

in depriving insurgents of their standing on committees, in refusing
to recognize them in the House chamber or to speak to them in the
corridors. Obviously, there

was no need

to prepare this lecture;

it

was

delivered extemporaneously. Its structure varied with each delivery
but its contents remained the same. When the series ended, Norris,

were of
evaluating his experience on the platform, said his audiences

but one opinion on the matter; namely, "They are all insurgents." n
With lecturing concluded, he made plans to return to Washington
for the second session of the Sixty-first Congress, which was to open on
December 6. Mrs. Norris and the children had left McCook in mid-

September so that the

girls

might enter Washington schools at the

beginning of the school year. The family rented quarters in the North
East section of the city. McCarl again remained in McCook, devoting

whatever time he could to acting as Norris* secretary. And Norris, on
renewed arrangements with Polk, the Washington attorney
who had proven so helpful, and hired a stenographer for his office,
Room 214 of the House Office Building. 12
Since rules for this Congress were already in effect, there was no
The situation con
open fight when the second session got under way.
session: the House of Representatives con
tinued as in the

his part,

previous
business in its usual way, while an undercurrent of insurgent
discontent revealed members who sought an opportunity to force the
issue of the rules to a vote. Rumors were rampant and Norris learned

ducted

its

be made against every insurgent
for an insurgent
seeking re-election. While many Republicans hoped
vote
with
them. On the
dare
to
would
few
victory, Norris knew that

that

Cannon thought a

fight should
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other hand, he realized that there were many Democrats who would
have liked to see the insurgents defeated but who would not dare to

vote against them. 13

was in an atmosphere of anxiety and tension that he pre
examine
and execute the nation's business. His removal to
pared
what were for all intents and purposes nonexistent committees meant
that he would have more time to investigate issues. While prohibition
was not a significant issue before the Congress, the people of Nebraska

Thus

it

to

of great political importance. Norris was very cautious
said
to consider it from any but a legal point of view:
that while prohibition was a state and local issue, the federal govern

considered

it

He

and refused

ment had done much

to regulate

and

curtail abuses in the interstate

14
shipment of liquor.

On

the equally explosive issue of

woman

suffrage, Norris took a

somewhat stronger position. He claimed that suffrage was a state func
tion, and that Nebraska, or any other state, could provide for universal
suffrage. He admitted that he was not opposed to woman suffrage if
the state desired it. But he would not champion the cause until he
became convinced that women desired the franchise. 15
Of more immediate importance were the issues of taxes and postal
rates. Businessmen,
particularly in Lincoln and Omaha, were con
cerned about the corporation tax, while those in the Fifth
Congres
sional District, along with
many of Norris' rural constituents, were con
cerned about postal rates. Norris, seeing no possibility of
repealing the
controversial tax, focused his attention on the
postal situation. He be

had not considered both sides of the
For
the
proposition.
example,
president claimed that it cost the govern
ment nine cents per pound to transport second class mail,
especially
lieved that the administration

magazines.

To

Norris such information indicated not that rates should

be increased but that the government was
paying too much for carry
ing the mail He noted that express companies, competing for busi
ness, were still profitably carrying second, third, and fourth class mail
for less than a
penny a pound, primarily on short hauls. In most in
stances they left the
unprofitable long hauls to the government. There
fore, he argued, "If the express
companies can carry mail for less than
a cent a pound, we ought not to
pay the railroads nine cents per pound
for carrying it" 1Q

The Post Office Department, he
suggested, could profitably carry
most mail under a zone system
charging more for long than for short
hauls. The
express companies operated on such a basis and the gov
ernment would do well to foUow their
example. Thus the solution
necessitated no increase in
on
postage
newspapers and magazines but
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required reduction of the amount paid to railroads for carrying this
mail. Furthermore, as Norris understood it, the
had a

government
monopoly on mail matters. If its power were enforced, express com
panies could be prohibited from carrying second class mail, thereby
securing to the government the benefit of profitable short hauls. Un
he could be convinced of the error of his reasoning, Norris an
nounced that he intended to vote against any postal rate increase. 17

less

Along with postal matters, Norris also gave careful consideration to
legislation pertaining to land and internal improvements. Homestead
ers called attention to financial difficulties in the North Platte
irriga
tion project. The project, which
incidentally was not in Norris* district,
benefited from the Pathfinder Dam in Wyoming, constructed under
the terms of the Reclamation Act. The settlers had
originally been told
that water rights would cost them no more than thirty-five dollars
per
acre. The price had since been raised to
forty-five dollars per acre
plus maintenance, and the inhabitants now found it impossible to meet
their payments, support their families, and maintain
adequate school
facilities. Having traveled over this country, Norris was convinced
that the law needed amendment. The financial burden would defeat
the government's purpose, making it difficult if not impossible for the
farmers to get their lands into full production and meet their payments
too. 18

Norris believed that the settlers should be relieved of their

payment

years, allowing them to direct all their
efforts toward cultivating the land. Once the land was workable, pay
ments would begin. Nonis wanted to amend the Reclamation Act to

obligations for the

improve

its

some laws

first

two

usefulness, since he regarded it "as one of the most whole
that was ever passed, for the West and, in fact, for the en

tire country/' 19
Despite this praise, Norris criticized section nine,

that

allocated for reclamation

which provided
be equalized every ten years

money
among the public land states in proportion to the funds different states
had furnished by the sale of public lands. This section "was the worst
feature of the act" and accounted for projects that had been com
menced without due consideration. He did not believe that public
lands belonged to any particular state or that money from their sale
should go back to the particular localities from which it originated.
Such beliefs, he thought, could "make a failure of the reclamation bus
iness." Officials ought to be permitted to use the money where it would
in the
yield the best returns, thus benefiting all who desired to settle
20
all political considerations.

West and removing almost
Along with

irrigation,

dry farming represented another technique
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offered opportuni
for developing portions of the West. Both methods
had been
heretofore
that
acres
of
millions
of
ties for the utilization

considered useless for agricultural purposes. Hardy W. Campbell
of dry farming and had demonstrated it
developed the technique
however, was done outside of
throughout the West. Campbell's work,
and Norris wanted to increase the Department of
first

government

service,

21
bill so that it could encourage his method.
Agriculture's appropriation
Norris also offered an amendment granting twenty-five thousand
with artesian wells for irrigation
dollars to

encourage experimentation
where farmers could not obtain sufficient water
purposes
from streams. He did not expect the government to irrigate the land,
but once artesian wells were shown to be feasible, people could then
in localities

bore their own. He considered such an expenditure a valid use of
that would eventually enable large areas to raise
public funds, one
22
Norris' concern
communities.
and
support prosperous farming
crops
was not limited to Nebraska. His remarks evinced his
with
agriculture

knowledge of the arid regions which,
lines

if

intelligently

worked along

could fruitfully
suggested during the Roosevelt administration,
the vast inland empire of the United States.

develop

When

Norris

showed

his interest in the conservation of natural

he moved from issues of local and regional interest to a
the public in the form of
burning national question which was before
Pinchot and Secretary
Gifford
Forester
Chief
a controversy between
of the Interior Richard Ballinger. In the House of Representatives the
resources,

the struggle of the insurgents
controversy appeared as another phase of
of
the
the
Speaker.
power
against
Louis R. Glavis, a special agent in the land office in Seattle, dramat

had connived with the Cunningham
ically charged that the secretary
coal group, portrayed as a front for a Morgan-Guggenheim syndicate,
to validate withdrawals from the public domain of choice Alaska coal
backed Glavis in these assertions while Ballinger denied
he had been dishonest. Taft, in September, 1909, exonerated Bal
linger and fired Glavis. And when Senator Jonathan P. Dolliver of
Iowa, in January, 1910, read a letter on the Senate floor by Pinchot in
lands. Pinchot

that

by removing Pinchot as chief
row already had prompted Gilbert M. Hitchcock, a
Nebraska Democrat, to introduce a resolution in the House of Repre
sentatives on December 6, 1909, providing for a committee to investi
gate the conduct of the General Land Office in the Department of the
Interior. On December 21, Senator Frank P. Flint of California re
defense of Glavis, Taft followed suit

forester. This

quested that the president transmit to Congress the information upon

which he had acted in exonerating Ballinger of the Glavis charges.
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same day Wesley L. Jones

of Washington read on the Senate
a letter from the secretary of the interior, in which Baltinger
"courted the widest and fullest inquiry by Congress." He requested
that the investigation include not only the General Land Office but the
Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Forestry as well. Norris
agreed with Ballinger on this point and said that he would 'do all in

the

floor

power to bring about a fair, honest, and searching investigation of
the matter. But he was not certain that such an inquiry was possible,
chiefly because the Speaker was not anxious to see too probing an

his

23

investigation.

After the Christmas recess Senator Jones offered a resolution pro
viding for an investigation of the Department of the Interior by a
joint

committee of twelve members, half of

whom were

to

be chosen

by the vice president and half by the Speaker. On January 7, 1910,
when the House of Representatives considered this proposition, Nor
called for a broad, inclusive investigation which would have "the
confidence and the faith of the American people." To bring this about,
he suggested that the committee "ought to be elected by the House of
ris

Representatives and not appointed by the Speaker." He then offered
an amendment "that the committee will be elected by the House of
Representatives from the members of that body." The combined votes
of the Democratic members and the Republican insurgents carried the
resolution and thereby insured a fuller and fairer hearing than other
wise would have been possible. At the same time Cannon was admin
istered a stinging and severe rebuff, his first in the battle against the
24

insurgents.

Cannon

suffered defeat because

one of

his staunchest lieutenants,

John Dalzell of Pennsylvania, made the mistake of yielding two min
utes of his allotted time to Norris, who had been unable to gain rec
had previously agreed
ognition from the chair. The Rules Committee
that the Senate resolution should be debated for six hours, three hours

on each side. Any member who spoke would have a right to make a
motion to amend, but all such motions would be voted on at the close
of the debate. At that time, Norris and twenty-five other insurgents
amendment with three
joined forces with the Democrats to carry the
votes to spare. More than thirty of Cannon's reliable Republicans were
absent. 25 Thus Cannon suffered his first defeat and undoubtedly real
ized that in Norris he had a foe whose understanding of parliamentary
incident it
procedure and maneuvering rivaled his own. From this
should have become evident to Cannon that he would have to main
tain eternal vigilance to prevent the insurgents from receiving another
opportunity to gain the upper hand.
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evoked a great consternation. Since the amendment
which the House could vote, it was decided
provided no method by
on the investigating committee. The
members
of
choice
the
to delay
the Democrats each held caucuses, while the
and
machine
Republican
were now well organized, met at the spacious resi
insurgents, who
Here
dence of Congressman William C. Lovering of Massachusetts.
committee.
the
of
decided to insist on naming at least one member
Norris' motion

they

The Democrats would name two and the regular Republicans the re
also decided that neither Payne nor
maining three members. They
be allowed to sit on this com
Dalzell, Cannon's chief aides, should
because
insist
mittee. They were able to
upon this arrangement only

the Democrats in their caucus accepted it, while Speaker Cannon
26
the issue and risk another rebuff.
undoubtedly did not want to force
Norris,
unanimously tendered the insurgent position on

though

the committee, refused on the ground that critics would say he intro
duced the amendment to promote his own advantage. He suggested
that Edmond H. Madison of Kansas be selected, and to this the group

the twelve-man committee was
agreed. With Madison's appointment
not evenly divided; administration supporters chosen by the vice presi
dent and the Republican caucus in the House of Representatives still
dominated it. But Madison's presence assured Glavis and Pinchot of
at least

one sympathetic

member who would

insist that their side

be

as a result of his amendment, Norris
given a full hearing. Therefore,
had.'*
was
real
claimed, "A
investigation
the investigation, the attorneys for Pinchot and Glavis,

During
at least able to
though unable to prove their clients' assertions, were
demonstrate that Ballinger had no enthusiasm for and little sympathy
with the cause of conservation. Louis D. Brandeis impeached the in
that crucial documents
tegrity of the administration by showing
offered as evidence against Glavis' charges had been predated. As a
result of these and other findings, the investigation, launched as a ges
ture to political expediency, proved to be a considerable burden to the
27
Republican party in the next presidential election.
Since Taft thought the charges leveled against his secretary of the
interior were unjust, and since he regarded Pinchot "as a good deal of
a radical and a good deal of a crank," 28 he was none too happy about

amendment. To

and the insurgents were committed
and would be incapable of coming to a just
verdict based on evidence if that evidence in any way threatened the
policies and the friends of the previous administration.
On the other hand, Norris and his fellow insurgents believed that
Taft had allied himself with the Republican old
guard and was underNorris*

Taft, Norris

to the cause of Pinchot
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mining the Roosevelt policies. Even worse, the president had sided
with the Speaker in this controversy and with the cause against which
the insurgents had been fighting. As a long-time, bitter foe of con
servation, Cannon, in the eyes of the insurgents, had now won the ad
ministration to his point of view. The president, the insurgents were
now convinced, would have to be regarded as a traitor to the Roosevelt
policies and another bulwark in the system of privilege they were at
tacking. Taft's treatment of the insurgents, too, reassured
they were correct in their evaluation.

On
letter

January

6,

1910, the

them

that

day Dolliver read the Senate Pinchot's

endorsing the Glavis position, Norris wrote the president:

There was published

in the

newpapers of January 5 an Asso

ciated Press dispatch to the effect that you had decided to deprive
the "Insurgents" in Congress of all executive patronage. The article

come direct from the White House and
inasmuch as it had remained unchallenged and undisputed I feel
warranted in assuming that it is true and has your approval. I am
referred to purported to

likewise led to this conclusion because the recent

recommenda

from "insurgent" Republican Congressmen have not received
the favorable consideration by the heads of Departments formerly

tions

accorded. 29

He

explained to the chief executive what the insurgent members of
the House were striving to do. He insisted that they had never made
any attempt to influence votes "upon any proposition other than the

and that they were loyal Republicans who be
good faith the pledges of the party. Moreover,
he claimed the insurgents had taken "no stand against the present ad
ministration" even though the president at the outset of his term of
30
office took a stand against them in their effort to change the rules.
The president, of course, had the legal right to deprive any member of
patronage if he so desired, but Norris thought that if a reason was
and justice'* demanded that
given for this action, "common fairness
the correct one be presented; namely, that the insurgents opposed the
rules, and not, as had been suggested, that they were unworthy mem
rules of the House/'

lieved in carrying out in

bers of the Republican party. 31
Previously, in December, 1909, as the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy
moved toward a climax with the convening of Congress, Taft decided
to use the
weapon against insurgent Republicans on the

patronage
grounds that they were doing everything to bring the Democratic
this position at the
party into power. The president apparently took
32
insistence of Cannon and other party leaders.
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Taft responded to Norris on January 10, 1910, the day he
he convinced Norris that
dropped Pinchot from government service,
for his
he was
against the rules. Taft claimed

When

fight
being punished
Norris* letter contained "such misstatements that I

must answer

it."

He

denied Noms* charge that he had made any statement to the press and
averred that he had taken no part in the fight over the House rules.

Then he presented a

his position:
forthright statement of

declined to do was to join those who differed from a
and stayed out of the caucus,
majority of the Republican Party
am
I
the
of
leader
as
when
dependent upon party actions
party
to secure the legislation that has been promised. It did not then

What

seem

to

I

me, as

it

does not

now seem

to

me, that as

titular leader

of the party I should take sides with fifteen or twenty who refused
to abide by the majority votes of the party, but that I should

by whatever the party decides under the majority rule,
my views as to the wisdom of the rules, which are
in the House itself. It has been
peculiarly a matter for settlement
a custom for a Republican administration to honor the recom
mendations of Republican Congressmen and Senators with re
stand

whatever

spect to local appointments, subject, however, to the condition
that the candidates recommended should be fit fqr the place. This

custom has grown up with a view to securing a party solidarity in
upon party questions. The only indication that I have given
has been that with respect to legislation which I have recom
mended, there should be party action to discharge the promise
acting

of the party platform, and that those who feel no obligation in
respect to it can not complain if their recommendations are not

given customary weight.

The

33

president, by refusing to accept Norris* thesis that the insur
were
gents
loyal Republicans who were only challenging the rules,
them
in the position of opposing the Republican party. This
placed
created a dilemma for the insurgents, but they were too far committed
to turn back or
stop in their fight against Cannonism. The BallingerPinchot controversy seemingly offered them a way out. They were
loyal Republicans, loyal to the policies and principles of Theodore
Roosevelt, while Taft, Cannon, and the old guard were destroying the
very things that had made Roosevelt and the party so popular with the
American people. Thus by 1910 the insurgency movement in the House
of Representatives had become part of the conflict between
progres
sive and standpat Republicans that was to tear the
party asunder.
Norris, however, refused to accept Taffs statement as final. He felt
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that the president, by stating in effect that he had taken no
Norris
fight over the rules of the House, had impeached his integrity.

part in the

only fair, since he first made the statement, that he should
present the evidence upon which it was based; namely, claims by in
in
surgents that Taft labored to convince them to support the Speaker
in
the
no
"If
his effort to adopt the old rules.
part
you were taking

thought

fight/'

it

Norris wrote, "then you were most woefully misrepresented

by

some of your closest advisors/' 34
all the measures wherein he had supported the
while
noting that the Speaker and his followers were op
president,
made
to
practically all of them. He claimed that Cannon had
posed
committee assignments so as to "prevent the enactment of many, if not

Norris then listed

all, of these measures." Thus Norris attempted to answer the charge
that the insurgents were not good Republicans and, by presenting evi
dence that they supported many more planks than did the followers of
Cannon, he implied that the insurgents had reason to complain that
their patronage recommendations were being ignored. He wisely con
cluded that he was in no way "piqued or grieved" that executive pa
it was returned or
tronage had been taken away from him. Whether
not he intended to do all in his power to help his party redeem in good

faith the pledges

it

had made

to the country. 35

he was a loyal Re
were violating party pledges, im
publican while administration men
Taft, unwilling to accept Norris' premise that

He

claimed that his only interference in the rules
was to try to effect a compromise by suggesting
fight in March, 1909,
to all congressmen who came to see him that majority rule must pre
vail if the legislative burdens assumed by the party in its platform were
to be enacted. To Norris and the other insurgents, this statement was
a validation of the charge that the president had used Ms power

mediately responded.

was withholding patronage from the
chose
to
because
ignore the obligations of the Repub
they
insurgents
lican platform. He wanted only to prevent them from placing oppo
nents of the administration in federal offices, thereby making it easier
for the Democratic party to reassert itself. However, as of the date of
this letter, January 11, 1910, Taft had withdrawn patronage from only
four insurgents: William Gary and Irvine Lenroot, both of Wisconsin,
Clarence B. Miller of Minnesota, and Norris. Soon others found that
against them. Taft implied that he

their

recommendations were ignored. 36

The insurgents, of course, had reason to be bitter and to complain
about their shabby treatment by the president. During the tariff fight,
when old guard Republicans saddled Taft with what in many respects
he considered an unsatisfactory arrangement, he never once threatened
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use the patronage weapon against them. 37 By exerting it against the
nor gained
insurgents, Taft neither strengthened the Republican party
Norris
as
his
of
out, the
since,
pointed
support
legislative program
to

him more support than the regular Re
on
most
issues.
publicans
Once news of Tart's action reached the home districts of the affected
insurgents were already giving

members, public sentiment, already critical of the administration, be
came even more hostile. The president's action, based on the premise
that the insurgents with their patronage were aiding the Democratic
part} helped only to widen the growing breach in the Republican
party and to convince the insurgents of Taffs betrayal of his prede
cessor's policies. It was a singular example of inept leadership which,
against his own inclinations, forced Taft into a firm alliance with the
7

,

old guard in the Republican party.
Thus, by January, 1910, the stage

and

historic battle that

was set for the notable, dramatic,
culminated the insurgency revolt against the

of the Speaker. Norris and his cohorts, deprived of their
pa
tronage and committee standing, ignored by their colleagues in the

power

House of Representatives, branded as disloyal Republicans and avowed
enemies of the administration, had everything to gain and nothing to
lose by finding a legislative lever to
open a wedge in the House rules.

mem

Norris, as a result of his resolution calling for the election of
bers to the Ballinger-Pinchot investigating committee, had
emerged as
the insurgent leader. 38 He had revealed himself as a skilful
parlia
mentarian, equal or almost equal in knowledge and ability to Cannon

himself. Though his position in
Congress and his life in Washington
were now unpleasant, he did not intend to deviate from his course
under any circumstances. Letters from constituents approved his stand
and helped convince him that popular support would continue even
if
patronage would not. A friend, sounding public sentiment, wrote:

Yesterday

I

was on the

Street,

and

I

sidled

up

to a

group of men,

who were talking about the Administration, and they agreed
among themselves that they expected Taft would quit the office,
as much a hated and
despised man as ever Grover Cleveland was.
I don't know how all this is
going to end. Something will have to
be done. People are not sticking by Party so
closely as they were a
few years ago, there is not nearly so much
politics as in former
years, people are wondering now, where they are at, and how they
are going to remedy the
wrong that has its grip on the country
Unless
the
today.
insurgent movement wins out, there will be a
Democratic President next time. Probably
people are not always
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men

to rule.
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takes

me

Oklahoma, Texas, and Kansas, and as a matter of fact
there don't seem to be any parties any more among the common
39
class, it is any thing now to clean up the machine.

in Missouri,

Another more succinctly stated, "The West is warm over the fight
you are having and satisfaction is expressed everywhere with the stand
you have taken." Both the Omaha Bee and the Nebraska State Journal
were giving space and attention to Norris, claiming along with other
papers that Taft was rapidly losing whatever popularity he had in the
West. McCarl was convinced that loss of patronage would make Nor
ris more
popular than ever with the voters in the Fifth Congressional
District and would improve his chances for the senatorial nomination.
McCarl felt that no "standpatter" would have a chance against Norris
in the 1910 primary, either congressional or senatorial, and that no
Democrat, not even Fred Ashton, would be eager to oppose him in the
election. 40

Thus Norris, heartened by public approval of his position, was con
vinced that the fight the insurgents were making was just and was
based on sound principle. He was more than ever determined to con
tinue it, regardless of the outcome. With patience and fortitude he
awaited an opportunity to drive a wedge into the procedural block
that Cannon and his chief lieutenants were utilizing to prevent the in
surgent Republicans and the Democrats from administering him an
other defeat similar to the one already experienced in the BallingerPinchot controversy. Norris hoped that it might come soon. If not, he
still be satisfied that he had
helped to sow the seeds that would
allow others to "reap an effective harvest for free and untrammelled
41
As it turned out, an opportunity was
representation in the House."

would

not long in forthcoming.

Chapter 18

Insurgency Revolt: Part

I

ON THE EVE of the conflict, the House of Representatives had 391
members. Each of these gentlemen was usually assigned a place on any
two of the fifty-six standing committees of the House by the Speaker,
who, at the same time, chose the chairman of each of these committees.
The Speaker also had the power to refer bills to committees where he
knew they would be reported as he desired. As chairman of the allpowerful, five-man Rules Committee, he could make anything in or out
of order at any time. In the Speaker's chair, Joseph G. Cannon usually
refused to recognize anyone unless the member first stated his purpose.

Consequently most members visited the Speaker's room beforehand
and requested recognition rather than undergo the embarrassment of
having their requests to speak denied and noted in the Congressional
Record*

Committee assignments, as Noms and the other insurgents well
knew, could make or break a member's reputation by placing him in
the foreground on important issues or by relegating him to an insig
nificant position in the congressional hierarchy. The
Speaker thus could
curb the ambition as well as the ability and usefulness of any member.

The insurgents, besides being demoted in their committee assignments,
knew that no bill they filed would be seriously considered and that
recognition from the Speaker would not be easily forthcoming. This
knowledge, of course, did not silence them. When the House resolved
itself into the Committee of the Whole for
of debate and

purposes

amendment,

all

members were granted some time

for

speechmaking or

1
questioning
they so desired.
The insurgents, as has already

if

been noted, had no desire to repeal
the strictly parliamentary rules of the House.
They realized that rules
were necessary in a large legislative body and were in accord with
most of them. Their desire was to make the
Speaker a presiding officer
with no extraneous powers. Under the
prevailing rules the Speaker was
all-powerful and was responsible, once duly chosen and installed, to no
one for the remainder of the Congress, while he had it within his

power
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promote or destroy the careers of members who met with his favor
As a journalist, referring to the insurgents' goal, put it:

or displeasure.

take the Speaker's purely political power: to ob
struct, impair or control legislation: to thwart the will of the
majority: to limit genuine debate: to pack important committees

They would

with the representatives of Big Business: to control the ambition,
ability,

and usefulness

of

make him the
and
what meas
enacted
be
may

members

sole political judge of what laws
ures shall be defeated. 2

of Congress: to

Until the opportunity to bring about this change presented itself,
the insurgents by themselves could do little in terms of introducing or
even improving bills. However, aided by the Democrats, they were able
to take advantage of any slips Cannon and his lieutenants made. And,
on their own, since they first organized in December, 1908, they ex
erted tremendous efforts to educate the public in the righteousness of
their cause. Their nuisance value was a growing source of embarrass
ment to both Cannon and the Taft administration and a boon to the
coalescing progressive cause.
Sentiment against the Speaker

and

his

power was growing through

out the country, especially in the Middle West. In February, 1909.
Success Magazine asked its subscribers, "Do you believe that the rules
of the House should place in the hands of the Speaker the power of
determining the membership of the Committees?" Within three weeks,
11,134 readers voted "No" and 364, "Yes." To the question, "Do you
believe that Joseph G. Cannon should be elected Speaker of the House
3 On
a
of Representatives?" 10,825 voted "No" and 539 voted "Yes."
state-wide basis, T. A. McNeal, a columnist for the Topeka Daily
results of a poll he had con
Capital, published in January, 1910, the
ducted among Kansas Republicans. To the question, "Are you opposed

to the rule of

Cannon

in the

House and Aldrich

4
81, "No."
able to
organizing, the insurgents were

in the Senate?" 1,579

answered "Yes" and

By

make themselves an

between twentymembership
though
them. After
rare
was
and
among
thirty
complete unanimity
of the Sixtieth Congress, Augustus
end
the
at
retirement
Hepburn's
Gardner of Massachusetts served as chairman of the group. John M.
Nelson of Wisconsin acted as secretary and his office was utilized as a
functioned as
meeting place. With Edmond H. Madison of Kansas they
5
the
a committee on strategy which ably directed
insurgent forces in
the first major conflict over the rules. However, by 1910, Norris had

effective group,
five

fluctuated

their

and

emerged

as the outstanding figure

among

the insurgents.
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As an indication
several articles in

of his rising prominence, Morris in 1910 published
Follettes Magazine explaining the insurgents'
and desires for the future. 6 His interviews

La

position, accomplishments,

and correspondence with members of the press increased substantially.
In his letters, he explained the insurgent position and occasionally at
tempted to correct misconceptions that appeared in articles. Letters in
the latter category were usually not for publication, while those in the
former were. In his correspondence with journalists, Morris revealed
more fully the workings of the House. He explained that there was not
"log rolling" in Congress as there was subservience to the
a rule they had
Speaker's will. Deals were made, Morris knew, but as
the approval of the Speaker, if, in fact, they did not originate with him.

much

as

Furthermore, he understood that reform usually came slowly and in
way of compromise, and that many who had been most active in a

the

7
might not be on the scene when victory was won. Actually, in
the case of the insurgents, most of them were on hand when victory
was achieved, and all of them must have known that it was, at best, a

fight

partial triumph.

Since the term "progressive" was coming into widespread use, Mor
effort early in 1910 to distinguish between an
insurgent
and a progressive as they affected politics. The insurgency movement,

ris

made some

he claimed, arose in the House when some Republicans demanded a
change in the rules; its primary aim was to change these rules and to
curb the Speaker's power. Progressives, on the other hand, sought more
widespread reform; they wanted to curb not only machine rule in the
political arena, but corporation control in the social and economic
realm as well. While many of the insurgents were progressives as far
as other reforms were concerned, some were
standpatters on all but
the rules issue. There was no attempt to
organize Republican dissi
dents "along any line except that of
taking away from the Speaker
some of his extraordinary power." Morris summarized the insurgent
position as follows:

We

want the House to have an opportunity for itself to pass on
the questions and we therefore desire to take
away from the
Speaker the power given to him by the Rules of the House which
prevent the House from participating in legislative action.
want the House to be representative of the people and each individ
ual member to have his ideas
presented and passed on, and at the
8
same time to be required to assume his share of the
responsibility.

We

To

his constituents, Morris
explained that

he was not discouraged,
though he was convinced that Taft would be unable to carry out the
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Roosevelt policies. Indeed, Norris believed that the
president had allied
himself with Speaker Cannon and Senator Aldrich
against these pol
icies. Yet despite
overwhelming opposition, he knew that the insurgents

had been making "some impression on the machine." Referring to the
power of the Speaker, Norris, in mid-January, 1910, said, "It is going
to pieces, there is no doubt about that/' But he envisioned
in the next Congress as a result of the 1910 elections. 9

its

collapse

Throughout February Norris and the insurgents busied themselves
with legislative matters. Then in March the insurgents, allied with the
Democratic members, found an opportunity to inflict a petty personal
humiliation on the Speaker; they amended an
appropriation bill to
both
the
and
the
vice
of
a fifteen-thousanddeprive
Speaker
president
dollar allowance for automobiles. 10 However,
appropriations had noth
with
to
the
do
matter
that
soon
thereafter
ing
provided an entering

wedge and
cently

precipitated a revolution in the House.
enough with a discussion of the census.

It

started inno

Democratic Congressman Adolph J. Sabath of Illinois, a member
Committee on the Census, introduced a resolution, not fifty
words in length, providing that in the approaching census enumerators
ascertain the mother tongue of all persons born abroad,
thereby pro
viding more adequate information about the languages and the national
origins of the American people. On the next day, Wednesday, March
16, Speaker Cannon recognized Edgar D. Crurnpacker of Indiana,
chairman of the Committee on the Census, for the purpose of present
ing this minor resolution as an amendment to the census bill. While
there was no opposition to the amendment, Crumpacker's proposal
brought forth a storm of criticism because it violated the sanctity of
Calendar Wednesday which Cannon had conceded to the insurgents
a year before in the first major battle over the rules. Many members
of the

the introduction of the Sabath resolution at this time created
a dangerous precedent and impaired the value of the one day when
members did not have to seek the Speaker's permission to gain recog
felt that

nition.

Democratic Representative John

J.

Fitzgerald of

New

York,

who

had suggested Calendar Wednesday to Cannon as a compromise
measure in the 1909 fracas, was vigorous in his protest and raised a
point of order. Cannon, after listening to the debate in which, inci
dentally, the insurgents rarely participated, ruled that the census

amendment was
House,

stitution." It
I,

in order

"under a higher law than the rule of the

matter, higher than a statutory law under the Con
a privileged question under the Constitution (Article

or, for that

was

Section 2) and as such claimed precedence over

all

House proce-
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The Speaker's decision, however, was reversed by the
11
a rare occurrence in the House by a vote of 163 to 112.

dures.

members

Crampacker, like Cannon, thought the resolution was privileged.
Somewhat piqued 12 over the refusal of the House to consider it on
Calendar Wednesday, he reintroduced it the next day, St. Patrick's
Day, March 17, 1910. When a point of order was again made, Speaker

Cannon, rather than
question to the

suffer another humiliation,

members

for decision.

shrewdly referred the
of 201 to

The House, by a vote

overwhelmingly decided that the resolution was privileged and in
order, indicating that it was less concerned with the constitutional
question than with the desire to preserve the integrity of Calendar
Wednesday. Incidentally, Norris and other insurgents voted against

72,

amendment presented a question

the proposition that the census

of

13
high constitutional privilege.

Before the vote was taken, Norris engaged in a discussion with

M arlin E. Olmsted of Pennsylvania in which Norris inquired if a com

mittee report was necessary for a constitutionally privileged motion.
He asked asked whether any member could come in with a bill that

had not even been printed and take up the time of the House on the
ground that it was a matter privileged by the Constitution. Olmsted,
a Cannon supporter, adroitly parried Norris*
probing by implying that
14
the Speaker, and not a mere member, could answer such
questions.
Here then was the opportunity the insurgents had been
awaiting,
though it is doubtful if any but Norris realized it at the time.
Once the vote was taken which declared the amendment
privileged,
the House proceeded to
adopt the amendment. Norris thereupon
sought the floor, stating, "Mr. Speaker, I have a privileged resolution."
At about three o'clock in the afternoon on his third effort to
gain the
Speaker's attention, he

MR. NORMS:

THE SPEAKER:

was recognized. The revolution was under way:

Mr. Speaker,

I

present a resolution

by the

Constitution.

If it is

a resolution

tution, the

made

made

privileged

gentleman will present

it.

privileged

by the Consti
15

Amid general laughter, Norris pulled from his
pocket a creased
and crumbled piece of paper which he sent to the desk for the clerk to
read. The smiling, deferential
grin on the Speaker's face quickly gave

way

to a look of

grim determination as the clerk read the resolution,
one Norris had presented in the Sixtieth
Congress (May
called for a Committee on Rules
consisting of fifteen mem

similar to the
16,

1908)

.

It

bers, geographically distributed, nine of

whom

should be members of
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the majority party. The Speaker could not be eligible for membership
on the committee which would choose its own chairman.

Cannon's chief lieutenant, John Dalzell, immediately made the point
that this resolution was not in order, that it was not privileged. Norris,
citing the census amendment, insisted his resolution was privileged
under the Constitution and thereby entitled to consideration. Article
the Constitution wherein it is stated that "each House
I, Section 5 o

determine the rules of its proceedings" provided the basis for the
claim that the resolution was privileged. He said the Constitution
granted him a right to introduce this resolution, that under the recent

may

decision of the

House on the census amendment

Norris crystallized his position

when he

it

must be

in order. 16

said:

When the House went on record that the census proposition was
it was not in accordance with my individual view. I did

in order,

as a logical
it was
privileged. But this must follow,
seems to me, in that case that the privileged nature of the
resolution did not depend on its being reported by a committee

not believe
result, it

by a committee, but it was privileged, if privileged
because
the Constitution made it so.
all,
No committee consideration, no committee report, would add
or take away from its privileged nature. I am not responsible for
in which the House has placed itself; but to be con
the

or considered
at

position

sistent, it

seems to

me

this resolution

would have

to

be held priv

11
ileged the same as the others.

Cannon, having been overruled the previous day by insurgent and
Democratic votes, fully understood his precarious position. Ninetynine members had not answered when the roll was recorded shortly af
ter noon, and the Speaker realized that the absent regular Republican
members would have to be present to vote on any ruling if he were
if the entire membership of the House
were on hand, Cannon knew that the insurgent Republicans and their
Democratic allies could probably defeat him. The only chance he had
and it was a long one was to delay making a decision until absent
return and he could seek ample
Republican members could be urged to

not to suffer further defeat. Yet,

the census decision, that Norris' res
precedents for deciding, despite
olution was not in order.

and

settled down to a long period of discussion
of the House,
the
of
In
one
debate.
very rare instances in the history
to say and took as long as he
wanted
he
what
said
member
every
wanted in saying it. The debate on the merits of the question before

Thus the House
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the House was presumably for the
him with information necessary for

benefit of the Speaker, to provide

But Cannon was rarely
the insurgents refused
and
in the Speaker's chair. Since the Democrats
the
to countenance any adjournment until
Speaker made a ruling, and
since there was no power to compel him to rule, the group supporting
the Norris resolution prepared to spend the night in session and to
maintain their forces on the floor to prevent any sudden recess for lack
of a quorum. Norris personally had no objection to an adjournment,
though he went along with the members who wanted the Speaker to

make a

his ruling.

18

ruling beforehand.
Partners to both sides of this controversy stated their positions in
speeches of varying ability and eloquence. Norris, having had his say
at the outset, said little. Frequently the House chamber reverberated

with applause and cheers or cries of "Rule, Rule," as the members,
realizing it would be many hours before a ruling was forthcoming,
gave vent to their partisanship while the Speaker, the central figure in
the debate, could in effect do

little

more boisterous members. One

of the

when Henry

to exercise authority

more dramatic

Allen Cooper of Wisconsin called

and curb the

incidents occurred

upon a number of

in

surgent Republicans to testify to the punishment they had received in
the way of unfavorable committee appointments.
Speaker Cannon had
been out of the chamber at the outset of Cooper's speech. Upon his
return he stood on the lower
steps of the Speaker's platform, resting
his arm upon the clerk's desk. From this
vantage point, raised slightly
above the crowd of members who were milling in front of him, he
19
glared down into the face of the "insurging" Cooper.
had
mentioned
the
case
of
Cooper
just
Augustus Gardner of Mas

He shouted that Gardner had voted for the present Speaker,
but because Gardner had voted against the rules he was
from

sachusetts.

deposed
chairman of the Committee on Industrial Arts and
Exposi
tions. Suddenly the
Speaker sprang into action and interrupted Cooper.
He asked Gardner to come forth and explain why he did not retain
his
chairmanship. Gardner, called to the floor from an adjoining lobby,
came forth and explained, while Cannon smiled, that he had retired
voluntarily because he wanted to be free to speak and act as he pleased
on insurgent matters.
his place as

However, Cannon did not have much time to enjoy this victory be
cause Cooper then called upon Charles W. Fowler of New
Jersey,
Victor Murdock of Kansas, and Norris, each of whom related to the
House how they were punished for opposing the autocratic rule of the
Speaker and his organization. As Cooper called each of these gentle
men, they were pushed through the crowd up to the open space before
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the dais to speak, while Cannon, leaning against the clerk's desk, "rigid
in every line of his body," turned occasionally to Vice-President Sher

man who,
House.

along with

many

senators,

had appeared on the

floor of the

20

Once Cooper had concluded his remarks, Cannon resumed the
Speaker's chair and explained he would rule on the point of order only
after due consideration of precedents. After the House again refused
Democrats amid great excitement continually
shouted, "Rule, Rule." But Cannon, once the shouting started, merely
smiled, kissed the tips of his fingers towards the Democrats, bowed

to adjourn or recess, the

politely,

and then recognized

J.

Warren Keifer

of

Ohio who spoke

at

length in support of the Speaker, despite much disorder and many in
terruptions \vhich now characterized these proceedings more and

more. 21

As evening turned to night and night to dawn, Cannon still refused
a ruling on the Norris resolution. The wordy battle raged on,
but fewer members appeared on the floor to participate. The Speaker
sought a few hours' sleep in his office, while other members did the
same at their desks, in their offices, or in the adjoining lobbies. There
were so few members on the floor during the exhausting night session
that the sergeant-at-arms and several deputies were ordered to seek
members absent without leave and bring them before the bar of the
to

make

House.
Continually the Democrats and the small insurgent group voted
efforts by Republican mem
against any recess or adjournment despite
bers to achieve one or the other. 22 Indeed, at times in the early morning

hours of March

18, the

House

of Representatives did not appear to
Record indicates:

be

in session, as the following entry in the

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE: The House

men

will

be in

order. Gentle

will understand the impropriety of singing on the floor, even
the House is not at this moment transacting aoy business.

though

The House

is

not in recess.

CHORUS: "There'll be a hot time in the old town tonight."
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE: That was last night, not tonight,
(laughter).

The House

will

be

in order. 23

In a more serious vein, Norris at 5:20 A.M. proposed an adjourn
ment until noon. He felt that the group, having exemplified its princi
itself out needlessly. Ollie M. James, a Kentucky
ple, was now wearing

Democrat, replied that "for the people's rule of the Congress of the
United States" he was willing to lose a night's sleep. He protested
to personal comfort which would tend to deagainst any concession
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from the impressiveness of the object lesson they were giving the
24
American people of devotion to the public business.
At 6 A.M. Speaker Cannon returned to the House chamber. He
the least bit husky, and
appeared slightly worried. His voice was not
the early morning hours were spent discussing whether less than a
quorum had the power to issue warrants empowering the sergeant-atarms and his deputies to bring in absent members. During this dis
cussion some members snoozed in their seats; some read the morning
tract

in small groups. Though nothing of conse
papers; others gathered
the
occurred
morning hours on the floor, the official re
during
quence
since noon the previous day noted
porters who had been at their posts
that thus far they had taken down 146,000 words, more than three
25

times the daily average.
Throughout the proceedings on

March

17, the galleries

were

filled

with an appreciative audience that overflowed into the corridors.
During the evening the entrance to the House was flanked by auto
mobiles.

While the audience had thinned out

in the early

morning

hours of March 18, galleries once again reached capacity long before
mid-morning. Men and women prominent in the life of the nation's
capital as well as

members

of the families of the participants

below

were on hand.26
Meanwhile, behind the scenes, three distinct compromise efforts
were made by the regular Republicans, and all were humiliatingly
rejected by the insurgent Republicans and Democrats. The first con

The proposition submitted by the
ten-man Rules Committee, consisting of
six Republicans and four Democrats.
Nothing was said about keeping
the Speaker off the committee, though the regulars said they were
willing to make a gentleman's agreement that the Speaker would not
seek membership. The conference came to nought. The radical insur
gents insisted that the Speaker specifically be excluded from the com
mittee, though their more moderate colleagues were willing to accept
a compromise which would have
postponed the operation of the elim
ination provision until after Cannon's tenure as
Speaker had expired.
The only point to which all factions agreed at this first conference was
that the committee should consist of ten men. 27
ference

Cannon

was held

in Gardner's office.

delegates called for a

No

sooner had the delegates filed into the House chamber than the
regulars requested another conference. This time they suggested a
fifteen-man Rules Committee, but
again said nothing about the Speak
er's
membership. This conference, like the first, failed to reach

any

understanding and for the same reason. The insurgents and the

Demo-
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crats were in accord that the Speaker must be removed from the
Committee on Rules. 28
It now appeared that further negotiation was futile. Norris asserted
that a majority of between ten and fifteen votes would carry his ruling.
**We will beat them. There is no doubt of the result unless there is some
legerdemain." This prediction was endorsed by Champ Clark, the
Democratic leader. Roth men felt, indeed all participants and observers
knew, that Cannon would soon be compelled to face the issue he had
been dodging for almost twenty-four hours in the vain hope that
29
enough votes could be mustered to save him from humiliating defeat.
When the Speaker ascended to his desk just before noon he was

greeted with jeering cries of "Rule, Rule, Rule." Cannon smiled grimly
Democratic tormentors and announced that he would be pre
pared to rule in the near future. The delay in ruling was due to a
at his

desperate effort by Cannon's lieutenants to secure some sort of

com

promise. The Speaker's position was becoming even more precarious,
not only because the Democrats and insurgent Republicans were hold

ing their ground, but because many Republicans representing close
districts, particularly in the West, were flooded with telegrams demand
ing that they vote against Cannon for a liberalization of the rules. This

knowledge and the

realization that several of his supporters

Cannon

would be

seek a
compelled
30
compromise.
Thus, sometime before noon, the regulars sought another confer
ence, their final effort at compromise. This time they announced their
willingness to accept the Norris resolution, provided the sentence ex
cluding the Speaker from membership on the committee be removed.
This of course was not acceptable to Norris, Gardner, Irvine Lenroot
to break ranks

undoubtedly forced

to

and E. A. Hayes of California, the insurgent delegates.
conference was in session, on the floor of the House of
for a recess
Representatives, W. E. Martin of South Dakota moved
until 4 P.M. Champ Clark demanded a roll call and the conference
came to an abrupt end as the participants returned to the floor to vote.
On this vote the regulars defeated the insurgent and Democratic co
of Wisconsin,

While

this

alition

by a vote

at the

end of which time

and the House recessed for two hours,
was hoped the Speaker would make his

of 160 to 152,
it

31

ruling.

As soon as the recess was announced, the Democrats went into
caucus and reiterated their decision to oust the Speaker from the Com
mittee on Rules, though they decided to modify the structure of the
committee from that proposed in the Norris resolution. They consulted
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with Congressmen Dalzell, Walter I. Smith of Iowa, and John W.
Dwight of New York, all prominent Cannon aides, as to possible con
cessions to which the Speaker might agree. The aides, however, refused
to give any information as to the Speaker's intentions. 32
Norris, interviewed at the start of the two-hour recess, said the

lay in proceeding had no significance.
his unshaven face was lined and pale.

de

He

appeared worn and haggard,
Yet his voice was clear and calm

and exuded confidence as he said, "If the regulars will consent to take
the Speaker off the Committee on Rules we will settle this matter in
short order after the recess." Both sides, he added, were already in
agreement upon an enlarged committee. However, during the recess
as during the earlier efforts at compromise, no side was
willing to
on
its
on
the
in
relation
to
the
commit
yield
position
Speaker's place
tee; compromise was impossible on this point. The insurgents at a
caucus during the recess reaffirmed their position. All groups realized
that the outcome would be decided on the floor. 33

When
ready to

the

rale.

House reconvened at 4 P.M., the Speaker said he was
James A. Tawney of Minnesota offered a motion to post

pone the business before the House until the next day, March 19. After
brief discussion the motion was carried 163-151 with the
insurgentDemocratic coalition again in the minority. 34 After twenty-six hours in
continuous session, everyone concerned looked forward to the
oppor
tunity for a night's sleep and a chance to freshen up before the final
ordeal on the morrow.

On

March

House of Representatives met at noon
members on hand and the galleries filled
to capacity. As
Speaker Cannon entered the chamber and ascended to
the dais, a great burst of
applause and cheers arose from the Repub
Saturday,

with more than 350 of

19,

its

the

391

and from the galleries. Cannon, with an air of
deep concern, gazed about the chamber and brought down his gavel
with a loud bang that reverberated
througout the room. Reverend
its conclusion, con
Henry N. Conden offered a brief
lican side of the aisle

prayer. Upon
versation began again,
though most members remained in their seats
as the clerk read the
Journal of the previous day's proceedings. As the
session started,
people lined the corridors and stairways, in hope of
35
witnessing the conclusion of this historic
struggle.

Cannon announced

his readiness to rule

on the point of order,

after the clerk
again read the Norris resolution. The Speaker read his
ruling in a deliberate voice that could be heard distinctly by every
one.
Cannon proclaimed the point of order
the Norris

When

against

was tremendous applause which soon
gave way to
on
the Republican side.
table-pounding
Insurgent Republicans and
resolution, there
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Democrats remained silent. Every seat in the press gallery was oc
cupied, while on the floor below senators were sitting or standing in
the rear. 36
Before order was fully restored, Norris was on his feet shouting,
"Mr. Speaker, I appeal from the decision; and on that I move the
previous question." Dalzell immediately followed with a move to lay
the appeal on the table. This was rejected by a vote of 182 to 164,

whereupon Norris again moved the previous question on the appeal.
His motion prevailed by a vote of 183 to 160. The House was now
ready to decide on the Speaker's ruling. The decision on this crucial
question was another defeat for Cannon by a 182-162 vote. The Norris
resolution (H.R. 502) \vas now pending before the House.
During these roll calls confusion reigned. A motion to adjourn

was

When

the

shouted

down

results of

so vigorously that

each vote were

no

roll call

was

taken.

made known

the opponents of the rules
shouted and pounded. As the shouts over the defeat of DalzelFs at
tempt to table Norris' appeal pervaded the chamber, Cannon stood

motionless in his place. His set features

American

flag

behind his

ing, stamping, pounding,

chair.

With

his

w ere
r

silhouetted against the

opponents before him shout

and applauding, Cannon presented a picture

of a doughty old warrior, magnificent in defeat. 37
During these roll calls Clark was busily preparing an

amendment

incorporating the suggestions of the Democratic caucus of the previous
day. At the same time Gardner and Norris consulted with each other.

soon became known that the insurgents and Democrats had agreed
an amendment to the Norris resolution. It would provide for a tenman Rules Committee consisting of six Republicans and four Demo
crats, with representatives of each party selected by caucuses and
elected by the House. In addition, the insurgents agreed to participate
in the Republican caucus and abide by its results as to the choice of
members. 38 Though many insurgents were unhappy about this amend
ment, they had no alternative but to accept it if their fight were to
It

to

this time.

accomplish anything at

pending before the House, Norris sought an
the
time for debate. Suggestions and counteragreement dividing
the
course that should be followed and the
to
suggestions relating

With

his resolution

parliamentary status that would apply to the consideration of the
resolution added to the confusion. Unable to reach any agreement and

with the Speaker requesting "regular order," Norris announced that
while he preferred his original resolution many of his associates fa
vored a substitute measure. Therefore he sent to the clerk's desk the
following

amendment

as a substitute for his original resolution:
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be a Committee on Rules, elected by the House,
10
Members, 6 of whom shall be Members of the
consisting of
4 of whom shall be Members of the minority
and
majority party
shall not be a member of the committee, and
The
There

shall

Speaker

party.

the committee shall elect

its

own chairman from

its

own mem

bers.

Resolved further, That within ten days after the adoption of
be an election of this committee and
the present Committee on Rules
immediately upon its election

this resolution there shall

shall

be

dissolved. 39

Mann of Illinois attempted to get Norris off
Representative James
the floor on the ground that his right to that privilege had expired,
but the Speaker affirmed Noms' right to hold the floor and suggested
that his resolution was in order. Norris held the floor for about an
as desired
hour, yielding to such members, including a few regulars,
to

be placed on record.

Clark requested the floor and amid a storm of applause
the Honorable Joseph
proclaimed that this was not "a fight against
but against a system. Clark was followed
G. Cannon

Champ

personally,"

and Victor
by several other speakers including Lenroot, Gronna,
Murdock. In concluding the debate Norris forcefully disavowed any
the revision of the rules, stating that
personal feeling in his efforts for
"those of us who favor this rule represent a principle here far beyond
the personality of any man or any set of men." He denied the charge
that the insurgents were anti-Republican, concluding, amidst derisive
from every fireside,
laughter and applause, that "from every hamlet,
and from every farm of Republican constituents today there are going
to change the rules of the
up prayers and hopes that this resolution
7
40
House will be successful here today/
The amendment was approved by a vote of 193 to 153, and the
insurgent revolution was then doubly consummated by the passage of
the Norris resolution as

amended by

a vote of 191 to 156.

During these

the Speaker stood in his place, gavel in hand, presenting a
countenance that gave no indication of his feelings. He was under
roll calls

the constant scrutiny of

people on the

floor

two thousand

visitors as

well as of

all

below. Earlier he chatted with a clerk and

the

was

seen laughing heartily. After the results were announced, Norris moved
to reconsider the vote by which his resolution was adopted and to lay
that motion
substitute

Without objection, it was so ordered; the
41
prevailed as the adopted resolution.
Norris was concerned, the insurgency revolt should

on the

table.

amendment now

Here, as far as
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have ended. The Speaker had been removed from the Committee on
Rules. While this was not all Norris desired, a break in the Speaker's
power had been made and further reforms at the convening of the
next session of Congress would certainly be easier to obtain. Therefore
Norris, upon the acceptance of his amendment, moved to adjourn. But
this revolution in the

procedures of the House, like

all revolutions,
as far as its original movers desired. It soon
a fight for principle it degenerated to a squab

would not proceed merely

got out of hand. From
ble over personalities, presenting dramatic scenes which made those of
the previous days pale by comparison. Norris, the more moderate in
surgents and Democrats, would be swept aside as the extreme radicals
among them gave vent to their passions, with some encouragement

from die Speaker.

Chapter 19

Part
Insurgency Revolt:

II

IN THE CONFUSION that followed Norris* motion to adjourn, Cannon
he said, as if asking a favor,
spoke in a calm voice. "The Speaker,"
"asks the indulgence of the House for not exceeding three minutes to
make a statement." Norris announced his willingness to withhold the
motion and the chamber became silent. Cannon then began a speech

was one of the most remarkable and dramatic, if not the most
House. He reiterated his belief
impetuous, ever delivered before the
in party rule and announced that his party, despite the fact that the
in the House,
country believed it had a majority of forty-four members
was no longer in control. The Democratic minority, aided by "the
that

efforts

of the so-called insurgents," was now in the majority. The
he was not in harmony with the actual majority was evidenced

fact that

by the vote

Two
the

new

poses.

to create a

new Committee on Rules.

courses were open for Cannon. One was to resign and permit
majority to choose a Speaker in accord with its aims and pur

The

other was to allow "the combination" to declare the office

new Speaker, Cannon did not choose to follow the
course because he did not want to endanger the passage of legis

vacant and elect a
first

redeem Republican pledges and fulfill Republican
promises."
important, however, was the fact that he regarded a
"a
as
confession of weakness or mistake or an apology for
resignation
he believed he had construed the rules as he
actions."
Since
past
found them and as they had been construed "by previous Speakers
from Thomas B. Reed's incumbency down to the present time," he
therefore saw no need or reason to resign.
Then Cannon threw down the gauntlet to the opposition and an
nounced that since there was "no coherent Republican majority in the
House of Representatives, therefore, the real majority ought to have
the courage of its convictions and logically meet the situation that
confronts it." Reaffirming his belief in party rule, he announced Ms
willingness, as a matter of the highest privilege under the Constitulation necessary "to

More
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a motion to vacate his office and elect a

in accord with the wishes of the "Democratic

who, by the

What

II

last vote,
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new Speaker

and insurgent Members

evidently constitute a majority of this House."

occurred next was described in the Congressional Record as

"loud and long-continued" applause on the Republican side; great con
fusion in the Hall/* 1
Amid the demonstration, J.
Sherley of Kentucky hurried to

Swager

converse with Oscar

W. Underwood

of

Alabama, while Albert

S.

Burleson of Texas arose waving a piece of paper and demanding recog
nition. Rushing to the Speaker's desk, Sherley shouted for adjourn
ment. Burleson shouted that his resolution should be read and Imme

and the Speaker called
diately voted upon. Other members shouted
for order. He said there were matters that could take precedence over
a motion to adjourn and requested that the Burleson resolution be
read. This resolution, accepting Cannon's challenge, provided simply
"that the office of Speaker of the House of Representatives is hereby

declared to be vacant, and the House of Representatives shall at once
2
proceed to the election of a Speaker."
Up to this point Norris had remained quietly in his place at the
rear of the chamber. Now he rose, proceeded to the open space before
the Speaker's chair, and doggedly refused to give way to the Demo

and insurgent Republicans who came forth to offer advice. He
it was only out of courtesy to the Speaker that he had with
held his motion to adjourn which should now be the business of the
House. Cannon acknowledged the validity of Norris' remarks and
called for a voice vote on the motion to adjourn. The "ayes" and
"noes" of the members all registered at the same time and only in
creased the tumult, but Cannon decided the "noes" had it and that the
crats

insisted

House had refused

3

to adjourn.
Norris refused to

be downed so easily. Claiming that he
However,
had never heard the announcement on the vote owing to the con
Cannon requested
fusion, he demanded a roll call vote, whereupon
that all in favor of such a vote rise and be counted. Only fourteen
members, including Norris, stood. Thus the House declined to adjourn.
The insurgent Republicans were now caught between rapidly
lines. The Republicans were determined to vindicate
solidifying party
the
while
Democrats, with misgivings on the part of some,
Cannon,
resolution to remove the Speaker. Under
Burleson
the
rallied behind
ranks split asunder. The more
the
these circumstances,
insurgent

moderate among them, following Norris, continued to Insist their bat
the Repubtle was against the rules per se and not against Cannon,
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the other hand, nine in
program. On
four from Wisconsin and two from Minnesota,
surgents, including
4
in the effort to depose Cannon.
joined with the Democrats
chair
to Sereno
the
Before the crucial vote, Cannon surrendered

lican party, or

its

legislative

side. He nodded and
Payne amid loud applause on the Republican
to await the result
office
his
smiled to his colleagues as he went to
with insurgent
During this interlude Norris was busily conferring
vote
to
some
against the
members, requesting and even. begging

Burleson resolution. All but nine of the insurgents cast their votes
For the first time throughout the conflict most
against the resolution.
in unison with their Republican colleagues.
voted
of the insurgents
resolution was an
vote
When the 192-155
against the Rurleson
and
arose
the
all
almost
yelled themselves
nounced,
Republicans
hoarse. Some wept. Payne, after surrendering the chair to Speaker
Cannon amid a scene of wild enthusiasm, moved to adjourn and at
5:30 P.M., March 19, the House officially adjourned. Most Republicans,
however, remained in the chamber to serenade the Speaker with the
fellow." As they sang, Speaker Cannon
jolly good
the
dais. Nodding and smiling, he held a recep
stepped
of his loyal sup
tion, shaking hands and receiving the good wishes
strains of

"For he's a

down from

5

porters.

As a

result of the revolution of

March

19, 1910, Norris

became a

His name was intimately connected
figure of national prominence.
with the proceedings in the House, his picture appeared in newspa

views were sought by reporters.
pers throughout the country, and his
In the public mind he was the personification of the insurgency move

ment The

press,

which had been instrumental

in

supporting the

David who
insurgent cause, now presented Norris as the insurgent
slew the tyrannical Goliath known as Cannon. As one editorial put
it:

Mr. Norris has been the real parliamentary leader at almost
every crisis when the insurgents have won a point or gained a
real victory. He has proved himself able, from the outside of the
citadel, to discover weaknesses in the entrenchments of the or
ganization, which the organization itself did not suspect. In the
present fight a fight, by the way, which was opened exactly one
year from the date when Cannon and Tammanyism won their
disastrous victory of March, 1909 he has again proved his title of
the Rupert of insurgency. 6

Interviewed after Congress adjourned, Norris claimed "a great
and the people." It would now be possible

victory for the insurgents
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for the majority of the House to "work its will" on matters
affecting
the nation's business. He still thought, however, that his
original resolu
7
tion "was far superior to the one which was
adopted by the House."

He

Cannon represented a great
victory for democratic control of the House, "it did not place the
power where it would be exercised in the most practical and demo
realized that while the overthrow of

cratic

way." Chairmen and members of standing committees, instead
by the Speaker, would be chosen in party caucus

of being chosen

where the Speaker
little

and the insurgents
was aware then and later that compromise
achieve partial reform which would make further
still

exercised a powerful voice

or none. But Norris

was necessary

to

8
progress easier.

Speaking for the insurgents, Norris said they did not expect con
when the Republican caucus met within the prescribed
ten-day period to select members of the new Rules Committee, The
insurgents did not intend to ask for representation on the committee
nor would they take action to modify the rules any further at this ses
sideration

sion.

He

claimed, however, that at the beginning of the next Congress
fight to deprive the Speaker of the power to ap

they would make a

9
point standing committees.
When the new Committee on Rules was presented on

March 25,
was accepted unanimously. Not an insurgent Republican or an in
dependent Democrat appeared on the roster of its members; all were
appointed in party caucus, and with the exception of Cannon all former
members of the five-man committee were on the new ten-man com
it

mittee. 10

On

the surface

it
appeared
were
the Speaker
merely doubled

as if a
in

size

committee controlled by
and controlled by the

Speaker's closest political friends with John Dalzell acting as chair
man. However, a revolution had occurred; a spirit of independence
had been manifested in the House and a minority of members had
dealt a severe blow at the source of the Speaker's tremendous power.
This new spirit was displayed throughout the remainder of the Sixtyfirst Congress though no further radical departures from established
procedure were made. While most of the insurgents quickly entered
the progressive camp, others, like Hamilton Fish of New York, Butler
Ames and A. P. Gardner of Massachusetts, and Andrew J. Volstead of

Minnesota, returned to the regular Republican ranks. With the revolu
tion against the rules thus consummated, the members returned to
consider more mundane matters.
Six weeks after the event, Norris tried to evaluate its meaning:
"There is a freedom of action that has never existed before since I
have been a Member of Congress/' While the upheaval was far from
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a complete victory over the machine, it allowed for more independ
Norris
ence of action than anything that had occurred for many years.
not
was
committee
new
the
of
satisfactory,
the
that
admitted
personnel
a small handful of insurgents in a party caucus
but, he
explained,

could not control committee membership.
To the charge that the reorganized Committee on Rules was still
that it was not a matter
in effect controlled
Cannon, Norris
replied

by

of

much consequence

to practical legislation.

He

insisted the

commit

action
tee would not dare to present any rule that curtailed individual
"The
day of
or gave the machine control over particular legislation.
the
and
Speaker
such domination," he claimed, "is absolutely over,
with all of his power, is not able to push such a rule through the
he observed, his function should be similar to that of
Housed
Ideally,

the policeman' on the corner: "There
n
robbed, so long as he is there."

The

rules fight

added

is

no danger of the store being

to Norris' strain

and

tension.

He was worn

be on hand while the House
out, but could not rest because he had to
considered important railroad legislation. By May he was so exhausted
12
He be
that he contemplated going to a sanitarium to recuperate.
came depressed, regarding himself as something of a failure, at least
he had been unable to provide adequately
financially, and feeling that
for his family. He found his existence lonely, and because of his

He

disliked life in

Washington
and would have welcomed a chance to leave. But he had no intention
of quitting under pressure, of "showing the white feather." If the
Nebraska voters chose to retire him, he would not regret their deci
sion; nevertheless, he intended to seek their approval in the coming

precarious party position, unpleasant.

election. 13

Though

was anticlimactic, Norris soon took a
and claimed that the new situation
As an illustration of the more relaxed

the rest of the session

keen interest

in legislative matters

resulted in improved legislation.
Norris obtained the
atmosphere, less than a week after the revolution

and humorously twitted colleagues who refused to follow a com
recommendation on a bill before the House. The members
ex
his
bantering remarks and when his time expired, it was
enjoyed
tended by unanimous consent for five minutes. He reproached the
the committee for their in
regular Republicans who refused to follow
surgency. He appealed "to these young men/' saying amid laughter
and applause, "For God's sake, boys, get back on the reservation be
14
fore it is everlastingly and eternally too late."
Given this new spirit, Norris hoped a bill providing for publicity of
floor

mittee's

campaign expenses might merit

serious consideration. This matter

had
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long interested him and had become urgent during the 1908 cam
paign when his opponents unscrupulously spent large amounts of
money. In the previous Congress in April, 1908, Norris had prepared
a report to accompany the first bill ever reported on this subject. The
bill, proposed by Samuel W. McCall, a conservative Republican from
Massachusetts, was referred to the Committee on Elections of Presi
dent, Vice President, and Members of Congress which held extensive
hearings. Roosevelt, Taft, Bryan, and many members of both houses
had urged Congress to take action. After long debate the committee

unanimously supported the

bill

and Norris was selected

to prepare

the report. All these efforts came to nought because of the Speaker's
opposition. Later in the session, because of public pressure, a some
what modified version of the same bill was again introduced. With
the help of the Speaker, who suspended the rules to prevent amend
ments, it was passed, but it died in the Senate because of Democratic
15

opposition.
Early in the Sixty-first Congress McCall reintroduced the bill. It
was sent to the same committee, which again reported favorably on

no longer a committee member, inserted a copy of his
original report in the Record. The bill, he remarked, would go a long
way toward purifying elections. Political machines, operating under
cover of secrecy and dominated by bosses, interfered with freedom of
action by public officials and made exceedingly difficult, if not im
could
possible, legislation demanded by the people. These machines
not exist, "at least to any harmful extent," if they were not supported
by secret contributions from individuals desiring to profit from the

it.

Norris,

conduct of the public servants they influenced. The "searchlight of
these machines out of business
publicity," he thought, would soon put

and drive the political boss into oblivion.
Norris' opinions on this matter revealed traits characteristic of
many progressives. He had a simple solution to a complicated prob
lem which he saw in moralistic terms. He was optimistic but did not
think the bill would solve the problem completely. It was merely "a
deserved the hearty support of
step in the right direction" which
those

who

desired "to give the people themselves the greatest possible

amount of participation in governmental affairs."
The bill was passed by the House and soon

16

thereafter, with slight

On

the last day of the session Norris
conference
the
to
his
report because the provi
reject
urged
colleagues
sion calling for the publication of expenses prior to an election had

modifications, by the Senate.

been removed from the House bill. By rejecting the report, he argued,
itself would not be lost, as there would still be another session

the bill

GEORGE W. NORRIS

i86

of the Congress, The bill would not lose its place on the calendar,
and might well become a better law. Congressmen, however, were in
no mood to accept this reasoning; the report was accepted and before
the day was out the emasculated bill was signed into law by President

TaftX
While Norris was not
that

it

entirely in accord

with

this

measure, he

knew

received consideration only because of changed conditions in

The new environment was also responsible for railroad
with
which he was in hearty agreement. In January, 1910,
legislation
the House.

at the request of the administration, Congressman James Mann in
troduced a bill enlarging the rate-making power of the Interstate

Commerce Commission and

creating a commerce court to handle ap
peals from commission rulings. Included in the measure was a clause
allowing railroads to acquire competing lines.

The House, when

bill in April and
May, modified
favoring competition by removing the
provision allowing mergers of competing roads and by accepting
amendments for physical valuation and equitable charges to obviate
it

along progressive

it

considered the

lines,

The House also approved a provi
and telegraph companies under the jurisdic
amendments were carried by the Democrats
and the progressive Republicans who were recruited from the ranks of

long and short haul discrimination.
sion bringing telephone
tion of the ICC. These

the former insurgents. Norris, while not
playing a major role in the
of
this
nevertheless
favored
these
and other
bill,
passage

strengthening
believed the Mann-Elkins Act to be the most
pro
gressive railroad measure enacted during the decade, though it at
18
tracted less discussion and
publicity than the Hepburn Act of 1906.
Norris was pleased with the way the House amended the bill. Be

amendments.

He

fore the curtailment of die
Speaker's power, the bill would have passed
its
original form. Now, according to Norris, it was "the longest step
in the right direction that has ever been taken at one time/' This
step
had been achieved because interested members,
including many in
surgents, had devoted at least three weeks, working day and night, to
the bill. After the House version of the bill went to the
Senate, Norris
in

revealed

how effective their efforts had been. He wrote:

Some

of these most valuable amendments to this bill were of
by the so-called Regulars, but as a matter of fact were pre
pared by some of the Insurgents at secret sessions. Wherever we

fered

could find any record in favor of a
particular amendment that we
believed ought to be adopted, we secured its introduction
by
such member, if possible, and some of these members have of-
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fered these amendments without the knowledge that the amend
ment itself was prepared and worked out by a meeting of some
19
of the so-called
insurgents.

The

fight for

improved railroad

legislation further

convinced Nor-

that the real friends of progressive legislation in the House were the
insurgent Republicans. They were able to achieve this success only by
cooperating with Democratic members. Though the Republican party

ris

took credit for the Mann-Elkins Act and other legislative achieve
ments, none of the progressive measures, said Norris, would have
been enacted in their final form "had it not been for the victory which
we obtained over the machine in the House, by which the atmosphere

was

entirely changed and the secret, unexplainable, but yet positive
control of the Speaker and his machine was partially destroyed." 20
On June 17, at the unanimous suggestion of the Committee on
Rules, a motion was adopted, providing a calendar on which members
register motions to discharge committees from further considera
tion of bills which had not been reported. Known as the "Discharge

might

provided means by which a bill could be forced out of
to this time the only way to discharge a committee was
to move to suspend the rules; such a motion could be made only on
the first and third Mondays in every month. Norris supported this
resolution, believing it another step in the direction of curtailing the
Speaker's power. He added what may be considered a peroration on
Calendar/'
committee.

it

Up

the insurgency revolt and

its

significance:

But for that victory we would not have this opportunity of an
other advance presented us to-day. We all know there is a change
of atmosphere in this House. There is more individual freedom
and less coercion. There is more individual liberty and less
machine control. The result is better legislation, better laws, bet
ter government. This result has been brought about, this freedom
has been obtained by the unequal, desperate, and sometimes dis
couraging fight made upon the rules by the hated and despised
will or feeling
insurgents. With malice toward none, without ill
against any man, without patronage or political favor, opposed,
abused and misrepresented by members of their own party, they

have steadfastly stood for a fundamental principle of representa
tive government that was being violated in this House, and by
virtue of such violation the rights of the people were being neg
lected and sacrificed.

The good results of their bitter struggle have been apparent
some time. Machine control in the House of Representatives is

for
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disappearing. There is still room for improvement, but the action
of the Committee on Rules to-day indicates that the House will

yet be

its

own

master; and

when

that time

comes about, the in

surgent will receive his reward. He gets considerable consolation
out of this condition here to-day, and it affords me no small

degree of satisfaction on this occasion to welcome to the insurgent
ranks practically the unanimous membership of the House.

We

give you the glad
is rather late, and

hand
it

of fellowship, and although your coming
may be your action is moved in some degree

what might happen if you did not come, yet we receive
by
you with open arms and promise to kill the fattened calf in your
fear of

behalf. 21

Thus Norris considered himself a spokesman for the insurgents
and was so regarded by friend and foe in and out of Congress. His
sudden fame must have been a bit overwhelming; it taxed his physical
stamina and burdened him with further responsibilities. Though the
possibilities for self-aggrandizement did not impress him, he soon
began to meet a wider range of people and to emerge as a prominent
progressive on the national scene. His battle against the House rules
soon expanded into a concern for issues affecting progressive politics.
In May, 1910, he spoke at a dinner of New Jersey progressives in
Newark. During the same month a California progressive requested
literature and information that could be used to
help the movement in
that state. Samuel Gompers invited him to a conference
early in June,
while Pinchot asked Norris to visit him. In short, before he returned to

Nebraska

campaign for re-election, Norris was entering the progres
During the campaign he moved into their camp and there
22
after emerged in the
upper echelons of the progressive ranks.
sive fold.

to

Chapter 20

Entering the Progressive Fold

EMERGING

as a national figure in 1910, Norris presented a picture of a
man of medium stature with a mass of black hair flecked

stockily built

with grey and a closely clipped reddish brown mustache. His appear
ance literally bespoke action. He walked briskly, talked tersely and to
the point. His chin projected aggressively and his mouth shut in a
thin fine line. His left eyebrow drooped deceptively, a result of the
old hunting accident, but the sharpness of his eyes belied any impli

He dressed simply, if not carelessly, usually in
or black, and his coat generally fitted badly over a pair of
muscular shoulders.
cation of listlessness.

brown

Norris gave the impression of energy personified. He had
queer
trick of pursing up his mouth to emphasize points he wished to make.
However, in personal appearance he still looked like a country lawyer.

a

him out
Simple in tastes, quiet in dress, he had little to distinguish
His
men.
wardly from other small-town business and professional
was
diversion
favorite
his
and
favorite exercise was mowing the lawn
reading Dickens' novels.

Whatever fame he had achieved was primarily the

result of play
almost
impossible odds. As a
ing the parliamentary game against
boss rule in the House.
undermine
to
had
he
master strategist,
helped

Since believers in good government were engaged in similar struggles
the insurgents conveniently served
throughout the country, Norris and
as a symbol of what a small intrepid group could accomplish. To a
most of whom believed that the problems
generation of Americans
and evils in American life were not of a fundamental nature, Norris

and his fellow insurgents showed that the cure lay in the readjustment
of the mechanisms. While the reformers in the Senate stressed tariff
railroad regulation, and similar social and economic issues,

changes,
the House insurgents, as previously noted, were split as soon as the
Cannon from the Speaker's chair. Norris
question arose of removing
realized that the relaxation of the House rules provided freer debate.

A

change in the

rules

was not a panacea but merely an

initial step,
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necessary to the full and free confrontation of important social and

economic problems.
Despite his sudden prominence Norris remained noticeably unaf
fected. He did not speak frequently, but when he arose from his seat
in the southeast section of die House chamber in the "Cherokee
Strip/' a Republican pocket amid the abandoned society of Democrats,
members listened attentively. Though he appeared to be an average
man, and though his actions were not as enthusiastic and emotional as
Victor MurdocFs, no one doubted that he was a legislator of superior
ability.

When not
cigar in his

on the

floor,

mouth and

Norris spent most of his time in his office, a
on the desk. It was there that he

his heels

pondered the question whether to be a candidate for a fifth term or to
seek the Republican senatorial nomination from incumbent E. J.
Burkett. From his arrival in Washington in December, 1909, to his
departure at the end of June, 1910, Norris was besieged with requests
to become a candidate in the senatorial primary. In the
beginning he
was noncommittal, though he did ask friends to sound out sentiment
and keep him abreast of it. He soon learned that Burkett was regarded

by progressive Republicans as a mere opportunist, "slippery and slimy
Elmer/' and that unless the party nominated a progressive candidate,
almost any prominent Democrat, such as Bryan or Congressman Hitch
1
wipe the earth with Elmer/'
The appearance of Burkett clubs which passed resolutions criticiz
ing the insurgent movement angered Norris in February almost to the

cock, "could

point of committing himself as a senatorial candidate. "If

my

in

surgency is to be a test of my Republicanism," he was quoted as say
ing, "then I think the sooner we know where we stand the better."
Since the primary law
permitted voters to express their preference for
United States senator, Norris thought seriously of
entering the race,
2
he
he
to
confessed,
though personally,
preferred
stay out of the fight.
While he continued to express distaste for life in
Washington, he
also insisted that he could not retire or
pursue a course that would
show any indication of backing down or of cowardice. If he decided
for a Senate seat, he intended to
delay announcing his decision to
keep the primary campaign as short and as inexpensive as possible.
This indecision kept the political
picture in Nebraska in a state of
constant confusion, while Norris, exhausted,
depressed, lonely, and
3
ill, mulled the matter over in big mind.

By June, Norris still had not announced his decision, but he had
been talking the matter over with his
"insurgent brethren." Almost
without exception they urged him to be a candidate for the House and

ENTERING THE PROGRESSIVE FOLD

191

He also discussed the problem with people outside of
Congress, among them Gifford Pinchot. Their advice was practically
the same. While all of his confidants invariably said they would have

not the Senate.

liked to see

him

in the Senate, they also claimed that because of his
he should remain in the House at least one more

role in the rules fight

term. His

they said, would be watched by the entire country.
was presented as a challenge to ascertain whether peo
ple approved of the insurgents* course, Norris decided it was his duty
district,

When the issue

4

term as a representative.
arrived at this decision in Washington in mid-June, less than
two weeks before Congress adjourned. Once it was made, he decided

to seek a fifth

He

speak for progressive candidates in some western states before
returning to Nebraska and his own campaign. Leaving Washington,
to

Norris

felt

certain that

he would be re-elected in November. The

promise of the coming campaign restored- his mental outlook and al
leviated his mood of depression. Though physically exhausted and

he
desperately in need of a vacation, Norris nevertheless felt that
could thrive on campaigning, especially since he had an important
issue to present. 5
Believing that the welfare

and success of the Republican party
he was determined to do Ms
members,
depended upon progressive
He also believed that an
for
candidates.
such
part by campaigning
with
this purpose in mind. Thus,
be
established
should
organization
after speaking in New York State and elsewhere in the East, early in
July Norris departed on a speaking trip through Kansas, Colorado,
and Wyoming, and his secretary thought he might also campaign in
6
Oklahoma, Washington, and North Dakota.
youngest daughter, Gertrude, was quaran
tined for scarlet fever. Her serious illness cut short his speaking trip.
He returned to McCook to be with his family and to get a brief rest

On July

12, 1910, Norris'

before launching his

home, and wanted

own campaign. McCarl was

Norris to visit

anxious to get

Mm

with friends, editors, and politicians

district before campaigning began early in the fall
the only Republican candidate to enter the con
was
Since Norris
would be necessary until Septem
gressional primary, no campaign

throughout the

ber. 7

As Republican county conventions chose delegates

for the state

Norris and Ms
convention, many
passed resolutions endorsing
the
of
Because
Cannonism.
in
role
quarantine period, Nor
attacking
to attend the state convention at Lincoln at the end
ris did not
also

expect

of July, though he

Cannonism. 8

was anxious

for

it

to

adopt a resolution condemning
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Progressive Republicans feared that there would be an effort to
the state convention "stand pat" and that Burkett and his fol
lowers would try to prevent an endorsement of Morris' work in Can-

make

Thus progressive hopes soared when on the afternoon of July
was announced that the danger period was just about over and
that Morris would be temporarily released from quarantine. Monday
evening he boarded the train with the Red Willow County delegation
for the convention which would convene the next
morning in Lin
gress.

25

it

coln. 9

At the convention he was defeated by Senator Morris Brown
the position of permanent chairman.

for

The

conservative Republican
press claimed this setback as a great victory for their cause. Since
Morris arrived only a short time before the convention convened and
made no serious effort to obtain the post, his defeat was no indication
that the delegates were conservative. When
John L. Webster, the at

torney for the Omaha Street Railway Company and a standpatter, was
placed at the head of the Platform Committee, progressive delegates
thought that machine control would prevent any endorsement of
Morris* work. But Morris himself
prevented this from
By

happening.

passing the Platform Committee, he secured recognition from the
unsuspecting chairman, Morris Brown, and introduced from the floor
a resolution
Cannonism and at the same time

condemning
pledging
Nebraska Republicans to the support of the insurgent cause. This
resolution, which caught Burkett, Rosewater (editor of the Omaha
Bee), and other standpat leaders offguard, was passed by an over
whelming majority and clearly indicated the temper of most Nebraska
10

Republicans.
As soon as he returned from Lincoln, Morris went back into
quarantine for more than two weeks. McCarl returned to his cam

paign preparations and noted with some dismay the increased out-ofstate mail. He knew that the National
Republican Congressional
Committee would not aid Morris with funds and that the state com
mittee would supply little or no aid. Therefore he
requested office
holders in the district to send contributions direct to the
congressional

committee. 11

Morris had been too
busy with his

own

affairs to

follow Theodore

Roosevelt's activities as he
prepared for his western trip. On August
23, the day Roosevelt started his trip, Samuel Merwin, the editor of

Success Magazine in
I

New York, wrote to Morris:

suppose you know by

this

time about what

T. R. in his western
speeches.

is

coming from

Have you seen a copy

of his
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Osawatomie speech? Confidentially, I read it
through last week.
While it is sometimes hard to tell from a
manuscript just how it
is
going to sound when it is uttered and started around in the
it read to me like one of the most terrific
progressive in
surgent broadsides we have had so far. Apparently T. R. forced
by circumstances as well as by his own temperament into the
ranks of the progressives is
going about it with his characteristic
12
vigor to try and take the lead on the right side.

papers,

Norris, however, did not take notice of Roosevelt's

famous speech.

Nor did he attend the Roosevelt speech in Omaha several days later;
Norris, who had been invited to attend, was speaking in Wisconsin
on behalf of La Follette and other
progressive candidates whom he
13
had promised to help "in the event the battle became too
strong."

Almost

of Norris" speeches
during the campaign were on Cannonism, a subject of great interest to his audience. It was an ideal
all

topic because

it could be
presented as a nonpartisan discussion or ex
with
little
effort, as a partisan campaign speech.
planation
very
M.
an
Nelson,
Though John
insurgent colleague, later criticized Nor

or,

on the grounds that he "placed himself decidedly in the front seat"
and did not mention Nelson's own role in the fight, Norris' speeches
and those of other prominent progressives were eminently successful
in achieving their main
goal that of assisting La Follette, He was
ris

renominated in the September primary by a majority of over 102,000
votes. 14

Norris left Wisconsin on September 3 to speak at a rally in Min
neapolis on September 5. From there he went on to Nebraska. En

route he was injured slightly in a railroad accident.

Though he was

McCook on September 14, to begin his own
hardly up
intensive campaign. Norris now refused all out-of-state speaking re
quests, including one from Hiram W. Johnson, the progressive Repub
lican candidate for governor of California. He remained in Nebraska
to

it,

he

left

15
busily campaigning until election day.
Following his usual pattern, Norris generally traveled alone to
meetings, stayed at the local hotel, and conferred with local leaders

and citizens. McCarl remained in McCook, directing and coordinating
the over-all campaign. Toward the end of September he wrote, "Con
ditions are splendid all over the district." He felt certain that disgrun
tled and disappointed Republicans would still vote for party can
didates and that some Democrats would be likely to cross party lines
and vote for Norris. In this campaign there was none of the anxiety
and distress so prevalent in 1908. 16

GEORGE W. NORRIS

194

Nebraska was complicated by the liquor
in his
issue which disturbed many voters and which Norris avoided
law
a
in 1909 signed
requir
speeches. When Governor Shallenberger
of renomination.
all saloons to close at 8 P.M., he lost all chance

The 1910 campaign

in

ing

of Omaha and a
James C. Dahlman, the colorful ex-cowboy mayor
nomina
Democratic
the
obtained
strong opponent of liquor legislation,
the
on
beer
free
voters
the
Capitol
tion and campaigned by promising
of inauguration. His opponent Chester H. Aldrich
time
at
the
grounds
for county option. The Antisupported the Republican plank calling
to
its
Aldrich, while Bryan refused to
Saloon League gave
support
a temperance
"wet"
his
of
because
position. Bryan,
support Dahlman
Democratic
entire
the
for
and
campaigned
man, favored county option
fact that many voters
The
for
nominee
the
governor.
ticket, except

planned to

split

their tickets

because of the liquor question probably

17
by giving him many Democratic votes.
Norris' meetings were well attended and his speeches well re
ceived. As McCarl noted, "When given an opportunity to get the facts
before the people, he usually leaves with more friends than he had
worked hard at campaigning, speaking twice
prior to his talk." Norris
a day for several weeks towards the end of October. But this time he
had significant help. While Senator A. B. Cummins of Iowa spoke on
three consecutive days at Hastings, Holdrege, and McCook, Con
Kansas each devoted two full
gressmen Madison and Murdock from

benefited Norris

18

the district.
days to speaking at various points throughout
The major criticism hurled against Norris by R. D. Sutherland, also
his opponent in 1906, and other Democratic speakers was the fact that
he did not vote for the Burleson resolution to unseat Speaker Cannon.
Norris, of course, always discussed this matter and explained his posi
tion. According to McCarl, once this had been done, the voters in
aided consider
variably approved his course. The Omaha Daily News
the Burleson
on
his
an
editorial
position
explaining
ably by publishing
resolution. 19

the other hand, James A. Tawney, who was in Nebraska in
October, saw an account of one of Norris* speeches and was shocked
to read that Norris had said Burleson presented a motion to depose

On

the Speaker "after a conference with Representative Tawney, one of
Cannon's chief supporters." Tawney claimed that this statement was
"absolutely and unqualifiedly false"

and hoped that he would correct

the impression created by this misstatement of fact. Tawney's letter
indicates that Norris may have been embellishing speeches to drama
tize his position. 20

To prevent

Irish-American citizens from voting the straight

Demo-

ENTERING THE PROGRESSIVE FOLD

195

merely to support Dahlman's "wet" position, McCarl
asked former Congressman J. J. McCarthy to speak in the district at
the close of the campaign. McCarthy gladly accepted. 21
Norris maintained his stamina and voice throughout the entire
campaign. A week before its ending he spoke for almost two hours at
a small town in Nuckolls County, and those who attended, Democrats
cratic ticket

talk they had ever heard.
before
election, the Nebraska news
days
a
endorsement
of
Norris from Senator La Folpapers printed
strong
thus
Sutherland's
lette,
undermining
charges that Norris was not a true

and Republicans alike,
Then on November 3,

said

it

was the best

five

progressive like La Follette. And Congressman Murdock informed
Norris that his name had been mentioned in at least eighty-six of the

ninety-one speeches he had delivered since leaving Washington. By
continuing to fight to change "the vicious system of personal control"
in the House, the insurgency revolt, said Murdock, would become "not

a passing incident in

politics,

but epochal in the history of American

22

legislation."

Norris returned to McCook on November 7, election eve, and
closed his campaign in the Masonic Temple Theater that evening.
Norris received a great ovation from the capacity crowd and was
that Norvisibly affected by the tribute paid him. A visitor claimed
ris*

speech was equal,

if

Beveridge. Norris had now
the voters to do theirs. 23

not superior, to any given by Senator
done his part of the job; it remained for

The results of the 1910 election in Nebraska gave neither party
a decisive victory. Aldrich was elected governor and Republican can
didates won all available executive offices. Hitchcock, however, de
feated Burkett by almost twenty thousand votes in the preference
vote for United States senator, and the Democrats also won a majority
in both houses of the state legislature and elected their congressional
candidates from three districts. Republican candidates were successful
in the fourth, fifth, and sixth congressional districts. Norris rolled up
a substantial majority in the Fifth District, defeating Sutherland by
more than four thousand votes. He carried all but three of the
slightly

24
eighteen counties in the district.
In McCook, where almost one thousand votes were cast,

less

than

two hundred were registered against Norris. He was elated with his
his course in
victory since it showed that his constituents approved
celebration because there
Congress, but was cautioned against any
were "too many Republican funerals in the country to make any
demonstration." 25 In the House the Democrats won a majority of
the Republican majority in the Senate
sixty-three seats, while reducing
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from twenty-eight

many

to eight.

The Democrats

traditionally Republican

also elected governors in

states including

New

York,

Connec

New Jersey, where Woodrow Wilson
ticut, Massachusetts, Maine, and
embarked on his political career. Only in the West, where the progres
hold its own.
sive movement was rampant, ad the Republican parry
of Albert J.
that
defeat
Despite the one outstanding progressive
of Washington, John D. Works of Cali
Poindexter
Miles
Beveridge
and colleague, Asle
fornia, and Norris' former Washington neighbor
and enabled the
Senate
the
Gronria of North Dakota all entered
J.

of that body to hold the balance of power.
progressive membership
reverses in 1910, no
leaders
expected to suffer
Though Republican
one was prepared for the magnitude of the defeat. Only two of the
Roosevelt were elected to office.
numerous candidates endorsed

by

from the results
Indeed, only the Democratic party could obtain solace
of the 1910 elections.
After the election Norris admitted to intimates that he regretted his
decision not to enter the senatorial race. He did not comment upon his
future course, but was pleased with suggestions that he enter the next
senatorial race. 26

Since the lame duck session of the Sixty-first Congress was sched
uled to convene early in December, Norris was able to spend little
time in Nebraska before returning to Washington. His congressional
career,

which

at the outset of 1910

seemed doomed

to frustration

and

the in
oblivion, now seemed to have vast potential as a result of
in the coming session
Members
his
re-election.
revolt
and
surgency
would greet a new, optimistic Norris a national figure, interested in
a wide range of reforms, whose advice and services were sought by
1910 had demon
progressives throughout the country. The election of
strated the progressive temper of the citizens of Nebraska and other

western states. Victory assured Norris that the voters approved his
course and would support him in demanding further reforms. Victory
convinced him that with the assistance of a few devoted, hard-working
men he could handily defeat a Democratic opponent and surmount
It also as
opposition in his own party despite his inadequate funds.
sured him more than ever of his ability to win the senatorial seat.
Thus when he left McCook, Norris was much more than the repre
sentative of Nebraska's Fifth Congressional District. He was a symbol,
soon to become a spokesman as well, for progressive-minded citizens

throughout the United

States.

Chapter 21

The
THAN

LESS

a

Insurgent as Progressive

month

after the election, Norris

was

in

Washington

for

the short session of the Sixty-first Congress. Any hopes he may have
had for a leisurely session were quickly shattered. The breach in the

Republican party was already too large to permit any easy reconcilia
tion of the opposing factions, and during this session further issues and
events would widen the gap. Believing that he would return to McCook in March, Norris did not bring his family and took a room at
the Y.M.C.A. His secretary again remained in McCook tending to Ms
law practice and intending to keep Norris informed of political devel
opments, real estate matters, and investment possibilities. When the
House was in session, Norris usually spent the forenoon in his office,
the afternoon in the House, and the evenings working in his office or
1
relaxing in the Y.M.C.A. swimming pool.
December
The House convened at noon on
5, 1910. A week later
tax in the
inheritance
an
for
Norris spoke on a measure providing
fairest
the
tax
inheritance
an
He
District of Columbia.
proclaimed
the
could
that
it
and
stated
amassing
prevent
way to raise revenue
of large fortunes which most progressives "admitted to be detrimental
2

kept up for several generations." Throughout
his long career Norris took advantage of every opportunity to speak in
favor of an inheritance tax, gaining acceptance of his views only once,
during the Wilson administration.
to

good government

Though deprived
he foresaw a

if

president, Norris thought
in
session he suggested that
the
early

of his patronage

reconciliation

when

by the

Taft appoint a Nebraska jurist to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court.
Norris sent information about several Nebraska candidates, but all
the two men ended when Taft ap
attempts at harmony between
Willis Van Devanter of Wyoming, to fill the
a
conservative,
pointed

post

3

Norris continued to expound his views on judicial matters. On
was considering an amendment that
January 25, 1911, the House
to raise the salary of federal circuit judges from $7,000 to

sought
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ig8

would
$8 5GO. Norris opposed the measure, arguing that the increase
"to
them
in
station
a
to
encouraging
elevate judges
society,
higher
liberties." He believed that the present
human
and
human
rights
forget
to enable a judge to be independent of any in
salary was sufficient
derived
terest or financial consideration. Norris summarized his views,
5

from

his

own experience as a judge,

as follows:

outside
absolutely independent of every
a
have
tendency to in
influence and of everything which might
duties.
interfere with their official
They are the most

Our judges should be

any way

officials of our Government. They should be
and
unbiased, so that they can weigh the evidence
absolutely free
and decide litigation alike between the rich and the poor, the
and the low. They should never be so far removed from the

important public

high

from the common, struggling citizens that they will
and fair rights of any litigant. The judges' salaries
the
just
forget
should be sufficient to keep them from want, from privation, from
them all the necessities and all of the reason
hardship, and to give
able luxuries of life. The salary should never be so high as to
man on account of its money consideration alone. The
attract

people

any

best judge, as well as the best citizen, is the man who realizes that
that the
money alone can not bring satisfaction or happiness;
be
should
same
of property, while the
protected according

rights
to the spirit of the law, should never be permitted to outweigh
whose life work
or to cover up the rights of the individual.

Men

an under
study have been in the direction of
and
of
and
the
the
law
of
justice, and
equity
principles
standing
who follow such lines because they love it and not for the money
there is in it, are the men in whose hands the scales of justice

and whose

life

should be placed.4

So persuasive was Norris and so economy-minded was the House
that the amendment was defeated. But his interest in the federal
these remarks. When the president con
judiciary did not end with
sidered Walter I. Smith, one of the staunchest regulars in the House,
to succeed Van Devanter on the Circuit Court of Appeals, E. H. Madi
5
son of Kansas suggested Norris as a suitable candidate. Madison
talked with Taft and asked McCarl to send recommendations show

and fearless on the Nebraska bench,
ing that Norris had been fair
of their financial or social
to
out
litigants regardless
justice
meting
condition. Madison received a large number of recommendations,

was
including one from the entire Supreme Court of Nebraska, but, as
6
named
the
Smith
to
nonetheless
the
post.
president
expected,
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Throughout these hurried negotiations, Norris did nothing to en
courage Ms candidacy. His friends suggested his name because they
did not wish to have another conservative on the federal bench, and
because they did not want the administration to have the excuse once
again that no progressive candidates were available. Norris' candidacy
was an effort on the part of the progressives to dramatize an issue, suc
cinctly stated by Senator Cummins, who wrote; "Why send progres

men to

Congress to enact progressive measures, when the Interests
may rely upon the Federal Bench to give them relief when those
construc
progressive measures come before the courts for judicial
sive

tion?"

7

Reactions to the judgeship issue varied. Some were sorry Norris was
not appointed, while others rejoiced because he could now run for
senator. Many felt that the progressives' purpose
name was to counter the president's nominee with

in suggesting his
a better one from

wing of the party, thus challenging Taffs announced intention
8
of treating equally all groups within the Republican party.
Norris was a passive and silent judicial candidate in part because
he was involved in another skirmish with the standpat element in the

their

On

the
January 5, he introduced two resolutions amending
One proposed a revolutionary reform by making the
of the House available to
proceedings and votes of every committee
the public, thereby preventing committees from evading responsibility
bills. The other was designed to remedy a defect in the

House.

House

by

rules.

tiirottling

the
thereby preventing the clogging of
were sent to the Committee on Rules, though

"motion to discharge"
calendar. Both bills
neither

rule,

was presented on the floor. 9

Several days later, on January 9, the insurgent position seemingly
received a setback, when Charles E. Fuller, a regular Republican from
the rules. When challenged
Illinois, presented an amendment to one of
for it the constitu
claimed
he
not
in order,
that the resolution was

had been previously accorded the Norris resolu
tion. Speaker Cannon in effect repeated his ruling of March 19, 1910,
that the resolution was not in order. In this instance he was sustained
the insurgents, none of whom
by a rousing 235-53 vote, with all of
in the discussion, voting with the minority and most of the

tional privilege that

participated

Democrats not voting, though Oscar Underwood, who played a promi
nent role in the insurgency revolt, voted with the majority to sustain
the Speaker. 10

While Cannon and

was a
Norris prepared a statement which
enacted in 1910 had been abrogated.

his supporters claimed that this vote

vindication of their position,
claimed that none of the rules
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the 235-53 vote was indeed a setback, he

Though

vowed

American principles in legislation"
fight "tor progressive
tinue. The attacks on the rules during this short session,

that the

would con

he thought,
were inspired by a small group of the "old guard" with a view to dis
1910. He claimed that the Demo
crediting the accomplishments of
11
this
in
Cannon
crats, who supported
ruling, were playing politics.
If Cannon experienced vindication early in January, by midfrom an
January he experienced further defeat. The fight developed
at
the
House
the
that
rule
specific
power
gave
attempt to utilize a
times to discharge a committee from further consideration of a bill.
The insurgents and Democrats believed that this ruling, which had
been enacted in the second session of the sitting Congress, was iron
clad that, as soon as the consideration of bills by unanimous consent

had been concluded on every first and third Monday of the month, the
House was then bound to consider motions to discharge committees
from the custody of specific bills. Cannon declared that the rule did
not make it mandatory for the House to take up such motions, but
simply made them in order if the House wanted to consider them.
When the vote was taken on January 16 on the appeal from Cannon's
decision, twenty-two insurgents and all but one of the Democrats
present voted against the Speaker. The attempt to sidetrack discharge
motions was rejected by a vote of 145-126. 12

Since the rules received

much

attention during this short session,

Norris took the opportunity on the first anniversary of the start of the
insurgency revolt, Saint Patrick's Day, to prepare a strong statement.

Claiming that the victory did more to make the House a truly repre
body than any other incident in the history of Congress, he

sentative

it was "a
fight between representative government and
control, a conflict between the people and the Special Inter

asserted that

machine
ests."

He

noted that

now

was growing sentiment "for more pub
and for a higher standard of efficiency
growing acceptance of the initiative and

there

licity in governmental affairs
in public officials." The

referendum, the widespread demand for direct election of delegates
to national conventions and of United States senators, were indications
that

the "great progressive movement" was
surging forward and
until the reins of
government were restored to the

would continue

He

also decried
partisanship by asserting that "patriotic public
was more to be desired than "party solidarity." This anniver
sary statement was one of the earliest public pronouncements of his
growing awareness that he was more a progressive than a Repub

people.

service"

lican. 13
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Along with other prominent progressive Republicans, Norris
helped to form the National Progressive Republican League, in Jan
uary, 1911, with the avowed object of promoting popular government
and progressive legislation. As an indication of his new status, Norris
was chosen first vice president of the organization, which was headed
by Senator Jonathan Bourne of Oregon and had among its members
Senator Brown and Governor Aldrich of Nebraska. At the outset the
President
league unofficially served as a rallying point for opposition to
Taft and his standpat supporters in Congress. 14

Nebraskans reacted favorably to the creation of this organization
and to Norris' official position in it. His prominence continued to grow
in progressive Republican circles. He was chosen to deliver a eulogy
in Congress honoring the memory of the later Senator Dolliver. Thus
in the last session of the Sixty-first Congress, he continued to be the
15
outstanding progressive leader in the House.
Norris devoted much time and energy to legislative problems.
Since the session would be the last during Taft's term in which the
made greater
Republicans would control Congress, the administration

efforts

than usual to enact

its

legislative program.
Nebraskans was proposed legislation to establish a
the plan because they thought
parcel post system. Many opposed
of
an
enormous trust, create an op
"it would foster the development

Important

to

the propeiity of all country towns, se
pressive monopoly, destroy
of jobbers and country merchants,
riously injure tens of thousands
drain the rural communities of their capital and population, aggravate
the evils of centralized wealth and congested cities, and benefit no

mail order houses in the big cities, and the
farmer's local market, they argued, would be
express companies." The
his educational, social, and religious
destroyed, and with it would go
benefits as well. Realty values would decline and further taxation
would be thrown upon already overburdened shoulders. Retail mail
order houses would benefit enormously, but country merchants and

one but the great

retail

farmers would face financial ruin as well as loss of their

way

of

life.

16

mounted rapidly during the short ses
Agitation against parcel post
a parcel
sion and reached a climax in the following Congress when
in
criticisms
the
mind,
enacted into law. Norris kept
post measure was
the
of
most
account
into
that if the system took distance
but

argued
could be obviated. If the charge were in proportion to cost
and took into account the weight of the parcel and the distance it
the farmers and rural merchants
traveled, he thought the doom of
would not materialize. Furthermore, a fair parcel post system would
difficulties
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lower exorbitant rates charged by express companies which, accord
all
ing to a report of the ICC made an average profit of 50 per cent of
invested capital in 1909. 1T
In this session, as in the past, Norris voted against the annual addi
tion of two battleships for the navy. The custom of adding two ships
per year was inaugurated by Roosevelt to keep the navy at fighting

While
strength and to provide for the scrapping of obsolete vessels.
it
more
he
naval
Norris believed in a moderate
increase,
urgent
thought
that the government devote its attention and funds to agreements for
arbitration treaties.

He

thought the time was ripe for the United States
an agreement to arbitrate all fu

to propose to other civilized nations

ture difficulties. Both progressives and standpatters were divided on
these issues and there had never been any concrete attempt to unite

them. 18

Concerning military affairs, Norris favored the national guard
rather than a large standing army, though he never gave the matter
19
He became more involved with military mat
very careful scrutiny.
ters and took stronger stands on them as conditions in Mexico dete
riorated during the last months of the Diaz regime. Norris insisted on
strict neutrality, denying that the president had any legal
right to use

the army or his official position to influence Mexican affairs. "The fact
that the armies in the field are destroying property such as railroads,
mines, etc., in which citizens of our country have a financial interest,"

Norris explained, "ought to have no effect whatever upon the course
our Government should take." He maintained that since the destruc
tion of property was a legitimate method of warfare, citizens invest
ing in foreign countries always took the risk of war and must abide by
20
its results. The
private citizen, not the government, was involved.

The major piece of business before this session was the reciprocity
agreement with Canada which was sent to Congress on January 26,
1911. In negotiating it was agreed that
reciprocity would be effected
by concurrent legislation in both countries instead of by a treaty. The
proposed legislation would admit nearly all agricultural products

A few minerals, as well as iron and steel
and
were
also
on
the free list, while innumerable manu
wire,
plates
factured items would move across the border at reduced rates which
would be identical in either direction. Generally
speaking, the free
list included raw materials
the
United
States. The sched
imported by
ule provided American
with
publishers
cheaper newsprint by calling
for free
paper and wood pulp, and thereby assured a base of popular
except wool without duty.

21
support for the arrangement
Norris opposed this measure because he considered

it

unfair to
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removed agricultural tariff protection without
reducing the farmer's costs. Free trade for the farmer and not for
the manufacturer seemed to Norris to be another
example of dis
crimination against the rural regions. He could not see
why America
should not be protected from Canada as well as from
other coun
the farmer's interests. It

any

A

rate that assured the difference in the
production cost of the
article imported, with
perhaps a small profit to die American producer,
try.

ought to be applied to all
22
country of origin.

articles subject to tariff
legislation,

regard

less of

At the outset Norris was alone

in his opposition to Canadian
all of Nebraska's
congres

The Nebraska newspapers, and

reciprocity.
sional delegates except Norris,

were in favor of it. It was pushed
the
House
on
through
February 14, by gag-rule tactics, with no op
to
offer
amendments, little chance to comment, and, unlike
portunity
the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, with Democratic support. Norris
protested,

wishing to send the measure back to committee with instructions
to put on the free list some of the farmer's necessities. His
protest was

no

passed the House by a vote of 221-93.
the former insurgent members, eighteen favored it and nine,
including Norris, opposed it. The measure carried because of Demo
cratic support. The majority of Republicans voting on the measure
to

avail; the bill easily

Among

23

opposed it.
Unable to express his opposition on the floor, Norris had his
lengthy remarks inserted in the Appendix to the Congressional Record.
Since the House had already agreed to a bill providing for a perma
nent nonpartisan tariff commission which would determine the dif
ference in cost of similar articles produced at home and abroad, he
thought the commission could aid in determining rates that would be
applicable to

all

nations alike.

As an agrarian, he insisted that danger to American institutions
would surely come if legislation helped to decrease rural population
and drive more people into already overcrowded cities. Indicating his
connection with nineteenth-century rural America, a bond he had in

common with many
But

it is

progressives, Norris added:

also in the city that

we have

the slum and the breeding

we have the
places of anarchy, ignorance, and crime. It is there
mob. It is in the city that we have the machine politician and the
boss, where, by organization and machine control, the

political

elective franchise

is

seriously interfered with.

On

the other hand,

upon the farms are located the conservative, patriotic, and think
or
ing voters of our country. Uninfluenced by the machine control
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the political boss, they are the balance wheel in our form of gov
ernment. In time of danger and in time of war we lean with

confidence and pride upon the strong
24
patriotic heart of the American farmer,

arm and the

willing

and

He could not comprehend why the United States should surrender
markets for the advantage and development of the Canadian economy
expense of the American farmer. He suggested that "the in
stigators of this plan" might have framed it as a punishment to that

at the

portion of the country whose Republican representatives had the
courage to protest the high schedules in the prevailing Payne-Aldrich
Tariff.

25

He

ordered 25,000 copies of

this

speech from the Government

Printing Office and had them sent to McCook for distribution. The
job of informing Nebraska's farmers would be difficult, since all the
large daily papers, sympathetic to either free trade or free newsprint,
favored the measure. Yet the fact that Norris stood alone would

make it easier for him to expound his position because voters would
want to know what prompted his opposition. 26
Nebraska farmers, however, would have ample time to obtain an
understanding of the reciprocity agreement. While the measure
quickly passed the House, it immediately ran into trouble in the upper
chamber where standpat qualms and progressive opposition grew
rapidly, provoking a swell of senatorial oratory that did not abate in
time for a vote to be taken before the session ended on March 4.
Taft, to save reciprocity, was forced to call a special session and to
hope that the Democrats would continue their support of the measure.

The

president's inability to obtain its passage during the third session
of the Sixty-first
Congress assured opponents of the measure an op
to
educate
their rural constituents to its
portunity
inequities.
Because the short session presented a major legislative issue that

had not been resolved, members of Congress looked forward to a sum
mer of fervid debate in hot, humid Washington. The debate on
pushed Norris further into the progressive camp, led him
and convinced him that reconciliation
with the Taft administration was impossible.
reciprocity

to despise intense
partisanship,

Comic

relief to the serious

doings of Congress was provided for

by the condemnation and censure he received from the Society
for the Protection of Poodle
Dogs in the District of Columbia. On
Norris

February 5 he delivered an impromptu address before an audience of
young men in the Washington Y.M.C.A. He reflected on his blissful
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domestic condition and advised his audience in favor of
marriage. He
claimed "To be a husband and a father is the noblest ambition of

human being/' Following Theodore Roosevelt, he believed
men
who wanted to do good for their country and human
young

every male
that

must marry and raise children. "Of all the
joys that life can give,"
27
He observed, however, that many
said, "the baby is the best."
wealthy people were raising more poodle dogs than children, and
related the following incident with
irony and humor.
Connecticut
Avenue
one day he saw a well-dressed
Walking along
woman come out of a luxurious mansion and enter a carriage. In her
ity

he

arms she carried a beautiful poodle, "all decked out in ribbons, trin
and flowers/ Norris pitied this wealthy woman who, he
supposed,
was childless and therefore wasted her affection on a
poodle. But
soon the door of the mansion opened again and a maid
emerged wheel
ing a baby carriage. Norris assumed from the baby's clothes that it
was the child of the woman who had just departed. First he felt sorry
for the child, but
upon reflection he shifted his sympathy to the
because
under
the circumstances the baby seemed to be in the
poodle
best company. Poodles, he believed, should never
replace children.
"Too often in America today rich women care nothing for their off
spring, but would rather bestow their foolish affection on pets that
'

1

kets

amount

to nothing."

Few

wealthy mothers, Norris concluded, gave

and best thought to their children. 28
This address aroused an immediate and violent
response from
wealthy women and poodle-lovers all over the country. Washington's
leading matrons unanimously condemned Norris and defended their
pets. The male president of the Washington Kennel Club stepped into
the breach and praised socially prominent women and their
lap dogs,
declaring, "If more men would attend to their children as they should,
we would not hear so much of this talk of the American home being
their first

To

protect himself Norris contemplated moving out of
and
Washington
taking other precautions to escape the crowd of
women and dogs pursuing him. 29
As humorous as this incident may seem, it shows that Norris* re
marks were seldom without purpose. In this case he was condemning
ruined/'

conspicuous wealth, a social phenomenon at odds with his progressive
views and rural values. Later efforts along these lines would usually

be more

political

and pertinent

the tenor of Norris' statements

in their application. However, whether
was serious or humorous, he seldom

failed to inform his listeners.

When

Congress adjourned on March

4, 1911,

he quickly returned
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McCook and his family. All plans for an extended vacation had
be shelved when Taft announced his intention of calling the new
Congress into special session to consider the unresolved Canadian
dis
reciprocity agreement. Hopes for a brief vacation, as well, were

to

to

sipated shortly after his return to Nebraska.

Chapter 22

Widening the Breach
THE

Sixty-second Congress, Norris* last as a

member

of the House,

was called into a special session on April 4, 1911, by President Taft
The new Congress would convene exactly one month after the old one
had expired, giving Norris about three weeks in McCook. Instead of
resting, he worked ten and twelve hours a day on a matter he planned
to introduce in the coming session. McCarl thought he looked "like
thunder, worse if anything than he did at the close of the [1910] cam
paign/*

Home

cooking and the pleasure of his family's company

brought some improvement, but Norris was not well. Friends were
worried that the special session would "get him" if he did not pay

more

attention to his health. 1

Though he would not openly admit it, Norris too was concerned.
After his return to Washington, he confided to a doctor that he had
begun to realize he was on the verge of a nervous breakdown as a
result of four years of

overwork without an extended vacation and

under intense political pressure. 2
His worries about his health and

his eagerness to participate in the

burgeoning progressive movement created mixed feelings about
the Demo
spending the entire summer in Washington. He thought
of the
revision
a
would
than
rather
crats,
attempt
accept reciprocity,
tariff to embarrass the administration still further. Moreover, he was
not sure whether the Democrats expected to appoint all the House
committees and proceed with general legislation or whether the work

of the special session would be confined exclusively to the reciprocity
measure. He planned for the former but hoped for the latter. Prior to
his return to Washington he had a severe attack of lumbago which
the few engagements he had made while in
forced him to
relinquish

Nebraska. 3
able to leave Mc
Fortunately Norris recovered rapidly and was
at the end of March in time to attend a meeting of progressive
Nelson for the afternoon of April 3.
Republicans called by John M.
The term "insurgent" had been replaced by "progressive" in Nelson's

Cook
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fell into disuse as the latter term was felt to be
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss and, if pos
sible, agree upon some plan of action with reference to the caucus, the
choice of a minority leader, committee assignments, and other mat

and soon

invitation,

more

ters.

inclusive.

4

When

the

first

session of the Sixty-second Congress convened on
band of progressive Republican members

Tuesday, April 4, the small

were determined to continue the fight for improved parliamentary
procedures and better legislation. During this Congress the Demo
crats

non

had a majority in the House, and Champ Clark replaced Can
At their initial meeting the progessive Republicans

as Speaker.

decided not to oppose the candidacy of James R. Mann for minority
had the highest regard for Mann even though he had
been a devoted Cannon supporter in the rules fight. One of the hardest
workers and best parliamentarians in the House, Mann was always
leader. Norris

scrupulously fair, though he rarely displayed
lenient during partisan controversy. 5
The Senate, however, was still controlled

any inclination to be

by the Republicans.
ranks
were
progressive
seriously depleted by the defeat of
Beveridge and the death of Dolliver, a new group included Asle J.
Gronna and Miles Poindexter, former insurgent members of the

Though

its

House, and John D. Works. William

S.

Kenyon

of Iowa, replacing

Dolliver, joined their ranks several weeks later. With each chamber
of Congress controlled by a different
party, the last two years of the

Taft administration would be characterized more than the

first two
and define issues for the
1912 campaign. Throughout the turmoil, the
struggle between progres
sive and conservative
Republicanism continued. Given these condi

by jockeying

for political effect, to create

tions, it is surprising that this Congress enacted as much
nonpartisan
but progressive legislation as it did. 6
Norris noted with satisfaction some marked
changes in the organi
zation of the House. For the first time the rules
provided that the
Committee on Ways and Means be elected and endowed with the

to appoint other committees.
Representatives were assigned to
only one important committee, thereby obviating the fear that mem
bers of the Ways and Means Committee would
appoint themselves
chairmen of powerful committees. As in the
the
past
minority leader

power

was

members. The committees, when
determined, were "elected" by receiving the formal approval of
a caucus and then of the House. These new rules,
though they still
left
something to be desired, represented a long step toward the
7
greater freedom the former insurgents desired.
to assign places to
minority

finally
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One morning shortly after Congress convened, Norris was invited
to the minority leader's office, where Mann frankly asked him what
committee assignments he wanted. The question and the change in
procedure greatly surprised Norris and, before he could answer, he

was offered a place on the Judiciary Committee. Norris
sented.

From

readily as

committee assignments were
found himself on a prominent committee at the

his recent oblivion as far as

concerned, Norris now
8
suggestion of a Cannon lieutenant.
At the start of the session, during consideration of the rules, Norris
suggested several further changes. He stated that the members should

be free

amendments and vote on them rather than being sub
and the need to vote accordingly. While he
still favored a fifteen-member Committee on Rules, he realized that
caucus control was a more limiting evil and had to be eliminated be
fore any further significant rules changes could be made. Control by
to offer

ject to caucus control

caucus, though better than control by the Speaker,
members by the

free selection of all committee

still

prevented the

Ways and Means

Norris felt that the time was
not far distant "when the progressive, patriotic sentiment of the
American people will drive the caucus and the political boss and the

Committee

political

as the rules

machine out

now provided.
7

of business."

9

business and
would
records public. Such publication
prevent suspicion and rumor
When
as
fact.
from being reported
secrecy was necessary, he believed
committee members should say their work was of such a nature as

Norris also favored an

amendment making committee

10
ought to remain private.
Norris read with considerable interest the reports of Governor
Woodrow Wilson's speech before the National League of Democratic
Clubs at Indianapolis criticizing the secrecy that surrounded the work
of the standing committees. Committee secrecy, Norris wrote Wilson,
was one of the best ways for the machine politician to kill legislation
The blame, he suggested, was formerly with
the
demanded

by

his party,

but

people.
that the Democrats controlled the House,

now

it

was

11
equally divided between both parties.
The purpose of the changes that Norris suggested was to increase
the power and freedom of individual members at the expense of both
the Speaker and the party organization. Curbing caucus control and
committee secrecy, limiting the Speaker's power, and abolishing gag

amendments would help to
the
achieve this purpose without destroying
ability of the House to
that
function. Norris was aware, however,
partisanship would prevent

rules prohibiting

these

members from

offering

the Democrats had
changes from being realized. Though
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criticized the previous rules, they now accepted and imposed most
of them, seemingly forgetting their earlier statements about arbitrary

and procedures. As long as men blindly followed leadership they
did not believe to be honest or pursued purposes they did not think
would accomplish good, individual freedom would be unobtainable in
the House. Norris hoped that political parties, an integral part of

rules

American political life, would improve in caliber by attracting progres
12
sive and honest men who could unite in favor of good legislation.
Another suggestion Norris put forth in his attempt to encourage
was a limit or decrease in House
greater individual responsibility,
in membership would necessitate
increase
an
membership. Certainly
the surrender of rights and prerogatives to some smaller governing
the body which enabled the
body. Indeed, it was the present size of
and
committee
secret
arbitrary rulings by the
caucus,
hearings,
the size of
Speaker to flourish without serious opposition. Reducing
the House, Norris argued, would not affect the basis of representation
because the influence of each state would remain proportionally the
13
same; but the gain in improved procedures would be immeasurable.
to the proposed
Early in the session Norris turned his attention

amendment

to the Constitution calling for direct election of
He favored it. While further rules changes

States senators.

United

would

freedom and responsibility,
grant individual representatives greater
insure
broader
would
senators
election
of
direct
democracy by plac
in the hands of the people. It would
ing greater control of government
allow state legislatures to devote more time to lawmaking and would
enable the voter to cast his ballot for candidates who represented his
ideas on state-wide issues without considering the candidates* choice
for senator. Furthermore, direct election

would make

it

more

difficult

for organized wealth or political bosses to dictate the selection of
had recently con
particular candidates. The fact that the Senate

sidered the fraudulent election of William Lorimer of Illinois

had welcomed him nonetheless, gave added weight
for the amendment. 14

to

and

arguments

In the hope of bringing about the rejection of the amendment,
opponents combined it with one that took from Congress the right
to control congressional elections. Norris favored separating the
proposition, but so effective

were the dilatory

tactics that it

took an

other year and the approaching presidential campaign before Con
15
gress in May, 1912, approved the Seventeenth Amendment.
A further procedural matter that Congress considered during this
special session

was the admission

to the

union of the

last

contiguous
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territories of the

States, Arizona,

and

New
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Mexico. This issue

was fraught with

political significance, reflecting the breach between
and
conservatives
in both parties. Norris favored the ad
progressives
mission of both territories, though he had some qualms because the

Arizona constitution included the provision that recall apply to the
judiciary. He believed this to be dangerous, but since the proposed
constitution had been made by representatives of the people in ac
cordance with their wishes, he considered it his duty to approve it.
In defending the initiative and referendum clauses in these con
stitutions, he used arguments similar to those he had presented in
supporting the direct election of senators. These provisions, while not
insuring good government, would promote political understanding and
responsibility. If properly used, he predicted, initiative, referendum,
and recall would be tools to promote better legislation, help restore

government

to the people,

and insure

its

resting

upon the consent

of

the governed. 10

Once procedural matters were disposed

of,

the

House turned

its

attention to a reconsideration of the major piece of business before it,
the Canadian Reciprocity Agreement. Norris' position, clearly defined
in the previous Congress, remained unchanged. On April 21, 1911, be
fore the House adopted the measure by a vote of 268-89, he tried to

back to committee with instructions to amend it. 1T Reci
the floor o the Senate begin
procity was debated for seven weeks on
on
July 22.
ning in mid-June until its final passage
in
the
Meanwhile the Democrats
House, anxious to appeal to
in
1912
the
midwestern farmers
election, had Oscar Underwood, chair
man of the Ways and Means Committee, introduce the fanner's free
list bill which passed the chamber a month later. Norris supported the
bill because it offered some relief to the farmer, providing for free
lumber, free boots and shoes, and many other items which the farmer
of the inequities of the
bought. He hoped it would rectify some
send the

bill

18

reciprocity agreement.

Norris also tried to get Underwood to consider revising the sugar
schedule. Failing in this, he called for an inquiry into the operations of
the sugar trust. When these efforts came to nought, he supported an
other measure proposing a drastic downward revision of the tariff on
wool. World production of wool had not been equal to the demand for
and Norris felt that there was no good reason for a
several
years,

was the case with the farmer's free list
these Underwood tariff measures were promptly vetoed by

high wool
bill,

Taft. 19

tariff.

However,

as
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In the last days of the special session, Norris regaled his colleagues
with a pointed but humorous narrative of the recently approved
reciprocity measure:

written and this

much-

judgment, when true history
abused and much beloved child called "Reciprocity" is properly
a cross, having both
labeled, it will be found that she is a sort of
her veins. It
blood
circulating in
Republican and Democratic
Democratic
and
a
father
a
had
she
that
will be found
Republican
of the
consideration
the
to
once
at
us
this
mother, and
brings
no
heard
of
have
I
marriage ceremony
question of her legitimacy.
and if this unfortunate child is able to
concerning her parents,
of her birth it will be necessary for her
establish the
In

is

my

legitimacy

to prove a

common-law marriage.

At the ceremony of her birth, the doctor having charge of
affairs was furnished by the interested railroads, the nurse was
and her swaddling clothes were pur
provided by the Beef Trust,
uncer
To
the
brewers.
chased by
compensate the infant for the
also to deceive farmers of the coun
and
her
of
parentage,
tainty
who were robbed of the honest and just protection which is
try,

the high-sounding and beautiful name of "Reci
rightfully theirs,
name usually indicates the na
was
given to the child.
procity"
instance the beauty of the
this
in
but
ture of the
named,

A

thing

name was intended

to conceal the real nature of the child

and

to

20
cover up the sin of its parents.

In

this

vein he criticized everyone

who

supported the agreement.

In Washington, both parties vied for the credit, but in Nebraska and
the measure was truly an orphan
throughout the Mississippi Valley
1911 conventions in Nebraska,
the
In
and
disowned
child,
ignored.

was not mentioned by the Republicans or endorsed by the
Democrats. 21 But Norris had no intention of ignoring the issue when
he returned to Nebraska and considered his political future.

reciprocity

Shortly after the

House passed the measure, Norris delivered the

most ambitious speech he had ever made. It concerned an issue which
affected not only his constituents but citizens throughout the country,

and represented a congressman's venture in muckraking at a time
of such probes, Norris' sources, though
journalists were tiring
not all verifiable, were extensive, and included information from the
a greedy
Library of Congress and the Bureau of Statistics. He attacked
and unscrupulous trust, a monopoly on an international scale that
included a foreign government among its directors and extorted its

when

WIDENING THE BREACH

213

from victims throughout the world. In a carefully prepared
22
speech on April 26, Norris attacked the coffee trust.
The immediate purpose of his speech was to expose this powerful

levies

trust

with the ultimate hope of securing remedial
legislation to curb
in the United States. He introduced his
subject by com

its activities

menting on the worldwide tendency toward combination. Competi
tion when throttled
inevitably led to monopoly which "if unrestrained
and uncontrolled" always resulted in "an unfair and an unequal dis
tribution of the products of labor and of wealth." Whereas most com
binations that attracted public attention affected comparatively few
people, this particular combination levied its tribute in pennies but
counted its contributions by the millions and was a "daily uninvited
23
guest" in homes, whether mansions or hovels, throughout the world.
The coffee trust began with the 1906 attempt by Sao Paulo, one of
the states of the Brazilian government, to assume control of the world's
supply of coffee. The state bought all the coffee produced within its
border and held it from sale until the price rose. After two years,
it became evident that the
undertaking was too great for
the state, and a new and more gigantic plan was undertaken. Sao
Paulo issued bonds amounting to $75,000,000, guaranteed by the

however,

government of Brazil. With the proceeds the state purchased Brazilian
coffee and held it off the market. The bonds were handled by English,
French, German, Dutch, and American bankers; J. P. Morgan and
Company, the National City Bank, and the First National Bank to
24
gether took $10,000,000 worth.
A committee of seven men, one chosen by the Brazilian govern
ment and six by the bankers, supervised and controlled the disposal
of the coffee purchased. The coffee was shipped to representatives of

these financial concerns and stored to be sold in such quantities and
at such prices as agreed upon by the supervising group. As a guaran

payment of the bonds and interest, the Brazilian govern
ment agreed to levy an export tax on coffee and to remit the proceeds
weekly to the financial backers. The government also agreed to enact
a law prohibiting the planting of additional coffee trees and to prevent
as far as possible an increase in the supply. Thus ample provision was
tee for the

made

until 1919, the year the
takes six or seven years for a coffee

for the control of the coffee

bonds were to mature. Since

it

market

bearing capacity, no great increase in the coffee
threaten the arrange
supply from other countries was expected to
25
ment.
Norris next noted that coffee had already more than doubled in
tree to reach

its full
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World consumption had averaged for the previous four years
about 17,900,000 bags, while world production for the same period
had averaged over 18,600,000 bags. Thus in the face of continual over
this
production, prices had steadily and regularly advanced. During
price.

same period Brazil annually produced more than 14,000,000 bags of
exported to the United States about 23,000,000 bags during
the period from 1907 to 1911, while American coffee imports from all
20
other countries during these years were a little over 5,000,000 bags.
The basic
Norris raised with his description of the coffee
coffee. It

question

was what could be done about this international plan for the
valorization of coffee. American law was not applicable to Brazil, nor
could European bankers be brought into American courts. The Ameri
can participants could be punished only if they violated American
laws. However, Norris was convinced that by a change in tariff laws,
indirect action at least could be taken against the government of Brazil
and its states.
Norris* remedy was twofold. He suggested first that American
corporations involved in the agreement be prosecuted for violations of
the Sherman Act. He suggested, second, that Section 2 of the PayneAldrich Tariff Act, providing for raising rates against nations which
discriminated against the United States, be amended to include in
stances where a government became a party to an arrangement de
signed to increase prices to American consumers. However, if this
suggested amendment did not bring relief, Norris then was willing to
consider another scheme whereby all coffee entered free o
duty
until the amount
slightly exceeded our domestic consumption. If at
that point a high duty were
imposed only on Brazilian coffee, Norris
was certain that Brazil would be compelled to come to terms. Thus
the amount of coffee consumed by the American
people and not the
manipulation of a special committee would more nearly determine the
trust

domestic price. 27
Unless some such action were taken Norris
thought similar steps to
control the supply and price of rubber soon would be undertaken. He
concluded with a brief statement of the role of the United States, as he
envisioned

it,

in

its

dealing with other nations:

As a Nation and as a people we are in possession and control of
the natural resources and are
de
occupying a situation that,

by

manding and

asserting only

what

is

right

and

fair,

we

will

be able

to secure justice to our
people without doing any injury to the
people of any other nation. To this we are entitled, and we should

be content with nothing

less.

With a

spirit of entire friendliness
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toward the balance of the world

common
of the

justice to our

Golden Rule

own

we

people.

should

We
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demand and

exact

should apply the doctrine

people of the earth and at the same
time should insist that the rule work both
should give
ways.
to
all
others
and
should
demand
that
the
justice
recipients of our
favor repay us in kind. 28
to all the

We

most ambitious thus

far in his con
There was no
congressional investigation and the Department of Justice took no
steps to invoke the Sherman Act against the American banking firms.

Unfortunately

this speech, the

gressional career, attracted relatively

little

attention.

The department assigned a special attorney to investigate the matter,
but nothing came of it No sensational exposure appeared in the public
press, and only the coffee merchants commended the speech and gave
it some
publicity. The results were unimpressive and the speech did
not appear to be worth the effort. 29
The study and the speech, however, were important in increasing
Norris' knowledge and in helping him formulate his views. He was
more than ever convinced that competition was the best way of con
ducting business and that government action would be necessary to

preserve competition and obtain fair play for American consumers.
He envisioned the international scene as an extension of the domestic.

The problems and
only the scale was
or international

their remedies,

he believed, were basically

similar;

that of domestic corporation
the American government had the re

larger. In either case

monopoly

sponsibility of protecting its citizens.
By the end of the first session of the Sixty-second Congress Norris
leader in the House. While concerned
was regarded as the

progressive

with the interests of his constituents and battling for more democratic
issues of broader
procedure in the House, he devoted his attention to
interest as well. His remarks in Congress now commanded the atten
tion of most of his colleagues. But politics, with the Democrats con

and seeking to define issues for the 1912 campaign,
trolling the House
serious consideration during
prevented his suggestions from receiving
While the Democrats were attempting to consoli
date 1910 election gains in preparation for the coming presidential
also weighing chances of
campaign, progressive Republicans were
and nominating one of their leaders
capturing the Republican party
for the presidency. Norris was an active participant in these delibera
future and
tions, but his most important concern was his own political
this special session.

the senatorial election of 1912.

Chapter 23

La

Follette for President

not devoting time to congressional matters during the spring
months in Washington, Norris turned his attention to Nebraska and
and sought
his political future. He brought mailing lists up to date
the
sent
He
districts.
people on
suitable lists in other

WHEN

congressional
"The Caucus and
several of his speeches
copies of one of
on Canadian
views
his
or
of
Coffee/'
the Rules/' "The Valorization
Norris
but
most
the
was
The tariff speech
thought
popular,
reciprocity.
for the
it advisable to circulate as well copies of his speech calling
these

lists

direct election of senators.

1

time Norris was certain that Taft could not win Nebraska
in 1912; only a progressive candidate stood a chance to hold the state
in the Republican electoral vote column. Though he had doubts as to
the possibility of preventing Taft's renomination, he was encouraged
the president. Like other
by reports indicating rising sentiment against
the president's claim of
faith
in
he had lost
former Taft

By

this

supporters,
His sympathies and associations, Nor
following the Roosevelt policies.
the fact that the
ris
argued, had been with wealthy people despite
never yet known
"He
has
man:
president was a comparatively poor
of his OWTI
sweat
the
what it is to work or to be
upon

dependent

face for support." Though Taft had lost the support of "the Cannon
and Aldrich machine" on the Canadian Reciprocity Agreement, Norris

believed he would

make no

effort at reconciliation

with the progres

sive members of his party. Norris thought, too, that the president had
"a personal dislike, if not a personal hatred" of him, because Taft
with some justification, that Norris was one of the individuals

thought,
responsible for

much of his

discomfort. 2

On

Sunday, April 30, 1911, Norris and other prominent progressive
Republicans in and out of Congress attended a conference in Senator
Bourne's office in the Capitol. At this lengthy meeting all agreed that
Taft could not be re-elected in 1912, though they conceded that the
president probably had, through his control of the federal patronage,
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sufficient strength to
bring about his renomination. As to the question
whether to try to nominate anyone else, all
agreed it would be better

to

make

the effort and

too, that the fight

fail

than to make no attempt at

should be

made

in the

name

of

all.

They agreed,

Theodore Roosevelt,

but were promptly informed by Gilson Gardner, a friend of Roosevelt
and Washington correspondent of the
Scripps papers, that under no
circumstances would the former president consent to the use of his
name. Senator Cummins then said, "There is but one man who should
be considered as the Progressive candidate, and that is Senator La
Follette." Once again everyone
agreed. Norris promised to do all in
his power to further the Wisconsin senator's cause in Nebraska. La
Follette, after further discussion, consented to make the attempt, pro
vided funds could be found to support his efforts. 3

When the Progressive Republican League of Nebraska invited
Norris to attend a meeting at Omaha at the end of May, he
suggested
that if Nebraska emphatically endorsed the candidacy of a
progressive
Republican her voice would have great influence in the selection of
delegates from other states. But he quickly learned that all was not
well among Nebraska Republican leaders and that the friction be
tween them involved him. Victor Rosewater, editor of the Omaha

Bee,

whom

Norris

had never regarded

as a political friend,

claimed

had engaged in a
bitter patronage quarrel with Senator Norris Brown and now sup
ported Norris as a means of evening the score. Norris was thus pressed
to announce his intentions. 4
Until this time he had been noncommittal, but by mid-June he was
more specific about his plans. He expected "in due time" to announce
he favored Norris

for the Senate in 1912. Rosewater

his candidacy, even though 1912 looked like a
thought that he could get the nomination but

Democratic year. Norris

would be defeated by a
Democratic landslide in the election. Meanwhile, until an opportune
time arose to announce his candidacy, he championed the cause of
Follette and, in this way, kept his name before the voters as the
5
outstanding progressive Republican in the state.

La

In the midst of these political developments Norris celebrated
his fiftieth birthday, an event which caused him to do some serious
and future. He felt that he was now
reflecting on his past, present,

down the other side of the hill." In one respect, the financial
he
considered himself a failure. Though he had no desire for
one,
wealth and did not believe money to be "the chief object in life," he
was disturbed about his inability to provide for his old age. On the
his financial worries, were his accomplishpositive side, outweighing
"going
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ments and the knowledge that they were appreciated. "The greatest
to a man/' he said, "is a consciousness of
happiness that can come
6
and
his
done
fearlessly."
duty fully
having
he had supplemented his income by
During the special session
Unwilling to be away from Washing
occasionally delivering speeches.
ton for any length of time, he limited his engagements to nearby areas.
He delivered the commencement address at the Rockville High School
in Maryland, spoke for the National Progressive League in Pennsyl
and addressed the Winter Chautauqua at
vania and

Maryland,

Binghamton,

New

at most
York, and the Boston City Club. His topic

of these lectures was Cannonism, and audiences were disappointed

when he spoke on anything else. 7
to leave Washington, progressive
Despite his unwillingness

Repub

lican politicians in Nebraska urged him to return for the state con
vention in July, announce his candidacy for the Senate, and assume

a prominent position in the Nebraska progressive movement. But
lack of funds as an
Norris, using the pressure of legislative duties and

watch the fluid political situation from his vantage
There he could benefit from any feuding that
Potomac.
on
the
point
time main
Nebraska
occur
Republicans and at the same
among
might
8
tain a statesman-like posture that would impress the average voter.
As county conventions chose delegates for the state convention,
efforts were made to place Norris supporters on prominent commit
tees. While sentiment for Taft or Norris Brown was not particularly
lest the organization choose a "stand
strong, McCarl was worried
The Repub
or
a
"crazy" progressive as temporary chairman.
patter"
lican press was trying to portray all progressives as this latter type
as radicals. Norris was concerned lest the convention endorse reci
If it began to take this direction,
procity and the Taft administration.
he intended to go to Lincoln and asked to be placed on the Red Wil
low County delegation so that he could gain admission on the conven
excuse, preferred to

tion floor

9

if
necessary.
Norris* request, however, arrived too late for

McCarl to get him on
the delegation. The Red Willow County convention on July 19, follow
ing the lead of several other conventions, had endorsed La Follette for
10
Delegates at the state conven
president and Norris for the Senate.
an
in
the
of
fearful
tion,
party, refused to pass any resolu
open split

While Norris sentiment was
he
had
done enough for La Follette
many delegates thought
and too little for himself. All expected an announcement of his senato
rial candidacy at any moment.
Summing up the convention for his
tion endorsing Taft

evident,

chief,

McCarl wrote;

and

his policies.
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you had been Injured. Everybody

to think that you
got through fine, considering the fact
you had endorsed La Follette. However, this came from the
Taft men. Many of them like you and will do
you some good

that

all, I am satisfied with conditions at this time.
11
can only improve them and not let them
get worse.

next April. All in

we

If

The sentiment shown

at the convention
helped Norris resolve his
informed friends he would announce his
candidacy
after Congress adjourned, but then
changed his plans and made the
announcement late in July. His evaluation of the forthcoming presi

decision.

He

first

was

dential race

substantially correct:

It looks as

though

unless Taft can

it is

going to be a Democratic year, and
for the nomination and assuming

be defeated

Woodrow Wilson, or some other progressive Democrat
nominated, Nebraska will surely go Democratic by an over
whelming majority, and will very likely carry everything with it
on the ticket. I hardly expect La Follette to be nominated. The
chances are all in favor of the renomination of Taft, but I think
also, that

is

it

will

12
pay to make the fight anyway.

Thus when the special session of the Sixty-second Congress ended
on August 22, Norris was committed to the cause of La Follette and
to a long and arduous campaign for the senatorial nomination. In a
sense he had been campaigning since March, 1910, when he force
fully came to the attention of all Nebraska voters. From what he had
been able to discern, he believed that sentiment in the state was more
united behind his candidacy than behind that of any other candidate
for major political office in 1912. On leaving Washington he asserted
that he would win the primary by a great majority, but added that
the party could avoid disaster only

by preventing Taffs renomina

tion. 13

His

first

was scheduled for Sioux City, Iowa, on September 4.
to speak at the State Fair in Lincoln, following Secretary

talk

Next he was

of Agriculture James Wilson. The secretary, it was announced, would
defend the Canadian Reciprocity Agreement and show that duty-free
farm products and protected manufactured goods were designed to
benefit Nebraska farmers. Norris had hoped the issue would remain
in the background until after the 1911 election since it had no place in
a campaign for justices of the Supreme Court and members of the
Board of Regents. But once Wilson had said he would speak, Norris
14
agreed to present the other side.

GEORGE W. NORRIS

220

Thus on September 6, before several thousand people, he scath
The speech was similar to others he had
ingly denounced reciprocity.
the topic made it all the
but
delivered on the subject,
familiarity with
loud
were
remarks
more effective. His
frequently interrupted by
he
October
of
end
the
until
on
time
this
bursts of applause. From
Nebraska chiefly on the subject of Canadian reci
spoke throughout
15

procity.

the govern
Oii September 21, Canadian voters turned out of office
the
for
reciprocity
ment of Sir Wilfred Laurier, responsible
negotiating
The victorious Conservative
abrogated the measure,

party
agreement.
and President Taft found that his efforts were in vain, his prestige at
divided. Norris thought that,
party irreparably
in
measure
the
of
Canada, voters would still re
despite the defeat
favored it, Senator Norris
had
who
those
member with displeasure
Brown among them.
Norris tried to show that free trade in agricultural products was
detrimental to the American farmer and that tariffs on such items

low ebb, and

his

used wheat as an example and compared its
of the United States, Canada, and in Liverpool.
price in different parts
and
Farmers, he claimed, were selling wheat on the domestic market
was
not
States
United
the
of
outside
the
not on the world market;
price
than
was
lower
but
of
cost
the
the American
transportation,
raised their value.

He

price plus

and sometimes lower than the American price itself. As
conclusive evidence of the relationship between the presence of tariffs
and higher market value, he cited the fact that the day after Canada
wheat rose from three to seven cents
rejected reciprocity, the price of
States.
It went down a little in Win
the
United
in every market in
in
Liverpool. Through these speeches
nipeg and remained stationary
this total

many a Nebraska farmer to the complexities of
and nurtured seeds of hostility toward the Taft ad

Norris introduced
tariff legislation

ministration

and the reciprocity measure. 16
October, Taft appeared in Nebraska on a western tour

to
Early in
On
international
of
in
of
arbitration
favor
arouse sentiment
disputes.
October 1, he spoke in Omaha and Norris was among the guests
seated on the stage. The next day a reception was held for Taft in

Lincoln, but Norris was not invited to attend this meeting or to travel
on the president's train. In order not to seem piqued, Norris sent a

note claiming he had other business requiring his attention. The note
did not prevent the circulation of reports that he purposely snubbed
the president but, having attended the Omaha meeting, Norris felt

he had done

all

that political etiquette required. 17
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Norris' absence at the
reception in Lincoln merely heightened
the chilly welcome Taft received. Three bands, two hundred Civil
War veterans, and six automobiles took part in the procession, and
crowds lined the streets. But, an ardent La Follette supporter noted,

was a minimum of applause during the parade and after Taft's
speech. The only burst of applause came when the president men
tioned Bryan and his support of arbitration treaties. Gilson Gardner
reported that 75 per cent of the Nebraska Republicans were for La
there

Follette. 18

Striving to arouse progressive sentiment, Norris worked under a
heavy handicap. He lived in the less populous western part of the
state,

and had never campaigned

in

Omaha

or in other prominent

eastern towns. Another drawback was the fact that progressive senti
ment in Nebraska was not yet as vigorous as in Kansas and Iowa, and
to Taft than they were in
claimed that "the great common people
of Nebraska" were not as progressive as the rank and file he had met
in the East. "In all my travels/* he explained, "through Pennsylvania

Nebraska Republicans were more opposed
favor of

La

Follette. Norris

and other eastern states, I found that when Republicans were opposed
to Taft, they were invariably for La Follette." 19

On October 16, the Conference of Progressive Republicans con
vened in Chicago with delegates from thirty states. The resolutions
adopted declared that the progressive movement was a struggle on
behalf of the people to wrest control of government from representa
tives of special privilege. To achieve this end they aimed to nominate
and elect men who would truly represent popular will and carry out
the progressive policies pledged by the Republican party. Favoring
a presidential primary law or any other scheme by which the people
would gain the right to express their choice, the conference en
The meeting, accord
thusiastically endorsed La Toilette's candidacy.
a most unqualified
ing to Senator Moses Clapp of Minnesota, "was
success." 20

Although speaking engagements prevented Norris from attending
the conference, he did offer some suggestions. He put forth a plan ask
for one-dollar subscriptions; this method would im

ing supporters

the "people's campaign"
prove finances, show voters that funds for
were coming from the people themselves, and encourage supporters to
work for the success of the cause. Norris also suggested the writing
and circulating of a pamphlet that would explain La Follette's views
of publicity for him in the press. Norris was
Follette could win the Nebraska primary by a

and combat the lack
confident that

La
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and was gaining admiration and affection for "the little
he felt, "the progress and advancement
fighting Senator" to whom,
21
of liberty and justice" already owed so much.
Between speeches, he participated in the state campaign, advocat

large majority

without regard to partisan politics. He
ing the election of candidates
that no man's vote in 1911 should be controlled by his views on

argued

the presidential nominee. Most of these so-called non-partisan cam
the southern part of the state, were in
paign speeches, delivered in

answer

to those

made by Bryan

requesting support for

all

Democratic

candidates. Bryan had argued that progressive Republicans could help
La Follette's cause by voting the Democratic ticket in 1911. A few
voters challenged Bryan to commit himself to La Follette if the
Democratic convention in 1912 nominated a conservative candidate.
some people
Bryan refused to make such a commitment, though
claimed his remarks tended in that direction. While Norris was relax
was un
his
partisanship with every passing year, Bryan

ing

political

22

relenting in his.
At the end of October, Norris returned to McCook for a brief rest.
He spent part of November speaking in Idaho, Oregon, Washington,

and Montana. Though he would have preferred to speak about other
the month discussing Cansubjects, he was resigned to spending
nonism. He knew from previous experience it would be futile to dis
cuss anything else. Whenever possible, he tried to deliver speeches on
behalf of

La FoUette. 23

had adjourned, Norris was busy
speaking and making himself known to large numbers of people who
knew him only through reputation. He had done little campaigning
on his own behalf, preferring to criticize the Taft administration and
support the progressive program and principles of the Wisconsin
senator. As Congress gathered in December, 1911, Norris seemed
willing to have his destiny determined by La Follette's success or
With

little

respite since Congress

failure in Nebraska.

In

this

campaign as

in later ones, Norris

made no

great effort to

appeal personally to Omaha voters, though he did not ignore the popu
lation center of the state. He preferred to
actively in the

campaign
farm areas and smaller towns, seeking the rural vote and leaving
Omaha to the machine politicians. In this way he was able to main
tain freedom from compromises and commitments and to
pursue his
campaign with a minimum of political interference. But as Congress
convened, Norris, though not forgetting politics completely, became
absorbed with pressing congressional business and left McCarl in

McCook to manage the primary campaign.

Chapter 24

Business as Usual

THE SECOND

SESSION of the Sixty-second
Congress, in an atmosphere
of mounting political intensity, convened at noon on
Monday, Decem
ber 4, 1911. George Norris, though involved in a fight for the Nebraska
senatorial nomination, nevertheless
the ordinary business of the session.

new

to participate fully in
fought old fights and initiated
session, he continued to reveal him

issues.

managed

He

Throughout this long
one of the ablest men in the House, a devoted public servant
fighting for improved legislation and a chance to further the cause of
self as

popular government.

At the outset

of the session Norris indirectly lent his

name

to the

cause of prohibition by attending a banquet sponsored by the National
Anti-Saloon League. He was the only Nebraska legislator present,
among more than fifty representatives and senators. As a teetotaler, he
had occasionally given money and legal advice to the cause, but was
never active in the league and had tried to avoid prohibition as a
1
political issue.

The

fight against the coffee trust, initiated in the previous session,
at this time. Correspondence with coffee importers

was continued

further convinced Norris that

it

was necessary

to introduce a bill pro

viding for the free admission of coffee from all countries whose output
was not controlled or manipulated by the valorization scheme. The
bill

a

would

little

also call for the free admission of Brazilian coffee to a point
the limit of domestic consumption. Such a plan, in his

beyond

judgment, would force Brazil to reject the valorization scheme. On
June 17, 1912, the House accepted Nonis' views, passed this measure,
and sent it to the Senate. Though Norris called Senator Cummins*
2
attention to the bill, no action was taken by the upper chamber.

Soon

after the

previous session,

Democrats,

now

11,

settled

down

to business, Norris, as in the

engaged in sharp skirmishes over the rules. The
in control, appeared to be as arbitrary and partisan

under Speaker Cannon. On
the insurgents, led by Norris, attempted to upset the

in interpreting

January

House

them

as the Republicans
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power

of Republican leader James R.

Mann

to

name

all

Republican

candidates for places on House committees. They attempted to set
aside the nomination of Philip B. Campbell of Kansas, a regular, to
succeed the late E. H. Madison on the Committee on Rules, and to
substitute another progressive Kansan, Victor Murdock.
the in
Opposed by both Democratic and Republican leaders,
the
107
Of
107.
to
167
of
a
vote
floor
the
on
by
surgents were beaten
81
Demo
and
were
26
of
votes cast in favor
Murdock,
Republican
the proposed substitution were cast by
cratic. All the votes
against

nominated Murdock, but Oscar W. Under
Republicans. Norris had
wood, the Democratic leader, exhorted the members of his party to
Mann, whom the Republican caucus had authorized to select
uphold
committee members. 3

Norris* statements attacked both the caucus method of selecting
committees and the right of either party to prevent nominations from
the floor. Since the pertinent rule (Rule X) provided that committee
members be elected by the House, Norris claimed the right to substi
tute another

name

for the

one proposed by the minority leader. While

not criticizing Mann's appointments, he claimed that caucus approval
4
was not the proper way of selecting committee members. Minority
sentiment, he felt, should be registered by nominations from the floor,

and a Republican with views

similar to Madison's should

be chosen

to

Though defeated, Norris at least had the opportunity to
state his case. Progressive membership on the Committee on Rules was

replace him.

reduced to one, Irvine Lenroot of Wisconsin. 5
In an introduction to a pamphlet published in 1912, Norris argued
that the chief evil of Democratic management in the House was
caucus control. By this means the freedom of individual action, par
gained in 1910, had been nullified and the political machine
firmly re-established. The caucus, an unofficial instrument by which a
tially

majority was controlled by a minority, perpetuated machine rule in
the House even though Cannonism, the term that the insurgents had
found so convenient as a symbol, was no longer in vogue.

To

Norris, the primary difference between progressive Repub
and progressive Democrats was their attitude toward the
caucus. Republican progressives, as a fundamental tenet,
opposed
caucus rule and machine control; they paid allegiance to no
political
boss and accepted individual rather than caucus
responsibility. Demo
cratic
progressives were not yet ready to declare their independence
licans

of

caucus

free

rule, a species of "parliamentary slavery" inconsistent with
representative government. Norris concluded, as he had in March,
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He wrote:

Cannon did not overthrow
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the system of

ma

chine rule.

The members of the House of Representatives, coming directly
from the people, should be absolutely free to follow the dictates
of conscience in every official action. There should be no caucus
on matters of legislation. There can be no real freedom as long as
the people's representatives, with gagged lips and shackled hands,
continue to worship at the shrine of King Caucus. 6

On

February 3, Norris led a fight against a rules change which he
thought would restore power to the Speaker. Representative Robert
Lee Henry of Texas introduced a motion amending the discharge
rule. It was claimed that the operation of this rule, instead of prevent
ing the "killing" of bills in committees, "had resulted in a congestion
of business on discharge days," the first and third Mondays in each
month. Henry's amendment, which was adopted after long debate by
a vote of 150 to 130, virtually repealed Rule XXVII which the Demo
crats led by Champ Clark had fought so hard to pass in June, 1910J
Norris considered the motion a step backward, "a surrender of the
a wonderful increase of the
rights of the individual member and

The prevailing rule provided that the motion to
would have precedence over a motion to sus
committees
discharge
Speaker's power."

rules. The Henry amendment reversed the procedure. Since
the Speaker had supreme power of recognition in motions to suspend
the rules, he could if he desired recognize friends who would move
to suspend the rules on the days discharge motions were to be con

pend the

sidered. Norris complained that if the proposed motion carried, it
would have the same effect as writing the following sentence in place
of the existing rule: "This rule shall have no effect and be of no

wants it to be." 8
validity except in cases where the Speaker
Two years after Norris' famous rules fight of 1910, he issued

no

statements and was interviewed by no reporters. Indeed, his experi
ences under Democratic control of the House revealed that the fun
damental fight to make every member a free individual, uncoerced
and uncontrolled by political machinery, was still being fought. Open
were still im
votes, uncontrolled by a caucus or a powerful member,
to obtain. Recognizing that much remained to be done, he
possible
nevertheless would have admitted that much beneficial legislation had
9

been accomplished since March, 1910.
caucus
Though these two incidents, that of the

Henry amendment

in January

and the

in February, gave Norris his chief opportunity to
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under Democratic control, he criticized

challenge the House
them at other times as well.
rules

On

February

House was

24, while the

for an investigation of the "Money Trust/'
considering a report calling
control. The Democratic
to
he found another chance
challenge caucus

caucus seemed determined that the
majority acting through a party
should be instructed by a harmless
Committee
and Currency

Banking

resolution, granting

it

to

no additional power or authority,

an investigation. Norris

demanded a strong

resolution.

conduct

He

appealed
Democratic members who favored a comprehensive investigation
to reject the dictum of their caucus and help strengthen the resolu
tion. Norris used humor and verse to convince members of the need
to

for a thorough study, and eventually was successful. The investigation
in 1913 by a subcommittee led by Representative

was completed

10

Arsene Pujo of Louisiana.
In July Norris spoke out against a ruling which

made

it

impossible

and vote upon amendments to the bill the House was con
a rule destroyed the legislative process. 'What is the
sidering. Such
use of debating a bill," he queried, "if you have decided in advance
that the ruling
by a rule that it shall not be amended?" He claimed
and deprived members of a legitimate
resulted in
to offer

poorer legislation
function of their legislative prerogatives.

The

operation of the

House

under Speaker Champ Clark still left much to be desired by Norris
and his progressive colleagues. But with a presidential campaign
with Norris seeking a senate seat, no concerted
getting under way and
effort

11

was made

Though
when they

to challenge Speaker Clark's domination.
critical of their rulings, Norris agreed with the

Democrats

considered revising the sugar schedule. While Nebraska
was not yet a major sugar-producing area, its farmers, in an effort to
of sugar
diversify production, were raising considerable quantities
beets, especially in western irrigated areas, and a large sugar beet
factory was in operation at Grand Island. Since the sugar schedule was

one of the most complex

in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff,

Norris

first

sought detailed information as to conditions in the industry. He dis
cussed the matter with Republican members who favored lower rates

and proposed

to introduce several

amendments

if

the Democrats did

not present a satisfactory measure. 12
Though favoring a reduction in the sugar schedule, he still con
sidered himself a firm believer in the protection principle. He believed
that a tariff should measure the difference

home and

between the cost of an

abroad. "The true protectionists," he affirmed,
"are just as anxious that the tariff should not be too high as they are
article at
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that it should not be too low." If it were too low, it would flood the
American market with products of other countries where the standard
of living was lower. These products in turn would either lower Ameri
can standards or drive out of business the American producers of such
articles. If, on the other hand, the tariff were placed much above the
cost of production, as was the case with most items in the PayneAldrich Act, it would enable American producers to combine and
raise their prices to exorbitant levels. The tariff in such cases would
keep out the foreign product and encourage domestic monopoly as
well. Such combinations could not exist if a tariff were prepared in
accord with the suggestion that once domestic prices were raised

beyond the difference in the
would reduce the price. Thus
could argue in favor of lower

He was

cost of production, the foreign article
Norris, a believer in a protective

tariff,

rates, 13

also a firm believer in a nonpartisan tariff board.

How

ever, he considered the board provided in the Payne- Aldrich Tariff a
temporary and makeshift affair. He found no fault with the personnel
of the board, but rather with the limitations of its powers. Moreover
he believed that a nonpartisan tariff board should report to Congress

rather than to the president;

it

should report particularly to the

House, which was charged by the Constitution with the initiative in
all tariff legislation. Norris also favored House approval of presidential
While he was not sure exactly how these
appointees to this board.
and how long appointees should serve,
made
be
should
appointments
he was certain that no American tariff had ever been properly con
sidered. 14

Thus, in March, 1912,

had

when he voted

to explain this departure

from

for a free sugar bill, Norris

his protectionist views.

Free sugar

eliminated the American beet sugar industry
virtually would have
which was serving as something of a brake on tfye practices of the
the nations' sugar supply,
"Sugar Trust." This monopoly controlled
time
was making large pur
the
at
and
from
made
that
beets,
except
beet
various
in
of
stock
chases
companies. Since the American
sugar

was the sole refiner, it favored
Sugar Refining Company (the trust)
the
cost of its raw material a re
of
a
means
as
free sugar
lowering
15
to the consumer.
be
not
would
that
duction
fully passed on
the trust into the sugar beet industry,
inroads
Yet,

by
despite
Norris believed that sugar beet factories (there were seventy-one in
the nation at that time) were preventing a complete monopoly of the
he favored a small duty on beet sugar or a
sugar trade. Therefore
them in existence "and to save
the
small bounty to
producers to keep
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the American people from the evils that will come from an arbitrary
and tyrannical control of the price of sugar by this great monopoly."
This protection would save the nation from complete dependence

upon foreign sugar in time of
into an amendment providing

crisis.

Norris incorporated these views
bounty extending over a

for a small

16

ten-year period.

He

also protested the Dutch Standard Color Test in the sugar
schedule. He called it iniquitous, infamous, indefensible, and wicked.

This provision kept out of the American market a cheaper grade of
sugar which was of as good quality as refined sugar but lacked only
the color. Since the invention of the polariscope, which provided a

method of testing sugar, Norris claimed there was no possible
excuse for retaining in the law the Dutch Standard Color Test. Its
removal would provide another way of lowering the price to the con
sumer. 17
scientific

After presenting his views on the sugar schedule, he then charged
that the free sugar bill was
proposed by men who did not expect to
see it enacted into law. It was a
politicians* maneuver in a great
politi

measures had to originate in the House, he
intended to vote for free sugar even if his amendment were not ac
cepted. In that event the Senate might properly amend the bill and
the conference committee could further relieve the consumer. Thus
on March 17, he voted for free sugar. However, no action was taken
by the Senate during this session of Congress. 18
cal

game. Since

Important as

all tariff

this

matter was, Norris nevertheless devoted most of

his energies to
legislation reorganizing the Post Office

Since 1910 he

had been given no voice

in the

naming

Department.

of postmasters

nor was he consulted in the distribution of other
patronage plums in
Nebraska. With personal experience to
guide him, he now engaged in
a concerted effort to take the
office out of
As an individ
post

politics.

who had received campaign funds from
that these men were
expected to make political
ual

postmasters, he knew
contributions and that

the public saw little or
nothing wrong with it. By prohibiting em
ployee contributions, the ordinary voter might be encouraged to par
ticipate more directly in politics. Thus, early in January, 1912, Norris
introduced a bill which proposed to
put almost everybody connected
with the Post Office Department,
except the postmaster general,
under the classified civil service. The measure was sent to the Com
mittee on Reform in the Civil Service where the Democrats had to
decide its fate. 19

Soon

after

introducing the

bill,

he explained, "The machine

cians in both parties are
opposed to

it

bitterly,

politi

and some men who
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claim to be for

in the

it

open

will

be
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secretly trying to knife

it."

Though confident that this type of legislation was bound to come, he
was under no illusion that it would be enacted at this time. Public
sentiment had yet to be fully aroused. When Norris claimed many
congressmen secretly favored such a law, he knew that few would
support it until their constituents demanded it. Furthermore, because
the Democrats had high hopes of winning the presidency, many
would oppose the measure in that they wanted to reward loyal party
workers. 20

After considerable discussion and investigation, Norris decided to
bill to avoid the constitutional
objections which
be
raised
his
one.
the
If
Post
Office
against
original
might
Department

introduce another

were to be removed entirely from the influence of partisan politics,
the postmaster general should also be selected without regard to par
tisanship. Norris contemplated providing a ten-year term for the post
master general. 21

To arouse

public sentiment, Norris prepared several articles, the

most important of which appeared in the March, 1912, issue of the
Editorial Review under the title, 'Why Not Take the Post Office
Department Out of Politics?" While he did not mention the bill, he in
cluded many of its points in the article, wherein he argued that the
Post Office Department ought to be a great business corporation in
stead of a great political machine. After the article appeared he wrote
to Roosevelt suggesting that the former president write a signed
editorial for the Outlook upon the question of the Post Office Depart
ment in politics. Roosevelt readily agreed and promised to use as his

had introduced. Thus while Taft was using the
Norris
build
political strength for his renomination,
department to
and Roosevelt were trying to arouse sentiment to place it under civil

text the bill Norris

service.

22

effec
Believing in progress, Norris was optimistic that eventually
tive reform could be achieved. But idealist and optimist that he was,

he had been too long in politics not to be a realist
as follows:
plained the inevitable march of progress

The world

is

as well.

He

ex

of special
progressing and the combined efforts
machines cannot stop the
and

interests, political bosses,

political

march of progress. It will take die crystallization of a public senti
ment to bring this about, but public sentiment is stronger, as his
bosses and political machines, and
tory shows, than the political
one step
eventually they must give way. They usually give way
Office
Post
the
at a time. They have done this in
Department.
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such a

The last step however, will be taken just as soon as there
to resist
demand from the people that the political boss is unable
claim
to
and
band
the
try
he will get onto
wagon
it
longer, then
the
than
more
are
The people
powerful
some of the credit
the
make
the
if
but
right
He controls for a while,
people
politician.
win this fight. It
kind of an effort they can always win. They will
soon or whether it will
is only a question of whether it will come
from now. That will depend more upon the people
come a
is

year
themselves than upon anything

else.

23

Norris' bill, he knew it
Though the House actually considered
he also knew
would not be enacted by the Sixty-second Congress. But
that some
and
been
had
engendered
that much profitable discussion
he
In
aroused.
spoke extensively
July
favorable sentiment had been

a

nonpolitical appointee.
making the postmaster general
the extraconstitutional aspect of the cabinet, he noted
on
Capitalizing
to be a political
that there was no law requiring a cabinet member
the
for
term
postmaster general,
adviser. He called for a ten-year
in favor of

devote his at
divorced from partisan political considerations, who could
24
the
of
business
department.
tention and ability to the
management
Norris' bill was the measure providing for a
Indirectly related to
which reorganized the delivery of packages on the
parcel post system
of the Post Of
basis of size, weight, and distance under the auspices
had been
a
for
fice
parcel post system
calling

Department. Legislation
enacted by the first session of the Sixty-second Congress in 1911, but
before service could begin, appropriations and decisions regarding
rates and zones had to be made. In consultation with David J.
the subject, Norris
Lewis, a Maryland Democrat and an expert on
for
the
be
would
concluded that it
government to condemn
proper
their business, rather
over
take
and
the property of express companies
existed in
Whatever
them.
with
than merely compete
profits honestly

the express business, he claimed, ought to go to the railroad and its
stockholders. Whatever extravagance existed in express rates ought to
form of reasonable rates. In any event, proper
go to the shippers in the
the merchandise were carried by express
whether
of
reduction
rates,
the public's benefit.
the
or
post office, would redound to
by
companies
the
vote
on
to
came
the
time
when
proposition to have
However,

all the Democrats, in
a measure, voted
such
favored
previously
cluding Lewis,
the
on
defection
their
it. Norris
ground that Demo
explained
against
cratic leaders had quietly given them to understand that it would be

government take over the express companies,

who had
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to the best interests of their
party to
election. 25
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postpone action until after the

While

matters relating to postal affairs were his chief
legislative
concern, Norris did not ignore other issues. He was not greatly con
cerned, for example, with the issue of immigration, but admitted that

he favored restrictive legislation. Because of his agrarian bias, he was
concerned that the majority of recent immigrants were settling in cities
and avoiding rural areas. He singled out the Italians, who generally
made their way to urban areas despite efforts to scatter them. For
the same reason, he felt that a
great many immigrants from southern
were
not
desirable
and
that educational restrictions did not
Europe
a
method
for
provide
proper
excluding them. On the other hand,
"Germans, English and Norwegians" made excellent citizens because
many of them were willing to till the soil. Thus Norris viewed im
migration as he viewed many items of legislation as a factor tending
to further the imbalance between urban and rural America. 26
In this session Norris was responsible for one item which was re
gional in nature, but which helped immensely in his senatorial cam
paign. He introduced a bill limiting the right of way of the Union
Pacific Railroad to one hundred feet on each side of its tracks, two
hundred feet wide in all, except in such places where the railroad
had actually used the entire four hundred feet it claimed under a
recent interpretation of its charter. The railroad, contending for the
four-hundred-foot right of way, had threatened proceedings against
landowners whose property fell within this limit on the grounds that
the owners had either usurped or not properly purchased railroad
Thousands of farmers and businessmen in Nebraska, Colorado,

land.

and other western

states were threatened with loss of part of their
railroad's
the
interpretation prevailed. In cities such as
property
Grand Island the railroad would be entitled to take in the street run
if

ning parallel to its tracks. In some instances, streets on each side of
27
the railroad could be included in the four-hundred-foot right of way.
to the Judiciary Committee, and hearings
N.
H.
Loomis of Omaha, chief attorney of the
began early in April.
Union Pacific Railroad, testified against the bill, while representatives

Norris' bill

was sent

of citizens in Greeley, Colorado, spoke in favor of it. Loomis had
in this attempt, concen
sought a compromise with Norris but, failing

trated his

efforts

on Brown and Hitchcock, Nebraska's

neither of whom testified in favor of Norris'

senators,

bill.

and was soon pending
Early in June the measure passed the House
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Norris consulted with
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of the subcommittee assigned to examine the bill and tes
a hearing. During most of this period, Loomis remained in
on the measure first
Washington, trying to prevent favorable reports
Norris
Senate
the
then
the
House
and
Judiciary committees.
by
by

members
tified at

and Loomis both knew that opposition would fade if the bill reached a
be obtained. But the Union Pacific,
stage where a record vote could
Norris claimed, was pulling every string to prevent such a vote from

much publicity as possible, claiming
that the support of Nebraska's newspapers would assure passage of
the measure. 28
the Senate and signed into law
the bill was
Late in

being taken. Norris sought as

passed by

June

the Union Pacific would
president. To contest the measure,
have to go to court and prove the bill a violation of its charter

by the

now

rights.

Towns along
this

the railroad's route applauded Norris' role in
officials bitterly con
legislation, while railroad

championing
demned it. Soon the

bill

became a

controversial issue in Norris'

cam

29
paign for a Senate seat.

While the right-of-way measure affected only a limited number
and other western states, it sought to provide, as
did all the bills he introduced, a "square and honest deal" in
and governmental affairs. Affecting a broader popular base
political
and capitalizing on the interest aroused in an exciting election year,
Norris introduced two measures calling for a presidential primary.
Neither of them was enacted, but they did serve to arouse further
30
interest in this more direct way of choosing candidates.
Though many citizens were outraged by the trampling under foot
of the rank and file desires by the "well regulated and well oiled"
machine at the Republican convention in Chicago in mid-June, the
Democrats, anxious to capitalize on these proceedings, did not allow
the primary bills to get before the House. Norris, equally anxious,
of voters in Nebraska

sought support of his

bills

among

the leading progressive contenders
Republican machine at

for the presidency. Roosevelt, victim of the

Chicago, announced he was heartily in favor of such legislation and
promised to do all in his power to help the movement. Woodrow Wil
son, who previously had expressed an interest in such legislation, did
not respond. Norris claimed that a word from Wilson to the Demo
cratic leaders in the House would have done much to insure the
pas
31
sage of some legislation on this subject
While the legislative achievements of this session of Congress were
a
sparse because of party deadlock (each chamber was controlled

by

different party)

and the unfolding presidential campaign, important
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were discussed. A
year of the Taft ad

issues concerning large segments of the population

few such measures were enacted during the

last

ministration; others, under a Democratic Congress during the first
Wilson administration. Agricultural legislation, of great concern to

came in this latter category, but was easier to achieve because
the path had been cleared for it during the Sixty-second Congress. On
March 29, 1912, Norris introduced a joint resolution to provide for
the appointment of a Farmers' National Cooperative Credit Com
Norris,

mission, and two months later, on May 29, he appeared at a hearing
before the House Committee on Agriculture. In the interim, two simi

had been introduced, one by Representative A. F. Lever
of South Carolina, the other by Norris' friend and former colleague,

lar resolutions

Senator Gronna.
Norris said before the committee that as an agrarian he believed
was the best security available and the foundation of all

that land

prosperity.

He

sought ways of making

life

on the farm and in the

country more
population.

attractive while preventing the further decline of rural
He desired information about ways and means of extend

ing credit to farmers, enabling them to use their land as security.
The need for easier credit was evident to all who examined agri
cultural conditions. Farmers could not

borrow from national banks

using land as security. At other banks they usually could not borrow
at as low a rate as the merchant because their security was not liquid.
Thus the farmer was compelled to sell his crop almost immediately
after harvesting it, when the market price was at its lowest. In many
instances the crops were bought by speculators who held them until
Norris and others hoped to provide the farmer with
went
the
up.
price
credit facilities so that he

would not be forced to sell Ms crop
an inopportune moment. The report of the Country Life
Commission in 1908 and the resolutions of 1912 emphasized the need
for farm credit and the growing sentiment in its favor.
critical of many investigatory commissions, Norris noted
ample

at such

Though

that Congress had sent a group of bankers to Europe to investigate
the monetary situation, and called for a similar investigation dealing
with agricultural matters. Such a study would secure much important
credit institutions, enabling legislators to
information about
existing

write satisfactory bills applying the knowledge of European credit
scene. 32
systems to the American
Some of the members of the Committee on Agriculture were con
vinced that farm credit was a state issue and that Congress should not

commission. Norris countered by saying that since
provide for such a
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was of interest to all the states, the federal government
the expense of getting the basic general information.
bear
ought
Furthermore, he concluded:

the matter
to

We

have spent thousands of dollars for the investigations of
the Monetary Commission, why not spend a few dollars to make
an investigation for the benefit of the farmer, who is the real
source of all prosperity? Make him prosperous and happy and
the whole country will prosper and the whole world will be
but what has been granted to
I ask for the farmer
happy.
the

bankernothing

nothing
a square
nothing in the world but

unfair,

deal. 33
this session, but shortly thereafter
Congress took no action during
two special commissions to Europe to investigate
rural credit conditions. The result was the enactment of the Federal

sent not one but

Farm Loan Act in

1916.

he was with both legislative and political developments
of Congress, Norris
this
long and wearing second session
during
delivered eulogies in memory of two recently deceased colleagues,
both of whom had been staunch allies in the fight against Cannonism.
member of the Nebraska con
James P. Latta, a Democrat, had been a
had been "the nearest
Madison
Edmond
while
gressional delegation,
and the dearest" friend Norris had in Congress. His eloquent tribute to
Madison's memory was his most painful undertaking since his arrival in
of Norris as
Washington. As Norris said of Madison, so one could say
Busy

as

he concluded his service in the House:
His country was his

humanity was
believed to be
found

it.

idol, his

conscience was his master, and

God. He never hesitated to defend what he
denounced evil wherever he
right, and he always
his

34

Several days after Norris delivered this eulogy, the Nebraska
and diffi
primary election was held. The primary and the complex
which was to follow hovered over him and influenced
cult

campaign

many

of his congressional decisions during the long period
to the end of the following August.

December, 1911,

from

Chapter 25

La

Follette vs. Roosevelt

NOBBIS remained in Washington while McCarl, finding it impossible to
Washington on the $1,500 salary provided for congressmen's
secretaries, stayed in McCook to organize and conduct the primary
campaign. This arrangement cost Norris several hundred dollars each
1
year for extra clerical help during especially busy periods. At first it
was complicated and cumbersome, but eventually it worked fairly
well. In 1912 it proved a boon to Norris because it kept him out of
the state and out of the bitter factional strife which ruined the chances
live in

of many hopeful candidates.
McCarl was well suited for his position. As a member of the execu
tive committee of the Progressive League of Nebraska, he had a voice
in policy determination. He knew the Nebraska political scene well
and had directed two of Norris* previous campaigns. Able, hard-work
ing, and pleasant, McCarl was liked and trusted by most political
leaders. Norris had complete faith in McCarl's honesty, thoroughness,

and

efficiency.

This primary campaign, it was quickly decided, would be con
ducted apart from other campaigns. Norris refused, as always, to buy
the support of any newspaper. He kept out of all statewide primary
contests, claiming he would endorse the Republican nominees. He was
committed, however, to the candidacy of La Follette, and intended
2
to further his cause in Nebraska.

At the end
to

of 1911, the progressive Republicans in Nebraska were
their activities. They supported La Follette and

expand
beginning
little Taft sentiment in
quickly endorsed Norris. While there was very
titie state, La Follette leaders were worried lest the politicians support
a boom for Roosevelt to split the
ing the administration promote
If this occurred, Taft might capture the Nebraska
forces.
progressive
The situation was complicated by the fact that while the

delegation.
voters would express their presidential preference in the April primary,
did not commit the convention delegates to vote
the law
specifically

for the

leaders were
winning presidential candidate. La Follette
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could

Norris
anxious to get their campaign underway and hoped that
3
1912.
in
Nebraska
visit
to
senator
early
persuade the Wisconsin
was sure that Roosevelt was not a
During this period Norris
La Follette move
in
was
he
and
that
candidate
sympathy with the
ment. Norris was afraid, however, that some Taft people, realizing
that the president's cause was hopeless in Nebraska, might organize
under a Roosevelt banner "simply for the purpose of getting into the
Taft. Thus Norris sug
convention," where they would then support
La
Follette
that in every congressional district
supporters seek

gested

4

to wrest control of the party organization from the standpatters.
for La Follette supporters, the complications Norris

Unfortunately

and others feared actually occurred. On the morning of December
in the office of the secretary of state
22, 1911, a petition was filed
the
on
name
s
ticket, thereby causing a further split
placing Roosevelt'
was filed by John O. Yeiser of
The
forces.
in Republican
petition
and an
the
of
a
member
Advisory State Board of Pardons
Omaha,
associate of Victor Rosewater, standpat National Committeeman from
Nebraska. Under Nebraska law, no one could decline such a nomina
Roosevelt could have
tion, although the petition could be withdrawn.
avoided the issue by requesting that his name not be placed on the
5

petition.

was not a can
believing that the former president
Roosevelt either
asked
didate, wrote him explaining the situation. He
not
be printed on
name
his
that
to avow his candidacy or to demand
Norris

the

official

ing

it

velt,

still

primary

ballot.

He

concluded that

if

conditions arose

mak

to nominate Roose
necessary and expedient for the convention
"and if in such an emergency you could be prevailed upon to

permit the use of your name as a candidate, all La Follette delegates
would be then, as they are now, your enthusiastic supporters." 6
On January 2, 1912, Roosevelt answered, saying, "No man has been

me

my name

on any ballot, or to get up any peti
any action on my behalf." Previously
my
he had written to Yeiser that he did not wish to be a candidate and
would not speak on his own behalf. However, Roosevelt made it clear
that while he was not a candidate, he had said nothing about what he
would do if tendered the nomination. He also refused to request the
withdrawal of his name from the primary ballot on the grounds that
such a withdrawal would probably hurt La Follette's candidacy far
authorized by

to

put

tion in

interest, or to take

more than

it

the use of his

would TafYs. Thus Roosevelt would neither authorize

name nor request its withdrawal. 7

Answering Roosevelt's letter, Norris noted, "If nothing is done to
meet the predicament with which we are confronted in Nebraska, the
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be that the state and others
be carried by the Taft delegates, on account

result, I fear, will

ranks."

To prevent

this,

237

similarly situated, will
of the division in our

he thought Roosevelt should either ask his

friends to support La Follette delegates or request that his name not
on the ballot. If the nomination were then offered to Roosevelt be

go

La

it, all La Follette delegates would
the
former
enthusiastically support
president. In this way, Norris ex
could
plained, progressive Republicans
campaign with united ranks

cause

Follette could not obtain

and insure progressive delegations from
were operative. 8

states

where primary laws

Despite these developments, progressive Republican leaders were
still

optimistic. F. P. Corrick, secretary of the

La

Follette

League

(formerly the Progressive League), made an arrangement whereby
both factions united on a common slate of delegates and agreed to

endorse R. B. Howell over Rosewater for national committeeman.
Thus anti-Taft men could support a set of progressive delegates who,
if elected in the primary, would vote at the convention for the
presi
dential candidate receiving a plurality of the Nebraska primary votes.
This arrangement, while not satisfactory to the La Follette leaders
who did most of the arduous organizational work, at least prevented
chaos from dominating the progressive camp. It also assured Repub
lican voters who were progressive in their sentiments that Taft men

would not represent Nebraska

at the national convention.
Since Roosevelt did not issue a statement taking himself out of the
Nebraska primary, Norris concluded that he wanted the nomination.

Men who had

spoken with the former president said he was "very
and
pronounced" against the renomination of Taft and
emphatic
did not want to eliminate himself for fear that he might be the only

man who

it
"square" for Roose
and he hoped no quar

could beat Taft. Norris did not think

velt to allow the use of his

name

in Nebraska,

would develop between Roosevelt and La Follette followers.
intended to continue supporting La Follette, and hoped to avoid
than differences be
controversy by stressing opposition to Taft rather

reling

He

tween the progressive factions. 10
Meanwhile, Norris' application as a candidate for the Senate
reached the secretary of state on January 19. At the time McCarl was
results." Visitors were on
spending three days in Lincoln "with good
hand for a meeting of Taft men and a gathering of farmers. The Taft
men chose a full set of convention delegates, presidential electors, and
a candidate, Rosewater, for national committeeman. According to
McCarl, most farmers favorably recalled Norris' position on reciprocity
and Cannonism. Local politicians reported Norris sentiment. Every-
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where Norris and Governor Aldrich were recognized

as the progres

sive leaders.
"It's my
overwhelming Roosevelt sentiment;
a candidate he will secure the delegation from
Roosevelt
Nebraska, hands down." A La Follette manager reported
sentiment in the towns, but the farmers were for La Follette. If Roose

McCarl

also reported

judgment that

if

he

is

were not a candidate, almost everyone agreed, La Follette would
have most of his votes. The uncertainty as to the former president's
intentions was making it difficult to organize a following for La Fol

velt

lette.

11

Aldrich's position, too, was uncertain. Ostensibly he was for La
had been "coquetting with the
Follette, but, according to rumors, he

Taft fellows" to win their endorsement and thereby avoid a primary
Norris was concerned that the governor did nothing to silence
fight.
Yeiser in his attempts to get a Roosevelt slate of delegates on the
ticket instead of an accepted slate of progressive Republican dele
12

gates.

Norris did very little on his own behalf during the primary cam
of his correspondence concerned the over-all political
paign. Most
of La Follette. However, he assured friends
situation and his

support

was

in the senatorial primary in
nominated and elected. Though rumor
that he

good faith and wanted to be
had it otherwise, Norris in

sisted he had not agreed with Senator Brown to remain in Washington
like Norris, preferred
throughout the primary campaign. The senator,
relied
on the Republican
duties.
Brown
to tend to his congressional
feud
with Rosewater,
bitter
His
his
to
candidacy.
push
organization
the
that
indicated
however,
regular Republicans did
harmony among
13
not prevail when offices other than the presidency were at stake.
At the end of January, in an effort to thwart the Roosevelt move

ment

Nebraska and restore harmony among progressive Repub
wrote a long letter to Yeiser calling on him to support La
Follette. He insisted that he would be for Roosevelt only if and when
La Follette were unable to obtain the nomination at the Chicago
in

licans, Norris

convention. If the delegates pledged themselves in this way, followers
men could work in harmony for the progressive cause. Norris,
in effect, told Yeiser that the proper thing for Roosevelt men to do was
of both

to

support La Follette,

lest

they insure a Taft delegation to the

Repub

lican convention. 14

harmony would not be easily restored.
informed Norris that he ought to get aboard the Roosevelt band
wagon, lest the Roosevelt followers find it necessary to choose a sena
torial candidate committed to their man. Norris was led to believe
Yeiser's reply indicated that

He

LA FOLLETTE

VS.

ROOSEVELT

239

was motivated by the desire to attend the Chicago con
vention as a delegate at large and was
using Roosevelt's candidacy as
a way of doing so. 15
that Yeiser

The

letters of Morris and Yeiser were
published and stimulated
discussion throughout the state. Norris
supporters began to feel
that while fidelity and constancy to La Follette were noble
qualities,

much

caution and recognition of rising Roosevelt sentiment also had their
value. In spite of Yeiser rather than because of him, Nebraska senti

ment was

around Roosevelt, who was predicted to win
Follette did not
appeal to large numbers of
rank and file voters because it was believed that his progressivism
was too radical. While most Americans favored reform and progress,
few wanted it in "trainload lots." Therefore they found Roosevelt a
more acceptable candidate, more respectable and moderate than La
Follette. Such views were prevalent
among a growing number of
Nebraska Republicans, but Norris learned that in his congressional
district voters were more in accord with his views. A
Republican con
ference in Hastings on January 27 strongly endorsed both La Follette
crystallizing

the preference vote.

and

La

Norris. 16

Despite growing Roosevelt support, Norris had no intention of
La Follette and he so informed Yeiser early in February. He

leaving

reiterated the view that the fight for La Follette was in no sense a
fight against Roosevelt. Although Norris knew that Yeiser could make
good his threat to enter another candidate in the senatorial primary

against him, he refused to allow such tactics to affect his actions; "I
can afford to be defeated, but I can not afford to be driven by a
threat" 17

Thus stood the

situation

between the two progressive Republican

when Louis

Brandeis gave the La Follette
the
a
state.
boost
Launching his tour in Fremont,
League
by stumping
Brandeis spoke once or twice a day in favor of La Follette's candidacy.

factions early in February

He

A

La Follette sup
also praised Norris for his work in Congress.
His
made
a
he
that
speeches re
"great impression."
porter reported
ceived wide press coverage. Shortly thereafter, Republican meetings
at

York and Fremont, where the Boston lawyer had spoken, adopted

18
resolutions endorsing Norris for the Senate.
Meanwhile, in Washington, Norris was calling for harmony be
tween the Roosevelt and La Follette factions. R. B. Howell of Omaha,

a candidate for national committeeman in the primary election, called
on Norris after conferring with Roosevelt and likewise spoke for har
mony among Nebraska progressives. Norris, thinking it useless to write
any more letters to Yeiser, now wrote to Governor Aldrich requesting
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ranks.
to provide leadership and prevent any split in the progessive
Yeiser and Frank Harrison,
between
a
conference
after
February 7,

him

On

a representative of the La FoUette League, it was announced that
there would be one primary ticket for La Follette and Roosevelt
forces. While Norris was not directly instrumental in establishing
19
numerous letters paved the way for it.
party harmony, his
for
as a candidate
delegate-atThough Yeiser now was eliminated
this announcement. At the
the Roosevelt forces won much

by
was made Republicans in five of the state's six congressional
districts had already named La Follette men as their delegates. The
La Follette League, which had done the basic political spadework,

large,

time

it

the chance of capitalizing on their efforts.
agreed to give Roosevelt
La Follette at the annual banquet of the
of
The

reported collapse
Periodical Publishers' Association at Philadelphia on February 2 and
loss of many of his prominent supporters undoubtedly
the

subsequent

between Yeiser and Harrison. Uneasy
prompted the conference
Nebraska supporters of the Wisconsin senator welcomed its result
since

it

gave tibem a chance

to

support Roosevelt without appearing

and the progressive cause. An uneasy harmony
was restored to the ranks of Nebraska progressive Republicans,
20
though Roosevelt officially was still not a candidate.
had resulted in the
breakdown
La
Follette's
that
Norris
disloyal to

La

Follette

reported

cancellation of his meetings.

He

also reported that

many La

Follette

men had now decided to come out openly for Roosevelt. Representa
tive Lenroot had told Norris that La Follette's collapse would prob
withdraw from the contest.
ably make it necessary for the senator to
While Norris understood that La Follette was in "a serious physical
condition," he did not endorse Roosevelt. In his correspondence he
that
still
supported the Wisconsin senator, though he often repeated
he was not opposed to Roosevelt, who, according to Norris, was
anxious for him to win the senatorial nomination. 21
On February 12, progressive Republicans met in Lincoln to perfect
their primary ticket. Norris received "a very cordial endorsement for
Senator." Nevertheless, this was a tense and exciting meeting because
Governor Aldrich, representing the Roosevelt

forces, took a strong

position against endorsing La Follette, while C. O. Whedon, a vice
president of the La Follette League, was equally insistent upon an

outright endorsement. After a strenuous session a set of resolutions
satisfactory to both camps and a slate of progressive delegates were

presented and unanimously accepted.
This meeting was significant because

among

progressives on

all levels

it
put an end to controversy
but that of presidential preference.
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Both Roosevelt and La Follette would appear on the ballot, but the
rest of the ticket would include only one name for each office. The
sixteen delegates sent to the Chicago convention would vote for the
candidate who won the preference vote. Controversy and animosity,
however, continued over the matter of plurality versus majority. It had
yet to be decided whether a clear plurality would have to be achieved
by one of the three presidential candidates or whether the combined
Roosevelt-La Follette vote would be sufficient to send the common
slate of progressive delegates (fourteen of whom were devoted La

men

to the nominating convention. 22
In McCook, McCarl reported the situation to

Follette

it

was

velt's

)

be "up in the air," as
seemed
to
be awaiting Roose
Everybody
Columbus, Ohio, where it was believed he would ac

in other areas as well.

speech in

cept the invitation of eight Republican governors, Aldrich among
them, and announce his candidacy. McCarl thought that if Roosevelt
accepted, he would probably defeat both La Follette and Taft in
Nebraska. La Follette alone could defeat Taft in Nebraska, but Roose
one
velt alone could score a much more impressive primary victory

which would aid other progressive candidates

as well

because he

Follette supporters but many Taft men
as well. Norris' candidacy would benefit more with Roosevelt on the
23
ticket as the lone progressive Republican presidential aspirant.

could

command

not only

La

Norris, however, was certain that both Roosevelt and La Follette
would run in the Nebraska primary, and that further efforts to get

either candidate to

withdraw were worthless. There was no

statute

elected delegates to support the victorious pri
specifically requiring
that
but
popular opinion on this matter was so strong
mary candidate,
all delegate candidates quickly pledged themselves to abide by the
vote. Thus, if one of the progressive candidates did not get

popular
more primary votes than Taft the president would receive the Ne
24
braska votes at the convention.
Since Norris' name was endorsed by both progressive factions,
his candidacy would not unduly suffer because of factional discord.
If both Roosevelt and La Follette remained on the ticket, however,
McCarl assured Norris, "Things will be in a bad shape." There was
could be made whereby
growing sentiment because no arrangement
one candidate would withdraw, that both must be selfish and consider
themselves more important than the progressive movement. If no
withdrawal arrangement were forthcoming, observers felt that Ne
braska progressive leaders should endorse one of the candidates, prob
more popular, in a final effort to stave
ably Roosevelt since he was
25
off a Taft victory.
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Bowing to the mounting pressure of public opinion
to shift his position on
ple of prominent progressives, Norris began
La Follette shortly before the former president officially announced
his candidacy on February 21. Norris still favored La Follette, but
to narrow
recognized the practical necessity of backing Roosevelt
the issue to a fight between "the Taft men and the progressive men."
If La Follette would do likewise, Norris believed he would prove
himself "the greatest man in the country/" and 'Invincible four years
from now." 26
Meanwhile the La Follette League in Nebraska, rent asunder by
the same forces that impelled Norris to endorse Roosevelt, was del
uged with letters urging it to boost Roosevelt. R. B. Howell, who never
had shown any open preference for Roosevelt over La Follette, an
nounced his shift and thought the league ought to do likewise. By the
end of February, Nebraska progressives were stampeding to Roose
velt, and J. J. McCarthy, the president of the La Follette League,
thought it impossible to check them. F. P. Corrick, the secretary of the
organization, shifted to Roosevelt believing that the former president's
candidacy would insure a progressive victory in Nebraska. But Frank
A. Harrison, a diehard La Follette leader, remained loyal to the Wis
consin senator though he was not optimistic. 27
By the end of February the first phase of the Nebraska primary
had come to an end. Though there were two progressive Republican
presidential candidates, it was evident that Roosevelt was the more
popular. The thorny problem of progressive delegates and the way
they would vote at Chicago had been solved. As a senatorial can
didate, Norris was scheduled to appear on both the La Follette and

Roosevelt ballots, with hopes of getting votes from Taft men as well.
Though animosity and bitterness remained, the issue had become
more clearly defined. Much of the confusion was dispelled when
Roosevelt announced, in Columbus, Ohio, "My hat is in the ring/'
Now with less than two months before the April 19 primary, Nor

who was busy

in Washington with legislative chores, had to
an
perfect
organization and get his record before the voters. At the
same time he had to avoid further involvement in the Roosevelt-La
Follette controversy, lest diehard
supporters of either candidate dis
ris,

charge their anger against him by voting for his opponent.

Chapter 26

Primary Victory
Wrm

the perplexing questions of Republican presidential candidates

and convention delegates clarified by the end of February, Norris
could now pay more attention to the senatorial primary campaign.
Remaining in Washington, he watched unfolding events with great
interest because of the embittered feelings aroused by the La FolletteRoosevelt controversy.

McCarl reported conditions in Nebraska
had returned to McCook early
proved. He

to

in

be considerably im
March from a trip

found men in all walks of
throughout northern Nebraska, where he
Norris'
encouraging was the sup
Particularly
candidacy.
favoring
had contacted men in
McCarl
Norris.
were
businessmen
giving
port
the southern and western counties, but had done very little as yet in
life

1
the populous northeastern part of the state.

improved by the support of Joseph PolNorris suggested that Polcar
car, editor of the Omaha Daily News.
alert readers to possible confusion that might arise between the names
Norris Brown and George Norris, differentiating between the two
men. He wanted Polcar to stress the fact that while Brown stood for
machine control, Norris believed in "absolute independence/* Norris
would create a better impression of the work
thought that such stress
he was doing in Congress and the odds against which he fought. But
in a
attack, Norris had no desire to
unless Brown
Norris' chances

were

indulged

also

personal

2

make an all-out fight against his opponent.
La Follette League had de
By early March, F. P. Corrick of the
He tried
more
was
movement
cided that the
important than the man.
to obtaining
to maintain a neutral posture and to devote his energies
His
however,
enemies,
interested
thought he
all
funds from
groups.

was convinced that Roosevelt would be nominated and therefore did
3
not want to fight lest he lose his chance for patronage.
the first
Norris agreed with Corrick. In North Dakota, where
March
was scheduled for
19,
primary of the presidential campaign
of Roosevelt and La Follette were rumored to be very
supporters
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toward one another. In Washington, leaders on both sides
to compromise to any
deprecated this feeling but seemed unwilling
similar occurrence in Nebraska, Norris argued that
a
avoid
To
degree.
"to take the bull by its horns" and do what
progressive leaders ought

bitter

was best for the cause, regardless of die wishes of either faction. Since
both factions were supposedly striving for the same thing, he thought
over personali
it foolish that their ranks should be split by a conflict
that
ties. Frank A. Harrison disagreed with Norris' position, claiming
vote
for
not
would
who
there were "a whole lot of La Follette men
the Colonel under any circumstances." La Follette's name, he argued,
should remain on the ticket until the outcome of the North Dakota
4

strength.
evaluating
primary presented a means
Further confusion occurred on March 12, when Corrick received
a telegram from La Follette announcing that he could not consent to
slate or to the printing of the name
any combination on the delegate
candidate
other
of'anv
upon petitions or ballots in connection with
his own. Corrick burned this
intending to go through with

of further

his

telegram,

He explained the Nebraska situation
Wisconsin senator, noting the steps already taken toward the
a delegation that would assist in writing a progressive
goal of electing
and concluding with
the
at
Republican National Convention,
platform
a statement that he thought it unwise for any presidential candidate
"the

compromise

ticket business."

to the

that no
attempt to defeat that purpose. Norris agreed
what
course
candidate had the right to dictate
progressives should

to interfere or

take in any given locality.

5

While he admired La Follette, Norris was grieved at the course
he was pursuing. Norris believed that the principal object was to
a progressive Republican
prevent the renomination of Taft by placing
at the head of the ticket, and he had no further intention of sup
the most available or the most
porting a person who was no longer
that he was battling for a principle,
Convinced
candidate.
popular
Norris wanted to do everything possible to insure its triumph without
6
destroying a candidate's chances by factional strife.

Meanwhile, Norris* campaign was proceeding satisfactorily. There
was strong Norris sentiment throughout the state, though McCarl was
worried that the newspapers were not paying him sufficient attention.
The difficulty, of course, was that extensive interest in the presidential
controversy overshadowed the senatorial race. McCarl suggested
that Norris improve his newspaper coverage by returning to Ne
braska for five or six days before the primary election on April 19. By
campaigning in Nebraska, he would compel the newspapers to present
his record. By appearing in Omaha, preferably with Roosevelt, Norris
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difficult and as
yet untackled problem of appealing
most populous community in the state. His candidacy

would be well publicized shortly before the voters made their
decision in the primary election. 7
Despite McCaiTs pleading, Norris thought it unwise to return to

thus

Nebraska, where he would be in the middle of the La Follette-Roosevelt controversy, and
thought he could better serve his cause by re
in
maining
Washington. At this time North Dakota voters went to the
polls in the first primary election of the campaign. Out of 49,264 votes
cast in the Republican
La Follette received 28,620, Roosevelt

primary,

and Taft, 1,543. The results created a sensation in Nebraska.
Harrison was beseiged by well-wishers assuring him that if La Follette
spoke in Nebraska the Roosevelt boom would be "busted." Many ob
servers now believed that La Follette had a
good chance of winning
the Nebraska primary election. 8
By the end of March the bitterness that Norris feared became evi
dent in the Nebraska campaign. W. L. Houser, La Follette's campaign
manager, delivered a vitriolic speech against Roosevelt. Houser at
tacked Governor Aldrich in an attempt to force him to request Roose
velt's withdrawal in Nebraska. Norris feared that the La Follette men,
who seemed desperate and more anxious to fight Roosevelt than Taft,
might attack him. To Norris, some of La Follette's supporters now
seemed "insanely mad" and determined to undermine the progressive
19,101,

cause. 9

In the Wisconsin primary on April 2, the La Follette ticket carried
by almost three to one over Taft. With no Roosevelt slate in
the field, the former president received only 628 votes. Fresh from this
the state

Follette made plans for a vigorous campaign in Nebraska,
an evening rally in Lincoln on April 5. McCarl wanted
with
starting
Norris to announce that he would return to Nebraska to help elect
that his views
progressive Republican delegates. But Norris, convinced
on this matter were correct, and convinced that his nomination was
this suggestion, but remained in Wash
fairly sure, did not respond to
victory,

La

10

ington continuing his campaign through correspondence.
Norris believed his nomination to be assured because he thought
the great majority of Republicans to be either for Roosevelt or La Fol
lette. He was convinced that the support for Taft and Brown came

from the "old wheel-horses of the

party,"

prominent

men

in

many

A

situation in many
communities.
stranger observing the political
that
Nebraska towns might readily conclude
everybody was for the
Norris
believed, would
administration ticket, but closer observation,

reveal deep and bitter resentment toward the Taft administration. In
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did not actively
case, Norris surmised that while the voters
dislike his opponent, they wholeheartedly approved Norris' own ag
his

own

on important issues. The fact that some postmasters
offered to con
appointed by the regular Republican organization
could
he
Norris
convinced
tribute to his campaign
capture the votes of
was
he
Because
as
well.
Taft supporters
against reciprocity while
11
of the farm vote.
assured
was
Brown favored it, Norris
virtually
gressive stand

La

Follette conducted an arduous four-day

To

campaign in the

state

the relief of Norris and other worried ob

beginning on April
servers, he did not stoop to personalities but discussed issues. Indeed,
he endorsed Norris in all of his speeches except that in Omaha, where
he erroneously supported Brown until he was told of his mistake. La
5.

Follette canvassed the state with six other speakers, including his
launched a personal attack on Roosevelt. 12
daughter, Fola. No one

As reports of La

Follette's tour

reached Norris, his anxiety about

bitter factionalism in the progressive camp eased considerably. La
Follette was well received in Nebraska. Traveling by automobile over

dusty country roads, he spoke in the open air and had to contend
with wind and dust. But he spoke well and, though somewhat hoarse,
made a good impression. In Sutton, in the Fifth Congressional District,

he gave Norris a strong recommendation, whereupon the audience
cheered and threw hats in the air. If similar sentiment existed through
out the state, a friend assured him, "y ou would go in a whooping/' 13

As the primary campaign moved toward

its

climax,

McCarl stepped

by taking frequent trips. While most of the reports
up
he received claimed that Norris' prospects were good even in Omaha,
he did not know whether to believe them completely. He explained
his activities

his

dilemma:

have been having a

hell of a time. Possibly you have
a job to try to perfect a sort of a
working organiza
tion in about seventy-five counties in which you don't know a

Well,

an idea

I

it isn't

total of fifty
people. Well, that's been
it for
many long, weary days,

my

working at

ting things in rather

Norris

had begun

to

job and I have been
I believe I am
get

but

14
good shape, hope so anyway.

worry about the

effects

upon

his

candidacy

of the Roosevelt-La Follette controversy. La Follette had
repeatedly
endorsed him, but Norris knew he would lose a great deal if Roosevelt
ignored him when he spoke in the state. If, on the other hand, Roose
velt also

endorsed Norris, his senatorial nomination would be assured.
to speak- on
April 17 and 18, just before the

With Roosevelt scheduled
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primary, tension mounted. The day before the former president was to
appear, Norris received an urgent telegram from Aldrich requesting
him to issue a statement calling upon La Follette men to

support
Roosevelt in order to prevent a division of the
progressive forces and
a Taft victory. Norris wired back, "Such advice should be
given by
15

League not by me."
Governor Aldrich was concerned about a

state Progressive

story in the Sunday
State Journal of April 14,
that
had
Norris
advised Nebraska
reporting
vote
to
for
La
Follette
last
and
all
the time." Norris
"first,
Republicans
flat denial and so informed R. B. Howell, who was
traveling
with Roosevelt. Whether Roosevelt learned of this denial is not known,
but the former president did not endorse Norris when he spoke in
Nebraska. 16

issued a

Norris did not expect Roosevelt to speak in his behalf. He did not
it
right to ask him to take any part in local elections. If Roose

think

he would be more than pleased, but under
no circumstances would he request such support. Norris would not

velt chose to endorse him,

publicly endorse either of the progressive presidential candidates for
fear of losing some of his own supporters. He believed that a vote for

La

Follette in Nebraska might
thought that most progressives

be construed as half a vote
would vote for Roosevelt. 17

for Taft,

but

Friday, April 19, saw 133,603 voters go to the polls in Nebraska to

The total number of males of voting age in
The percentage of those voting at this primary was

cast their primary ballots.

1912 was 364,132.

which compared with 28.38 per cent at the first primary in 1907.
Though the returns came in slowly, it was soon evident that Roose
velt would win by an overwhelming majority. He received 46,795
votes to 16,786 for La Follette and 13,341 for Taft. Thus all sixteen of
the state's Republican delegates would support his candidacy at the
Chicago convention. Norris' majority was not as impressive as the
former president's. He defeated Brown by more than five thousand
votes, 38,893 to 33,156, while Aldrich and Howell, progressive Repub
licans, defeated their more conservative opponents for governor and
national committeeman by more substantial majorities. In the Demo
36.69

cratic

Norris'

primary
first

Champ

Clark

won

the Nebraska delegation, while

Governor Shallenberger,
congressional opponent, former
18
senatorial
to be his opponent in the
campaign.

was designated

in upon McCarl in McCook
Messages of congratulation poured
and Norris in Washington. Norris was delighted to learn that he had
a substantial lead long before returns from distant western

acquired
counties,

which he was almost

certain to carry,

began

to arrive at
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party headquarters in Lincoln. He carried Douglas County, in which
Omaha is located, by a small majority, though it had been predicted
that

Brown would carry it by a 2-to-l

19

majority.

While others were happy or sad depending on the fate of their
McCarl and Norris had little time for emotion.
McCarl immediately started preparations for the coming campaign,
while Norris was still involved with congressional duties. But he too
was looking ahead, particularly to the Republican convention in Chi
cago, where he predicted a fierce fight to nominate Roosevelt. Now
that the former president had won so impressive a primary victory,
favorite candidates,

Norris openly endorsed his candidacy as representing the desire of
the overwhelming majority of Nebraska voters. 20

The La Follette supporters in Nebraska, more than any other
group, had reason for bitterness and recrimination. They had started
a movement which others would now direct and control, Frank Harri
son offered no excuses; they were overwhelmed by the Roosevelt
bandwagon. He did point out, however, that La Follette had done
very well in communities where he had spoken, and that railroad work
his candidacy. He also claimed that "Aldrich men
over the state," and that consequently the senatorial
race had been much closer than originally
anticipated. But Harrison

ers

had stood by

knifed Norris

all

observed the result was "good enough for Norris"

who had

straddled

the presidential issue. 21

Thus Norris, though his majority was the smallest among can
didates seeking state-wide
Republican nomination, successfully crossed
the first hurdle in his race for a seat in the Senate. While Senator

Brown had been

generally consistent as a progressive, his friendship
was the weak spot in his armor. At various times he
resolved doubts by standing with the
president. He had not been

for President Taft

had

it, and more often than not he had voted with the
pro
But
on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff and the Canadian Reci
gressives.
procity Agreement, issues which aroused much antipathy in Nebraska,
Brown had supported the president on the final vote.
On the other hand, Norris, as a congressman, was regarded as
one of the staunchest fighters for the
progressive cause. He was one
of the prominent victims of the administration's
attempt to ruin the
progressives politically by withdrawing patronage. He had been the
leader of the fight
against Cannon and machine rule in the House, a
firm friend of the farmer, and a
leading figure in the fight against reci
22
with
Canada.
Voters
in
Nebraska knew and understood this.
procity

slavish about

In the primary they chose Norris
despite the fact that he was per-
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sonally unknown in the larger communities of the state. Undoubtedly
the deciding factor was Brown's friendship with Taft and Norris' op

position to the administration; Nebraska Republicans in 1912 wanted
nobody suspected of friendship toward the Taft administration.

Chapter 27

Preliminaries

PBOGBESSIVE REPUBLICANS emerged from the Nebraska primary in a
most advantageous position. Nearly all of their candidates had been
elected, and their leaders now assumed a more dominant position in
the party hierarchy. Much depended upon the outcome of the Repub
lican National Convention in June. If Taft were nominated, F. P. Cor-

who had directed the over-all progressive primary campaign,
assured Norris that they would have to "hustle good and plenty to
elect anything on the Republican State Ticket/' Governor Aldrich
rick,

would have a

difficult

campaign no matter who was nominated for the

presidency because he had antagonized citizens representing

all

shades

of political opinion through inept moves and
hasty decisions. Norris,
still
in
with
busy
Washington
legislative duties, had made no serious

blunder during the primary campaign, and was the strongest can
didate on the entire Republican ticket, though his plurality was not as
1
large as the governor's.

A week after his primary victory Norris,

by way of a diversion from

politics, spoke at a large

meeting in Washington celebrating the an
under
Fellowship in America. He had been

Odd
working
and pressure and now rheumatism added to his general
feeling
of misery. He needed a rest, but at the same time he had
every inten
tion of
plunging into the campaign and working hard to the very end.
If Roosevelt were nominated, Norris
predicted a relatively easy tri
in
Nebraska.
But
the nominee, he believed that
of
umph
regardless
"the progressive
of
the
would
spirit
age"
require voters to lay aside
"the political partisan yoke" and consider measures and men without
regard to party politics. Such a condition would mean better legisla
tion, since it would leave officeholders free to vote
to the
niversary of
strain

dictates of their consciences.

a higher moral

A

for a democratic
people. Norris believed this
in the coming election when voters would have
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according

free individual,
acting in accord with
could
insure
law,
only
greater happiness and progress

end could be achieved
an opportunity to over-
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throw political bosses and machine rule, and he was determined to
2
play an active role in this effort.
Observers in Nebraska felt that Norris'
popularity would have to
carry the rest of the ticket if Taft were nominated, and that Norris*
name would attract Democratic votes as well. But as Roosevelt won
more and more primary elections, Norris was inclined to believe that
die former president would be nominated and would lead the ticket
to victory in Nebraska. Norris
reported that every

member

of the

House from Massachusetts, which Taft had barely won, was absent
from Washington for a week or ten days before that primary. They
were all Taft supporters. One of them told Norris that if the delega
tion had not returned to
campaign, Roosevelt would have carried
3
practically every district in the state.
With the decisive defeat of Taft in the

Ohio primary in mid-May,

some politicians and most public opinion began to concede that Roose
velt would win the nomination. After the New
Jersey primary, the vic
torious Roosevelt began to admit that he was "reasonably sure" of
becoming his party's standard-bearer. Similar optimism was rampant

On May 22, behind closed doors in Lincoln, the Repub
lican delegates and their alternates to the national convention decided
to support Taft and then La Follette only if Roosevelt were unable

in Nebraska.

to obtain the nomination. 4

In Washington, Norris refused to prepare statements on the issues
campaign until the platforms were formulated. He did state,

of the

his opinion the most important issue would be an en
of
the
rights of citizens to participate in governmental af
largement
the overthrow on the national scene of political machines and
fairs

however, that in

To achieve this goal he endorsed the widely discussed
devices of the initiative, referendum, and recall, the direct election of
United States senators, and the direct nomination of presidential can
didates. To Norris, the issues of the campaign were projections on the

boss rule.

5
national scene of his experience in the House.
The unwillingness of the Republican machine to yield power be
came fully evident to Norris and other progressives when they found

it

the national convention. Norris soon
impossible to obtain tickets to
to steal the nomination by

concluded that Taft managers intended

La Follette supporters from the galleries,
and
by obtaining control of key convention
by pressuring delegates,
committees. He believed Taft men would prefer to retain control of
the
machinery rather than to win at the polls. He fully expected
excluding Roosevelt and

party

to decide arbitrarily against Roosevelt delegates in disputed
their control of committees. Concerned as he was.
contests

them

through
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Since he
over this situation, Norris could do nothing to prevent it.
to
to
Chicago, in
go
had chosen not to be a delegate, he did not plan
6

tending instead to stay in Washington.
Two days before the convention convened, Norris told a reporter
he thought the Republican platform should contain a permanent, nonantitrust legislation, a work
partisan tariff commission, supplemental
interstate
railroads, the placing of
men s compensation law applying to
new
a
the post office on a business basis,
presidential primary law,
basis
the
on
conventions
national
in
rules determining representation
the control
of voting strength and prohibiting federal officials from
short
the
and,
ballot,
finally,
and management of political campaigns,
in ac
were
these
of
Most
recall.
and
the initiative, referendum,
planks
of
wishes
assembling
the
cord with
progressive Republican delegates
7

in Chicago.

at its first caucus in Chicago
June 17, the Nebraska delegation
censured Victor Rosewater, acting chairman of the National Commit
tee and a devoted Taft supporter. Rosewater found that the delegates
would abide by none of his arrangements. The way they treated him,

On

however, was only a preview of the bitterness and
characterize relations between progressive
8
throughout the convention.

ill

will that

was

to

and conservative delegates

As the convention got under way, Norris anxiously read accounts
of the Republican organization's rejection of the claims of the vast
for contested seats. When he
majority of the Roosevelt delegates

learned that Roosevelt

and

that a

made

men had

bolted the Committee on Resolutions

movement was under way

for a separate convention,

hurried plans to leave for Chicago.

He

he

sent the following

nightletter to F. P. Corrick:

Opposed to organization of new party. The progressive are the
true Republicans. Fight to purge the roll. If defeated by stolen
votes
organize and nominate candidate without leaving hall.
.

We

.

.

already have control of party and candidates in progressive
are the Republicans and en
must not give this up.

states.

We

We

titled to the designation

on

official ballot.

9

When Norris arrived in Chicago, Roosevelt already had received
assurances of financial support for a new party. The former president
had prepared a message which was read by Henry J. Allen of Kansas
shortly after the delegates assembled on Saturday, June 22. Roosevelt
chronicled the outrageous frauds of the convention and asked delegates
not to participate any longer in its deliberations. That afternoon it was

announced that a new party would be formed that night

at Orchestra
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Hiram Johnson opened the evening
meeting with a rousing
speech and Roosevelt announced, amid tumultuous roars of approval,
that he would accept the nomination of a new
party if it were made
Hall.

by a new convention regularly called and honestly elected. Earlier,
when Norris was introduced to the audience, another round of cheers
went up, and he ascended the platform and probably remained there
10
throughout the remainder of the proceedings.
thereafter
to
Norris
felt that the
Returning
Washington,
exciting
events in Chicago insured a Democratic
in
Nebraska. While he
victory
was confused about the campaign and his own political future, he was
certain that under no circumstances could he be induced to
support
Taft after "the fraudulent, dishonest and
illegal methods by which he

received his pretended nomination/* Norris had no intention of sanc
tioning what he considered the unseating of honestly elected delegates
by men who had not "a scintilla of an honest or rightful claim to the
seats." He drafted a statement, soon released to the
press and later

expanded into a speech delivered on the House floor, which reviewed
the situation in detail. "Democratic Tammany/' claimed Norris, "in
her worst guise had never more arbitrarily and unlawfully trampled
the rights of the individual voter under foot than was done by these
had already been
political manipulators and bosses, most of
repudiated in their own states and in their own communities by the

whom

of the Republican party." n
Norris, Roosevelt had been nominated at Orchestra Hall early
in the morning of June 23, and a new convention and a third party

rank and

file

To

were unnecessary. Roosevelt had been nominated without opposition
in one of the most enthusiastic meetings he had ever attended, and
Norris intended to support him as the only lawfully nominated Repub
lican candidate for president.
Full formalities were ignored,

delegates had been

in

Chicago

for a

Norris

explained,

because most

week and could not remain any
unanimous in their support of
and depart as quickly as pos
which Norris claimed the news

longer. The Orchestra Hall delegates,
Roosevelt, were eager to endorse him
sible.

Thus they passed a

resolution,

constituted a
papers never published, stating that they
the legally elected Republican delegates of the National
Convention, and acting on behalf of the Republicans of
had nominated Roosevelt as the Republican candidate for

majority of

Republican
the nation,
12

president.

On this basis Norris opposed the creation of a third party, espe
where progressives had nominated almost all of the
cially in Nebraska
control of the situation. He feared that
candidates and had
complete

if

a third party were organized, some progressive candidates might
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control of
ticket, giving Taft men
the party in Nebraska. Norris, who had no desire to leave the Repub
started it would endorse
lican
hoped that if a new party were

withdraw from the Republican

all

party,
of the candidates already

states like

Norris*

nominated in progressive Republican

Nebraska. 13

condemnation of machine

tactics in securing Taft's

nomina

tion "created something of a sensation" in Nebraska. Upon learning
the details of the Chicago convention, Nebraskans were more en
thusiastic than ever for Roosevelt and looked forward to progressive

convention. The Nebraska delega
Republicans dominating the state
issued a series of statements chal
also
tion to the Chicago convention
the
on
people by the fraudulently con
lenging the outrage perpetrated
the
Norris'
Like
stituted convention.
speech, these releases analyzed
of
a
that
concluded
All
states.
in
contests
lawfully
majority
disputed
elected delegates were for Roosevelt and that enough votes were
Taft the nomination. Norris endorsed these
stolen from him to

give
statements and planned to plunge into the fight to capture control of
14
the forthcoming state convention.
Norris had no intention of leaving the party and no desire to con
that had taken place within
ceal and cover the fraud and

manipulation

duty to expose it and to repudiate the nominee
thought
whose title to the nomination depended upon illegal and fraudulent
action. To summarize his feelings in this matter, he used a phrase

it.

He

it

his

made memorable by Abraham Lincoln:
I am not bound to win, but I am bound to be true. I am not
bound to succeed, but I am bound to live up to what light I have.
I must stand with anybody who stands right, stand with him
15
while he is right and part from him when he goes wrong.

He

believed too that Roosevelt had no reason for leaving the

without qualification the nomina
party, that he should have accepted
tion tendered him, and that he should not attempt to organize a third
should simply recognize the
party. Progressives, Norris contended,
Orchestra Hall meeting and go ahead with the fight. While such a
national level, it could be
step could no longer be taken on the
and
he
state
taken on the
level,
urged supporters to send progressive
delegates to the Republican State Convention in Lincoln to extirpate

He intended to support Roosevelt with
out joining the new party. If the Taft element in Nebraska claimed he
was not a Republican and nominated somebody in his place, Norris

machine control in Nebraska.

admitted his cause would be hopeless. The fate of Norris and of the
progressive movement in Nebraska thus depended on which faction
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gained control of the convention scheduled to

meet on July 30 to
16
adopt a party platform.
Norris was displeased about the role of Senator La Follette, who
had remained in Washington throughout the national convention. La
Follette

had refused

to let his delegates
support

Governor Francis E.

McGovern of Wisconsin for temporary chairman and, while Norris
knew the senator had been treated shabbily, he considered this ac
tion a serious mistake. 17 La Follette seemed to
prefer the defeat of
the progressive cause to victory with Roosevelt as standardbearer.
it became
apparent he could not win, La Follette should have
his
individual
ambitions for the progressive movement
given up

When

While he

still

admired La

his behavior during the

was critical of
and
primary campaigns
especially during the
Follette, Norris nevertheless

national convention. 18

Nebraskans soon supported Norris' repudiation of Taft Letters,
announced that voters agreed with or at least
admired his straightforward declaration. His statement, released after
his return to Washington from the convention, was the first of its kind.
Governor Aldrich followed with one of his own. But McCarl warned
Norris that since his position was stronger than the governor's, he
should not work too closely with Aldrich in the campaign. 19

resolutions, editorials all

McCarl realized, however, that control of the state convention was
more important than the question of Norris' relationship with Aldrich.
If the convention were standpat and favored Taft, it would no doubt
condemn Norris, Aldrich, and others who had corne out against Taft.

On

the other hand, if the progressive faction could control the conven
tion, the rest of the campaign would be relatively easy. A platform in
accord with Norris' views would be adopted and no third party ticket
then would appear on the ballot. To bring about this desired result,
9*

to see "the right fellows in person to make sure that
chose progressive delegates to county conventions,

McCarl proposed
their

counties

thereby insuring a state convention favorable to the progressive
cause. 20

Meanwhile Norris prepared a statement stressing the importance of
a progressive platform and the election of progressive delegates to the
state convention. Such a platform would show that the rank and file
of the party in Nebraska were in favor of progressive principles and
were opposed

to the

methods used

"to steal the presidential

nomina

21
tion" for Taft.

It had been rumored that Norris might act as temporary or per
manent chairman of the state convention and make a speech, but
several friends warned him against such action. Any address would
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have to endorse other progressive candidates and thus would lose him
Democratic and independent votes. While many Democrats might
vote for Norris, few would vote for Aldrich or other progressive Re
publican candidates. Since Norris was the only Republican in the state

with a chance of being elected, these friends
suicide to aid candidates

who had been more

felt it

would be

political

or less indifferent to his

success in the past. All agreed, however, that the chances that progres
would control the convention were good. 22

sives

So persistent were rumors that the standpatters, if they controlled
the convention, would ask Norris to withdraw from the ticket, that he
wrote a letter to the chairman of the State Republican Committee,

John L. Kennedy. In

it

he stated that

if

his course in refusing to

recog

were unsatisfactory to the Repub
licans who nominated him, he would withdraw. If his candidacy de
pended on supporting Taft, given the fraudulent methods used in
obtaining his nomination, he would return to private life. But Ken
nedy claimed that Norris had been properly nominated and that no
state committeeman had questioned his
right to a place on the ticket.
Norris* proposal, however,
coming on the eve of the state convention,
dramatically presented his views and took the initiative away from
nize Taft as his party's nominee

the regular Republicans. 23

The Red Willow County convention meeting in McCook on July
member of its delegation and reiterated his views
a resolution which was unanimously adopted. Other counties also

20 chose Norris as a
in

chose progressive delegates, and several conventions denounced Taft
and the Chicago convention. A large majority of the counties compris
ing the Fifth Congressional District endorsed Norris* position. Mean
while, Norris, who was expected to attend the state convention and
perhaps to serve as temporary chairman and keynote speaker, an
nounced at the last moment that pressure of congressional business

would prevent
few,

if

his return.

By remaining in Washington he would lose
who intended to support him, and

any, votes from Democrats

progressives would support him whether he attended or not. Taft
unless they voted Democratic or forced him off the ticket, would

men,
have

no alternative but to vote for him on election day. Thus Norris
strengthened his position by staying in Washington during the con

vention. 24

Another factor which may have helped him decide not to attend
was that he expected a bitter battle to take place there.
behind
the scenes, he had indirectly tried to
Previously,
prevent such
a battle from
developing. In Omaha the county committee, controlled
by Rosewater, had met on July 16 and called for the convening of the
the convention
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Douglas County Convention on July 20. To be sure that they would
control this convention, the committee
appointed a group of their
own members to select delegates to the convention and a committee to
select their own successors. Norris,
learning of these procedures from
Rosewater's Omaha Bee, considered them brazen
political skuldug
gery. He wrote to Howell, asking him to take the lead in calling for a
genuine county convention. He also requested that Roosevelt write to
Howell and urge him to take the lead in challenging Rosewater *s
manipulation of the Douglas County committee. But Roosevelt was of
no help in this matter. While he agreed with Norris" sentiments, his so
lution

was

"to

come out

straight for the third ticket" rather than to

submit to such infamy. 25
Thus at the state convention Taft

men

controlled the Douglas

County delegation, the largest single delegation. Nine or ten counties
had contested delegations, and in every instance both sets of delegates
were on hand. Indications did not point to a harmonious gathering.
The night before the convention was to get under way, leaders of the
Taft and Roosevelt groups met together in a futile effort to resolve their
differences. Norris sent a telegram which was indicative of the temper
of most of the delegates. He insisted, "Any compromise is an uncon
ditional surrender." At the same time he knew, despite bitter feeling
between contending factions, that the progressive Republicans were in
control. 26

McCarl played an important role at the convention, helping to
Taft men.
organize progressives to combat any unforeseen tactics by
At a conference, the Taft leaders boldly demanded that Roosevelt
electors get off the Republican ticket. Norris was informed, "They
wanted the party name and the party machinery." Rebuffed at this in
formal meeting, the Taft men received a further blow the next day,
July

.31,

most

when

the Executive Committee, headed

by

Aldrich, decided

of the contested cases in favor of progressive delegates, thereby
their control of the convention by a large majority. Once

insuring
these decisions were announced many of the regular Republican dele
the Douglas County delegation in the lead, reversed the
gates, with
and walked out, bitterly com
procedure of the Chicago convention
called Governor Aldrich's "steam roller" tac
plaining of what they
tics.

27

The

came when Rosewater found himself unable to
of the Execu
Kennedy, a Taft supporter and a member

real trouble

control John L.

Committee hearing the contested cases. Kennedy, deciding the
dele
cases on their merits, was compelled in most instances to support
s beover
furious
Roosevelt.
Kennedy
Rosewater,
to
gates favorable
tive

GEORGE W. MORRIS
havior, decided to "bust the convention/' and, largely through Ken
nedy's courageous stand, the progressive group gained control. This
was not the opinion of all observers. None of the newspapers, accord
fairly. But from his vantage point
prominent delegate, McCarl saw Kennedy as the real hero of the
state convention and Rosewater as the villain. 28

ing to McCarl, reported the facts
as a

The platform enthusiastically adopted by the convention was
short but vague as to the test of Republicanism. It made no mention
of Taft, his administration, the Chicago convention, and used no
vindictive language reflecting the division of the party. At the same
time, the Taft delegates, who had walked out of the state convention,
were holding a meeting and claiming that they were the only true

Republicans.

They intended to obtain a court order validating their
moved that the state central committee be

contention. Rosewater

given the power to
didates

fill

who supported

all

vacancies on the Republican ticket with can

Taft. 29

was warned not to attend the Progressive convention in
and
to stay away from the new
Chicago
party altogether. The third
party, if and when it was organized in the state, could endorse his
candidacy, but Norris* job was to remain in the Republican party and
keep the control which progressive elements had firmly established
as a result of the state convention. As McCarl
explained it, 'We can be
Republicans without supporting Taft and that's what we are." Though
there was disappointment in Lincoln because Norris was not
present
at the convention, there was also
strong sentiment for him. The pre
liminaries, as far as Norris was concerned, were over. It was now his
Norris

responsibility, as soon as Congress adjourned, to take his

the people of Nebraska. 30

candidacy to

Chapter 28

Campaigning
THROUGHOUT Nebraska people discussed whether Norris should at
tend and play a prominent role in the Progressive party convention
to be held in Chicago early in August. However, he still saw no reason
to leave the Republican party. He would abide by a recall election if
voters demanded one and, if recalled, would get off the Republican
ticket.

He made

in the recall

this

announcement

to illustrate dramatically his belief

make it difficult
read him out of the

and

to

if

not impossible for the regular

Republicans
party. With progressive Repub
licans fully in control of the party organization in Nebraska, Norris
1
still tended to his
congressional duties in Washington.
to

The

question of selecting a

new chairman

of the state committee

was an important one and threatened to disrupt progressive Repub
lican leaders. F. P. Corrick, who had ably guided the destinies of the
he
Progressive Republican League, thought the job should be his, but
was quickly opposed. On August 13, the Republican State Committee
chose Judge Ambrose Epperson as chairman. He regarded Norris* elec
tion as one of the most important items of business facing the commit
McCarl, though satisfied with Epperson, felt that Corrick deserved
the post and, having been treated unjustly, would now direct the third
remained angry, McCarl feared
party campaign in Nebraska. If Corrick
was
candidate
a
he might place Progressive party
against Aldrich, who
further
thus
and
for
jeopardize
Epperson's choice,
responsible
tee.

largely

2
Republican chances.

Norris intended to leave no doubt as to his stand on national
He would support Roosevelt and denounce the political rob
was perpetrated at Chicago. He was disturbed and puzzled
that
bery
would probably with
by reports that Roosevelt electors in Nebraska
ticket Since they had been chosen at the
draw from the

issues.

Republican

their course in supporting Roosevelt had been vin
April primary and
dicated by the state convention, he could not understand why they
would not continue to support Roosevelt on the Republican ticket.
The only reasonable explanation was that the progressive Republicans
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intended to trade electoral votes for state votes: Roosevelt electors
would appear only on the Progressive ticket, state candidates would
men could then substitute a
appear on both tickets, and organization
announced
list of Taft electors to replace the Roosevelt men. Norris
that he

3
would play no part in such a compromise.

received several letters indicating that Aldrich favored such
an arrangement, but though Norris stood to benefit by it, he refused
could
to be swayed. He firmly believed that some form of harmony
need
to
the
ranks, avoiding
be maintained within
bring

He

Republican

4
additional Progressive candidates into the field.
McCarl, after attending several meetings in Lincoln, confirmed
this impression. The executive committees of both the Republican and
had met in separate rooms of the same
Progressive state organizations
or their representatives were
candidates
the
hotel while

Republican
who repre
meeting with the Republican State Committee. McCaii,
sented Norris, reported that a state convention of the third party
would be held in Lincoln on September 3. At this time the matter of
endorsement of the state Republican ticket would be officially decided
Committee had already ap
upon, though the Progressive Executive
It was the sentiment of this meeting that if
the
arrangement.
proved
the state-wide candidates would agree not to show any inconsistency to
the Progressive party by advocating Taft's election in their speeches,
all such candidates would be endorsed in the interest of harmony and
victory in

November. 5

Furthermore, the Republican Executive Committee, McCarl in
formed Norris, had taken "the proper attitude/' They intended to
the presidential
support Norris and the entire state ticket, including
electors. If any elector wanted to withdraw to be placed on the third
matter beyond the
party ticket, this would be considered a personal
committee's jurisdiction. Most members of the committee thought the
electors would do so, since leaders in the Roosevelt headquarters in
Chicago had indicated that they wished them to. McCarl regarded
this position as sensible, but thought it should not be publicly dis
cussed. Few voters actually understood that the politicians wished to
give the Taft men a chance to vote for Taft electors to prevent many
of them from voting for Wilson and possibly Shallenberger as well.

Though Norris disagreed with this scheme, McCarl thought there
was wisdom in it. Since the decision for the Roosevelt electors to
withdraw had been made in Chicago in the best interests of Roosevelt's
candidacy, McCarl felt that Norris should be less concerned with this
decision than with the fact that Taft voters and third party voters as
well would be able to support his candidacy, 6
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Shortly after Congress adjourned on August 26, Norris announced
that he intended to return to Nebraska on or about September 10,

stopping

first in

Chicago for a conference with Senator Joseph Dixon

of Montana, Roosevelt's campaign manager, and other Progressive
party leaders. His delay in returning to Nebraska was wise politically
because it allowed him to be absent when the Progressive state con

vention opened and gave him time to prepare campaign material.
The Progressive state convention met on September 3 to organize
formally the new party by nominating a set of electors who would
support Roosevelt and Hiram Johnson. This convention chose Corrick
as chairman of its state committee, endorsed six of the eight electors

primary on the Republican ticket the Roose
to complete the list. All other
at the April primary \vere endorsed by
nominees
chosen
Republican
the Progressive convention, making it possible for their names to ap
the Republican and
pear on the ballot in November under both
endorsed
was
Norris
Thus
labels.
by two parties,
officially
Progressive
and the arrangements between the parties had been worked out with
out involving him in bitterness and acrimony."

nominated
velt

at the April

men and added two new men

On

before returning to McCook, Norris stopped
in Lincoln to speak and to visit with leaders of the state committees. To
that he supported Roosevelt and believed Taft
reporters he repeated
made great efforts to clarify his position
unfairly nominated. Norris
he maintained, would be a crusade for political
because the

September

9,

campaign,

and

civic righteousness, a national manifestation similar to the fight

8
against Cannonism.

in
Meanwhile, McCarFs job was to supervise Norris' campaign
He
committees.
state
and
Progressive
cooperation with the Republican
Shallenalso collected information about the less honorable aspects of
in order to be prepared in the event Shallenberger's
record
berger's
level of that of Fred Ashton's, Norris'
campaign degenerated to the
State
in 1908, and to satisfy a request from the Republican
opponent
9
candidates.
Democratic
all
on
file
for
a
Committee

before
Norris launched his campaign with a nonpolitical speech
their
for
some three thousand Odd Fellows assembled outside Omaha
delivered
annual picnic. Governor Aldrich and several others
^wel
No
remarks before Norris started his speech on "Fraternity."

coming

his speech
sooner did he begin than it started to rain. He continued
audience
a few members of tibe
stayed to hear
anyway, although only
and Lin
Omaha
in
10
two
or
him out Afterwards Norris spent a day
leaders.
and
Republican party
coln discussing politics with Progressive
on
Lincoln
in
September
He was to deliver his first political speech
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and

thereafter

was scheduled

for

two speeches almost every day

Norris changed
for the rest of the campaign. But at the last minute,
him to
his plans for the Lincoln meeting because Roosevelt expected

his campaign train. Roosevelt, coming east
spend that day on board
from Denver over the Burlington route, spoke at Minden, Hastings,
on the platform with the
Lincoln, and Omaha, and Norris appeared
In
Omaha, Roosevelt spoke
former president during these addresses.
handkerchiefs and
waved
who
before an audience of 7,500 enthusiasts
Norris
cheered wildly when he appeared.
accompanied Roosevelt to
crowd
the
the platform and addressed
briefly after the former presi

dent had spoken. In

this

dramatic

way

Norris began his grueling

11

campaign.

The next day he

started a

one-week tour of the western part of the

state to get "in good working order" before appearing in the eastern
counties. Nine formal meetings were scheduled. He returned to Lin
two days in the First Congressional
29 to
coln on

September

spend
he was scheduled

to spend a few days early in
October speaking in the south central part of the state before em
Nebraska. He agreed to devote
barking on a tour of northeastern
most of his time to the more populous eastern end of the state where
District. Thereafter

he was

less

well known, and to appear before as

many people

there

as possible. Automobile transportation helped him carry out this
12

plan.

the end of September McCarl thought that Norris might have
to speak three or four times a day. He was encouraged by the interest
aroused in Norris* first meetings in the eastern end of the state, an

By

matched in the western part of Nebraska where voters
their candidate. McCarl wanted Norris to be continually
already
on the move, returning to certain areas, if necessary, to speak again.
By going back to a locality he could defend himself against rumors,
opposing local politicians who thought there was no danger of a "re

interest not

knew

turn engagement." Furthermore,

ponents would be unable

if

Norris

moved

continually, his op
change of sen

to trace or evaluate fully the

timent following his meetings. 13

Early in their campaigns both Norris and Shallenberger spoke
before attentive audiences in Merrick County in east central Nebraska.

As was his custom, Norris made no attempt whatever at oratory,
preferring to let the facts make their own impression. Favorable com
ments from listeners suggested that this type of address, though it
14

was eminently successful.
Several days later Shallenberger spoke in another

lasted over an hour,

community

in

Merrick County, addressing about two hundred people,
primarily
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town loafers. Very few fanners were present, chiefly
was an afternoon meeting. Shallenberger criticized Norris'
record in the Cannon fight because he had not voted to unseat Cannon
and had opposed the creation of a tariff commission. He was ap
plauded only when he referred to Bryan and the Baltimore conven
tion. At the conclusion, as
apparently was his custom, Shallenberger
included a peroration to the flag. The speech was reported to be unim
pressive; at least one prominent Democrat in the audience predicted
that Norris would win the election, a prediction repeated elsewhere
by Democrats after Norris spoke in their communities. Observers felt
that if voters deserted their traditional tickets, Roosevelt might win
Nebraska's electoral vote; otherwise, Wilson would win. In no case
would Taft carry the state. Democratic support for Norris, therefore,
would be beneficial to the Progressive party. 15
McCarl was delighted with these reports of Norris sentiment and
a
by report that at one place Norris was in such demand that he was
forced to make a speech to the crowd outside before they would let
him enter the hall. McCarl's optimism grew when he learned that
Corrick and Epperson were working harmoniously and effectively to
a result, he decided to let the combined Speakers' Bureau
gether. As

businessmen or
because

this

of both parties arrange Norris' speaking dates for the rest of the cam
16
paign subject, of course, to McCarFs approval.
remainder of the cam
the
for
Norris'
itinerary
By early October
for less than two
scheduled
was
time
he
no
At
was

completed.
paign
had been arranged;
meetings a day, and on a few days five meetings
this schedule, of course, did not include the many brief speeches and
unscheduled appearances he would make en route. Sundays would
he would obtain till after the election.
provide him with all the rest
This busy itinerary, however, had one serious flaw. Norris had
found that he was unable to give an effective short talk; he could make

a point or two, but would be unable to discuss his record or say much
of recent developments. Consequently, voters who did not know him
sometimes received an unfavorable impression. McCarl suggested that
when Norris was scheduled to make a number of brief stops, he have

someone accompany him

to give a short general talk before introduc

would keep Norris out of petty controversies
ing him. This arrangement
were
in which local candidates, who might otherwise introduce him,
from
young and prominent Progressive
satisfac
and
proved eminently
responsibility

involved. Harry Sackett, a
Beatrice,

assumed

this

17

tory.

On

October 5 and

was the guest

of Bryan

6,

Wilson spoke in Omaha and Lincoln and
home, Fairview. Bryan introduced Wil-

at his
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son at the auditorium in Lincoln and at the close of his address the
enthusiastic audience called for Bryan to speak as well. He refused,
however, merely motioning the audience to disperse. The appearance
of Wilson in Nebraska was not only a tribute to Bryan but a move
the Roosevelt supporters into the
seemingly well calculated to throw
for example, confessed:
depths of suspense and anxiety. McCarl,
I

am

a

little

afraid of the

this
straight Wilson votes

everybody crazy.
Norris

Nebraska.

am

in

hopes his

visit

many

won't set

18

was much too busy

To avoid

Wilson boom, afraid of too

fall. I

to take notice of Wilson's speeches in

he contributed one
possible rancor,

to aid the Progressive cause,
fifty dollars
tion to the Republican campaign chest.

hundred and

matching a previous contribu
Speaking several times a day,

in every community on his
shaking hands and talking with people
19
the
he
and
campaign.
enjoyed
large
by
Years later Norris related an amusing anecdote, supposedly illus
that occurred during this campaign. A
trating the evil of partisanship,
minister, who had come some distance to hear him speak, claimed to
route,

have followed

much

his record

with pleasure and admiration and to be
The following conversation took place

in favor of his election.

between the two men:
"Mr. Norris,
night before I

I

am

retire,

have you succeed that every
bended knees I ask God to see that

so anxious to

on

my

you are elected to the Senate. Why, I sometimes get so anxious
to see you elected that I almost feel as if I ought to vote for you
myself.'*

"My

friend/' said Norris, "if

you

feel that

you vote for me?"
"Oh," he replied, "I could not do that.

way about

it,

why

don't

I

am

a Democrat."

^

The

opposition, meanwhile, had a difficult time seriously challeng
or
ing
embarrassing Norris. To aid Shallenberger, the Lincoln Daily
Star, a Democratic paper, dredged up the story of the 1895 disputed
judicial election between Norris and Welty. Another possible threat

was

that Secretary of State Addison Wait would prepare the ballot in
way as to create confusion among the voters. The presidential

such a

names were arranged with the

six Roosevelt
Republicans
under the name "Republican-Progressive." After all the
other names on the ballot appeared those of the two regularly chosen
Republican electors in the primary as Republican. These were fol
lowed by six names bearing no party label but only the words "by

electors*

appearing

first
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These
names had been filed as Taft electors, but this fact
petition."
was not clearly established on the ballot. Once news of this
arrange
ment became known, attention quickly turned away from actual cam
paigning to the perplexing question of which electors favored Taft
and which favored Roosevelt. Protests were made, and Democrats
hoped that animosity between Taft and Roosevelt supporters would
burst forth once more into the open. 21
On October 16, the Republican State Central Committee brought
a petition for a writ of mandamus in the

district court of Lancaster
the
of
state
to
remove the heading "Re
County
compel
secretary
from
the
ballot.
The
names
under this
publican-Progressive"

to

heading

would appear as Progressives while the Republican ticket would bear
the names of the two regularly chosen electors
plus the six names
petition. On October 19, the judges of
the
writ of mandamus. Thus the
granted
eight Taft
on the ballot as Republicans, while the names of
Republican electors chosen in the primary would

filed

by

the district court
electors

would go

the

Roosevelt

six

appear under the

22

Progressive party designation.
The matter did not rest here. Wait, a Roosevelt supporter, ap
pealed the decision to the Supreme Court on October 22. At noon on

October

24, only hours before the deadline for certification of the

Supreme Court of Nebraska unanimously affirmed the ac
on

ballot, the

tion of the district court, thereby assuring the Taft electors a place
the ballot and finally solving this complex and thorny problem.

Now

that voters favoring Taft would vote the entire
whereas
previously it was feared that many would
Republican ticket,
scratch the Democratic ticket on election day. 23

was a chance

there

When

the matter of the ballot was settled there remained for
his concern about Norris' campaign. Though Norris was

McCarl only

even half
covering a large portion of the state, he could not speak at
the places from which requests had been received. Before mid-Octo
ber nearly two hundred different Nebraska communities had re
had clamored for a day or
quested his appearance and fourteen states
two of his time. Norris had no intention of campaigning outside the
of these com
state, and would be unable to speak to voters in most
munities.

McCarl had prepared a two-column plate
with a cut of Norris and a statement of some of the things he had
He sent this plate to editors
accomplished and was working for.
Nebraska and distributed copies of Norris* speeches and

To

offset this factor

throughout

other campaign literature.

country editor had told

By mid-October,

McCarl

that he

only one Republican

would not use the

plate.

Most
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Taft papers had agreed to publish it. This widespread acceptance,
plus the fact that the Democrats had to go back to 1895 to find any
2*
thing to criticize, pleased McCarl.
The outlook was further brightened

by a telephone conversation

between McCarl and John L. Kennedy. Kennedy said that Norris
would receive a fine hearing in Omaha, that an address would climax
the good work being done there for the entire Republican ticket and
particularly for Norris. Kennedy reassured McCarl regarding a rumor
of railroad opposition, claiming that most railroad officials, while
personally opposed to Norris, thought he would be easily elected and
would not work against him. 25
Though all reports about Norris' meetings were good, no relaxation
was contemplated. Norris was so tired that on Sundays, even when
feasible, he did not return home to spend the day with his family, but
rested instead in the community where he had last spoken. Until
McCarl reported his conversation with Kennedy, Norris had been
reluctant to attempt a meeting by himself in Omaha for fear he might
not receive a satisfactory hearing; a poor meeting, coming at the end
of the campaign, could hurt his chances. But now he
began to recon
sider. His speeches, however, did not
While
their content
change.
varied from town to town, all were crammed full of facts and devoid
of oratorical flourishes or
partisan criticism. They appealed to the in
rather
than
the
to
emotions of his hearers, and received a
telligence

favorable reception. 26
Besides Kennedy's comments, Norris heard further favorable
reports
about the situation in Omaha. Travelers told of
growing sentiment,
and the Omaha Daily News in October published two editorials, both

well received, endorsing Norris. R. B. Howell,
attempting to sense the
a
secured
number
of
straw
votes
at strategic
situation,
political
points
the
His
conclusion
was
that
Norris
could
throughout
city.
carry

Doug

County, though Roosevelt* s prospects did not seem "overly bright."
With these observations in mind, McCarl prepared twenty-five hun
dred personal letters to be mailed to Omaha residents on the Wednes
las

day or Thursday before

election,

November 1, the Friday before
South Omaha. 27

while Norris planned to
spend

the election,
speaking in

Omaha and

At times, the effects of the tiring campaign showed on Norris. In
the privacy of his hotel room and elsewhere,
among friends, he some
times became irritable, cursed, and
about
driven too
complained

being

hard. But the public and most
politicians rarely
personality. By the end of October he looked

saw

this side of his

haggard and tired but
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felt

assured of

success on election day. 28
Norris concluded his

campaign in the eastern end of the state on
November.
At noon he spoke before a luncheon
day
of
the
Omaha
Commercial
Club and spent the rest of the day
meeting
in Omaha and South Omaha.
Kennedy introduced him to the mem
bers of the Commercial Club. "Because we
disagree on president,"
the

of

first

said Kennedy, "is not to me a sufficient reason
why I should withhold
from him my support." Indeed, Kennedy s help, climaxed at this meet
29
ing, had been invaluable throughout the campaign.
McCarl had yet to finish his work. He arranged for Norris to spend

the last days of the campaign in the Fifth
Congressional District.
There were numerous meetings scheduled, including one at Hastings
on Saturday evening, November 2, and a final homecoming rally in
McCook on election eve. The Chicago Tribune summed up the feel

ing of many voters just before election day by predicting that while
the state might enter the Democratic fold, "It is more than likely that
Representative George W. Norris will be the next United States Sena
tor from Nebraska." 30

Though

the election of 1912 was infinitely more exciting than that
more votes were cast in Nebraska in the

of 1908, seventeen thousand

campaign. Slightly less than two hundred and fifty thousand
Nebraska citizens went to the polls in 1912. Wilson easily carried the
state, running more than thirty thousand votes ahead of Roosevelt.
But the combined Roosevelt and Taft votes surpassed Wilson's 109,109
votes. For governor, Aldrich was defeated by his Democratic opponent
John H. Morehead by almost four thousand votes. This race was so
close that Aldrich refused to admit defeat until several days after the
election. All otter state officers on the Republican and Progressive
tickets were elected by pluralities of ten thousand to fifteen thousand,
an indication of Aldrich's alienation of many voters. Control of the
state legislature was divided. The Democrats would dominate the

earlier

next session of the lower house, electing fifty-six members to forty-four
for the Progressive and Republican parties. In the state senate the
members won a three-man majority, elect
Progressive and Republican
fifteen. In the congressional
ing eighteen members to the Democrat's
races there was an even split, Democrats electing candidates in the
while Progressive and Republican candidates,
Norris' successor in the Fifth District, won
including Silas R. Barton,
the remaining three districts. Finally, in the preference race for the
United States Senate seat to be vacated by incumbent Norris Brown,
three eastern

districts,
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received 126,022
George Norris handily defeated Shallenberger. Norris
votes to Shallenberger's 111,946. 31
Norris was deeply gratified by the outcome. His exuberance,

how

ever, was tempered by the knowledge
triumph was a notable
and
of
Republican defeat
Progressive
exception to a general pattern
carried Douglas
he
that
He
was
pleased
throughout the nation.
thousand votes.
two
than
more
for
Wilson
which
went
by
County
Friction over prohibition between Shallenberger and James C. Dahl-

that his

man, Democratic Mayor of Omaha, helped Norris' vote in the state's
beneficial to Norris, nevertheless
largest city. Democratic strife, while
did not harm Wilson, who benefited immeasurably from Republican
factionalism. Despite ballot adjudication, Wilson's vote was increased
by conservative Taft supporters who resented the liberal group con
and its close cooperation with
trolling the state party organization
the Progressive State Committee. Others, fearful of a Roosevelt victory
in Nebraska, voted for Wilson. Democratic managers did all in their
power to encourage these resentments and fears. Despite Wilson's
impressive victory, Shallenberger, though defeated by Norris, polled
better than twenty-five hundred more votes than the head of his ticket,

and Morehead, with 124,000 votes, polled almost fifteen thousand more
votes than Wilson. Norris was the leading vote getter in Nebraska in
32
1912; his 126,022 votes were surpassed by no other candidate.
Both Republican and Progressive leaders were delighted with Nor
victory. Harry Sackett noted that it had an effect "upon the young
men of the State in leading them to follow their honest and conscien
ris'

tious convictions in all matters pertaining to the public welfare as well
as in business matters." Thus Norris' work in opposing Cannonism

had born

by 1912. Nebraska voters accepted and even admired
independence and lack of partisanship. As one o his admirers,
possibly summing up the views of the electorate, wrote, "We all ex
pect him to just be honest with himself and square with the people of
Nebraska." By 1912 Norris had been able to do just that. He had been
able to throw off the yoke of partisanship and yet to obtain improved
fruit

his

33
legislation benefiting his constituents.
Norris quickly regained his physical strength

and by mid-Novem

ber was feeling fine, though still deluged with
correspondence and
office work. He could not take an extended vacation, however, because
the third session of the Sixty-second Congress was scheduled to con

vene early in December. This forthcoming short session, his last as a
of the House, promised to be an active one. It was also a ses
sion which cast Norris in a different role from
any he had previously

member

experienced in Congress.

Chapter 29

Senator-Elect

THE THIRD
December
to

SESSION of the Sixty-second Congress convened on Monday,
2, 1912 at noon with Senator-elect George Norris on hand

complete

his service as a

member

of the House.

He had resumed

bachelor quarters at the Y.M.C.A. and plunged into congressional
duties. For the first part of the session his time and energies were
devoted to the impeachment trial of Judge Robert W. Archibald of the

United States Commerce Court.

On

July 11, 1912, the House had voted 223 to 1 to impeach the
Norris, as a member of the Judiciary Committee, had been
appointed one of the House managers to prosecute him before the
1

judge.

Senate convened as a court of impeachment. The trial committee
usually consisted of five members. This time, however, the chairman

had appointed and the House approved a seven-member committee so
that Norris and John W. Davis of West Virginia, both of whom were
among the ablest lawyers in Congress, but neither of whom had been
on the Judiciary Committee long enough to warrant the appointment,
could serve. From December 2, 1912, until Archbald's fate was de
cided on January 13, 1913, Norris appeared in the Senate chamber
every day that Congress was in session, an experience which in
troduced him to a body wherein he would play a significant role for
the next thirty years.
This impeachment

trial

was the ninth

in the history of the federal

government. In essence, the charges against Archbald were that he
had engaged in business deals with litigants before his court and had
sought favors from them to an extent that violated the canons of good
behavior and constituted high crimes and misdemeanors. He had been
appointed by William McKinley in 1901 as a district judge. In 1911
he had been promoted by President Taft and confirmed by the Senate
as an additional circuit judge, designated to serve on the United
States Commerce Court which had been created under the MannElkins Act of 1910. Thirteen articles of

with the

last serving as a

summary

impeachment were prepared
They called attention to

article.
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eleven distinct acts of misconduct and misbehavior.

Five of the

charges had occurred during his district judgeship, the remainder
during his circuit judgeship. From the beginning many senators were

dubious about convicting a person of charges that had occurred while
serving in a previous position, different from the one he held at the
time of the trial. 2
Of the six counts against Archbald as a circuit judge, five had to do
with transactions between himself and officers of railroads or their
subsidiaries in the Pennsylvania anthracite coal region, and one per
tained to correspondence between Archbald and counsel for a railroad
company with reference to a pending case. In no instance was he

involved in the expenditure or investment of money, but in each in
stance he and his friends gained or stood a chance of gaining hand

some

profits.

Archbald did not actively seek such

usually approached

by

a third party

who

activity,

requested him

but was
up a

to take

matter with a railroad company or one of its subsidiaries. No railroad
could afford to incur the displeasure of a judge of the Commerce
Court, which concentrated on litigation pertaining to rates and facili

by railroads engaged in interstate commerce. Hence it was
argued that Judge Archbald by his conduct had undermined public
confidence in his honesty and had cast suspicion upon his judicial
ties offered

integrity.

As a House manager
role.

He

in these proceedings Norris played a minor
questioned witnesses only occasionally, but at the conclusion

of the proceedings he delivered an effective summary argument. Repre
senting Judge Archbald, as his chief counsel, was Colonel A. S.
Worthington, a capable lawyer whom Norris would encounter in later
years as a lobbyist for public utility corporations. Appearing every
in the Senate Chamber, Norris, as a former prosecuting

day

attorney and
followed
the
trial.
he
But
had
further
reason, a more
judge, keenly
and
individual
for
his
interest
in
the
outcome.
one,
personal
great
the
Committee's
of
During
Judiciary
investigation
Judge Archbald, Norris met and befriended William P. Boland, owner and presi
dent of the Marian Coal Company of Scranton, Pennsylvania. Boland,

associated with anthracite mining all his life, was being ruined
by rail
road rate practices, and was convinced that Archbald was
trying to
take advantage of his plight for his own benefit. Norris listened with

seemed that in the summer and fall of
Marian Coal Company was defendant in a case
pending
before Judge Archibald's court. Archbald, a district
judge at this time,
had drawn a note for five hundred dollars payable to himself and
interest to Boland's story. It

1909, the

then agreed to allow the note to be presented to either Boland or
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his brother for the purpose of having it discounted. At the time Archbald's note was presented to the Bolands, the Marian Coal Company

was a

litigant in his court. In spite of this inducement to accept the
Boland refused. Archbald soon found someone else to
William
note,
it but, as of the end of 1912, this
accept
person had not yet been paid.
Then just prior to Archibald's service on the Commerce Court,
the Marian Coal Company had filed before the Interstate Commerce

Commission a complaint against the Delaware, Lackawanna & West
ern Railroad Company and five other interstate railroad companies,
charging discrimination in rates and excessive fees for the transporta

While the case was pending, Boland employed an at
torney, George M. Watson, to settle the matter by selling to the
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company two-thirds of
the stock of the Marian Coal Company. If the case were not settled
out of court, any party to the dispute had the option under the MannElkins Act of appealing the decision of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to the United States Commerce Court which had just
welcomed Judge Archbald as a new member.
Judge Archbald, knowing of the general plight of the Marian Coal
Company, and informed of further details by Watson, had agreed for
a consideration to assist Watson in the sale of Marian Coal Company
stock to the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company.
Archbald interfered in this matter without the consent of the Boland
brothers; Watson had merely raised the price to include the fee Judge
Archbald would receive.
tion of coal.

William Boland, distraught over
frantic

when he

his business

situation,

learned of Archibald's interference in his

became

affairs.

He

he thought would
reveal Archbald's culpability. Most people in Scranton, however,
thought his suit before the ICC was affected by his impending finan
cial collapse and dismissed his accusations; others thought him a crank
casting aspersions on judicial integrity. Norris, however, took him
seriously. He had listened sympathetically in the Judiciary Committee
hearings, during long walks, and in other conversations to Roland's tale
of personal woe and judicial disgrace. He had even advised Boland
how to prepare his case before the ICC. Boland's story eventually be
came the basis of the second and eighth articles of impeachment,
both of which the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, rejected. 3
In his summary argument requesting the conviction and removal
of Robert W. Archbald from judicial office, Norris did not discuss the
facts as they had been developed in the case. Rather he came to the
core of the problem and discussed the constitutional issues involved.

denounced the judge and began

to collect evidence
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ArchbalcTs lawyers had claimed that while he may have been guilty of
misbehavior in office, he was not guilty of any offense which could

properly be the subject of prosecution in a criminal court. They force
fully argued that a man may be impeached only for offenses which are
criminal in their nature and could legally be the subject of prosecu
tion by indictment.

Norris rejected this position and proceeded to demonstrate, citing
the Constitution and several commentaries, that a federal judge could
be impeached, convicted, and removed from office "for any act from

down

conduct that tends to bring the judiciary into dis
or
grace, disrespect
disrepute." Furthermore, holding that an official
with a fixed tenure of office should not be impeached and removed
treason

to

for misdemeanors that were not indictable offenses was
entirely dif
ferent from holding that a judge, who usually enjoyed a lifetime
tenure, should not be impeached and removed. Norris claimed that the

framers of the Constitution had this distinction in mind when
they
wrote the section which applies exclusively to the judiciary and which
provides that judges shall hold their offices during good behavior. If
this were not so, he stated,
Congress and the country could not

get

from a judge who had dragged "the judicial ermine down into
disgrace" but who at the same time had been careful not to commit
any criminal offense. Judge Archbald, Norris admitted, had not com
mitted any criminal offense. But by
secretly engaging in private agree
ments with attorneys on one side of a case, and by
continually and
relief

carefully asking favors of litigants in his court, he was guilty of mis
behavior and was perverting the ends of justice. Unless his
interpreta
tion of the Constitution were
accepted, such conduct could continue

unabated and the whole judicial system would be undermined. The
government, he concluded, could not perform its function unless
4
courts were above reproach and
judges above

On

suspicion.

Senate voted on the articles of
impeach
ment against Judge Archbald. While he was
adjudged not guilty of

January

13, 1913, the

eight charges, he
thirteen, the

was found

guilty

on

five counts,

including article

was the judgment of the Senate that
summary
Archbald be removed from office and "forever
disqualified to hold and
enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States/ 5
This trial was the most
important piece of congressional business
in which Norris
engaged during this short session. Once the verdict
was announced, he returned to the House and resumed an active in
article. It

7

terest in legislative matters
pending before that chamber. At the time,
evidence was being collected in cases
involving violations of the Sher-
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The method of acquiring this information, how
was being challenged and highly publicized.
The evidence was being taken by referees or masters traveling to
Antitrust Act.

ever,

throughout the country. In 1912, in the case of the
The United Shoe Machinery Company of New Jersey
et al, pending in a district court, the defendants
objected to the taking
of testimony by the master in public, and the
question was submitted

many

localities

United States

v.

to the court. After an exhaustive
hearing and the filing of briefs, the
court issued an order excluding the
public from such proceedings. Ac
to
who
consulted
Norris,
cording
Attorney General Wickersham on the

matter, this was the first time that the question had been raised. If the
decision of the court stood and Congress did not take immediate ac

Norris believed that in

all suits
arising under the Sherman Anti
Act the government would be asked to take evidence in private.
He was convinced that such secrecy was not only contrary "to the
fundamental idea of our jurisprudence," but would often result in a
denial of justice. Throughout his career he
opposed secrecy in public
affairs, whether in party caucuses or conferences of diplomats. In this
particular instance, he thought secret hearings would surround the
courts with "a mystery of doubt" and
bring them into disrepute. He
realized that there would have to be
exceptions to this general pro
he
"If
our
courts
are to retain the confidence
but,
scription,
argued,
and respect of the country generally their official conduct must be
6
entirely free from any suspicion of star-chamber proceedings/'
On March 2, just before the end of the session, he had die satisfac
tion of voting with the majority for a bill prohibiting testimony from
being taken in secret in suits arising under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Norris himself had introduced this measure at the request of the at
torney general. It had previously passed the Senate and was signed
into law by President Taft on March 3, his last full day in office. Thus
Norris, as he ended his service in the House, was cooperating closely
with the Taft administration, an administration which had fought him
and which he in turn had attacked throughout most of its stormy

tion,

trust

course.

improve the effectiveness of the antitrust law or to
directly with the problem of monopoly were also under
consideration, but Norris' measure was the only one upon which Con
Other

deal

bills to

more

gress acted. Norris desired further legislation along these lines, favor
ing, for example, certain patent-law changes that would lesson the
of patent monopolies. He
person would lose his patent if

power

wanted to amend the law so that a
he did not begin manufacturing his
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within a reasonable time. Thus, improvements on patented
not be kept off the market and out of public reach. Morris
could
items
believed that the patentee should have the exclusive right to manu
of the
facture an article, but that the public should have the benefit
terms. Under existing law, as construed by the
reasonable
on
patent
of a patent could attach conditions to
Supreme Court, the owner
under it, Morris, bearing in mind the recent
the use of items
article

produced

the United Shoe Machinery Com
Supreme Court decision wherein
control the leasing and use of their patented
pany was allowed to
to use other items entirely
machinery while requiring manufacturers
the law was giving
independent of these patented machines, thought

too

much power to monopoly. 7
The Panama Canal, which

interested Morris early in his Senate
this session.
during the last days of

his attention

caught
His remarks revealed his pacifism as well as his maturity as a legislator.
of the canal when the matter
Though he had opposed fortification
was originally before the House, after Congress had decided to fortify
im
it Morris deemed it foolish and even unpatriotic to prevent proper
career, briefly

decision that had been made.
plementation of a

As long

as

we have

He

explained:

we have
we
fortify it,
ought not to
manner. The minute we begin

decided to fortify, as long as
port and

decided to take any particular
it in any slipshod or half-way
to fortify the Panama Canal we invite the attack of any nation
that is at war with us, and it would be silly, it seems to me, to
fortification that is not ample, that is not absolutely
build

do

any

the best that

modern ingenuity can

devise. 8

This pattern of initial, strenuous opposition followed by final sup
view was one that would be repeated by Morris
port of the majority

on a more dramatic scale at the time of World War L
As the short session drew to a close, its time was given to the con
sideration of necessary appropriation bills. Other items were cast
aside in the rush to provide the functioning agencies of government
with necessary funds. Morris, though interested in some of the other
items, realized that nothing would come of them at this time and that

he would have another chance

to consider

most of them in the Senate.

He

looked forward to service in the other branch of the federal legisla
ture, and it was with some anticipation early in January that he

awaited his formal election as a United States senator by the Nebraska
legislature.

Shortly after the election, defeated Democratic candidates for seats
of the state legislature from Douglas County an-

in both houses
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their rivals' victory. Rumor had it, how
ever, that their real objective was to prevent Norris from becoming
senator. If the Democrats could control the legislature, they could
choose someone other than Norris for the post, despite their pledge to

nounced they would contest

vote for the people's choice. This potential threat, however, did not
materialize. Early in December the Democrats dropped their contest. 9
Norris was too busy to pay much attention to these charges. Re
turning to McCook during the Christmas recess, he devoted most of
time to congressional matters, particularly the Archbald impeach

Ms

He did not discuss politics, though McCarl assured him that he
had nothing but good reports about members of the state legislature
who would be meeting to choose a United States senator on January
ment.

22. 10

the end of the second

week in January, things seemed "to be in
the
mighty good shape";
legislature would probably elect him without
a hitch. Nevertheless, rumors were rampant. According to law and
the personal pledge of many members, the legislature would have to

By

vote for Norris, but for the

first time since Nebraska
adopted the
"Oregon" pledge system in 1909, one house of the legislature was not

of the

The

same

political persuasion as the people's choice for senator.

would vote in joint session, and the fact that the
Democrats outnumbered the Republicans seventy-one to sixty-two
made observers anxious about Norris' selection. McCarl insisted that
Norris be in Lincoln on January 22 to forestall by his presence any un
toward action and, if none occurred, to address the legislature and
legislature

11

promote political goodwill.
At this time it was rumored that Norris might be appointed to
Wilson's cabinet. This report may have helped to insure Norris' unani
mous selection by the Nebraska legislature. In January, the New York
Times announced that Wilson was considering placing a political op
ponent in his cabinet and that Norris was the opponent in question.
Liberals in die Democratic party, especially those from New Jersey,
argued that the progressives were largely responsible for recent
changes in public sentiment on economic issues; placing a prominent
exponent of their point of view in the cabinet might lead many such
individuals into the Democratic party. 12 Norris was not appointed and
never mentioned the suggestion, but the episode helped his election
by the legislature to go smoothly even in his absence.
On January 21, the Nebraska legislative bodies, meeting separately,
unanimously elected George Norris as United States senator from
Nebraska. The next day in joint session they repeated the formality in
an election which was significant in several ways. Norris was the first
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and only senator from Nebraska to receive the unanimous vote of the
be elected
entire legislature. He was the first and only Republican to
the only senator in the history of the
and
a
Democratic
legislature
by
His election,
state to receive his election while absent from the state.
elected a
Nebraska
the
which
in
last
the
was
legislature
furthermore,
senator. Several
stitution

went

months

later the

into effect

Seventeenth

Amendment

and direct election of senators

to the

Con

became the

13

established procedure.
Members of the legislature

not signed a pledge during the
voted for Norris; others, who had supported
campaign, emphatically
that respectfully but
him, spoke his full name "in sonorous tones
the
at
their joy
happy culmination of his
emphatically expressed
in the history
Lincoln
newspaper commented, "Never
campaign." One
more closely
Senate
States
United
the
to
a
man
has
of this state

who had

gone
of confidence
people and possessing a larger degree
u
on the part of the public, than Senator Norris/'
McCarl, who was present at these proceedings, summarized by
that Democrats and Republicans
saying "it was splendid." He reported
vied with one another in lauding Norris, while visitors in the galleries
and members on the floor applauded. A large group from the Fifth
were on hand for the
District, including old friends from Beaver City,
identified with the

But legisla
ceremony and were prepared to give him a royal reception.
and visitors were not totally disappointed by Norris' absence; the
he had written to the joint session
secretary of the senate read a letter

tors

confidence placed in him and apologiz
expressing his gratitude for the
15
ing for his absence.
Norris was delighted with the reports he received of the proceed
number of things about his election seemed remark
ings in Lincoln.
when compared to the situation that had
able to him,

A

especially
existed before the insurgency revolt and the broader progressive
movement. He would enter the Senate with a clear conscience, be

holden to no man. It gave him much pleasure to think that during the
recent campaign, one of the most hotly contested in the history of the

he had never been asked even indirectly to make any promise
or pledge. No member of the legislature had approached him after
the election with a suggestion that could in any way be construed as
state,

an effort to control his vote. Recalling the political bartering that had
occurred in the past, Norris thought that all Nebraska citizens were to
be congratulated. He was convinced that his efforts in Congress
against boss rule and blind partisanship, in favor of progressive legisla
tion and the restoration of governmental control to the people, had

not been in vain.

He

appreciated the efforts that were

made

in his
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behalf because they represented a vindication of the democratic
process and of popular government. Thus, having received support
for his past efforts, he intended to continue to pursue the same path

even though progressive-minded

citizens

were confused about

their

future course. 16

Norris was keenly aware of the dispute raging among progressives
concerning organization. As long as they remained divided, he felt
they could accomplish little and hoped that all progressive-minded
citizens would eventually unite in a
separate party. But so great were
the prevailing divisions and so bitter the feeling among numerous
leaders that he did little to ally himself with the debilitated third
17

though Roosevelt considered him a leading Progressive.
Norris himself was confused about his political status. Preparing a
biographical sketch for the forthcoming Congressional Directory.,
party,

McCarl retained the word "Republican," though he was not sure of
on this matter. He told Norris he could change it, and
suggested "Progressive-Republican" as a more satisfactory delineation.

Norris' wishes

However, in the Congressional Directory

for the first session of the

18
Sixty-third Congress, Norris listed himself as a Republican.

On February 17, 1913, Senator Norris Brown, recognizing the
action of the Nebraska legislature, presented to the president pro tempore of the Senate, Jacob H. Gallinger of New Hampshire, the
have them read. The secretary
George Norris, chosen by the
of
Nebraska
as
the term beginning March 4,
for
senator
legislature
19
Two weeks later Norris'
1913, and they were ordered to be filed.
notable career as a member of Congress from the Fifth Congressional
District of the state of Nebraska came to an end, and a more distin
guished one one that would span the following thirty years began,
As a congressman, Norris had proven himself one of the most forceful
credentials of his successor

and asked

to

of the Senate read the credentials of

and

intelligent fighters in the House, alert to every parliamentary
opportunity to advance the progressive cause. Strong in debate, know
ing neither fear nor favor, he had been a most valuable member.

While

his apprenticeship as a legislator
acter, ideas, and approach to national

were already defined. The
States would write in large

had come

to

an end, the char

problems of the senator-elect
future years in the Senate of the United
letters

on the national scene what was

al

ready evident in smaller print to the citizens of Nebraska. Thus Norris
had gradually moved from a conservative Republican politician to a

prominent progressive leader who, already entitled to
for his role in the insurgency revolt, was destined to
the outstanding legislators in American history.
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Vol.
4,
X,
Historical
Review,
Mississippi Valley
Nebraska (Lincoln,
418. Also see the charts in James C. Olson, History of
1.

1955), pp. 216,242.
2. G. W. Norris to Mrs. L.

1894.

S. (Melissa N.) Lowe, September 28,
Here
Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.^
col
this
from
are
otherwise noted,
manuscript citations, unless

George W.
after all
lection.

Farmer, op. cit., p. 420.
Nebraska Blue Book: 1948 (Lincoln, 1948), pp. 341, 342. The 1890
census stated that the average debt per Nebraska farm was $1,517.32.
"Now it would not be safe to estimate the average value of these farms,
even when well improved, was above, say, $25, an acre, so we can see
what a large proportion on the average the debt on the mortgaged farm
bears to their total value, being in fact considerably over one-third. With
3.

4.

final payment to provide for,
pay on such a sum, and with the
occur in
it is no wonder that the years of partial failure, always liable to
most
the
but
to
become
energetic
any
doubly discouraging
agriculture,
farmer." Quote from Arthur F. Bentley, The Economic History of a Ne
braska Township (Baltimore, 1893), pp. 61, 62. This volume provides an
excellent study of Harrison township in Hall County in 1892 where condi
similar to those Norris encountered in nearby Furnas
tions were

interest to

very

County.
5. B. F. Cunningham to Norris, September 5, 1890, October 15, 1890.
The Bank of Rulo by mid-December, 1890, did over fifty-five thousand
dollars worth of business ($34,251 in loans) while its deposits were more
than forty-three thousand dollars. Cunningham to Norris, December 18,

1890.
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Norris to Cunningham, July 16, 1891, April 30, 1892, Letter-press
book. Cunningham to Norris, January 13, 1891, May 2, 1892; Nebraska
Blue Book: 1948, p. 392 for statistics on annual and seasonal rainfall.
6.

7. J.

H. Miles

to Norris,

August 26, 1891, November 25, 1892, January

21, 1893, June 22, 1893.
8. In 1893 the average rainfall for western Nebraska

was 9.87 inches,
it was 11.15

the lowest recorded figure for the years 1867-1947, In 1894
inches. Nebraska Blue Book: 1948, p. 392.
9.

Miles to Norris, October 11, 1894. Norris to Miles, July 20, 1894,
29, 1894, July 18, 185, Letter-press books. It is interesting to

December

note that their lengthy correspondence throughout these difficult years con
tains no comments about free silver agitation among the people with whom
Norris comes in contact, though political comments are interspersed

throughout their

letters.

Chapman, December 23, 1890, Letter-press book;
Norris to Peter Foland, February 6, 1891, Letter-press book; Norris to
Mrs. E. G. Armstrong, September 11, 1894, Letter-press book; Norris to
10. Norris to C. C.

Mrs. Lowe, September 28, 1894, Letter-press book; Norris to Messrs.
Estey & Camp, June 14, 1894, Letter-press book; Norris to R. G. Dun &
Co., November 17, 1894, Letter-press book; Norris to O. C. Sands, May 31,
1895, Letter-press book; L. D. Hollingsworth to Norris, February 27, 1891;
Milo I. Whitman to Norris, September, 1891.

Wright & Stout

December 30, 1891; George W. Moore &
1892; Norris to Rock Island Stove Company,
April 16, 1894, Letter-press book.
12. Burnham, Trevett & Mattis to Norris, October 17, 1891, March 17,
1892, November 8, 1892, July 26, 1894, March 9, 1895, June 4, 1895.
11.

Co. to Norris,

to Norris,

November

8,

13. Norris to Stanley E. Filkins, November 30, 1890, March 13, 1894,
Letter-press book; Filkins to Norris, May 8, 1894, July 27, 1894, October

December

12, 1894, February 11, 1895.
A. Cavanagh (President, Snow, Church & Company, Omaha of
fice) to Norris, March 22, 1893, April 5, 1893, May 26, 1893; Norris to
Snow, Church & Company (Omaha), May 24, 1893; Letter-press book.
15. Norris to Cunningham, February 4, 1891, Letter-press book; G. W.
Clawson to Norris, November 10, 1890; A. Q. Miller to Norris, May 28,
1891; Will H. McShane to Norris, April 9, 1894; Norris to J. W. Brown,
6,

1894,

14.

J.

May 26, 1894; Norris to Alexander Robinson, April 2, 1894; Letter-press
book; Norris to M. S. Stoner, April 2, 1894, Letter-press book; Norris to
L. H. Lashley, April 18, 1892, Letter-press book; Norris to Treasurer,
Decatur County, Oberlin, Kansas, February 28, 1893; Norris to Treasurer,
Norton County, Norton, Kansas; Norris to Newton C. Johnson, November
12, 1894, Letter-press book.
16. Foland to Norris, July 27, 1894; E. Sanford to Norris, May 29, 1891,
September 23, 1891; P. W. Price to Norris, July 8, 1895; L. P. Miller to

Norris, January 27, 1893; Price to Norris, July 22,

Lowe, October

24, 1894, Letter-press book.

1895; Norris to Mrs.
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Arieadne (Lashley) Andrus, January 24, 1895, February
W. M. Davies to Norris,
February 15, 1895, Letter-press book;
December
16, 1895; Norris to
to
Norris,
17, 1895; A. A. Meeker

17. Norris to
2, 1895,

April

book.
Taylor, April 20, 1895, Letter-press
W. B. Colvin, January 19, 1893, January 24, 1893, Febru
Norris to Miles, June 20, 1893, Letter
ary 22, 1893, Letter-press books;

H.

J.

18. Norris to

press book.
19. Norris to Paxton

Jones to Norris,

May

E. E.

book;
Vireling, April 1, 1893, Letter-press
Norris to
1893;
to
17,
Miles
Norris, June
30, 1893;

&

Miles, June 20, 1893, July

1,

1893, Letter-press books; Miles to Norris,

June 22, 1893.
20. Norris to Schneider

& Scheurer, August 23, 1893, Letter-press book;
October 9,
Norris to Frank H. Jones (First Assistant Postmaster General),
Door Company to Norris,
1893, Letter-press book; Muscatine Sash and
October 28, 1893; Norris to Filkins, February 22, 1894, Letter-press book.
21. Miles to Norris, October 31, 1893; Walter H.

Green (Massachusetts

Mutual Life Insurance Company) to Norris, March 29, 1895; H. S. Ford
Norris to
(New York Life Insurance Company) to Norris, April 18, 1895;
A.
T. Lardin, June 26,
to
Norris
book;
1895,
Miles, April 23,
Letter-press
1895, Letter-press book.
22. Norris to Lardin, June 26, 1895, Letter-press book; Norris to Miles,
Lardin to Norris, June 28, 1895, July 5,
July 18, 1895, Letter-press book;
1895; H. H. Harrington to Norris, November 25, 1895.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1. A similar analysis, in
in

(pages 27-37)

accord with

my findings, is succinctly presented
Nebraska
C.
1955) p. 244.
(Lincoln,
Olson,
of
History
James
2. George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal (New York, 1946), p. 61.
to Norris, October 18, 1890; J. L. Lashbrook to
3. B. F.
,

Norris,
scripts,

Cunningham
December 19, 1890; George W.

Norris Papers, Division of Manu
noted all manuscript citations
Library of Congress. Unless otherwise

are from this collection.

Alfred Lief in his biography, written while Norris

was

still

alive

and

available for consultation, states that with the large number of desertions
to the Populist party in 1890 there were only two Republican lawyers left

in Furnas County, hence his nomination

and influence in Republican af

See Alfred Lief, Democracy's Norris (New York, 1939), pp. 39-40.
4.
E. Cochran to Norris, September 25, 1891; D. T. Welty to Norris,
J.
September 6, 1891; Norris, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
5. W. S. Morlan to Norris, December 12, 1892, January 1, 1893; Norris

fairs.

to George H. Crosby, May 26, 1894, Letter-press book. Norris wrote to
and, of course, can not take
Crosby, "I am the local attorney for the B &
a case against the Company/* However, as a member of the Beaver City
Board of Trade, Norris was prepared on behalf of commissioners to com
mence proceedings against the Burlington and Missouri in order to compel

M
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the company to put in a crossing on the main line west of Oxford so that
wagons and other traffic could cross the tracks on a more direct route to

Beaver City. See Norris to B. V. Haley, July 6, 1894.
6. Norris to J. H. Sherwood, September 28, 1892, Letter-press book.
7. By comparing the number of voters in this and the previous two
an idea of how the drought and
presidential elections, the reader can obtain
financial stringency affected the county. In 1884, the year before Norris
arrived, 1,229 votes were cast; in 1888, when Norris voted for Harrison
and the boom period had not fully collapsed, 2,100 votes were cast. In
1892 the figure was 2,125, an increase of twenty-five voters in four years.

W. Dean Burnham,

See

Presidential Ballots:

1836-1892 (Baltimore, 1955),

p. 609.

Anna George to Norris, July 14, 1891; William M. Arnold to
November 9, 1892; W. M. Ward to Norris, November 10, 1892;
E. Cochran to Norris, November 10, 1892; Frank H. Selby to Norris,
J.
November 11, 1892; Norris to Geneva National Bank, December 3, 1892;
S. B. Moore to Norris, May 17, 1893, June 3, 1893; Sherwood to Norris,
July 16, 1899; Edward Alstat to Norris, November 15, 1894; Norris to
M. Z. Taylor, March 16, 1899.
9. E. N. Allen to Norris, July 2, 1894; T. A. Boyd to Norris, July 9,
8.

Mrs.

Norris,

1894; Morlan to Norris, August 9, 1894, August 17, 1894; Perry L. Hole
August 16, 1894.
10. Addison Erwin Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People (Chicoga, 1931), pp. 738-40, for a discussion of the year in Nebraska.

to Norris,

11. A.

M. Robbins

to Norris,

August

4, 1894; Sheldon, op.

cit.,

pp. 744-

46.
12. Norris

Missouri),

to

May

First National

Bank

of

Buchanan County

10, 1895, Letter-press book; Norris to

(St.

Noyes,

Joseph,

Norman &

March, 1895, Letter-press book.
D. Fuller, January 26, 1895, Letter-press book; Norris
F. M. Rathbun, February 6, 1895, Letter-press book; Norris to R. C.

Co.,

13. Norris to C.
to

Orr, February 11, 1895, Letter-press book.
14. Norris to Boyd, February 27, 1895, Letter-press book; Rathbun to
Norris, August 31, 1895; J. A. Green to Norris, August 31, 1895; Hole to
Norris, September 7, 1895.
15. A. V. Perry to Norris, September 15, 1895; Norris to J. H. Miles,
September 16, 1895, Letter-press book.
16. D. T. Welty to Norris, September 19, 1895.
17. James A. Cline to Norris, October 23, 1895.
18. J. W. Tomblin to Norris, September (no date), 1895; S. R. Smith
to Norris, November 8, 1895. Several days later Smith explained his
activities in detail: "I may possibly have gone farther than I should in the
I did not know just where to
expense matter, without consulting you, but
reach you at any time, and men would come to me at the last moment and
or so & so we can do so & so, and I simply placed
say, now for $5 or $10
in your position and did what I would have liked that you would

myself
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do under the same circumstance. In order
quite effectual let me cite to
influence went out. Mo.

my

show you

to

that

my work

certain precincts in this county

you
Ridge

was
where

is the strongest pop precinct in the
of the State Republican ticket ran 5 to 6
German friends were at home- that day. In

County save one, the balance

You

votes.

received 16.

My

Fritsch precinct the usual Republican vote is 10 to 12. Your vote this year
was 20. In Indianola precinct a hard fight for both yourself and Judge
Noval was made you ran 4 ahead of Noval, 11 ahead of the highest vote

on the balance of the
county

state ticket

and 23 ahead of the highest vote on the

ticket."

W. Meeker to Norris, October 12, 1895; W. R. Starr to
October
18, 1895.
Norris,
20. S. R. Smith to Norris, October 26, 1895. Typewritten memo, p. 7,
George W. Norris Papers, Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln,
19. Charles

Nebraska.
21. Lief, op. cit., pp. 45-47, for press comment on the campaign.
22. A. T. Lardin to Norris, November 7, 1895; Henry Rice to Norris,
November 7, 1895; George C. Eisenhart to Norris, November 7, 1895;

Charles

W, Meeker

Hopping, November

November 8, 1895; J. A. Williams to C. E.
1895; Hole to Norris, November 14, 1895.

to Norris,
8,

23. Norris to S. R. Smith, November 11, 1895, Letter-press book; Eisen
hart to Norris, November 16, 1895, December 3, 1895, December 5, 1895.
24. Hole to Norris, November 13, 1895; Charles W. Meeker to Norris,
December 6, 1895; J. A. Williams to Norris, December 12, 1895; J. A.
(Sheriff) to Norris, December 16, 1895; Norris, op. cit., pp. 65-67.
25. S. R. Smith to Norris, November 15, 1895; Norris to Miles, Novem

Lynch

ber 12, 1895, Letter-press book.
26. Lief, op. cit., p. 37. See also affidavits of Norris and two members
of the Furnas County canvassing board in 1895 which were printed before
election day in 1899, when Norris sought a second term as judge in Beaver
Valley Tribune, November, 3, 1899, as well as in other papers throughout
the eight-county judicial district.
27. Lincoln State Journal, November 30, 1895.
28. The Secretary of State of Nebraska did not

file

the oath of office

by Welty as judge of the Fourteenth Judicial District. He returned it
to him claiming that he had already issued a certificate of election to Norris
left

as judge-elect of that judicial district. See
8,

J.

A. Piper to Norris, January

1896.

29. Welty dismissed the action
primarily because it was bankrupting
him and his supporters would not or could not come to his aid. Norris had
some knowledge of Welty's financial predicament, which was similar to his
own, before he went to Lincoln. See M. C. Reynolds to Norris, February
23,

1896;

Norris,

Eisenhart to Norris, February 22,
31, 1896.

1896;

Henry Lehman

to

March

30. Norris, op. cit., pp. 64-65. Charles W. Meeker to Norris,
January
22, 1896; L. H. Cheney to Norris, January 22, 1896; Norris to A. P. Van
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3, 1895, Decem
1895, January 16, 1896, February (no date), 1896, February 22,
1896, for evidence that Eisenhart and others were tracking down further
evidence of fraud until literally the very moment Welty gave up the fight.
31. Norris to S. O. Simonds,
January 31, 1896, Letter-press book.

Burgh, January 25, 1896; Eisenliart to Norris,

ber

December

5,

W. E. Andrews, January 11, 1896, Letter-press book; Nor
W. Post, September 4, 1896; Lardin to Norris, December 31,

32. Norris to
ris to

George

1895.
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G. W. Norris to D. M. Ure, September 4, 1896; Norris to Mrs. Me
N. Lowe, September 6, 1897; Norris to A. Campbell, October 9, 1897;
George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Un
less otherwise noted all manuscript citations are from this collection.
2. Jeanne Williamson, Chief
Deputy, Clerk of Courts, Sandusky County,
Fremont, Ohio, to author, July 13, 1957.
3. See John Henry Norris, Pension Claim, War Department Records,
National Archives. Claim was filed by Mary Norris in 1893.
4. Solomon Mook to Norris, March 1, 1896; Norris to Mrs. Lowe, Jan
1.

lissa

1897.
Mrs. Lowe to Norris, June 30, 1897, September 26, 1897, November
26, 1897; Norris to Mrs. Lowe, May 4, 1898, June 21, 1898; Norris to
D. R. Limbocker, October 8, 1898.
6. Norris to John M. Smuth Company, June 11, 1897; Norris to The
Harvey & Watts Company, November 21, 1897; Norris to Baker Boyles
Shoe Company, January 6, 1899.

uary

7,

5.

7.

March 30, 1891, Letter-press book; Norris
Water Company, August 28, 1892, Letter-press book;
Brunswick-Balke-Callender Company, December 26, 189 l y Letter

Norris to Clara Wheeler,

to Coifax Mineral

Norris to

press book.

West Publishing Company to Norris, January 8, 1896 and January
1896.
15,
9. Norris to North American Review, June 5, 1888, Letter-press book;
Norris to Toledo Blade, November 16, 1893, Letter-press book; Norris to
8.

State Journal

Company, July

30, 1898; Norris to Honolulu Advertiser, July

18, 1898.
10. Norris to Perry L. Hole, September 24, 1896; Norris to Brother (a
fellow member of the IOOF), September 25, 1896.
11. Norris to Hole, March 17, 1897; Norris to Charles Bailey, March 24,
1897; Norris to L. H. Blackledge, February 2, 1899; Norris to George
Williams, February 20, 1899; Norris to E. N. Rakestraw, April 15, 1899;
Norris to Dr. Lucas, April 29, 1899; Norris to W. S. Morlan, April 29, 1899,
12. Hole to Norris, July 1, 1899; Norris to A. H. Andrus, August 21,

1897; Norris to Rakestraw, April 15, 1899.
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Lowe to Norris, May 29, 1893; Norris to F. C. Schroeder, June
1898; Grant D. Harrington to Norris, November 20, 1897; Norris to
Morland, November 16, 1897; Norris to C. L. Kinney, February 17, 1898;
Norris to Mrs. Lowe, May 4, 1898; William A. Poynter (Governor) to
13. Mrs.

6,

Norris, November 13, 1899; Norris to Poynter, November 24, 1899.
14. E. A. Armstrong Company to Norris, July 22, 1892; J. E. Coapar to
8, 1892; J. A. Miller to Norris, March 18, 1896; Norris
C.
Eisenhart,
George
January 8, 1897; Norris to Hole, September 16,
1897, September 10, 1899; Norris to C. K. Wilbur, July 21, 1898; Norris

Norris,

December

to

to

L

P. Gage, October 7, 1898.

Lowe, January 7, 1897, Letter-press book.
Lowe, January 7, 1897, Letter-press book. By July,
1898, he had paid back most of the money he had borrowed from her.
See Norris to Mrs. Lowe, July 25, 1898.
17. Norris to W. S. Colvin, July 15, 1896; Stull Brothers to Norris, Octo
ber 31, 1896; R. E. Moore to Norris, October 31, 1896; Norris to J. W.
15. Norris to Mrs.

16. Norris to Mrs.

Tomblin, November 12, 1896, Letter-press book.
18. Norris to H. C. Fletcher, March 27, 1897; Norris to J. E. Axtell,
April 14, 1898; Norris to E. A. Wyatt, July 27, 1897; Norris to A. Lofgreen,
February 23, 1898; Norris to Secretary of Agriculture, December 26, 1897.
19. Norris to J. W. Thayer, January 6, 1898, March 9, 1899; Norris to
Daniel Bisbee, December 12, 1899; Norris to J. W. Holt, February 2, 1898;
Norris to Arie Andrus, February 3, 1898; Norris to J. H. Miles,
February
17, 1898, April 8, 1898, May 4, 1898.
20. Norris to M. J. Evans, August 11, 1897; Norris to Mrs. Eva Kene-

September 28, 1897; Hole

strick,

to Norris,

March

July 28, 1899.
21. Norris to Albert Andrus,
January 18, 1897.
22. Norris to Miles, March 15, 1898; Norris to
28, 1898.

1,

1898; Norris to Holt,

W.

B. Whitney,

March

23. Norris to Frank Neubauer, December 12, 1898; Norris to
George
Zulauf, December 12, 1898; Norris to C. P. Lashley, February 14, 1899;
Norris to Creamery Package
2, 1899; Norris to Rake-

Company, February
March 30, 1899; Norris

straw, April 15, 1899; Norris to Miles,

to

& Marmon Company, June 5, 1899.
24. G. W. Shafer to T.
J. Cress,

Nordyke

June 24, 1899; Norris to W. P. Slocum,
June 24, 1899; Norris to Cress, June 30, 1899; Norris to Miles Tulv
J 24 '
1899.
25. Norris to

W. W.

Tallman, September 11, 1899,

December

18, 1899,

December 28, 1899.
26.

H. H. Harrington

to Norris,
January 26, 1896; A. T. Lardin to Norris,
30, 1896, May 23, 1896; Norris to Lardin, October 8, 1896; Norris
to E. E. Smith,
January 12, 1897; Norris to A. J. Cole, November 9, 1899;
Fleming Brothers (Western managers of Mutual Life Insurance

March

of

New

York) to Norris, November 24, 1899.

Company
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6 (pages 46-54)

Norris, Fighting Liberal

(New

York, 1946), p. 69.

2. Ibid., p. 69.
3.

Mark De Wolfe Howe,

Justice Oliver

Wendell Holmes: The Shaping

Years 1841-1870

(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957), Vol.
Holmes' review appeared in The American Law Review, Vol.

I,

Ill,

p.

278.

January,

1869, p. 357.
4.

I

have

relied heavily for the material in this

paragraph upon the

insights contained in William Dudley Foulke, A Hoosier Autobiography
(New York, 1922), p. 42. For the quote by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
see Howe, op. cit., p. 250.
5. Norris to F. C. Krotter, July 23, 1896, Letter-press book; George W.
Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Unless other
wise noted all manuscript citations are from this collection.
6. E. J. Dudley to Norris, May 17, 1896; Norris to A. E.
cember 31, 1897; Norris to J. D. Shahan, March 9, 1899.

Bailer,

De

7. Norris, op. cit., p. 70.
8. Ibid., pp. 70-71.
9. W. F. Button to Norris, January 13, 1896; W. S. Morlan to Norris,
February 2, 1896; F. M. Flausburg to Norris, February 3, 1896; F. B.
Sheldon and E. E. Harden to Norris, February 6, 1896; N. S. Harwood to
Norris, February 7, 1896; Norris to H. W. Sipe, November 27, 1896,

Letter-press book.
10. L. H. Cheney to Norris, January 22,
Norris, January 23, 1896; J. W.
to J. E. Cochran, August 5, 1896.

Hann

1896; T. L. Warrington to
March 10, 1896; Norris

to Norris,

11. Harlow W. Keyes to Norris, October 2, 1896; Norris, op. cit., pp.
72-77; Alfred Lief, Democracy's Norm (New York, 1939), pp. 48-51.
12.

Morlan

to Norris, July 29, 1896,

December

15, 1896.

W.

E. Andrews, January 11, 1896, Letter-press book.
14. Norris to Andrews, July 15, 1896.

13. Norris to

W.

Meiklejohn to Norris, January 21, 1896; D. F. Smith to Norris,
1896; A. C. Wright to Norris, March 24, 1896; Lon Cone to
Norris, April 6, 1896; Norris to Charles F. Manderson, September 21, 1896;
Norris to G. W. Post, September 4, 1896; Post to Norris, September 8,
15. G.

February

6,

1896.

November 27, 1896; Norris to John M.
1896.
27,
17. John H. Christner to Norris, October 18, 1897; Norris to Andrews,
September 16, 1897; A. E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People
(Chicago, 1931), p. 767,
16. Norris to A.

T. Lardin,

Thurston, November

18.

H. H. Taylor

November

8,

1897.

to Norris,

November

5,

1897; H. A.

Rowe

to Norris,
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H. H. Taylor, November 11, 1897; for the Bartley and
see A. E. Sheldon, op. tit., pp. 767, 772-73, 788, 810.
Van Patten,
20. Norris to M. L. Hayward, July 2, 1898; Norris to W. V.
elected in 1899, died before he could be sworn
1899.
19. Norris to

Moore matter

Hayward,
February 15,
in as a senator and the governor chose the defeated candidate, Populist
election could be held; Norris to G. H,
W. V.
to serve until a
Allen,

special

Thummel, October 22, 1898.
21. I. P. Gage to Norris, September

3,

1898; Perry L. Hole to Norris,

February 10, 1899.
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Norris to Perry L. Hole, February 15, 1899; George Williams
W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Divi

February 22, 1899, George

Unless otherwise noted
Library of Congress.

sion,

all

manuscript citations

are from this collection.
2.

Norris to P.

W.

Scott, July 7, 1899.

Norris to Eisenhart,
George Eisenhart to Norris, August 1, 1899;
1899.
August 16,
4. Eisenhart to Norris, August 20, 1899; Norris to A. A. White, Sep
tember 7, 1899; Norris to Scott, September 8, 1899.
3.

5. Scott to Norris,

September 10, 1899.

L. H. Cheney to Norris, September 19, 1899; Norris to G. W. Dow,
1899.
September 11, 1899; Norris to J. L. McPheeley, September 11,
7. O. L. Burson to Norris, October 12, 1899; Charles W. Meeker to
1899.
Norris, October 7, 1899; C. C. Vennum to Norris, October 27,
1899.
October
October
28,
Vennum
to
8.
27, 1899,
Norris,
6.

9.

Vennum

to Norris, October 31, 1899; Williams to Norris,

October

28, 1899.
10. C.

W. Meeker

to Norris,

October 31, 1899;

Vennum

to Norris,

Octo

ber 31, 1899.
11.

Vennum

to Norris,

October 31, 1899.

12. Williams to Norris,

vember

November

8,

1899; D. T. Welty to Norris,

No

10, 1899.

Foss, November 13, 1899; Norris to Stanley E. Fil24, 1899; Norris to Hole, December 12, 1899.
kins,
14. Norris to Welty, November 13, 1899; Statement and Affidavit of
13. Norris to F.

L

November

Election Expenses, Notarized November 13, 1899.
15. Cyrus E. Watson, Nebraska's Industries and Resources

(Lincoln,

1902), pp. 138, 230-31; See Norris to Lizzie Tuck, March 10, 1900, where
Norris gives his reason for moving to McCook.
16. Norris to C. H. Wilson, February 13, 1900, May 5, 1900; Norris to
J.

to

F. Fults, April 7, 1900; Norris to O. E. Champe, April 19, 1900; Norris
W. L. Leonard, May 3, 1900.
17. Norris to

M.

F.

Doud, April

19, 1900.

.

-
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J. W.

Gull, July 25, 1900.
19. Norris to Williams, July 7, 1900; Norris to J. W. Holt, June 23, 1900.
20. Norris to Judge o Probate Court, Fremont, Ohio, June 11, 1900;
Mrs. Melissa N. Lowe to Norris, October 4, 1900.

21. Roscoe Lashley to Norris,

August 14, 1900; Norris to A. A. McCoy,
The dry weather and the failure of the wheat crop bank
rupted W. W. Tallman who had rented the Beaver City mill owned by
Norris and Shafer. In mid-October it was leased to another tenant. See

August

16, 1900.

Norris to Western Mutual Millers Insurance
22. Norris to R. C. Orr,

tember

9,

September

9,

Company, October

12, 1900.

1900; Norris to T. A. Boyd, Sep

1900.

M. Riggs, September 11, 1900; Norris to J. O.
Hane, September 10, 1900.
24. Norris to Riggs, September 11, 1900; Norris to H. C. Lindsay, Octo
ber 25, 1900; Norris to C. H. Dietrich, January 11, 1901; Norris to C. A.
23. Norris to Charles

Ferrand, November 3, 1900.
25. Norris to C. E. Hopping,

November 21, 1900; Norris to John M.
Thurston, December 27, 1900; Wilson to Norris, November 10, 1900;
Norris to J. H. Miles, November 24, 1900, December 21, 1900.
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1. G. W. Norris to F. I. Foss,
January 18, 1901; E. N. Allen to Norris,
January 17, 1901; Norris to Allen, January 31, 1901. George W, Norris
papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Unless otherwise noted,
all manuscript citations are from this collection.
2. Norris to H. M. Sullivan, February 2, 1901; Norris to J. W. Holt,
March 11, 1901; Norris to W. F. Wood, March 6, 1901.

Norris, March 29, 1901, March 31, 1901.
to Norris, April 8, 1901; Norris to G. W. Holdrege,
April 14, 1901; Mrs. A. J. Green to Norris, May 5, 1901.
5. Arie Andrus to Norris, May 22, 1901, July 15, 1901.

Green to

3.

A.

4.

Emma McKean

J.

6. A. J. Green to Norris, July 1, 1901; Perry L. Hole to Norris, June 5,
1901; Norris to Thomas Kirtley, July 9, 1901; Sara S. Harrington to Norris,
July 22, 1901; Norris to W. A. McCarl, August 23, 1901; Norris to Arie
Andrus, May 29, 1901.
7. Norris to J. C. Gammill, April 25, 1901; Norris to J. H. Miles, April

13, 1901.

Norris to C. H. Dietrich, September 30, 1901.
Norris to Dietrich, September 30, 1901; Norris to Fletcher W. Merwin, September 30, 1901; Norris to A. Bonham, October 3, 1901; Norris to
C. C. Green, November 6, 1901.
8.

9.

10. Norris to Hole, December 9, 1901.
11. Norris to Miles, November 19, 1901, June 5, 1902; Norris to Fred
D. Webster, April 1, 1902; Norris to Mrs. Knowles, February 5, 1902.
12. Norris to T.

Sumney, November 25 1901; Norris
?

to

G.

W.

Shafer,
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November 25, 1901; Norris to A. P. Hyatt, June 3, 1902; Norris to Stanley
E. Filkins, January 30, 1902.
13. Ella Leonard to Norris, January 28, 1902; Norris to H. J. Thorpe,
April 29, 1902.
14. Fletcher

W. Merwin to

Merwin

15.

to Norris,

Norris,

February

February
6,

6,

1902.

1902; Norris to Merwin, February

10, 1902.
16. Norris to
kins,

February

Walker Smith, February

11, 1902; Norris to

George Jud-

14, 1902.

17. Norris to

H. M. Grimes, February 11, 1902, February 15, 1902.
H. Tanner, March 10, 1902; Norris to E. C. Shobell,

18. Norris to C.

March 25, 1902.
19. Norris to A. J. Green, April 1, 1902; Norris to Merwin, April 1,
1902; Norris to Mrs. Watie Van Patten, April 8, 1902.
20. Norris to Walker Smith, May 3, 1902; Norris to Merwin, May 13,
1902.
21. Merwin to Norris, May 12, 1902; Norris to Hole, May 13, 1902.
22. Nebraska State Journal, May 21, 1902; Norris to Walker Smith,

May

May 21, 1902.
Sanders,
June 3, 1902; Norris to
John

20, 1902; Norris to Hole,

23. Norris to

W.

A. McCool, June

1902; H. M. Crane to Norris, June 12, 1902; Nebraska State Journal,
June 11, 1902.
24. Nebraska Blue Book: 1948 (Lincoln, 1945), p. 392.
25. Norris to Crane, June 18, 1902. Norris at first thought the chairman

4,

be a resident of Hastings which
be the capital of the district," but
on account of the many factional differences there he soon concluded that
he could not select anyone there who would prove satisfactory to all of
the Republicans even of Hastings. He offered the position to E. G. Titus
of Holdrege before finally choosing Merwin. See G. W. Norris to E. G.

of the congressional committee should
<c
seemed to him by common consent to

June 21, 1902.
26. Norris to F. J. Coates, June 19, 1902.
27. Norris to S. C. Brady, June 25, 1902; Norris to

Titus,

J.

D.

Stine,

June 26,

1902.
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9 (pages 71-78)

W. Lindsay, July 28, 1902; George W.
Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Unless otherwise
noted, all manuscript citations are from this collection.
2. Norris to Elliott Lowe,
July 1, 1902.
1.

Norris to C.

Norris to C. P. Schwer, July 22, 1902; Norris to W. B. Ireland,
August 19, 1902; Norris to M. B. Carman, September 16, 1902; Norris to
J. S. Hoagland, September 20, 1902.
3.

4. J.

M. Hollingsworth

to Norris,

September 24, 1902; E. V. Overman
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September 29, 1902, October 17, 1902; A. Galusha to Norris,
October 17, 1902.
5. Norris to G. W.
Holdrege, July 10, 1902.
6. The Swanson Reservoir near Trenton in Hitchcock
County was com

to Norris,

pleted after World War II.
7. Norris to E. A. Hitchcock,
August 15, 1902; Norris to H. C. Lindsay,
Norris
to
H.
C.
15,
1902;
Dietrich, August 15, 1902.
August
8. Dietrich to Norris,
September 29, 1902.
9. Dietrich to Norris,
August 2, 1902.
10. Dietrich to Norris,
August 8, 1902,

August 10, 1902, August 14,
1902; A. H. Clarke to Dietrich, August 9, 1902 (copy in Norris papers).
11. Norris to Dietrich, August 30, 1902; W. S.
Shallenberger to Dietrich,
September 4, 1902.
12. Dietrich to Norris, September 23, 1902,
September 28, 1902, Sep
tember 29, 1902, October 17, 1902, October 21, 1902; Norris to C. W.
McConaughy, September 20, 1902; J. L. Lashbrook to Norris, September

29, 1902.
13. Norris to

W. Babcock, September 8, 1902; Norris, Fighting Liberal
J.
1946), p. 93.
14. Typewritten resume of the
early career of Norris, p. 8, for informa
tion about Champ Clark. George W. Norris Papers, Nebraska Historical

(New York,

Society, Lincoln, Nebraska; David H. Mercer to Norris, October 17, 1902;
Harlow W. Keyes to Norris, October 18, 1902; Norris, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
The Republican press in the district unmercifully attacked Shallenberger's
banking connections. For example, the Superior Journal, in its issue of July

Congressman Shallenberger take his name out of
bank advertisement in his home paper this year?
He resorted to this cheap trick two years ago." This same paper also argued
on its editorial page on August 7, 1902, "The result of the elections in
November can not change the complexion of either branch of Congress;
both will remain Republican. The Fifth Nebraska District consequently
should make sure to send up a representative belonging to the dominant
party, who can accomplish something for the district after he is elected/
See also editorial on September 4, 1902.
10, 1902, asked, "Will

the

list

of officers in his

7

August 30, 1902; Norris to J. W. Hamm,
R. Mercer, September 27, 1902; George
J.
Eisenhart to A. T. McCoy, September 27, 1902. Norris received the support
of many small town Republican newspapers of which the following are
a partial listing: the Superior Journal, the Hildreth Telescope, the Holdrege
Citizen, the Edgar Post, the Oxford Standard, the Franklin Free Press,
the Benkelman News, the Alma Journal in Shallenberger's home town, the
Cambridge Clarion, the Hastings Tribune, the McCook Republican, and the
15. Norris to F. B. Johnson,
September 27, 1902; Norris to

McCook Tribune.
16. Norris, op.
17.

cit,,

p. 90.
to Norris,

George A. Allen

September 26, 1902, October

3,

1902.
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career of Norris, p. 8. Copy in Nebraska
Typewritten resume of the early
October
Historical Society. For Welty's statement see the Benkelman News,

17 1902
Will Brookley to Fletcher W. Merwin, September 30, 1902, Octo
October 9, 1902, Octo
9, 1902; A. B. Allen to Norris, October 8, 1902,
ber 13, 1902; Galusha to Norris, October 17, 1902; J. B. Dinsmore to
October 18, 1902.
Norris, October 8, 1902; Keyes to Norris,
18.

ber

October 23, 1902.
to Norris, October 23, 1902. See also the Franklin
Allen
A.
George
Free Press, October 24, 1902, for an account of Norris' position on national
national
issues. In addition to following the administration on pertinent
favored the direct
reunion
veterans'
a
before
a
in
Norris
issues,
speech
about American mil
election of United States senators and
19.

W. W. Campbell to Norris,

20.

lionaires

and

heiresses spending so

much

complained
time and money in Europe. The

Franklin Free Press, August 22, 1902.
21. Allen to Norris, October 24, 1902, October 25, 1902; Norris, op. cit,
brothers owned banks in the district:
pp. 90-91. Two of Shallenberger's
one at Elwood and the other at Imperial, while another of his brothers
was an official of the International Harvester Company in Chicago. This
third brother, a writer for the Lincoln Daily Star assured Norris, was not
interested in the re-election of his brother to Congress.
charge of this

A

land to be effective had to be backed by evidence, and the writer urged
Norris to secure such evidence "by persuasion, if possible, but beg, steal
or borrow it, and use dynamite if necessary." See G. W. Bemis to Norris,

December

10, 1902.

November 1, 1902, November 5, 1902; W. W.
November 11, 1902.
Campbell
23. A. E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People (Chicago, 1931),
Norris to A. J. Halford,
p. 796; Norris to A. R. Cruzen, December 5, 1902;
December 10, 1902.
24. James A. Cline to Norris, November 6, 1902; George R. Chaney to
Norris, November 5, 1902; Dietrich and J. H. Millard to Norris, November
5, 1902; J. S. and W. V. Hoagland to Norris, November 7, 1902.
25. Merwin to Norris, November 10, 1902, December 6, 1902.
26. Allen to Norris, November 10, 1902; W. W. Campbell to Norris,
November 11, 1902.
27. Most Republican newspapers in the district believed along with the
Oxford Standard (clipping, n.d.) that "old General Prosperity and a big
22. Allen to Norris,

to G.

W.

Norris,

crop have this year emblazoned a
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way

to Republican success/'

10 (pages 79-87)

Hasty, July 14, 1902; Norris to G. W. Shafer,
Graham, November 24, 1902; Norris
to C. O. Morse, January 24, 1903, January 30, 1903; Norris to Mill OwnI.

G.

W.

September

Norris to D.

S.

16, 1902; Norris to C. S.
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Mutual Insurance Company (Des Moines, Iowa), April 4, 1903; Norris
6, 1903. George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts

C. H. Pierce, June

Division, Library of Congress. All manuscript citations, unless otherwise
noted, are from this collection.
2. Norris to J. F. Fults, December 28, 1902; Norris to C. E. Hopping,

1903, September 6, 1903.
Norris to May & Feiberger, April 17, 1903; Norris to I. P. Gage,
September 20, 1902; Norris to Fleming Brothers, October 27, 1902; Norris
to E. T. McGuire, December 6, 1902; Norris to M. T. Phelps, August 30,

June

8,

3.

1902.
Norris to Andrew Carnegie, June 12, 1903.
Norris to H. C. Miller, December 29, 1902; Miller to Norris, Janu
ary 12, 1903.
6. MiUer to Norris,
May 3, 1903; Norris to Miller, May 2, 1903;
Fletcher W. Merwin to A. T. Lardin, May 18, 1903.
4.
5.

7.

1903;
8.

Merwin to J. W. Eby, May 9, 1903; Merwin
Merwin to W. D. Pruitt, May 5, 1903.

W.

E. Horton to Norris,

May

29, 1903; C. C.

to Lardin,

Green

May

to Norris,

18,

May

30, 1903.

Fighting Liberal (New York, 1946), pp. 83-85. Norris
account in which he stresses his loss of will to live after his
heartbreaking defeat in 1942 by Kenneth Wherry. Repudiation at the polls
9.

wrote

Norris,
this

induced a feeling of depression which probably lasted until his death in
1944 and colored his writing of this incident. That Norris was originally
very ill is attested by both of the letters cited in note 8. While Norris
claimed in his autobiography that this illness occurred in the fall of 1903,
it
actually happened in the spring. And Norris, as soon as he regained his
strength, married Ellie Leonard, a McCook school teacher, whom he must
have courted, however briefly, before his illness.
Norris, in his autobiography (pp. 85-86), mentions his second marriage
and the marvelous change that occurred in his life and that of his children.
He correctly states the date of the marriage as July 8, 1903, while on the
previous two pages

when

discussing this

illness

which occurred

"after

[November, 1902] to the House of Representatives, but before
"
I was sworn in [November, 1903]
and "in the fall of the year" which
would place it from these statements in either September or October,
1903. He is, in his autobiography, still a lonely bachelor obviously mourn-

my

election

wife. In other words, Norris, in writing of these
chronology confused and was probably projecting his cur

ing the loss of his

had

his

first

events,
rent condition back to a serious illness suffered forty years previously.
Furthermore, during his illness the doctor had to convince Norris that

would be imprudent

for

dress at the Wilsonville

him

to travel

High

and

it

commencement ad
wanted to get up and

deliver the

School. Norris also

about before he had fully recovered his strength, an action not usually
associated with a person who had no desire to get well or to live. See
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Merwin

The Class of '03, May 18, 1903; C. C. Green to Norris, May
30, 1903, where Dr. Green writes, "I am glad that you have improved to
such an extent that you feel able to go to Fairfield."
to

John H. Mickey to Merwin, May 21, 1903; Norris to
son, June 4, 1903; Norris to F. Kuenneth, June 4, 1903.
11. "Juliette" to Norris, January 6, 1903, May 23, 1903.
12. A. J. Green to Norris, March 14, 1903.
10.

13. Norris to C.

J.

Miller,

March

28,

William Peter

1903; Clyde Castle to Norris,

March 25, 1903.
14. Grant Harrington to Norris, September 2, 1903; Norris to Grant
Harrington, September 10, 1903; Norris to H. H. Harrington, September
10, 1903; Norris to G. H. Merriam, September 10, 1903.

15.

Merwin

to

R. Balding, July 21, 1903; C. E. Stine to Norris, July

J.

10, 1903; Norris, op. cit., p. 86.
16. Norris to G. W. Shafer,

September 22, 1903; R. H. Allard to Norris,

December 28, 1903.
17. Norris to

J.

W. Edwards, December

December 28, 1902.
18. Joseph G. Cannon to
19. C.

H. Dietrich

6,

1902; Norris to Mickey,

November 16, 1902.
December 4, 1902.
December 9, 1902.

Norris,

to Norris,

20. Norris to E.

J. Burkett,
21. Norris to Cannon, September 15, 1903.
22. Norris to Charles F. Manderson, December 9, 1902.
23. E. W. Eckerman to Norris, November 22, 1902; Norris to

December 29, 1902; Merwin
24. Norris to E. F.

to Norris,

Merwin,

January 11, 1903.

Ware, December

8,

1902. Norris, as befitted a

Re

publican politician, was ready to do anything he could "to contribute to
the welfare and comfort of the gallant
boys in blue who preserved this
glorious nation." In the matter of pensions or in private bills for the relief
of veterans, he intended to make "a direct contribution." See Norris to
Pruitt, April 20, 1903.
J. M. Jones, February 20, 1903; Norris to James McNally,
30, 1902; Norris to A. W. Machen, March 14, 1903.
26. Norris to J. A. Andrews, March 25, 1903; the StockviUe

25. Norris to

December

Republican,

October

2,

1903.

27. The Stockville
Republican, October 9, 1903. Incidentally, Judge Orr
was elected in the November, 1903, judicial election.
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11 (pages 88-96)

Norris, Fighting Liberal

(New York, 1946) p. 93-94.
pp. 95-96.
3.
Congressional Record, Fifty-eighth Congress, Second Session, Jan
uary 13, 1904, p. 728.
,

2. Ibid.,

4.

William Dudley Foulke, Fighting the
Spoilsmen

footnote

1, p.

174.

(New

York, 1919),

NOTES TO CHAPTERS
Congressional Record, loc. cit.
Congressional Record, Fifty-eighth Congress, Second Session, March
14, 1904, pp. 3256-57.
7. Fletcher W. Merwin to George Allen, March 12, 1904. George W.
Norris Papers, Library of Congress. All manuscript citations, unless other
5.

6.

wise noted, are from

this source.

Norris in his later years related an anecdote which all previous
his first
biographers have accepted about an incident that occurred during
term in Congress. The incident, involving his growing awareness of the
evils of partisanship, supposedly took place on February 20, 1904, in the
House, when
Sharp Williams, the minority leader, moved that the
8.

John

House adjourn on February 22 after the reading of George Washington's
Farewell Address. Congressman Sereno Payne, who had the floor, objected
and claimed that it would be "a far more patriotic observance of duty for
this Congress to be in session on Monday, and to provide for the building
of a proper navy, than to take a holiday on account of the birthday of
George Washington." Since Payne had moved for immediate adjournment
before Williams made his motion to adjourn after the Farewell Address was
read on Washington's birthday, the speaker ruled that Payne's motion to
to by the House which
adjourn had precedence and this motion was agreed
not
voted
was
motion
Williams'
upon.
thereupon adjourned.
On February 22, Williams again presented a motion to adjourn after the
were called for,
reading of the Farewell Address. When the yeas and nays
104
to
members
voted
Democratic
93
Republican members voted
adjourn,
to remain in session, 10 members answered present, and 175, including

were listed as not voting.
Norris' biographers claim that

Norris,

on February 20, 1904, on a standing vote
on Williams' motion, Norris was the lone Republican to stand, and that
this incident started his questioning the validity of partisanship
especially
when two days later he found the Republican-controlled Senate chamber

empty out of respect for the memory of George Washington.
The Congressional Record (Fifty-eighth Congress, Second

Session)

re

no vote on a motion by John Sharp Williams on February 20 to ad
while the vote on February 22
journ on Washington's birthday (p. 2178),
the Senate, on February 22,
above.
is
recorded
Moreover,
(pp. 2208-09)
busi
1904, adjourned at 5:15 P.M. (p. 2207) after conducting a full days

veals

ness.

One

of Norris' biographers relates this Washington's birthday incident
cites in his footnote the relevant pages of the Congressional

and then

examination of the Record has yielded no such verification and
me that this incident must be regarded as a fictional anecdote
which, like Patrick Henry's famous oration (though never delivered),
should have occurred. In 1912, on Washington's birthday, Norris offered a
motion to adjourn which was defeated when the question was taken. At
this time the Democrats controlled the House and Champ Clark of Mis
Record.

My

has convinced

souri

was

speaker.

The Senate on

this

day met

at

twelve noon and ad-
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Address. See Congressional
journed after the reading of the Farewell
Second
Session, February 22, 1912, pp.
Record, Sixty-second Congress,
2325.
2317,
Norris Typescript, p. 8. George W. Norris Papers, Nebraska State
Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska.
10. Norris to James R. Mann, June 7, 1904; Norris to Perry L. Hole, June
9.

15. 1904.

11.

to Norris, July 23, 1904. AUen wrote, "We can win as
so strong in this state against the Parker deal that the kicking
so vigorous that it would carry everything and we would win all

George Allen

the feeling

would be

is

lines in the state."

12.

Quoted

in

Addison E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People,

(Chicago, 1932), Vol. I, p. 805.
13. James C. Olson, History of Nebraska (Lincoln, 1955), p. 251.
14. George Allen to Norris, July 23, 1904; Norris to E. H. Hinshaw,
gust

5,

Au

1904.

15. Allen to Norris, July 29, 1904.
16. W. E. Andrews to Norris, August 27, 1904.
17. Allen to Norris, September 17, 1904. In another letter on this same
date Allen noted that in Hall County a fight had broken out between the
because some Populist leader proclaimed that
Democrats and

Populists

they could not support the Democratic nominee.
18. Cannon delivered his main speech for Norris at Hastings on Sep
tember 26; Norris appeared with the Speaker when Cannon campaigned
for

him throughout

his three

day visit.
October 16, 1904; Allen to Merwin, Oc
J. J. McCarthy,
tober 18, 1904; Norris to B. K. Schaeffer, October 24, 1904.
20. Allen to Merwin, November 3, 1904; Merwin to Allen, November 5,
19. Norris to

1904; Allen to Norris,
1904.

November

5,

1904; C. E. Stine to Norris,

November

4,

21.

Merwin

to A. T. Lardin,

14, 1904; Addison E. Sheldon,
Robinson, The Presidential Vote: 1896-

November

tit., pp. 808-09; Edgar Eugene
1932 (Stanford University, California, 1934), p. 66.
22. Norris to Joseph C. Cannon, November 14, 1902.

op.

23. Norris to Mrs. Emma Scott, August 5, 1904, September 12, 1904;
Norris to Mrs. Julia G. Yager, November 14, 1904.
24. Merwin to J. F. Cordeal, January 31, 1905; Norris to Allen, January

30. 1905.
25. Norris to

J.

F. Crocker, January 14, 1905; Allen to Norris, February

18, 1905.

26. Norris to Editor of the Outlook, January 16, 1905; Congressional
Record, Fifty-eighth Congress, Third Session, December 8, 1904, p. 92.
27. Norris to W. H. Moore, February 14, 1905.
28. Norris to E. A. Hitchcock, September 12, 1904; Cordeal to Merwin,
December 18, 1904.
29. Cordeal to Merwin, December 18, 1904.
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30. Norris to Cordeal,

December

23, 1904; Morris to F.
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M. Rathbun,

December

23, 1904.
31. Norris to Allen,

March
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27, 1905.

12 (pages 97-108)

W.

Norris to George Allen, April 15, 1905; Norris to C. A. Brandt,
1905.
4,
George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library
of Congress. All manuscript citations, unless otherwise noted, are from this
1.

G.

October

collection.

Norris to Patrick Heogney, May 18, 1905.
Norris to James Wilson, February 24, 1906.

2.
3.

4. Congressional Record,
Fifty-ninth Congress, First Session, May 1,
1906, pp. 6218-19.
5. For good brief discussions of the Kinkaid Act and its significance see

Land Systems and Land Policies in Nebraska (Lincoln, 1936),
pp. 15&-65, and James C. Olson, History of Nebraska (Lincoln, 1955),

A. E. Sheldon,

pp. 268-70.
Several years later Norris claimed that he was the originator of the 640acre homestead concept. On March 20, 1908, he wrote the following letter
to H. E. Langerin explaining his role: "I supposed at one time that I was
the originator of the idea of the 640-acre homestead in Nebraska. When I
first came to Washington I told a newspaper correspondent that I intended

A

to introduce this kind of a bill in Congress.
and said that he had read
Kinkaid came to

me

day or so afterwards Mr.
my interview in the paper

and that he also had been thinking of introducing this kind of a bill. He
asked me to withhold my bill and to consult with him over the matter with
a view of agreeing upon a bill and thus securing united and harmonious
most cheerfully agreed to this and after waiting some time, saw
Mr. Kinkaid in regard to it and suggested we get together and commence
work upon the bill. I did this several times and on each occasion he agreed
with me that we should get together with a view of agreeing upon the
terms of the bill, but each time he postponed the meeting for one reason or
another. It seems that during this time he was working on the bill, which he
action. I

have always thought that he made studied effort to
from introducing any bill on the subject. His conduct and repre
sentations certainly did deceive me, because if it had not been for his re
before he
quests for delay I would have introduced that kind of a bill long
introduced his. In fact I had the matter practically mapped out when he
came to me and requested the delay. It rather looks to me that he did this
with a studied effort to get whatever credit there might be in the introduc
tion of such a measure. I do not know much foundation there was in his
claim that he had been thinking about introducing the same kind of bill.
He may have given it much thought, but I never knew of it until he told
I
finally introduced.

prevent me

me

he requested me to practically make a joint matter out of it.
have never given any publicity to this matter, because I did not

at the time

...

I
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to get into a controversy with the members of the delegation and I
have suffered in silence what to me seems an injustice from Mr. Kinkaid,
rather than to have the matter aired in public. I have no desire now to have
the matter made public and prefer that nothing be said about it."

want

6.

Norris to Franklin E, Brooks, June (?), 1905.

7.

Fremont Herald, February 24, 1906; Norris

in the Fifty-ninth

Con

these sugges
gress actually introduced a bill (H.R. 16132) incorporating
tions. See Norris to S. N. Wolback, March 12, 1906.
Norris changed his mind chiefly because of several cases where defend
ants were charged with unlawfully fencing thousands of acres of the
Theodore Roosevelt
public domain and with intimidating homesteaders.
more Nebraska citizens when he obtained the
endeared himself to

many

Nebraska who were lax in their
resignations of several federal officials in
duties and responsibilities. For a discussion of these cases, see A. E. Shel
Policies in Nebraska, pp. 194-203.
War (New York, 1936), pp. 218-19. Curti
Peace
or
Curti,
and
a
few
"Within
states,
219)
years more than two hundred senators
(p.
Union."
representatives were enrolled as members of the Interparliamentary

don,

Land Systems and Land
Merle

8.

Norris to Richard Bartholdt, April (?), 1905.
indirectly to bring about the
peace conference at the Hague, while the second was
its initiative. See William I. Hull, The Two Hague Con
(Boston,
1908), pp. 4-5.
ferences
9. Norris to Bartholdt, June 10, 1905; incidentally, Norris did not
bother to acquire a passport from the Department of State, and later
claimed that he had found no use for one. See Norris to Cora A. Garber,

The Interparliamentary Union helped

meeting of the
due directly to

March

first

16, 1906.

From

10. Bartholdt,

Steerage to

Congress

(Philadelphia,

1930), pp.

260-75, passim.
11. Congressional Record, Sixty-fourth Congress, First Session, July 13,
1916, p. 10932.
12. Norris to Bartholdt, October 13, 1905, October 16, 1905.

13.

George Allen

to

J,

R. McCarl,

November

3,

1905; Norris to

W.

A.

Mc-

Cool, October 13, 1905; Norris to M. B. Carman, June 8, 1906. An article
by Norris on the Interparliamentary Union appeared in the December 1,
1905 issue of the Beaver City Times-Tribune.

For example, see Norris to L. T. Brooking, October 26, 1905.
Joseph Cannon to Norris, September 17, 1905.
16. Norris to Eugene Allen, June 5, 1906; Cannon to Norris, October 20,
14.

15.

1905.

W.

Phillips, "The Growth of a Progressive: Asle J.
thesis,
(Master's
University of North Dakota, 1951), p. 47.

17.

William

18. Norris, Fighting Liberal

(New

Adams County
Omaha World Herald news

York, 1946), p. 86;

Democrat, March 9, 1906, which quotes an
item from Washington.
19. Norris to

Gronna"

David Diamond, December

18,

1905; Norris to William
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May

24, 1906.

20. Congressional Record, Fifty-ninth Congress, First Session, January
13, 1906, pp. 1044-48, for the entire speech. The tariff measure, while
easily passing the House, was never acted upon in the Senate.
21. Norris to W. L. Hilyard, January 24, 1906; Norris to

W. F. Buck,
January 26, 1906. For another view of the Philippine tariff bill see John M.
Blum's essay, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Legislative Process: Tariff Revi
and Railroad Regulation, 1904-1906,** printed as Appendix 1 in Elting
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, 1951),
Vol. IV, pp. 1333-42. Blum argues that Roosevelt used the threat of tariff
legislation as a lever to obtain an effective railroad bill from Congress and
that he never vigorously supported the Philippine tariff bill. Blum further
develops his views in The Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge, 1954), Chap
sion

E. Morison (ed.),

while the interests of his "beet sugar" con
were considered, his position on the bill was a matter of principle
and he would always do what he believed "to be right on principle" even
though he felt sure "that the effect would prove injurious" to the personal
interests of some of his constituents. Concern about unduly benefiting the
sugar refiners and not hostility to American policy in the Philippine Islands
was central to his position. See Norris to A. F. Buechler, March 30, 1906.
ter VI. Norris insisted that

stituents

22. George Allen to Norris, January 25, 1906; Norris to Buechler, Jan
uary 26, 1906; Norris to George Lyon, Jr., January 26, 1906.
23. Norris to C. E. V. Smith, April 30, 1906, for a full analysis of the
tariff situation.

24. C. A. Patton to Norris, November 1, 1905; McCarl to Patton, Novem
ber 4, 1905.
25. Norris to Daniel Cook, December 12, 1905.
26. Norris to Charles F. Manderson, December 28, 1905. This letter has
been edited and published. See Richard Lowitt (ed.), "George W. Norris,

James

J. Hill,

and the Railroad Rate

June, 1959, pp. 137-45.
27. A. E. Sheldon, Nebraska:
Vol. I, p. 815.

Bill,"

Nebraska History, Vol. 40, No.

2,

The Land and the People (Chicago, 1931),

28. Norris to Manderson, January 20, 1906.
29. Norris to Fletcher W. Merwin, May 18, 1906; Norris to McCool,
May 19, 1906, May 26, 1906; Norris to A. H. Thomas, May 19, 1906, May
26, 1906.
30. Norris to First National

Bank of Holdrege, Nebraska, June 8, 1906;
Norris to C. E. V. Smith, June 11, 1906; Norris to T. L. Jones, June 18,
1906.

31. Washington, D.C. Times, January 20, 1906; Congressional Record,
Fifty-ninth Congress, First Session, June 20, 1906, pp. 8827-29.
32. Congressional Record, Fifty-ninth Congress, First Session, December
16, 1905, p.
tial

message
though

tion,

in particular, for entire speech see pp. 509-11. In his ini
to the Fifty-ninth Congress, Roosevelt requested such regula
it made no effective
headway in Congress. In the Senate,
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Morgan G. Bulkeley of Connecticut, since 1879
Company, led the fight against

Life Insurance

the president of the Aetna
national regulation of the

insurance industry.
George Allen to Norris, December 4, 1905.

life

33.
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M. Brown, January 13, 1906; Norris to Charles W.
1906; George AUen to Norris, June 21, 1906; Norris to

Norris to C.

Meeker, January 19,
T. C. Hacker, June 14, 1906, June 18, 1906. George W. Norris Papers,
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. All other manuscript citations,
unless otherwise noted, are from this collection.
2.

3.

Norris to A. F. Buechler, August 2, 1906.
Norris to Buechler, August 2, 1906.

4. Norris to

A. C. Wright, August 20, 1906;

Adams County Republican,

August 17, 1906.
Norris to Alexander DcDowell, August 20,

5.

1906,

September

18.

1906.

August 14, 1906; Norris to Wright, August 20,
L. Hilyard, September 1, 1906; Norris to the American
Protective Tariff League, July 23, 1906; for other and later statements of
6.

Wright

to Norris,

1906; Norris to

W.

Norris* optimism about the outcome of his campaign, see Norris to W. E.
Andrews, September 24, 1906; and J. R. McCarl to W. L. Crounse, October
23, 1906. Crounse, a former congressman and governor of Nebraska, now
a lobbyist for the National Cigar Leaf Tobacco Association offered on be
half of the association to support Norris' campaign because of his vote
against the Philippine tariff measure. See Crounse to Norris, October 13,

1906.
7. George Allen to McCarl,
September
tember 8, 1906.

7,

1906; Allen to Norris, Sep

Allen to McCarl, September 8, 1906, September 12, 1906; AUen to
September 18, 1906.
9. Norris to
Harry Hallenbeck, September 17, 1906; Norris to Charles
Montgomery, September 19, 1906.
10. Allen to Norris, October 6, 1906.
8.

Norris,

11. McCarl to H. M. Crane, October 8, 1906; McCarl to H. C.
Miller,
October 15, 1906; AUen to McCarl, October 18, 1906, Allen, of course,
handled aU of the arrangements when Norris
spoke in Clay County; McCarl
to S. A. Dravo, October 22, 1906; McCarl to
John S. Wise, October 8,

1906.
12. Allen to

13.
14.
15.

1906, October 30, 1906.
1906.

McCarl to Buechler, October 15, 1906.
McCarl, November 4, 1906, November
AUen to McCarl, November 4, 1906, November

16. Allen to

17.

McCarl, October 25, 1906.

AUen to McCarl, October 28,
AUen to McCarl, November 4,

10, 1906.
5,

1906.
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A. McCool, October 30, 1906; McCarl to Samuel
1906; McCarl to Allen, November 1, 1906, Novem

Committee on Printing, February 1, 1907; A. E. Shel
The
Nebraska:
Land
and the People (Chicago, 1931), Vol. I, pp. 820don,
21; James C. Olson, History of Nebraska (Lincoln, 1955), pp. 251-52.
20. Norris to James McNally, November 26, 1906; Allen to Norris,
19. Norris to Joint

November

8,

1906; Allen to McCarl,

November

7,

1906,

November

10,

1906.
21. Norris to Joseph G. Cannon, November 12, 1906; Cannon to Norris,
14, 1906.
22. Norris to George Williams, December 14, 1906; Norris to Buechler,

November

February 19, 1907.
23. Congressional Record, Fifty-ninth Congress, Second Session, January
24, 1907, pp. 1594, 1596; Norris to D. M. Francis, February 2, 1907; Roose
velt, in February, 1907, signed the McCumber Act which provided grad

uated pensions to veterans of the Mexican or Civil War. On reaching the
age of sixty-two the veteran was eligible to receive twelve dollars a month,

month, and after seventy-five, twenty dollars a
month. The great advantage of this law was that it obviated the necessity
for most special pension bills.
24. Congressional Record, Fifty-ninth Congress, Second Session, Feb
ruary 23, 1907, pp. 3785, 3803-04; McCarl to McNally, October 2, 1906;
at sixty-five, fifteen dollars a

Norris to E, J. Overing, November 10, 1906.
25. Congressional Record, Fifty-ninth Congress, Second Session, Feb
Alfred
ruary 18, 1907, pp. 3209-10; Allen to Norris, February 19, 1907;

Democracy's Norris (New York, 1939) , p. 78.
26. Norris to Fred Brown, January 4, 1907 (1908); see A. E. Sheldon,
Land Systems and Land Policies in Nebraska (Lincoln, 1936), pp. 196-98,

Lief,

1905 Nebraska example of Roosevelt's insistence upon the honesty of
government employees.
27. At least one congressman, disgruntled with Speaker Cannon and his
with his critical views dur
authority, thought that Norris was sympathetic
sure where Norris stood
not
was
he
ing the Fifty-ninth Congress. However,
on this issue, and Norris never committed himself, on paper at least, to
any criticism of Cannon at this time. See E. A. Hayes to Norris, September
30, 1907; see also the discussion in Chapter 14, pp. 126-28.
for a
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(Chicago,
5. A. E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and the People
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1931), Vol. I, pp. 824-26; the editorial (April 7, 1907)
4.

McCarl

p. 826.
6.

McCarl

to Norris,

September

1907; Norris to William Loeb,
30, 1908.

2,

1907; McCarl to Allen, July 11,
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8,

1907; Norris to McCarl,

March

7. McCarl to Norris, September 2, 1907; McCarl to H. M. Grimes,
1907.
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to
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A.
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Sheldon, op. cit., p. 827;
1907; Norris to Fred Brown, January 4, 1908.
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23, 1907; Corrick to Norris, November 6, 1907.
10. Norris to McCarl, December 13, 1907, December 20, 1907; Norris
to Percy M. Bell, December 23, 1907; McCarl to Norris, December 17,
and Proce
1907, January 23, 1908; De Alva Stanwood Alexander, History
9.

McCarl

dure of the House of Representatives (Boston, 1916), p. 40.
11. Norris to Edward W. Hoch, November 18, 1907; Norris to George
L. Sheldon, November 18, 1907.
12. Norris to Sheldon, November 18, 1907; Norris to Charles Bunce,

November 18, 1907; Norris to I. D. Evans, December 20, 1907; Congres
sional Record, Sixtieth Congress, First Session, January 7, 1908, p, 520.
13. Norris to Sheldon, November 18, 1907; Congressional Record, Six
tieth Congress, First Session,

Davis,

December

January 17, 1908, p. 520; Norris to

S.

M.

14, 1907.

14. Norris to Davis,

December

14, 1907; Norris to

D.

J.

Wood, Decem

ber 23, 1907; Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, First Session, Jan
uary 7, 1908, pp. 519-22, for the entire speech.
15. This was the chief criticism Norris had for the bill introduced by
Charles N. Fowler, chairman of the House Banking and Currency Com
mittee; Norris to S. C. Smith, December 17, 1907.
16. Norris to S. C. Smith, December 17, 1907; Congressional Record,
Sixtieth Congress, First Session, January 7, 1908, p. 522.

H. Burnham, March 27, 1908; Norris to W. E. StephenNorris to Charles K. Hart, May 13, 1908. The provi
1908;
son, April 13,
sion in the Aldrich-Vreeland Act calling for a national monetary commission
17. Norris to S.

to investigate the currency problem and suggest permanent reform assured
members of Congress, including Norris, who wanted a stronger bill,

those

and currency reform would again be a subject of legislation
many members of Congress who
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for
not
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Congress to enact a comprehensive bank
thought
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this time, that more study and thought were needed
at
and
law
currency
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on the subject and the situation.
that banking

in the near future. This provision pleased
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18. Norris to C. F. Bentley, December 20, 1907; Norris to Hart, May 13,
1908; Norris to B. Travis, May 18, 1908.
19. Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, First Session, February 3,

1908, Appendix: pp. 22-23; Norris to A. A. Burdick, November 16, 1907;
Norris to F. N. Richardson, November 19, 1907; McCarl to H. C. Miller,
March 24, 1908; McCarl to George Allen, March 24, 1908. In 1912 there

were 2,348 veterans in Nebraska receiving federal pensions. See William
H. Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States (New York,
1918), p. 257, footnote 2.
20. Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, First Session, January 15,
1908, p. 760; Norris to Merwin, February 10, 1908.
21. Norris to Adam Breede, February 4, 1908; Norris to Merwin, Feb
ruary 10, 1908; Norris to A. F. Buechler, February 24, 1908.
22. Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress, First Session, January 21,
1908, p. 936; incidentally, Norris was aware that Champ Clark derived part

by appearing on the lecture platform.

of his livelihood

E. Costello, May 20, 1908; Norris to O. T. Kountze,
J.
23, 1908; Norris to Chester M. Culver, May 25, 1908.
24. Norris to Isaac Le Droyt, November 9, 1907.
23. Norris to

May

25. The Philippine tariff measure was probably the only instance where
Norris did not support Theodore Roosevelt, though he did not agree with
Roosevelt's requests for appropriations for more battleships. For a list of

measures he did support see McCarl to Allan

Elliott, October 22, 1908, and
Norris to Corrick, May 1, 1908.
26. Norris to McCarl, March 30, 1908; McCarl to C. W. Meeker, April
2, 1908; Norris to McCarl, February 21, 1908, April 14, 1908.

27. E. A.

ber

9,

Hayes

to Norris,

September 30, 1907; Norris

28. Norris to E. F. Baldwin,

May

28, 1908; Norris to

September 21, 1908; Congressional Record,
p.

to Hayes,

Octo

1907.

W. E. Andrews,
May 16, 1908,

First Session,

6440.

29. Norris to Baldwin, May 28, 1908; Norris to Allen, June 22, 1908.
30. Norris to W. E. Andrews, September 21, 1908; Norris to W. L.
Hilyard, September 26, 1908.
31. Norris to
15, 1908; G.

Fisher,

Davis, August 21, 1908; McCarl to J. F. Boyd, July
Norris to Hayne Davis, August 21, 1908; Norris to Jacob

Hayne

W.

September

3,

1908.
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William H. Taft to G. W. Norris, January 1, 1908; Norris to Fred Brown,
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T.
M.
Garlow, March 4,
Norris to
January 12, 1907 (8), April 14, 1908;
1908
Norris to
F. Boyd, July 15, 1908, September 25, 1908;
W.
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September 10, 1908;
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Evans Hughes of New
Herrick of Ohio (1903-06) with Governor Charles
while Hughes spoke
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at Hastings in a hall provided by the Democrats early
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1908;
21,
E.
W.
to
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Andrews, September
nal September 21, 1908.
statement
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5.
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19
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made by Norris
p.
appears
September
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The Daily Independent of Grand
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in the district at this time,

point

most

of
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support

to the highest bidder in an election year was one way of avoiding bank
in the district had to meet the competition of the
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large Omaha and Lincoln
12. Norris to Merwin,

October

4,

which circulated throughout the state.
H. C. Lindsay,
September 24, 1908; Norris to

dailies

1908.

13. Norris to Lindsay, October 4, 1908; McCarl to J.
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September

Warren

Keifer,

Jr.,
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funds contributed by the postmasters of the Fifth Congressional District
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committee.
14. McCarl to George C, Eisenhart, September 26, 1908; F. Kuenneth
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Norris to A. B. Allen, September 28, 1908; McCarl to S. A. Dravo, October
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to Norris, October 23, 1908; Albert Peek to McCarl, October 24, 1908.
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1908; Norris to A. C. Rankin,
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10,

November
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23. McCarl to C. A. Ready, October 23, 1908; McCarl to H. C. Miller,
October 24, 1908; McCarl to E. B. Perry, October 25, 1908; McCarl to
W. James, October 25, 1908; McCarl to J. A. Martin, October 25, 1908;
J.
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24. McCarl to H. C. Lindsay, October 29, 1908; Lindsay to J. F. Cordeal,
October 28, 1908; M. S. Storer to McCarl, October 30, 1908; McCarl to
Dravo, October 31, 1908; A. C. Felt to McCarl, October 31, 1908.

H. C. Miller, November 1, 1908; McCarl to Merwin,
2, 1908; McCarl to H. G. Thomas, November 2, 1908.
26. Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote: 1896-1932 (Stan
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November

ford, 1934), p. 14.

27. Robinson, op. tit., pp. 99-101, 264; A. E. Sheldon, op. cit., pp. 83435; James C. Olson, History of Nebraska (Lincoln, 1955), pp. 253-54;
Norris to J. H. Jones, November 23, 1908; McCarl to Ready, November 4,
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1908; Lincoln Star,
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to
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5, 1908; George H. Thomas to
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McCarl, November
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29. Norris to George C. Junkin, November 10, 1908.
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November
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to
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Briggs, op. dt., p. 322; Norris to Norman Hapgood, November 17,
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the Democrats,
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the
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11. The House Calendar consists of all bills of a
character that do

public
not have as a purpose the raising or appropriating of money, while the
Calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union,

George William Norris between three and four years
(Courtesy Mr. and Mrs. John P. Robertson)

old.

Morris, age eight, with his mother.
( Courtesy Nebraska State Historical Society)

The

Norris

home

in

McCook, Nebraska,

as

it

looked

when

the family moved in. Remodeled in the late 1920's,
is Mrs. Norris' home today.

(Courtesy

it

Omaha World-Herald)

As a young schoolteacher

in

Whitehouse,

Ohio, Norris took part in a play.

(Courtesy Mr. and Mrs.
John P. Robertson)

Norris as a

young

attorney Just arrived
in

Beaver City,

Nebraska.

(Wide World Photos)

Left to right:

H. H. Harrington,
George W. Norris, and
Charles A. Murray,
practicing attorneys,
1885, Beatrice,

Nebraska.

(Courtesy Mr. and
Mrs. John P. Robertson)

Norris as he appeared on
campaign posters when he
first

ran for Congress
in 1902.

(

Courtesy Nebraska State
Historical Society )

The L.U.N. Club
about 1908:
Norris,

Harrington,
Lardin,
Smith.

(The Archives
of Valparaiso

University)

Norris in 1908.
(

A rare picture of Norris
with

full

beard, taken in

Omaha in

1895 after his

election as district judge.

(Wide World Photos)

Library of Congress )

Cartoon from

Omaha

Daily News, March 20, 1910.
(

Courtesy Nebraska State
Historical Society)

1913 -Norris enters
the Senate.

(Courtesy Mr. and
Mrs. John P. Robertson)
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Union Calendar, consists of all bills, previously considered and re
of money.
ported by committees, that involve the raising or spending
are con
Normally when these measures are taken from the calendar they
sidered by the entire House of Representatives acting as if it were a com
or the

mittee.
12. Briggs, op. cit., pp. 322-23.
13. Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress,
9,

Second Session, February

1909, p. 2116.

Congressman A. P. Gardner, while one of the twenty-nine sponsors
had previously on January 6, 1909, sponsored a "Calendar
For a discussion of this point see Briggs, op. cit., foot
resolution.
Tuesday"
notes 463 and 495 on pp. 429, 430-31.
14.

of this resolution,

15. Briggs, op. cit., pp. 324-27.
16. Congressional Record, Sixtieth Congress,

Second Session, March

1,

1909, p. 3570.
17. Ibid.
18. In order to placate the few people in Furnas County who did not
take kindly to Norris' part in the rules fight, Fletcher W. Merwin sug
document and an explanatory letter.
gested that he send them a government

Merwin's

list

of critics contained ten names. See

Merwin

to Norris, January

17, 1909.
19. See Charles R. Atkinson, The Committee on Rules and the Over
throw of Speaker Cannon (New York, 1911). Chapter VI, pp. 71-93, en
titled "The Development of Public Sentiment Against the Speaker," presents
an excellent survey of growing press and periodical hostility. The author
has surveyed all the major magazines at this time on the question. La Follette's Magazine between February and the end of April, 1909, contained
of the Speaker. The magazine, a weekly,
the
six articles

power
attacking
started publication in January,

1909. Blair Bolles, Tyrant from Illinois
a study of Cannon as Speaker. This book, while
not carefully researched, is well written; the author, unlike Norris, is more
concerned with the Speaker than with the rules.
20. See Siting E. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt
for the large correspondence
(Cambridge, 1951, 1952), volumes III-VI,
the president conducted with the Speaker. And see especially the Chro
indication of how frequently Cannon visited
nology in Volume VI for an
when
House
the White
Congress was in session.
21. Norris to O. E. Reynolds, November 21, 1908.

(New

York, 1951),

is

22. Norris to O. E. Reynolds, November 21, 1908.
23. Norris to W. A. Reynolds, December 21, 1908; Norris to

January 19, 1909.
24. Norris to Adam Breede,
January 25, 1909.

November

12, 1908; Norris to

J.

Lon Cone,
C. Hedge,

25. Norris to William Howard Taft, February 15, 1909.
was one
26. Norris to Mrs. N. L. Cronkhite, February 12, 1909. Norris
and
the
of
Most
home.
return
to
members
insurgents
of the few House
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for their

in Washington trying to obtain support
administration and Democratic members of the House of
the
from
position

Cannon men remained

49-55.
Representatives. See Hechler, op. cit., pp.
27. Norris to James G. King, March 13, 1909.
March 15,
28. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, First Session,
the insur
administrative
32. For a discussion of
pressure against
1909,
p.

comments upon see Hechler, op. cit., pp. 52-53. Taft
gents which Norris
as to how to handle this situation. While he had
confused
was
apparently

some sympathy for the insurgents and was very critical of Cannon, he
knew that he needed the Speakers support if tariff revision were to be
accomplished.
29. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, First Session,
1909, p. 32.

March

15,

30. Ibid.
31. Hechler, op.

cit.,

evidence of this arrangement
pp. 54-59. Hechler's

from insurgent sources
understandably rather skimpy, coming entirely
such as a 1910 newspaper article by Victor Murdock and a 1939 interview
M. Nelson. For another version of this arrangement see Bolles,
with

is

John

a deal had been made between
Democrats.
Commenting
upon the charges by
Tammany
Herbert
Parsons, that a tie-up existed,
his New York Republican colleague,
Norris said, "I can not prove absolutely what I think; but I could come
some of this proof is confidential." See
pretty near it if forced, though
Nebraska State Journal, October 10, 1910.
32. Norris to E. A. Van Valkenburg, March 19, 1909; incidentally, the
at this time aroused the admiration of Champ Clark, the Demo

op.

cit.,

believed that
p. 181. Norris, too,

Cannon and

the

insurgents

cratic leader,

who on

the floor of the

House on March 15, 1909, said that
more credit than the Democrats

the Republican insurgents were entitled to

who supported them.
33. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, First Session,
1909, p. 18.

March

15,

34. Norris to Breede, June 4, 1909. Norris in this letter denied that he
had promised during the campaign of 1908 to vote against Cannon. His
the campaign reveal
correspondence and his statement to the press during
the opposite to be true. The first words of a press statement, which he

the re-election
correspondents, reads, *1 am opposed to
State
Nebraska
Journal,
September 21,
Speaker/' (See
1908, and the discussion in Chapter 15.) In his defense Norris noted,
somewhat ingenuously, in this 1909 letter, that he did not state in the
campaign interview that he would vote against Cannon. He also correctly
that in his campaign speeches he said he would vote for Cannon,

commended to his
Cannon as

of Mr.

argued

notwithstanding his opposition, before he would vote for a Democrat as
Literature (pp. 127-31)
Speaker. In a February, 1910, article in Current
Norris, reminiscing about the contest that occurred at the opening of this
session, wrote, "It is doubtful if there was a single insurgent who did not

most devoutly hope that the Speaker might be defeated

for re-election."
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G. Partridge, December 20, 1909, where he

tries to

ex

plain his position.
35. Atkinson, op. cit., p. 97, suggests that a number of the insurgents
in favor of continuing their agitation against the rules even at the risk
of postponing tariff legislation. But at one of their conferences a member

were

(possibly Gardner of Massachusetts)

reported that the manufacturers in

were becoming demoralized over the uncertainty of business
conditions and feared a panic on Wall Street. After discussion the insur
his district

gents then decided to cease their tactics, deeming it the patriotic thing to
put nothing in the way of the earliest possible revision of the tariff.
36. Norris to J. H. Rushton, March 16, 1909.
37. Norris, Fighting Liberal (New York, 1946), pp. 101-02. Though
Norris was not a member of the subcommittee, his old friend Edgar D.
Crumpacker of Indiana was a Republican member. Crumpacker had been
there.
practicing law in Valparaiso when Norris was attending law school
indirect
Incidentally, this account in Norris' autobiography adds further
evidence to Hechler's thesis of a deal between Cannon and some Demo
cratic members to raise the rates on petroleum in return for their votes
against a major curtailment of his powers. See supra., footnote 31.
38. Norris, op. cit., p. 102; Hechler, op. cit., pp. 60-63; Congressional
Record, Sixty-first Congress, First Session, April 7, 1909, pp. 1164-65,
1168, 1170, and April 9, 1909, p. 1266.
39. McCarl to Norris, April 8, 1909.
40. Norris to C. E. V. Smith, April 13, 1909.

41. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, First Session, April 12,
1909, p. 1344.
42. Norris to Tom Cook, May 3, 1909; Norris to James E. Buck, May
30, 1909. Norris in this letter comments on conditions in the Canal Zone.

May 14, 1909; Norris to L. Morse, June 1, 1909;
Pollard, July 7, 1909. In 1896 while traveling in an official

43. Norris to McCarl,

Norris to E.

M.

IOOF he was overcome with heat prostration and found
for
the
rest of his life to be very careful of his health in the
necessary
hot weather, although for a period of about ten years after 1896 he thought
capacity for the

it

he had completely recovered.
44. Congressional Record,
1909, p. 4374.

Sixty-first

Congress,

First

Session,

July

9,

45. Ibid., pp. 4374-75.
46. Hechler, op. cit., p. 136.

47. Norris to W. A. Lindley, July 19, 1909; Norris to A. H. Bumham,
R. Kimball, July 19, 1909; for a discus
July 26, 1909; Norris to Thomas
sion of Taft's role in the corporation tax proposal, see Henry F. Pringle,
The Life and Times of William Howard Toft (New York, 1939), Vol. I,

pp. 433-36.
48. Norris to Clayton C. Rhoades, August 3, 1909; Hechler, op. cit.,
First Session, July 31,
p. 141; Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress,

1909, pp. 4754-55.

GEORGE W. NORRIS

312

1909.
49. Nebraska State Journal October 10,

For a devastating analysis

was included ^ the Republi
The Tanf E^sWry

which
of the cost of production tariff theory,
W. Taussig,
can platforms of 1904 and 1908, see F.

1931) pp. 363-67,
First Session, August 4,
Record,
50. Congressional
Sixty-first Congress,
5091-92; Norris to Breede, Sep
1909, p. 4909, and August 5, 1909, pp.
tember 4, 1900.
of the United States

(New York,
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,

17 (pages 153-165)
for

any
a voter to cast his primary vote
primary allowed
of what party
candidate of any party running for nomination, regardless
a system
voted. Wisconsin already had such
ticket he had

An open

1

m

previously

P

T

the People (Chicago,
Addison E. Sheldon, Nebraska: The Land and
Nebraska (Lincoln,
C.
of
Olson,
History
1931) Vol I pp 838-39; James
both
7, 1909. Incidentally
State
Journal
Nebraska
July
1955)' p. 254;
then
and
debate
the
tariff
during
Norris' and Burkett had criticized the

voted for it in its final version.
Norris to T. A. Boyd,
3 G W. Norris to J. R. McCarl, July 16, 1909;
W.
December
6, 1909; George
A. C. Christensen,
July 15 1909; Norris to
All letters, unless
of
Congress.
Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library
otherwise noted, are from this collection.
4. Norris to J. T. McBrien, July 26, 1909;

October

4,

to

George Allen,

1909.

5. Norris to
6.

McCarl

A.

J.

Watson, December 24, 1908.

Orleans Chronicle,

October 11,

Nebraska State Journal
September 10, 1909;

1909, November

2,

1909; Norris to F. Milton Willis, April 20,

1910.

J

,

.

,

In the next session of Congress he introduced an amendment which,
naval appropriations by five million dol
carried, would have reduced

7.
if it

vessels
struck out one battleship and called for six merchant
with
trade
our
would
develop
in place of it. These vessels, he claimed,
the
merchant
a
marine,
for
expedite
South
America,
Central and
lars,

because

it

provide
Railroad Company which

had the responsibility
to those of
for carrying freight, mail, and passengers from American ports
See
naval
reduce
time
Congressional
same
the
at
expenses.
Panama, and
services of the

Panama

4433.
Congress, Second Session, April 8, 1910, p.
William S,
to
Norris
8. Nebraska State Journal October 11, 1909;
1910.
Mattley, February 18,
9. Norris to McBrien,
3, 1909; Norris to J. C. Murtland, January
Record,

Sixty-first

August

an article by
1910; Nebraska State Journal January 2, 1910, quoting
in Success Magazine.
Welliver
C.
Judson
"to
10. Another criticism, besides expense, was that it gave an incentive
the
for
the
enter
to
purpose of
dishonorable and disreputable men"
primary
interests or individuals
from
special
"holding up" candidates, securing money
5,
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desiring particular legislation, or defeating another candidate. It gave mon
eyed men another undue political advantage. See Norris to Samuel Merwin,

December 17, 1909.
11. McCarl to George

Allen, October 4, 1909; Nebraska State Journal,
October 10, 1909, January 2, 1910; Norris to Welliver, September 14, 1909.
12. Norris to Mrs. J. A. Andrews, September 22, 1909; McCarl to Norris,

November

14, 1909,
13. Norris to F. M. Richard,

December 18, 1909. In a letter to Richard
on December 23, 1909, Norris noted that the Republican National Con
gressional Committee had recently launched a systematic campaign to
defeat insurgent congressmen through the country press. This committee,
"under the absolute control of Speaker Cannon," had just issued the first
of a series of weekly newsletters purporting to present congressional news.
By presenting in these letters critical items and malicious statements about
the insurgents, the committee, Norris thought, hoped to reach the con

men
W. T,

stituents of these

14. Norris to

through the rural newspapers.
K. Thompson, December 22, 1909; Norris to C. A.

Bride, June 10, 1909.
15. Norris to Mrs. Mary H. Williams, January 11, 1910.
16. Norris to David Cole, February 8, 1910; Norris to R. M. Joyce,
February 25, 1910; Norris to C. P. Grandfield, January 15, 1910, January

28, 1910; Norris to L. A. Sheldon, January 28, 1910; Norris to H. A. Talcott, January 3, 1910; Norris to A. E. Yorkel, January 21, 1910.
17. Norris to L. A. Sheldon, January 28, 1910; Norris to Ben Patterson,

January 31, 1910; Norris to S. R. McKelvie, February 5, 1910, February
18, 1910; Norris to W. B. Hargleroad, April 20, 1910.
18. S. L. Perkins to Norris, February, n.d., 1910; Norris to F. C. Robb,

January 31, 1910.
19. Norris to

William T. Evans, February

2,

1910; Norris to B.

J.

Seger, April 16, 1910. The settlers in the North Platte project requested
that the term of payment be extended from ten to fifteen or twenty years,

with the

first

two payments not

to exceed a dollar per year per acre,

con

struction charges. See Perkins to Norris, February, n.d., 1910.
20. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, June 21,

1910, p. 8696.
21. Congressional Record,
31, 1910, p. 1305.

Sixty-first

Congress, Second Session, January

22. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, February
3,

1910, p. 1456.

M. Stahl, The Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy (Northampton,
Massachusetts, 1926), p. 123; Norris to C. L. Abbott, December 31, 1909.
24. Stahl, op. cit., pp. 123-24; Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress,
Second Session, January 7, 1910, p. 390.
23. Rose

25. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, January
answer
7, 1910, pp. 390, 404. The vote was 149 to 146 with five members

were announced.
ing "present" and eighty-seven not voting. Over forty pairs
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Norris in later years became confused as to the details of what occurred.
He thought that Walter Smith of Iowa, an amiable supporter of Cannon
and a "warm personal friend," granted him the two minutes while Dalzell
was out to lunch. But the Congressional Record for January 7, 1910 (p.
him the two minutes in which
390) reveals that it was Dalzell who yielded
the amendment. After Norris spoke, Dalzell then yielded
he

presented
time to Smith

held the floor and allotted time to other members. For
what occurred see his speech of June 25, 1932, at
a Cosmos Club dinner honoring Harry Slattery and printed in the Con
First Session, July 15, 1932,
gressional Record, Seventy-second Congress,
to Harold Ickes, May 26, 1933.
Norris
and
15456-57
pp.
recollection
26. Norris to Alfred Lief, May 4, 1934; Norris erred in his
and
chosen
be
to
was
that. conse
committee
when he thought a ten-man
a standpat Republican major
would
member
the
prevent
insurgent
quently
it Kenneth W. Hechler, Insurgency (New York, 1940),
ity from dominating

who

Norris' later version of

p. 64.

Locke, January 22, 1910; Norris to Lief, May
Liberal (New
4, 1934; Norris to Ickes, May 26, 1933; Norris, Fighting
the chairman of
of
Nelson
Knute
Minnesota,
Senator
110;
York, 1946), p.
the committee, was personally sympathetic to Ballinger's position and in
the seven Republican members pre
tensely disliked Pinchot. Eventually
while the Democratic members and
a
Ballinger,
exonerating
27. Norris to Walter

J.

report
pared
Madison held that Ballinger should not be retained in office since he had
violated the trust reposed in him as secretary of the interior. Congressman
Edwin Denby of Michigan, who later as secretary of the navy was involved

in the Teapot Dome scandal, signed the majority report. In the light of
the strict party vote on these reports, Norris' claim about a "real investiga
tion" can be singularly applied to Madison, who was probably the only
to reach a conclusion on the basis of the evidence. Madi
member

willing

son

filed

a separate report, agreeing in

less partisan

terms with the

Demo

cratic members that Ballinger should resign. For a thorough monographic
T. Mason, Bureaucracy
study of the Ballinger-Pinchot affair see Alpheus
Convicts Itself (New York, 1941); Stahl, op. cit., is a careful study based

on easily accessible published materials. Mason had access to manuscript
studies by
collections, notably the papers of Louis D. Brandeis. More recent

Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency (Cambridge,
1959), and Elmo R. Richardson, The Politics of Conservation (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1962), present well balanced scholarly accounts which are
more critical of Pinchot and more favorable to Ballinger than is Mason's
study.
28.

William Howard Taft
Pringle, The Life and Times of
from a letter of June,
The
is
480,
Vol.
I,
1939),
(New York,
quote
p.
1909, from the president to his brother Horace.

Henry F.
c.

29. Norris to William

Howard Taft, January 6,

1910.

Taft and

referring to the pressure supposedly exerted by
other administration members to prevent the insurgents from

making a

fight against the rules

30. Norris

was here

on March

15, 1909.

See Norris to Taft,
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reveals that Taft, though
January 10, 1909; Hechler, op. eft., pp. 50-53,
members in March,
to
made
no
commitment
insurgent
secretly sympathetic,

by taking no part in the fight against the House
many insurgents an avowed supporter of Cannonism.

1909. Of course Taft,
rules,

became

to

31. Norris to Taft, January 6, 1910.
32. Hechler, op. cit., p. 216.
33. Taft to Norris, January 7, 1910.
34. Norris to Taft, January 10, 1910.
35. Ibid. The measures cited by Norris as indicative of his support of
the administration were the following: increase in the power of the Inter
state Commerce Commission, further regulation of corporations, physical

valuation of railroads, publication of campaign expenses, a postal savings
bank law, conservation of natural resources, regulation of injunctions, re
form of federal court procedures, and a permanent nonpartisan tariff com
mission. Norris opposed the administration on the ship subsidy question,
but so did many of the regular Republicans who continued to benefit
from patronage. Incidentally, for the rest of his congressional career, Norris
never again received executive patronage.-

36. Taft to Norris, January 11, 1910; Constance Gardner, (ed.), Some
at
Peabody Gardner (Boston, 1920), p. 59. Gardner
which
at
of
the
1910,
on
10,
tended an insurgent meeting
January
evening
to find out which insurgents had had trouble
a show of hands was

Letters of Augustus

requested
with their patronage.
37. Archie Butt, Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Archie
Butt (Garden City, New York, 1930), Vol. I, p. 41; Pringle, op. cit., Vol.
of the patronage at this time;
II, pp. 612-13 discusses Taft's handling
216-19.
Hechler, op. cit., pp.
Norris
38.
Gardner, for example, had previously informed

Congressman
to the
depend on his vote in matters pertaining
57.
Constance
cit.,
See
him.
Gardner,
notified
he
p.
time
op.
that he could

rules at

any

39. G. L. Keith to Norris, January 7, 1910.
McCarl to Norris, January 7, 1910.

40.

41. Norris to C. L. Fahnestock, January 11, 1910.
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II,

La

Follette's
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"The Progressive Movement/' Twentieth Century
315. With the economic analysis
No.
Vol.
4,
I,
January, 1910, p.
Magazine,
full accord. At the time this
in
was
Norris
presented in this statement,
that
Norris wrote to a critical constituent, "The facts are,
article
Kittle,

appeared,

behind

intrenched all the
at the hands

to the Speaker, are
power given by the rules
are
that
combines
interests and
seeking special favors
this

special
of Congress."
3.

Kittle, loc.

cit.,

4. Lillian Tuttle,

19ir

p. 315.
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University
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the "Mail and Breeze" column of the

Topeka Daily

Capital, January 16,

1910.
5.

Kittle, loc. cit., p.

315.

The articles were entitled "The Secret of His Power/' January 8,
in two parts on
1910, and "Cannonism: What It Is/* which appeared
on
articles
Cannonism,
1910. The
though ap
April 2, 1910 and April 9,
defeat in March, 1910, were undoubtedly
after the
6.

Speaker's
written before that time. Norris inserted

pearing

sional Record,

Sixty-first

Congress,

all

three articles in the Congres
May 14, 1910, pp.

Second Session,

6274-78.
to Walter
7. Norris to George A. Mosshart, January 15, 1910; Norris
Norris to Ross L. Hammond, February 4, 1910;
1910;
22,
Locke,
January
J.
of Congress. Un
George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library
less otherwise noted, all letters are from this collection.
a former
8. Norris to G. E. Hager, February 15, 1910. In a letter to
for example, Norris revealed that the insurgents were
judicial colleague,
to take on membership of the committee to
divided over what

position
once his amendment had
Ballinger-Pinchot controversy
M.
H.
to
Norris
Grimes, January 14, 1910.
been accepted. See
9. Norris to T. L. Porter, January 15, 1910; Norris to H. C. Miller,

investigate

the

January 18, 1910; Norris to

Hammond, February

4, 1910; Norris to

A. F.

Buechler, February 7, 1910.
10. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session,

March

15, 1910, pp. 3221-22.
11. Congressional Record,

March

Sixty-first

Congress, Second Session,

16, 1910, pp. 3250-51.

12. Detroit

News, March 20, 1910.

13. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress,

Second Session, March

17, 1910, p. 3290.
14. Ibid., p. 3285.

News, March 20, 1910; Washington Times, March 21, 1910;
Second Session, March 17, 1910,
Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress,
1910.
D.
to
Norris
19,
Cowden,
3292;
May
J.
p.
16. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, March
15. Detroit

17, 1910, pp. 3292, 3294.
17. Ibid., p. 3294.
18. Z&ii., p. 3307.

19.

Chicago Daily Tribune, March

19, 1910;

Brooklyn Eagle, March 19,

1910.

Daily Tribune, March 19, 1910; Congressional Record,
Congress, Second Session, March 17, 1910, pp. 3320-21.
21. Detroit News, March 20, 1910.
22. After the House had been in session thirteen and one-half hours,
20. Chicago

Sixty-first

James Tawney of Minnesota, one of the Speaker's lieutenants, tried for the
last time to secure a recess. The House remained in continuous session for
another twelve and one-half hours.
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25. Brooklyn Eagle, March 19, 1910.
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March 20, 1910.
28.

New York Evening Telegram, March
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29. Ibid.
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New

York Evening Telegram, March

18,

1910;

Brooklyn Eagle,

19, 1910.

31. New York Evening Telegram, March 18, 1910; Washington Herald,
March 20, 1910; Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Ses
sion, March 18, 1910, pp. 3415-16.
32. New York Evening Telegram, March 18, 1910.
33. Detroit News, March 19, 1910; Washington Herald, March 20, 1910;

Kenneth W. Hechler, Insurgency (New York, 1940), p. 70.
34. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second
18, 1910, pp.

Session,

March

3416-17.

35. Chicago

Sunday Tribune, March 20, 1910. Since the House did not
were

adjourn until late in the afternoon o March 18, these proceedings
included in the Journal of March 17, 1910.

36. Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 20, 1910. Taft, on a speaking tour,
heard of the events in the House in Erie, Pennsylvania, on March 18.

first

to return to Washington to save the regular organization
from defeat, the president, unmoved by these requests and apparently
convinced that he could do nothing if he returned, continued his speak

Though urged

Letters of
ing trip. See, Archie Butt, Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate
Archie Butt (Garden City, New York, 1930), Vol. I, pp. 306-08.
37. Congressional Record, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, March
19, 1910, pp. 3426-28; Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 20, 1910.
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Sixty-first Congress,
41. Ibid., pp. 3435-36.
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probably before the House convened at noon on March 19, 1910.
3. Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 20, 1910; Congressional Record,
3438.
Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, March 19, 1910, p.
4.

Congressional Record,

Sixty-first

Congress, Second Session,

March
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Brown, Norris, 114, 192, 238, 243,
247, 248, 267-68, 277
Bryan, William Jennings, 52, 57-58,
61, 90, 92, 130-31, 134, 136, 222,

263-64

ris*

Cannonism, 144, 145; endorsement
of Norris' attacks on, 191-92;
Norris' speeches on, 155, 193
Castle, Lorinda (Norris), 6
Caucus control, 224-25, 226
Census amendment, 169-70, 171
Cheney, L. H., 86
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rail
road, 104-06
Civil Service, 88-89
Civil War, 2-3

Clark, Champ, 124-25, 148, 177,
178, 247; as Speaker, 208, 226

Coffee trust, 212-15, 223
Committee assignments, 84-85, 87,
114, 120, 161-64, 209

337

INDEX

338

Committee on Election of President,
Vice-President and Representa
tives, 87, 120
Committee on Labor, 120
Committee on Public Lands and
Buildings, 84-85, 87, 120
Committee on Rules, 126-27, 170-

79
Conference of Progressive Republi
cans,

221

Cooper, Henry Allen, 172
Corrick, F. P., 237, 242, 243, 244,
250, 259, 263
Crescent Literary Society, 8
170
Crumpacker, Edgar D., 169,

DaHman, James

C., 194,

Dalzell, John, 171, 177
Davis, John W., 269

Delaware, Lackawanna-

268

& Western

Democratic party: and relation to
weaknesses in 1904,
Populists, 27;
90; mentioned passim
Devanter, Willis Van. See Van Devanter, Willis
Dietrich, C. H., 61, 64-65, 84, 91;

and campaign of 1902, 72-74, 78
Tariff,

of,

11-

Gardner, Augustus P., 167, 172, 177
Glavis, Louis R., 158, 160-61

Grand Island
84-85, 94

federal building,

70,

Grimes, H. M., 67
Gronna, Asle J., 208
Harrington, H. H., 11
Harrison, Frank A., 240, 244, 248
Henry, Robert Lee, 225
Hepburn, William P., 137, 139, 142,

143

James J., 105
Hinshaw, E. H., 136
Hitchcock, 195
Holcomb, Silas A., 30-31, 52, 55
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 46-47
H.R. 417, 127, 308
H.R. 502, 170-79; amendment to,
177-79
H.R. 551, 142-43
House rules. See Rules, House of
Hill,

Railroad, 271

Dingley

Furnas County, description
13
Fusion, 30, 51, 52-53, 91-92

Representatives

Howell, R. B., 239, 247, 266

103

Direct election of senators, 210

Discharge Calendar, 187
District judge: Norn's and office of,
31-36; Norris re-elected as, 55-

Immigration, 231
Initiative, referendum, recall, 211
Interparliamentary Union, 98-100
Irrigation, 72-73, 157

58
Jones,

Election results: 1890, 28; 1892, 29;
1894, 30-31; 1895, 34-36, 56-57,
71; 1896, 52; 1898, 53-54; 1899,
55; 1902, 77; 1904, 92-93; 1906,

Wesley L., 88, 159
197-99

Judiciary,

Epperson, Ambrose, 259, 263

Kelley, J. E., 69
Kennedy, John L., 257-58, 266, 267
Kenyon, William S., 208
Kinkaid, M. P., 136, 299-300
Kinkaid Act, 98, 299-300

Farm

La

1908, 136;
1912, 267-68

114;

credit,

1910,

195-96;

233-34

Filkins, Stanley E., 23
First National Bank of Falls City, 21,

22

Bank of Rulo, 17-18
Formation of separate party, 252First National

55,258

Follette, Robert M.: and cam
paign tours (1912), 246; candi
dacy and support of (1912), 21617, 218, 221-22, 236, 238-39,
240, 242, 244; and primary re
sults (1912), 245; and Roosevelt,
235, 237, 239-40, 241, 244, 255;

INDEX
sentiment for and against (1912),
238, 240; mentioned passim
La Follette League (formerly Pro
gressive League), 237, 240, 242,

Mook, Mary Magdalene. See

43-

Norris,

Norris* interest in, 5; Norris'

Morehead, John H., 267, 268
W. S., 61, 104; and election
of 1902, 66-69; and Norris .rise,
28-29

29-

Mortgage-loan business, 1418, 19,

distribution,

98

Lashley, David H., 18
Lashley, Pluma. See Norris,

Law:

Mill (Beaver Creek), 18, 24-25,
45, 79-80
Miller (Attorney), 56

Mary Mook

243

Land

339

Morlan,

Pluma

practice of, 9, 11, 14, 23-24,
30; Norris receives degree in,

89

7

21-24

Lenroot, Irvine, 224

Mount Carmel

Leonard, Ella. See Norris, Ella
Lewis, David J., 230
Lincoln, Nebraska, 10

Murdock, Victor, 195, 224

issue, 156, 194,

Progressive
Republican
League, 201
Nelson, John M., 167, 207-08
Norris, Chauncey, 2, 3, 279

8,

82-

Norris, Clara,

McCaD, Samuel W., 185

Norris,

McCarl,

Norris,

111-12, 118, 119,
129, 133, 134, 135-36, 218-19,
235, 243, 244-45, 246, 248, 255,
257, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265-66
R., 95,

McClure, John

T., 13;

and election

and election of 1895,
31, 32, 33; and election of 1899,
55-57, 58
of 1890, 28;

McCook, Nebraska,
58-59

description of,

McKinley, William, 42
Madison, Edmund H., 160, 167, 198,
224, 234, 314

Thomas J., 30-31
Manderson, Charles F., 85, 104-05,
106
Majors,

R.,

141-42, 186, 208,

Mann-Elkins Act, 186-87, 271
Marian Coal Company, 270-71
Mauck, H. H., 91, 92
Merwin, Fletcher .W., 13, 66-67, 69,
77, 81; as Norris' secretary, 85;

resignation as secretary,

Mickey, John H., 71, 77
Miles, J. H., 17-18, 21, 22

139-40

Norris,
Norris,

Norris,

5-6, 63-64
Gertrude, 63, 64, 139-40
Hazel, 38, 40, 64
John Henry, 2-3, 279
Marian, 38, 40, 64
Mary Mook, 2, 3-5, 9, 38-

Emma,

39,60
Norris, Pluma, 18-19, 38, 40,

63

Norris Block, 25-26, 43

Odd Fellows, 41

,

Orchestra Hall, 252-53, 254
Orr, R. C., 86

McCook land office, 94-95
McCumber Act, 123, 303

Mann, James
224

5-6

Norris, Ella, 66, 82, 83,
Norris,

J.

5

National

223

Liquor
Long School district, 67
Loomis, N. H., 231-32
L.U.N. (Loyal United Nine),
83

district school,

9596

Pacifism, 154
Palmer (Editor), 113
Panama Canal, 274

Parcel

post

system,

145,

201-02,

230-31
Parker, Alton B., 90, 93, 136
Parker, Isaac, 4, 38
Patents, 273-74

Patronage, 161-64
Payne, Sereno, 148, 149, 182

Payne-Aldrich tariff,
226, 227, 318
Pensions, 123

148-52,

214,

Philippine tariff, 101-03, 111, 301
Pinchot, Gifford, 158-59, 160-62,

314
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340

Poindexter, Miles, 208
Polk, James K. (Norris' assistant),

119-20

road

regulation,

Populist party: demise in Nebraska,

tioned, 61, 78, 131, 136, 144,

90; and Norris' election, 55; prom
inence of, 27-28; rise of, 26
Postal issues, 72, 73-74, 122-23,

93,

145, 156, 201-02, 228-30,

230-

31
"Progressive," use of term, 168,

207-

08

movement: height of
(1906), 114, 118; mentioned pas

Progressive

sim
Progressive party, 258-61, 264-65,

267-68
Prosecuting attorney, Norris and of
fice of, 28,

Railroad

senti

men
192-

and passim

Rosewater, Victor, 217, 237,

252,

256-58
Rules, House

of Representatives: at
tacks against, 223-26; attempts to

change, 126-27, 140-44, 145-48,
170-79, 199, 209-10; conflicting
criticisms
interpretations of, 200;
of,

100, 126, 131-32

Rules changes, 208; effects and re
sults of, 182-84, 187-88, 200
Rural postal routes, 72, 73-74

Russo-Japanese War, 98-100

29-30

regulation,

186-

103-07,

231-32
Rainbow Lake (Wisconsin),
83
Real estate, 24-26, 42
87,

8,

82-

Sandusky County, Ohio, description
of, 1-2
Savage, Ezra P., 71
Shafer, George, 17, 44, 79
Shallenberger, A. C., 32, 61, 70, 114,
130-31, 247, 261, 262-63, 268;
and campaign of 1902, 72-73, 74,

Reclamation Act, 157

"Reed rules," 141, 308
Republican party: and election of
1900, 61-62; and fusionists, 5253; and populists ideas, 90; and
Populists, 27-28; tensions in, 108;

mentioned passim
Republican party organization, Nor
ris'
independence of, 138
Republican platform (1912), 252,

258

75-77, 293, 294
Sheldon, George L., 114, 135
Sherman Antitrust Act, 214,

8889; and

election

of

1904, 90, 92; and election results
(1912), 267-68; and La Follette,
239-40, 241; and Norris, 102-03,
107-08, 116, 246-47; and Philip
pine tariff, 102-03, 301; and pri
mary results (1912), 245, 247;
and progressives, 217, 235, 25253, 254, 257, 259-60; and rail

215,

272-73
Slavery, attitudes toward,
Smith, Walter L, 198

2

Snow, Church & Company, 23-24
Speaker of the House, power of, 225,
318. See also Cannon, Joseph G.;
Rules,

Republican State Central Commit
tee, 130
Rhodes, J. EL, 9
Roosevelt, Theodore: and campaign
of
262;
(1912),
candidacy
(1912), 236-37, 251; and Civil
Service,

and

10304;

Russo-Japanese War, 100;
ment for, 238, 239, 242;

Sugar
301

House

trust,

of Representatives
101-03, 111, 226-28,

Sutherland, Roderick D., 110, 111,
114, 195
Taft,

William

management

Howard:

campaign

(1912), 251; chances

of nomination

(1912), 251; and

election of 1912, 216, 218,

221-

22, 235, 237, 241-42, 245, 248,
260, 265, 267-68; and insurgents,

160-64; and Nebraska convention
(1912), 257-58; and Norris' can
didacy, 256; and separate party,
257; mentioned, 119, 129, 130-31,

INDEX
136, 144-45, 146, 158, 197, 198,

and passim
Tallman, W. W., 44-45
Tariffs, 145, 148-52, 226-28
Tawney, James A., 194
Teaching positions, 6-7, 9
Trusts. See Coffee trust; Payne-Aldrich tariff; Philippine tariff; Sher

man Antitrust Act;

Sugar trust

Underwood, Oscar, 211, 224

Valparaiso University (Northern In
diana Normal School and Business
Institute),

Wait, Addison, 264-65
Washington Territory, 9-10
Watson, George M., 271
Welty, D. T., 75; and campaign of
1896, 51; compared with Norris,
48-49; and election of 1895, 31,
32, 33, 34-36, 286; and election
of 1899, 55-56, 57, 58
White, J. L., 86
Williams, John Sharp, 297
Wilson, James, 219
Wilson, Woodrow, 209, 263-64, 267,
268, 275

Woman suffrage, 156
Works, John D., 208
Worthington, A. S., 270

7-8

Van Devanter,

Willis, 197,

198

Yeiser,

John O., 236, 238-39, 240
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